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The importance of the remand decision cannot be overstated as by definition it deals 
with, in the main, legally innocent people. On the one hand, a remand in custody 
can adversely affect the defendants private life and preparation for trial and may 
result in an increased likelihood of conviction and receiving a custodial sentence and, 
on the other, a remand on bail may result in further offences being committed. 
This study is a comprehensive analysis of the remand process in magistrates' courts 
in England and Wales as it operated in the early 1990s. The thesis provides an 
extensive analysis of the law relating to bail as well as a detailed picture of its 
operation in three South Wales magistrates' courts through the use of four data 
collection methods (observations of remand hearings, an examination of court 
registers and questionnaires and follow-up interviews with participants). Both 
national statistics and previous research studies are used to assess the impact of 
changes which have been made both to the law and policy on bail. 
The findings of the research suggest that the law and policy relating to remand and 
the operation of the remand process have conflicting aims. However, the dominant 
principles of its operation are those of crime control. The findings also suggest that 
the majority of remand decisions are not judicial decisions but are taken executively 
by other participants in the process (predominantly the prosecution). However, these 
executive decisions are tempered by the culture of the court in which the participant 
operates and it is this that explains the variation in court practice and decision 
making found in the study. 
The focus of concern of participants was the inconsistent and inappropriate 
application of the law on bail which they perceived to be a product of the system of 
lay magistrates. On the whole, they were uncritical of the law on bail. This was 
exemplified by the problem of offending on bail which many participants believed 
could be tackled under the existing exception to the right to bail of 'risk of further 















Chapter 8 Policy Initiatives Relating to Bail
Chapter 9 Operational Issues in the Remand Process
Chapter 10 Bail or Jail? The Decision Revisited
Appendices
References and Bibliography
Bail or Jail? An Introduction
The Law and Policy Developments on Bail
The Remand Process in Context: Theoretical 
and Operational Perspectives
The Remand Decisions 
Influences on the Decision
Participants' Perspectives on the Decision 
Making Process




















I would like to thank my supervisors, A. Keith Bottomley, Rob East and Helen 
Power for their interest, guidence and ideas during the research process and their 
invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this thesis. I am grateful to the Department 
of Law and Finance and the Research Committee at the University of Glamorgan for 
their financial support which permitted me to undertake this PhD.
I would also like to thank all those who participated in the research who have to 
remain anonymous but without whom the completion of this thesis in this form 
would have been impossible.
I am grateful to collegues at the University of Glamorgan who helped to tackle the 
numerous problems encountered during the research. Space does not allow for each 
to be mentioned individually but I would especially like to mention Dave Hillier for 
his unending enthusiasm and encouragement, Elaine, Glendys, Michelle and Emma 
for answering all those wordprocessing queries, Geraint Raynes for overcoming 
computer hardware and printing problems and Ray Kingdom for his knowledge of 
SPSSx. Thanks also go to Carol Bretman who diligently transcribed the interviews.
My thanks also go to Lois Bibbings, Petra Wilson, Sue Evans and Ruth Costigan 
who have listened to my moaning and who inspired me to carry on.




BAIL OR JAIL: AN INTRODUCTION
If the concept of freedom is one of the fundamental criteria by which 
a society is judged, and the "refusal of bail represents one of the rare 
examples in peace time where a man[woman] can be kept in 
confinement without proper sentence following conviction after a 
trial", as a former Lord Chancellor had occasion to say in 1971, then 
[a] comprehensive ... work on the subject of bail would be of value 
at any tune. (Conner in Corre, 1990b:viii).
This study amis to provide a comprehensive analysis of the remand process in 
magistrates' courts hi England and Wales as it operated hi the early 1990s. The 
findings of the empirical research provide the most complete picture of the practical 
operation of the remand process in England and Wales for over a decade. The study 
also draws on both national statistics and previous research studies to assess the 
impact of changes which have been made to both the law and policy on bail as well 
as providing an extensive analysis of the law relating to bail.
The importance of the remand decision cannot be overstated as by definition it deals, 
in the main, with legally innocent people. As the Working Party (Home Office 1974) 
who reported into bail procedures in magistrates' courts prior to the Bail Act 1976 
stated:
The importance of the bail decision can hardly be exaggerated. It 
involves balancing the liberty of the individual who (in the case of 
remand before conviction) has been found guilty of no offence against 
the need to ensure that accused persons are duly brought to trial and 
the public protected. Quite apart from depriving him[her] of his[her] 
liberty, a remand hi custody may often have other harmful effects ... 
On the other hand, it is rightly a matter of serious concern if a person 
granted bail absconds or commits offences while on bail. (Home 
Office, 1974:17).
This tension between the rights of the individual and the protection of the public has 
been heightened by the recent concern over the issue of offending on bail. This is 
a concern which has resulted in both legal and policy developments which represent 
a major shift hi the focus and direction of the law and policy on bail, albeit for a 
small group of defendants. Since the 1960s the emphasis has been on reducing the 
number of defendants remanded in custody. However, the recent and proposed 
legislation will increase the likelihood that defendants who allegedly reoffend on bail
will be remanded in custody thus increasing the prison remand population. This 
policy contrasts sharply with the policy of the last three decades and mirrors much 
of the law and order rhetoric of the present Government and a general hardening of 
attitudes towards persons accused of criminal offences.
This first chapter will provide a general introduction to the remand process as well 
as to the research itself. Firstly, it will provide a definition of remand and will 
discuss the significance of the remand decision and some of the implications that it 
may have. Then, the aims and methodology of the present study will be addressed. 
Finally, several issues that may have particularly affected the study will be outlined.
Before these issues are addressed it is important to explain what the remand process 
is.
THE REMAND PROCESS: BAIL OR CUSTODY?
A defendant is remanded when a criminal court adjourns a case and either commits 
the accused person to custody (a remand hi custody) or releases him/her on bail (a 
remand on bail). The adjournment can take place at anytime during criminal 
proceedings including when a defendant is appealing against conviction or sentence. 
However, this study looked specifically at the remand process in magistrates' courts 
prior to the sentencing of the defendant. As a result, two groups of defendants were 
studied: those who were unconvicted and awaiting trial and those who were 
convicted and awaiting sentence. For the first group the issue of bail is perceived to 
be especially important as these defendants, according to English Law, are innocent 
until proven guilty. Consequently, hi short, the pre-trial remand decision deals with 
legally innocent people.
Defendants who are remanded in custody are committed either to a remand centre 
or to a remand wing in a local prison to await their next appearance at court which 
has traditionally been eight clear days, although in certain circumstances it can be
longer (see Chapter 2). Defendants who are remanded in custody are, therefore, 
deprived of their liberty. Defendants who are remanded on bail are released into the 
community to await their next appearance at court and are required to appear at that 
hearing. Additional requirements, or conditions, can be attached to a defendant's bail 
which may include, inter alia, residence, curfew, reporting to the police station and 
keeping away from prosecution witnesses.
A defendant under English law has a right to bail (Bail Act 1976). This means that 
unless certain circumstances apply a person must be released on unconditional bail. 
In all remand hearings there is, therefore, a presumption in favour of bail. The 
exceptions to the right to bail are spelt out in Sch.l, part 1 of the Bail Act 1976. If 
the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if released 
on bail the defendant would:
fail to surrender to custody;
commit an offence on bail; or
interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, 
then bail can be denied.
It must be stressed that the remand decision is based on an assessment of risk and 
is consequently about a 'balance of probabilities'. This partly reflects the fact that 
the magistrates or the judge are making a prediction of future behaviour. Will the 
defendant turn up for his/her trial? Is the defendant likely to commit further offences 
while on bail? Will the defendant interfere with witnesses? There are no certain 
answers, only predictions which are usually based on the past behaviour and 
circumstances of the defendant, which is necessarily a crude method of prediction.
The police also have the power to make a bail/detention decision when a person has 
been arrested on suspicion of committing a criminal offence. The specific 
circumstances are set out more fully in Chapter 3, but a brief mention of them 
should be made here for definitional purposes. When a defendant is charged with an 
offence by the police the police can either release a defendant on bail to appear at 
a magistrates' court on a specific date or they can detain them in custody until the
first available magistrates' court sitting. This decision is not part of the remit of this 
study but it does impact on the court remand decision and so is discussed in Chapter 
3.
Before outlining the reasons for the importance of the remand decision it is useful 
to spell out the advantages of remanding a defendant either on bail or in custody.
There are several advantages to a defendant being remanded in custody. Firstly, if 
a defendant is remanded in custody it guarantees that s/he will appear at court for 
trial. However, as discussed later in the Chapter, the prevalence of non-production 
of defendants means that this is not always the case. Secondly, and probably most 
importantly, prison has an incapacitation effect, meaning quite simply that it prevents 
defendants from committing further offences hi the community. Thirdly, a remand 
prisoner cannot interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice 
although there is little to stop him/her asking or employing someone else to do it for 
them. Fourthly, it is argued by some that defendants remanded in custody are more 
likely to confess to the crime and perhaps even to others. Fifthly, although strictly 
illegal (see Chapter 2), a remand in custody may be used for punitive reasons - hi 
other words, it may provide a form of punishment of the defendant pre-trial. Given 
that s/he may eventually be acquitted or receive a non-custodial sentence, the court 
may wish to teach the defendant a lesson or simply provide a short sharp shock to 
the defendant in the hope of deterring further offending. Sixthly, a remand in 
custody may provide protection for the defendant as hi some cases the victim or 
his/her relatives and friends or the defendant's co-accused may attempt to cause 
harm to the defendant. Finally, some people argue that a more thorough examination 
of the defendant can be undertaken hi prison for the preparation and completion of 
social, medical or psychiatric reports for the courts.
On the other hand, there are also advantages to a defendant being released on bail. 
Firstly, defendants released on bail have a chance to prove their trustworthiness (as 
they can demonstrate that they will appear at their trial, not commit further offences 
or attempt to interfere with the course of justice) which may well affect subsequent
remand decisions and the eventual outcome of the case. One major obstacle for those 
who are remanded in custody on their first appearance is that they never get the 
chance to prove their trustworthiness. Secondly, defendants released on bail have 
better opportunities to prepare their case. They can see their solicitor (subject to 
his/her availability) when necessary, whereas defendants in custody must wait for 
them to visit the prison and also put pressure on them to deal with the case. They 
can also attempt to find and speak to potential witnesses and generally look for 
evidence to support their case. Finally, defendants on bail can maintain their 
community ties including their family ties, accommodation and employment or, if 
unemployed, can continue to look for work.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF REMAND DECISIONS 
The presumption of innocence
A large majority of people remanded by the courts are remanded before they have 
been convicted of a criminal offence. As has already been stressed, this means that 
these defendants are innocent. According to democratic principles, no person, not 
even the state, has the right to deprive an innocent individual of their liberty without 
just cause. As Lord Hailsham stated, refusal of bail is:
... the only example, in peace time, where a man can be kept in 
confinement without a proper sentence following conviction after a 
proper trial. It is, therefore, the solitary exception to the Magna 
Carta. (quoted in Cavadino and Gibson, 1993:69).
Nevertheless, most people would agree that there is a need to detain some defendants 
pre-trial, for the greater good of society as a whole, for the protection of the public. 
However, their numbers should be kept to an absolute minimum.
The impact on pleas
There is some evidence, albeit somewhat dated, that a defendant who is remanded
in custody is more likely to plead guilty to the offence. An early Home Office study 
(1960) found that of those committed for trial in custody 82 per cent pleaded guilty 
while only 71 per cent of those remanded on bail pleaded guilty. Bottomley (1970) 
found similar results, with 39 per cent of those committed for trial in custody 
pleading not guilty compared to 64 per cent who were committed on bail. 
Unfortunately, there are no up-to-date figures on this particular stage of the case.
One possible explanation for these findings is that defendants choose to plead guilty 
in order to get the case completed in the shortest possible time. This seems more 
likely to be the case if a defendant is kept in overcrowded conditions in prison. 
However, further research needs to be undertaken in this area to validate this view.
The impact on acquittal
Evidence suggests that defendants who are remanded on bail are more likely to be 
acquitted of the offence with which they were charged. A positive causal connection 
cannot be established, of course, as it is possible that other, unmeasured or 
intervening factors, may produce the correlation.
The Criminal Statistics 1992 (Home Office 1993a) indicate that of those defendants 
remanded in custody and dealt with at magistrates' court, 21 per cent were acquitted 
whereas of those remanded on bail 31 per cent were acquitted. A similar picture 
emerges for those committed for trial at the Crown Court. Of those defendants 
committed in custody only 9 per cent were acquitted, whereas 23 per cent of those 
committed on bail were acquitted. This correlation has been apparent since the 
statistics were first published in the 1982 Criminal Statistics (Home Office 1983a).
One possible explanation put forward for this disparity is the difficulty of preparing 
a case to present at trial when a defendant is remanded in custody. Solicitors are less 
amenable to making prison visits than they are to defendants visiting them at their 
offices, partly because of the time involved. A solicitor, like anyone else, is unlikely 
to go looking for potential evidence or witnesses or, indeed, put as much effort into
the search and even if they do they may not be able to identify them. Although most 
defendants are now represented (see Chapter 3), the quality of the service solicitors 
provide may not be of the highest standard, especially if they are paid fixed legal aid 
rates.
Impact on the sentence passed
Evidence suggests that there is an association between whether or not a defendant 
is remanded in custody and the final disposal of the case. Again it is impossible to 
say that there is a direct causal link as other factors such as the seriousness of the 
offence may affect the decision. However, defendants who are remanded in custody 
are more likely to receive a custodial sentence than those that are released on bail. 
The 1992 Criminal Statistics (Home Office 1993a) show that 40 per cent of those 
remanded in custody but only 8 per cent of those released on bail received a 
custodial sentence when dealt with in the magistrates' court. A similar picture can 
be seen for those committed to Crown Court for trial where 69 per cent of those 
committed in custody and 27 per cent of those committed on bail were sentenced to 
immediate imprisonment.
Two research studies have also suggested that there is an association between 
remand status and the likelihood of receiving a custodial sentence. A study quoted 
by Cavadino and Dignan (1993) found that even when the gravity of the offence was 
similar, there was a much greater likelihood of the defendant being sentenced to 
immediate custody when they had been remanded in custody than when on bail 
(Brown 1990 see Cavadino and Gibson, 1993:70). Hedderman's (1991) study 
covered 619 offenders sentenced in the Crown Court. She found that being remanded 
in custody was an important predictor of receiving a custodial sentence even when 
other predictive factors were taken into account.
The effect of detention on the prisoner's private life
If a defendant is remanded in custody this can have a devastating effect on his/her
private life. It is possible that the defendant may lose his/her job as employers are 
unlikely to keep the position open for any length of time, especially for an employee 
charged with a criminal offence. This is likely to have significant economic effects 
as well as jeopardising any future employment prospects. If the defendant is 
unemployed, detention in prison will make job-seeking impossible which results in 
the defendant being debarred from claiming social security benefits. Not only will 
this have economic consequences which may affect dependants but it will also cause 
problems with the partner of the defendant having to claim social security benefits.
Furthermore, partly because of the economic consequences of a remand in custody, 
the defendant and possibly his/her family may be at risk of losing their home as 
landlords are unlikely to keep accommodation available when no rent can be paid, 
or the defendant may go into arrears on his/her mortgage. Furthermore, they may 
get into difficulty with other payments such as hire purchase agreements.
Several studies cited by Cavadino and Gibson (1993) provide evidence of the impact 
of pre-trial detention on a defendant. Morgan (1986), who studied remand prisoners 
in Winson Green prison, described a typical remand prisoner as financially insecure 
and as having no accommodation to go to upon release. Prisoners were increasingly 
concerned about their employment prospects. Relationships with partners and family 
had deteriorated. Eating and sleeping patterns were disrupted. Remand prisoners 
were also concerned about the problems of preparing for their trial, which included 
seeing their solicitor.
Hammond (1988), who conducted a similar study in the same prison, found that 
prisoners experienced numerous difficulties: increasing financial problems; 
deterioration in relationships with partners which sometimes resulted in the complete 
breakdown of the relationship; difficulties in preparing their case including meeting 
with their solicitor and disrupted sleeping and eating as well as health problems.
Williams et al (1987) found these problems but also identified problems with 
depression and loneliness. Sixty four per cent of prisoners said they suffered from
depression and 41 per cent from loneliness.
Consequently, it is not surprising that remand prisoners have a higher rate of suicide 
than sentenced prisoners, especially with the uncertainty and worry over the outcome 
of the trial. Between 1988 and 1992, 47 per cent (102 out of 218) of prisoners who 
took their own lives were on remand (Cavadino and Gibson 1993). Liebling and 
Krarup (1993) found that 40 per cent of the 305 reported suicides or attempted 
suicides in their study were by remand prisoners. This figure is substantially above 
the proportion of remand prisoners in the prison population which stands at 
approximately a fifth (see Liebling and Ward 1994).
The effect on the defendant's partner or family
It has already been noted that the financial consequences of a defendant being 
remanded in custody can also affect the partner and family of the defendant. In 
addition, the partner also has to find the money and the time to visit the defendant 
in prison where the visiting facilities are inadequate (see the Woolf Report 1991).
The emotional problems cited above especially problems with a relationship, are also 
likely to affect the family. The partner may have to deal with problems experienced 
by children which are related to the defendant's absence from home. Moreover, 
there is also a possibility, especially with single parents, that children will either 
have to stay with relatives or friends or be taken into the care of the local authority.
The effect on the prison remand population
Those defendants remanded in custody by the courts are detained in prison 
establishments and also more recently in police cells. Consequently, the number of 
defendants remanded in custody by the courts affects the prison remand population. 
The use of police cells for holding remand prisoners reflects the fact that the prison 
remand population is larger than the available space in which to house them.
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The effect of the court remand decision on the prison remand population is important 
partly because of the economic cost of keeping a defendant in custody but mainly 
because of the conditions in which remand prisoners are detained.
The detention of defendants on remand is important for two reasons. On 
humanitarian grounds, it should be remembered that the majority of these prisoners 
are unconvicted and a remand in custody is not supposed to be a punishment. 
Secondly, the conditions in which prisoners are held were described by Woolf 
(1991) as a major contributing factor to control problems within prisons. Remand 
prisoners are known to be more unstable than the sentenced prison population, 
mainly because of the uncertainty that exists about then- future. Consequently, as was 
shown in the prison disturbances hi 1990 (see Woolf 1991), remand prisoners are 
volatile and can sometimes cause major control problems within the prison system.
The condition of British prisons is well documented elsewhere (see Cavadino and 
Dignan 1992, Stern 1987, Morgan 1994). The picture which emerges is one in 
which remand prisoners are kept hi some of the worst conditions in the prison 
system. This is despite the fact that remand prisoners, because of their unconvicted 
status, have privileges which other convicted prisoners do not have, for example, 
more frequent visits and more flexible rules about what can be brought in for them 
by family and friends. Remand prisoners are kept either in remand centres or 
remand wings in local prisons which have some of the worst overcrowding problems 
hi the whole prison system, which gives rise to the intolerable conditions of cell 
sharing, slopping out and being locked hi their cells for long periods (which have 
been up to 23 hours a day). Lord Windlesham, former chairperson of the Parole 
Board, said:
... the detainee gets up at the same time as the convict, [s]he goes to 
bed at the same tune, [s]he takes exercise (one hour in 24) in the 
same place, [s]he eats at the same tune, is subject to the same 
discipline and the same loss of privacy, enduring the same humiliating 
sanitation, the noise and the overcrowded cells. In some respects 
his [her] plight is even worse than prisoners convicted of the most 
serious offences, for [s]he is often held hi local prisons where 
overcrowding in most acute ... the opportunities for work and 
training have gradually reduced hi the interests of economy until now
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they are virtually non existent. Above all, the detainee is subject to 
uncertainty; [s]he cannot plan ahead, or make friends, or settle down 
to serving a finite term of imprisonment. (Cavadino and Gibson, 
1993:71).
Furthermore,
The direct result of the inadequate regime activities was that many 
prisoners routinely spent practically the whole day locked in then- 
cells. Prisoners alleged, and it was confirmed by prison officers and 
governor grade staff, that out of cell time during a 24 hour period 
was on occasion as little as one to two hours and frequently less than 
four ... the position of unconvicted prisoners as regards regime 
activities tended to be even less favourable than that of the convicted 
prisoners. (Council of Europe, 1991:para.56).
Remand prisoners played a prominent part in the prison riots of 1990. Five of the 
six most serious disturbances were in remand establishments and remand prisoners 
played a leading or contributory part in all of the disturbances. The Woolf Report 
(1991) stresses the conditions and regimes under which remand prisoners are kept: 
overcrowded conditions with two or three sharing a cell in which they were locked 
for long periods; poor recreational and educational facilities and very few 
opportunities for work - all were contributory causes of the "injustice" that resulted 
in the disturbances. Lord Justice Woolf concluded:
[Remand prisoners] are an unstable section of the prison population. 
This is connected with the conditions of their confinement. It is 
beyond dispute that in the majority of prison establishments holding 
remand inmates, the regime for these inmates is wholly 
unsatisfactory. Because they are not in prison as a punishment the 
regime for remands should be better than that for sentenced prisoners 
... Unhappily the position is often the reverse. Even where the regime 
for sentenced prisoners is far from satisfactory, the regime for 
unsentenced prisoners is still more impoverished. The explanation for 
this travesty of justice is partly that it is the natural inclination of the 
prison service to devote proportionately more of its resources to the 
inmates who are longest in custody. (Woolf, 1991:246).
Despite Woolf's damning criticism the situation remains largely unchanged as the 
Director General of the Prison Service stated in 1992:
Taken as a whole, however, the regime for unconvicted prisoners is 
in practice far from satisfactory, and often worse than that for [the] 
convicted ... the regime available for unconvicted prisoners at many
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local prisons and remand centres has been sparse and they have spent 
too many hours locked in their cells with little to occupy their time, 
(quoted in Cavadino and Gibson, 1993:74).
TRENDS IN THE USE OF REMANDS IN CUSTODY
The major impetus for change hi the remand process since the 1960s has been the 
need to decrease the number of defendants remanded in custody by the courts. 
However, this has always been tempered by the need to protect the public - a 
consideration that has become increasingly important in recent years. Reducing the 
prison population has been the focus of remand policies for two reasons: firstly, and 
most notably, to reduce the prison remand population; secondly, because of 
humanitarian concerns over the rights of defendants awaiting trial.
The prison remand population has increased dramatically during the 1980s and, at 
over a fifth of the total prison population, is the fastest growing section of the total. 
Its importance to any strategy to reduce the overall prison population is thus clear.
It is made up of two groups of defendants, those who are unconvicted and those that 
are convicted but unsentenced. The average prison remand population has increased 
substantially since the introduction of the Bail Act in 1978.
13
Table 1.1 Proportion of average population held on remand between 1979 and 



































































































Source: Fact Sheet No. 11, Howard League for Penal Reform (1992) and Prison 
Statistics England and Wales 1991 (Home Office, 1993b).
The average prison remand population grew steadily between 1979 and 1988 before 
falling slightly in 1989 and 1990. However, the figure rose again hi 1991 to 10,157. 
In 1992/93 the average number of remand prisoners increased from 9,460 to 10,000 
(Home Office 1993c). Cavadino and Gibson (1993) quote a figure of 10,632 on 30th 
June 1993. However, the apparently slow increase in the average population seems 
now to have started to increase significantly once again. The Prison Reform Trust 
suggests that the figure had risen to 12,100 by January 1994.
Not only is the average prison remand population increasing but it accounts for an 
increasing proportion of the total prison population. In 1976 remand prisoners 
accounted for 12 per cent of the total prison population, a figure which had 
increased to 22 per cent by 1991. In 1992/3 remand prisoners made up 22 per cent 
of the prison population which was 43,195 on March 31 1993 (Home Office 1993c). 
In fact, the prison remand population is the fastest growing sector of the prison 
population. Between 1975 and 1991 the total prison population rose by 22 per cent; 
the number of sentenced prisoners rose by only 12 per cent whereas remand
14
prisoners increased by 142 per cent. The increase was concentrated in the years 
1976 to 1987 (Morgan and Jones 1992).
In addition to these figures is the number of untried defendants remanded in custody 
who are kept in police cells - an average of 670 in 1991. This was an increase from 
1990 and 1989 when 447 and 103 prisoners respectively were kept in police cells but 
a decrease from the all time high of 978 in 1988 (Home Office 1993b)(these figures 
do not include convicted but unsentenced prisoners). However, these figures obscure 
large monthly disparities in the number of remand prisoners kept in police cells. For 
example, in 1991 when the average was 670, the lowest figure was 366 in April and 
the highest 1,040 in September.
Unconvicted Prisoners
The majority of the prison remand population is made up of unconvicted prisoners 
(approximately 80 per cent). Consequently, it is primarily trends in the unconvicted 
prison population that affect the overall average prison remand population. The 
trends in the average remand population for both males and female defendants can 
be seen in Table 1.2 (below). The average number of unconvicted remand prisoners 
held in prison establishments was provisionally put at 7,253 males and 291 females 
in 1991.
15































































































1991 figures are provisional.
Source: Table 2.2 Prison Statistics England and Wales 1991 (Home Office, 1993b).
The average population of both male and female unconvicted prisoners rose steadily 
between 1981 and 1989, before dropping slightly in 1990 and 1991. However, 
females made up only 3.8 per cent of the total average prison remand population in 
1991 and therefore only account for a small proportion of the increase hi the average 
prison remand population. Consequently, it is increases in the number of 
unconvicted male prisoners which account for the largest part of the prison remand 
population. Nevertheless, the small number of female remand prisoners cause further 
problems. There are only six prison establishments which hold female remand 
prisoners and as a consequence they are likely to be remanded much further from 
home than their male counterparts, which causes additional problems with visits 
from friends, relatives and solicitors.
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Convicted Unsentenced Prisoners


































































1991 figures are provisional
Source: Table 2.2 Prison Statistics England and Wales 1991 (Home Office, 1993b).
The convicted unsentenced population in prison service establishments on 31 June 
1991 was 1,900 - about 20 per cent of the total average remand population (Home 
Office, 1993b). Table 1.3 shows that there was a steady decline in the average 
number of male and female unsentenced prisoners kept in prison establishments 
between 1981 and 1988, after which the number begins to increase to a figure of 
1,834 males and 96 females in 1991. Females again only make up a small proportion 
of the total number of unsentenced prisoners in prison establishments. The number 
of receptions of unsentenced prisoners also decreased in the early to mid eighties 
with the receptions of males falling from 22,398 in 1981 to 15,528 in 1986 and the 
receptions of females falling from 1,687 in 1981 to 1,056 in 1989. Receptions of 
both unsentenced males and females started to increase albeit from different dates 
(1987 and 1990 respectively) reaching 18,828 males and 1,099 females in 1991.
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Accounting for the Increase
The increase in the average prison remand population throughout the 1980s occurred 
despite a fall in the proportion of defendants remanded in custody from 14 per cent 
in 1981 to 10 per cent in 1992 (see Chapter 4). Some of the increase in the average 
remand population is explained by the steady increase in the number of receptions 
of remand prisoners into prison establishments throughout the 1980s, which reflects 
the increase hi the number of defendants remanded by the courts, which itself 
reflects a rising crime rate for the same period.
Table 1.4 Number proceeded against, proportion of those remanded and 
receptions into Prison Service Establishments of untried and convicted 











































































Sources: Table 2.7 Prison Statistics England and Wales 1991 (Home Office, 1993b), 
Table 2.7 Prison Statistics England and Wales 1989 (Home Office, 1990b), Table 
8.4 Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1992 (Home Office, 1993a) and Table 8.4 
Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1989 (Home Office, 1990a).
Although the trend in the number of remand prisoners received into prison 
establishments has been upward since 1979, it has fluctuated since mid 1975. As a 
result of the Bail Act 1976 and the Home Office circular which preceded it (see 
Chapter 2) which introduced the presumption in favour of bail, the remand
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population fell from 68,388 in 1975 to 52,581 in 1978. Thereafter, the number 
began to increase again to a high of 63,306 in 1987, decreasing between 1988 and 
1990 when it stood at 56,967 before rising again to 59,422 in 1991. Despite the fact 
that the number of receptions of remand prisoners into prison establishments is still 
lower than prior to the introduction of the Bail Act 1976 the trend hi the 1980s was 
still upward, a trend which accounts for some, but not all, of the increase hi the 
average prison population.
However, the major explanation for the increase hi the average prison remand 
population is the increase in the length of tune that defendants are awaiting trial.
Table 1.5 Tune awaiting trial
Year Average number of days hi custody
Untried Unsentenced 
























































1991 figures are provisional.
Source: Table 2.1 Prison Statistics England and Wales 1991 (Home Office, 1993b).
Table 1.5 shows that the average time spent awaiting trial for unconvicted defendants 
increased dramatically during the 1980s. For unconvicted male defendants the 
average tune spent awaiting trial in 1981 was 38 days; by 1986 this had increased 
to 56 days before falling back slightly to 51 days in 1991. A similar trend can be 
seen for unconvicted female prisoners who spent an average of 25 days awaiting trial 
in 1981, which had increased to 51 days in 1988 before decreasing to 40 days in
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1991. The slight decline in the average number of days in the late 1980s and early 
1990s is probably the result of the introduction of custody time limits which were 
introduced explicitly to reduce the time that defendants hi custody awaited trial and 
partly explains the decrease hi the average remand population hi 1990 and 1991 (see 
Chapter 2). Although delays hi magistrates' courts are partly to blame for the 
increase in tune awaiting trial the main cause has been an increase hi the number of 
persons committed to the Crown Court, which increased rapidly between 1982 when 
the number of persons committed was 87,000 and 1988 when the figure reached 
113,000 persons, before falling back to 94,400 in 1992 (Home Office 1993a). The 
decline since 1988 is partly a result of a reclassification of some offences from 
triable either way to summary only under the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
The number of defendants waiting for longer periods has also increased which again 
reflects the rise in the number of defendants being dealt with by the courts.
Table 1.6 Number of unconvicted prisoners: length of tune since first reception 





































































































Source: Table 2.3 Prison Statistics England and Wales 1991 (Home Office, 1993b).
Table 1.6 shows that there was an increase in the number of unconvicted defendants 
in all categories, except those who waited 12 months or over between 1981 and 
1988. All categories declined hi 1989 and 1990 before increasing again in 1991.
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These figures show that more defendants are in prison establishments awaiting trial 
for longer in 1990 than 1981. The Prison Reform Trust (1994) quotes figures for 
1993 which indicate that these figures have increased still further. On 31 December 
1993, 1,960 prisoners had been in custody for over 3 months and up to 6 months, 
1,020 for over 6 months and up to and including 12 months. One hundred and 
seventy prisoners had been in custody for 12 months and up to and including 18 
months while 190 prisoners had been waiting in custody for over 18 months.
Although not sufficiently numerous to have a dramatic effect on the overall prison 
remand population, the trends for unsentenced prisoners give a slightly different 
picture. For male unsentenced prisoners the average number of days awaiting 
sentence was relatively steady between 1981 and 1987 with the average length of 
stay being between 30 and 32 days. There was a sharp increase in 1988 and 1989 
to a high of 38 days before dropping back slightly in 1990 and 1991 to 36 days. For 
females awaiting sentence the trend was downwards between 1981, when they waited 
an average of 31 days, and 1988, when they waited 27 days on average. However, 
it rose again in 1989 to 32 days, decreasing in 1990 to 26 days before rising back 
to 32 days in 1991.
Future Prospects
Both the number of receptions and the average number of remand prisoners 
decreased in 1990. However, both these figures rose again in 1991 and evidence 
suggests that the upward trend is now continuing. As the Prison Reform Trust 
argues, "remand prisoners are again the 'engine of growth' for the number of people 
behind bars" (Prison Reform Trust, 1994:1).
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Source: Prison Reform Trust (1994).
Table 1.7 shows that between January 1993 and 1994 the number of remand 
prisoners increased by 30% from 9,281 to 12,100. This accounted for 53 per cent 
of the increase in the total prison population which rose from 41,561 to 46,902.
Summary
The prison remand population has continued to grow despite the increase in the 
proportion of defendants remanded on bail by the courts. This rise is partly 
explained by an increase in the number and proportion of defendants remanded by 
the courts which itself reflects an increase in the official level of crime. However, 
the major explanation is the increase in the length of time defendants wait for trial 
which the Government has attempted to reduce by the introduction of custody time 
limits.
Although a reduction of the prison population and concern over the consequences for
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the defendant of being remanded in custody have produced the main impetus for 
change over the last two and a half decades, there is now some evidence to suggest 
that there is a partial reversal of this policy, at least for certain offenders, most 
notably those that have allegedly offended on bail. In other words, policy 
increasingly looks to the consequences for society of releasing defendants on bail. 
Indeed, the Howard League (1994) cite this as the main contributor to the increase 
in the prison remand population in January 1994. They argue that recent legislation 
which has attempted to curb the problem of offending on bail is partly to blame. 
However, they maintain that the underlying cause is a sea change in political opinion 
which is partly a reflection of media concern over the problem. They state:
... magistrates must have been responding to the changed political 
climate, and to the misleading police, press and political clamour 
surrounding so called 'bail bandits'. (Prison Reform Trust, 1994:2).
OFFENDING ON BAIL
The focus of concern relating to defendants released on bail has been directed at the 
number of crimes allegedly committed by these defendants whilst on bail. This issue 
has become increasingly important since 1991 when two research studies (Avon and 
Somerset Police 1991, Northumbria Police 1991) argued that defendants on bail 
accounted for a substantial and increasing proportion of the total number of crimes 
committed. The Northumbria study (1991) also suggested that a small group of 'hard 
core' defendants, soon to become known as "bail bandits", were responsible for 
most of the problem. As a result, ACPO, with the help of the media, conducted a 
campaign for changes in the law which has to a large extent been successful in 
persuading the Government to take action. However, perhaps more significant than 
the actual changes to the law which have either already taken place or been proposed 
(see below), is the notable shift in the ethos surrounding the remand decision which 
has been moving away from releasing as many defendants as possible on bail to a 
tendency to remand defendants in custody. This shift, also detectable in other areas 
of law and order policy, has occurred under a Home Secretary who is prepared to 
find prison places for as many people as the courts wish to send. Indeed, if the
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statistics and explanation quoted by the Prison Reform Trust (1994) above are 
correct this radical reversal of policy seems already to have reached the courts and 
has resulted in an increase in the number of defendants remanded in custody.
Empirical Evidence
As indicated above, concern over the prevalence of offending on bail was fuelled by 
the publication of two research reports by two police forces (Avon and Somerset 
1991 and Northumbria 1991) which suggested that the incidence of offending on bail 
was a major problem which was increasing. Both Reports suggested that since 
defendants on bail made a major contribution to the crime rate, if they were 
remanded in custody, it would decrease. However, other evidence suggests that 
although there is a problem and a substantial amount of crime is committed by 
defendants on bail, its incidence has not increased over the last 15 years.
The Avon and Somerset (1991) research collected data from three sources. Firstly, 
every detective constable and every detective sergeant in the force was required to 
fill in a questionnaire relating to their two most recent arrests. The second source 
of data was collected from custody officers who were asked to fill in details of cases 
which they dealt with in the custody suites. Thirdly, court records were scrutinised 
for two one-week periods to ascertain the number of defendants appearing for the 
first time in magistrates' court who were remanded on bail. All three of these 
methods measured the number of defendants arrested for a further offence while on 
bail. The first method found an overall reoffending rate of 27 per cent. However, 
this varied significantly between sub-divisions, ranging from 0 -19 per cent to 27-39 
per cent. The custody survey found an overall rate much lower than the first with 
a 12 per cent reoffending rate. However, the court survey found that 28 per cent of 
defendants were on bail at the time of their arrest.
Not only did the incidence of offending on bail vary by area but also by type of 
offence. Defendants charged with vehicle related crime and burglary were the most
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likely to be rearrested while on bail for another offence. Furthermore, the age of the 
defendant was found to be significant. Those most likely to be rearrested for 
offending on bail were defendants between the ages of 17 and 20. According to their 
figures,
... [offenders between 17 and 20 years are twice as likely to commit 
an offence on bail than those aged 26 years and above. Almost one 
in two of offenders in the younger age group were on bail at the tune 
of arrest, compared to almost one in three of those aged 21 to 25 
years and one in five of those in the older age group. (Avon and 
Somerset 1991:13).
The study also found a correlation between the number of previous convictions of 
a defendant and the likelihood that they would be arrested for an offence while on 
bail. Therefore, they were able to profile the offender most likely to commit 
offences on bail. The two groups were: (i) offenders aged between 17 and 20 years 
with one or more previous convictions, particularly in the previous twelve months, 
arrested for theft, or theft of or from a motor vehicle or burglary; (ii) defendants 
aged 21 or over, with two or more previous convictions and arrested for wounding, 
assault or other offences involving violence which includes robbery. The Avon and 
Somerset research also found,
...a significant correlation between the level of crime and the 
reoffending rate. It is therefore possible to state that a high 're- 
offending' rate is likely to lead to a high overall level of crime. 
(Avon and Somerset, 1991:7).
The Northumbria study (1991) was retrospective and was based wholly on data 
collected from custody records, detected crime records, court files and records 
covering 1989. This study therefore used the number of defendants charged with an 
offence which had allegedly been committed on bail. Of those who were granted bail 
18 per cent were rearrested for another offence. The figure increased to 31 per cent 
in cases where bail was refused by the police but subsequently granted by the courts. 
However, the reoffending rate varied significantly by the type of offence, with 35 
per cent of those defendants given bail for offences of burglary being rearrested and 
41 per cent of all defendants given bail for motor vehicle offences being arrested on 
bail. Overall 23 per cent of all those arrested were on bail from a previous arrest.
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Again, those charged with property crime were significantly more likely to be on 
bail: 40 per cent for domestic burglary, 30 per cent other burglary, 32 per cent for 
theft from a motor vehicle and 37 per cent for theft of a motor vehicle or taking 
without consent.
The Northumbria study also linked the number of persons rearrested while on bail 
with detected crimes: 41 per cent of all detected crimes were committed by people 
already on bail for another offence. They found that the number of detected crimes 
committed by those on bail varied by offence and that property offences were more 
likely to be committed by defendants on bail (54 per cent of all offences of domestic 
burglary, 44 per cent of all offences of other burglary, 55 per cent of theft from 
motor vehicles and 45 per cent of all offences of theft of motor vehicles and taking 
without consent). They also argued that the figures suggested that a 'hard core' of 
offenders were responsible for a large amount of crime. They found that persons 
who admitted three or more crimes made up only 17 per cent of total offenders and 
were responsible for 75 per cent of all admissions.
The two studies and the high profile campaign by ACPO caught the attention of the 
press and resulted in extensive media coverage. For example:
More than half of detected house burglaries and thefts from cars are 
committed by people on bail for other offences. (The Guardian, 5 
September 1991).
Offences on bail rise by 77%. The number of people committing new 
offences while on bail rose by 77 per cent in a year hi one police 
force area. (The Independent, 26 October 1991).
As a result the Home Office Research and Planning Unit was commissioned to 
review the evidence of the incidence of offending on bail (Morgan 1992). Morgan 
(1992) concluded that:
It is clear that the rates of offending while on bail found hi the studies 
depend on the methodology adopted. (Morgan, 1992:iii).
Basically, Morgan (1992) argued that the methodology used led to the Avon and 
Somerset and Northumbria findings overestimating the problem of offending on bail.
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The Avon and Somerset study selected samples of those arrested for an offence 
which included defendants who were not actually charged with the alleged offences. 
The Northumbria study used a measure of defendants charged with offences which, 
by definition, would include cases where the defendant was cautioned or where no 
further action was taken. Both studies do not take any account of the fact that the 
defendants which make up the study may not be found guilty of the alleged offence 
which, Morgan (1992) argues, is the only appropriate measure of the incidence of 
offending on bail. For an offence to be committed on bail the defendant must be 
convicted of an offence committed on bail and arguably, of the original offence (see 
Hucklesby 1992). This can be argued from the fact that a defendant is innocent until 
proven guilty. The Avon and Somerset and Northumbria study, therefore, in effect 
dealt with alleged offending on bail, not the incidence of proven offending on bail.
The Home Office review included both the Avon and Somerset study and the 
Northumbria study as well as studies carried out by the Greater Manchester Police 
(1987 and 1988), the Metropolitan Police (Ennis and Nichols 1992) and two Home 
Office studies, one in 1978 (Home Office 1981c) and one in 1986/8 (Henderson and 
Nichols 1992). The studies are not fully comparable because of differences in the 
sampling of defendants, types of offences included, definitions of offending or 
conviction and the type of bail (court or police bail or both) used.
The review used three indicators of offending on bail: (i) the proportion of persons 
given bail who had committed offences whilst on bail, in other words, the number 
of defendants who commit offences on bail; (ii) the proportion of persons charged 
who were on bail when they were charged which measures the number of offences 
committed on bail and; (iii) the proportion of crime cleared up that was committed 
by persons on bail, a measure of the proportion of the crime rate accounted for by 
offences committed on bail. The three findings using the indicators show the 
necessity for an agreement about how to measure the rate of offending on bail.
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The proportion of persons given bail who committed offences whilst on bail
Table 1.8 Defendants on court bail who were convicted of offences while on 
bail.
Study Year Convicted of offence No. of
committed on bail defendants
Home Office 1978 9% 7,400
Home Office 1986/8 10% 1,225
Metropolitan
Police 1988 12% 1,534
Northumbria 1989 17% 1,806 
Source: Table 1 Morgan 1992.
Table 1.8 shows that the four studies which attempted to measure the rate of 
reoffending on bail using the number of defendants found varying levels of 
reoffending ranging from 9 to 17 per cent. Morgan (1992) argues that the higher 
figure (17 per cent) found by the Northumbria study can be explained by differences 
in definitions of 'convicted'. All four studies included defendants found guilty by the 
courts. However, the Home Office 1978 study (1981c) also included persons whose 
offences on bail were taken into consideration, whilst the Northumbria study 
included both offences on bail taken into consideration and those dealt with by 
formal caution, which increased the numbers significantly.
Differences in the measures used also account for the differences in the numbers 
quoted in the original studies and those used by Morgan. Basically, the Metropolitan 
study used numbers charged with offences which were allegedly committed on bail 
(18 per cent) which dropped to 12 per cent when the measure was changed to the 
number convicted. The Northumbria study used the number of defendants arrested
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who were on bail (22 per cent) of whom about three quarters were convicted, giving 
the figure of 17 per cent.
Both the Metropolitan Police study and the Home Office study (Morgan 1992) 
confirm the findings of the Avon and Somerset and Northumbria research studies 
that certain groups of offenders are more likely to commit offences on bail. They 
show that offending on bail is more prevalent by male defendants, aged 17 to 20, 
with previous convictions who are on bail for vehicle related crime or burglary.
The Northumbria study also raised the issue of multiple offending on bail. However, 
the evidence from other studies suggest that their results are exceptional. Both the 
Home Office study (Morgan 1992) and the Metropolitan Police study found that 
defendants who were convicted of an offence committed whilst on bail were 
convicted on an average of 1.3 occasions. Both studies found that only 0.7 per cent 
of defendants were convicted of three or more offences committed whilst on bail.
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The proportion of persons charged who were on bail when charged
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23
Metropolitan 1988 4538
Percentage of those charged who 
were on court bail when offence 
committed
16
Source: Table 3 Morgan 1992.
Table 1.9 indicates that the two Manchester studies and the Avon and Somerset 
study have broadly similar results for those defendants charged with an offence 
committed while on police or court bail, between 26 and 29 per cent. The 
Northumbria study which measured those arrested while either on court or police 
bail found a lower figure of 23 per cent while the Metropolitan study which sampled 
those charged with a further offence while on court bail only found a figure of 16 
per cent. However, the figures are affected by the type of offences included hi the 
classification and whether or not both police and court bail was included.
This indicator is likely to produce higher estimates of the rate of offending on bail
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for several reasons. Firstly, it measures the number of offences allegedly committed 
on bail not the offenders as hi the first indicator; as a result, offenders who commit 
more than one offence are likely to be counted twice. Secondly, the indicator is 
based on those arrested or charged. Some of those arrested will not be charged and 
some of those charged will not be convicted. In fact, the Metropolitan Police 
research suggested that only 60 per cent of those charged were convicted while the 
Northumbria research suggested that 75 per cent of those arrested were subsequently 
convicted. Furthermore, in all the studies, except the Metropolitan Police Study, the 
fact that a person was on bail when they were charged or arrested was taken to mean 
that they were on bail when they committed the offence which does not necessarily 
follow.
The proportion of crime cleared up attributed to persons on bail
Morgan (1992) argues that the rate of offences committed on bail as measured by 
all crimes detected varies significantly with the way in which crimes were detected. 
Of detected offences where a defendant was charged or summonsed and found 
guilty, 31 per cent were on bail at the time of the commission of the offence. The 
figure rises to 39 per cent for offences that were taken into consideration and 57 per 
cent when the offence was admitted by a person serving a custodial sentence, 
whereas, where a defendant was cautioned, only 7 per cent were accounted for by 
defendants already on bail. The fact that the findings are heavily skewed hi favour 
of offences where admissions were made seems partly to account for the findings. 
As Morgan (1992) concludes, "the implication is that police forces who make more 
use of prison admissions in clearing up crime will show higher proportions of 
detected crime committed while defendants were on bail." (Morgan, 1992:15).
Morgan (1992) concluded that the studies indicated that the proportion of defendants 
granted court bail who were found guilty of further offences committed whilst on 
bail was between 10 and 12 per cent - a rate similar to that found by the Home 
Office study in 1978 (Home Office 1981c), which suggests that the incidence had 
not increased despite a rise in the proportion of defendants granted bail. It was
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impossible to find out the true amount of crime committed by persons on bail as 
only about a third of crime is detected and if the people who commit the crime are 
not caught it is impossible to say whether or not they were on bail. However, simply 
because the number of defendants granted bail has increased, it follows that the 
incidence of crime committed on bail will also have increased:
Home Office statistics indicate that the number of persons granted 
bail by the courts increased from 350,000 in 1985 to 480,000 in 
1990, an increase of 130,000. If 10 to 12 per cent of these persons 
committed an offence while on bail, and committed 1.7 offences on 
average (a figure taken from the Home Office 1992), there would be 
an extra 22,000 to 26,500 offences committed while on bail. This 
represents 2 per cent of the total crimes cleared up in 1985. (Morgan, 
1992:18).
However, the contribution to the increasing rate of detected crime is in fact minimal. 
Although, the statistics indicate that offending on bail is a substantial problem, the 
Home Office figures suggest that between 88 and 90 per cent of defendants granted 
bail are not convicted of committing an offence whilst on bail. Even if the 
Northumbria figures are accurate, a substantial majority of offenders do not commit 
offences on bail.
Summary
It is generally agreed that there is a problem of defendants committing offences on 
bail. The Home Secretary has said that 50,000 known offences are committed by 
defendants on bail (Prison Reform Trust 1994). On the other hand, the Home Office 
research indicates that between 88 and 90 per cent of defendants granted bail do not 
commit offences whilst on bail and these figures have not increased since 1978.
The problem of offending on bail has attracted both political and media attention 
resulting in new and proposed legislation in an attempt to tackle the problem. In 
1992 the Government announced changes to combat the problem (see appendix 12) 
which included making it an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes if an offence
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had been committed on bail (now enshrined in Criminal Justice Act 1991 by s.66 of 
the 1993 Criminal Justice Act). This was followed by a Private Member's Bill (the 
Bail (Amendment) Bill 1992) (see appendix 13) which eventually received both 
Government and opposition support, albeit, in a reduced form and became the Bail 
(Amendment) Act 1993, which is due to come into force in June 1994. The Act 
provides the prosecution with a right of appeal against a magistrates' decision to 
grant bail for offences which are punishable by five or more years of imprisonment 
or for the offences of taking a vehicle without authority and aggravated vehicle 
taking (see Chapter 2).
The Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill (1993) also includes various powers 
which are arguably aimed at curbing the incidence of offending on bail. Clause 22 
removes the right to bail for murder, attempted murder, manslaughter, rape and 
attempted rape if a defendant has previously been charged or convicted with such an 
offence. Clause 23 overturns the presumption of bail for defendants charged with 
indictable or triable either way offences if they were allegedly committed on bail. 
It is argued that these measures will inevitably increase the number of defendants 
remanded in custody. These issues will be returned to in Chapter 10.
This legislation will inevitably, at least hi the short term, result in an increase in the 
number of defendants remanded in custody and thus in an increase in the prison 
population. The very fact that the legislation has been passed or considered indicates 
a radical reversal of policy in favour of remanding defendants in custody, whatever 
the consequences for the defendant or the prison population.
AIMS OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT
Despite the importance of the remand decision only limited evidence of how the 
decisions are made is available. This study is an attempt to rectify the lack of 
research on the remand process since the introduction of the Bail Act 1976. Prior 
to the Act, a relatively large amount of research had been undertaken on the
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practical operation of the remand process (for example, Bottomley 1970, King 
1971a) which had highlighted some major deficiencies in and problems with the 
remand process. Although some research was conducted into the effect of the Bail 
Act 1976 on the practical operation of the remand process (Cutts 1981) it was not 
on the same scale as that conducted prior to the Act. Furthermore, only one local 
research study (East and Doherty 1984, 1985) and one study which relied on official 
statistics (Jones 1985) have attempted to investigate remand decision making in the 
1980s. As a consequence there is no research study which has attempted to 
investigate the remand decision making process in the light of changes to the remand 
process and the criminal justice process during the mid to late 1980s and early 
1990s.
What is available are research studies which have concentrated on a particular aspect 
on the remand process for example, the Vera Institute reports in conjunction with 
the Probation Service into the operation of the Bail Information Schemes (Stone 
1988) and the reports cited above in relation to offending on bail. However, these 
provide only a partial account of the remand process and are often specifically linked 
to policy objectives which may have influenced the findings of the research.
Another factor contributing to the general lack of knowledge of how the remand 
process operates is the small amount and superficiality of official statistics on the use 
of bail by the courts. This is coupled with the unreliability of the available data 
which, at the Home Office's own admission, must be treated with extreme caution 
and treated as broad estimates only. Because of the problems related to data 
collection, very little reliable information is available on the operation of the remand 
process. For example, one reason why the police force studies into the incidence of 
offending on bail have been so influential is that no official statistics are collected 
on its incidence.
The major aim of the research project was, therefore, to understand how the remand 
procedure is currently operating in magistrates' courts. This would be achieved 
through an examination of the law on bail and its practical operation including a
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detailed investigation of the decision-making processes involved. 
The more specific aims were:
1. To analyse the impact on the remand process of legal and policy 
developments in the criminal justice system since 1976.
2. To examine the practical operation of the remand process in relation to the 
law on bail. In other words, to investigate the similarities and differences 
between the law and practice on bail.
3. To identify the factors and issues which affect the magistrates' remand 
decision and establish their relative importance to the remand decision.
4. To compare the operation of the remand process in different magistrates' 
courts in order to identify similarities and/or differences in court procedure.
METHODOLOGY
The Selection of the Magistrates' Courts
The study was carried out in South East Wales. Several courts were included in the 
sample to facilitate a comparison of the procedures adopted in different courts in 
relation to remand. A number of courts in the South East Wales area were visited 
to observe remand hearings and the three courts (hereafter Courts A, B and C) were 
selected on the following criteria:
1. the courts had to be relatively busy with a comparatively large number of 
remand hearings taking place at any one sitting;
2. they had to be socially, economically and environmentally representative of 
South Wales;
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3. they had to coincide with as many of the different agency areas or branches 
as possible - for example, the two police forces which cover the majority of 
South East Wales;
4. magistrates' courts where both lay and Stipendiary magistrates sat should be 
covered.
Court A is the busiest court in South East Wales in terms of its throughput of cases. 
This reflects the fact that it is situated in the largest city in Wales. The city has its 
share of social and economic problems and is probably representative of many of the 
middle sized urban areas in England. Court B is situated in the county town of a 
mainly rural county. It is, therefore, the focus of much of the county's leisure 
activities which may be reflected in the type of cases which are processed by the 
court, for example, a large number of drink related offences. Court C is situated in 
one of the major towns hi a large semi-rural county. It differs from Town B hi that 
it is not the administrative centre for the county. It is basically a market town which 
is set hi the heart of the South Wales valleys, an area until recently dominated by 
the mining industry which is reflected in the high unemployment levels in the area. 
Indeed, much of the area surrounding it is part of an European "Objective Two" 
area which means it qualifies for special status and financial assistance from the 
European Union as a deprived ex-industrial area.
In Court A remand hearings were held five days a week and almost always on 
Saturdays. Remand hearings took place in Court B on four days a week and 
Saturdays when necessary. Court C sat for remand hearings on only two days a 
week which reflected the fact that it was part of a petty sessional division which 
covered a large geographical area with a large number of small courts conducting 
remand hearings on a rota basis.
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The Selection of Data Collection Methods
Four methods of data collection were used in each of the three magistrates' courts:
1. observations of remand decisions;
2. an examination of court records of remand decisions;
3. a questionnaire sent to participants hi the remand process;
4. interviews with participants in the remand process.
These four methods were chosen to provide both quantitative and qualitative data 
on the remand process to permit as wide-ranging an investigation of the remand 
process as possible in the time available. The utilisation of four methods would also 
allow for an assessment of the validity and reliability of the data collected by using 
the technique of triangulation which would permit the achievement of the greatest 
possible reliability and validity. Triangulation involves the use of multiple methods, 
briefly explained by Smith (1991) as follows:
Research methods are never atheoretical or neutral in representing the 
world "out there". They act as filters through which the researcher 
selectively experiences the research environment. By using one's 
knowledge of how each research method may selectively bias or 
distort the scientist's picture of "reality," the researcher may select 
combinations of methods that more accurately represent what is "out 
there". (Smith, 1991:485).
Smith (1991), in an attempt to explain the importance of triangulation, uses the 
example of a navigator trying to fix the position of a ship:
If the navigator picks up signals from only one known navigational 
aid, the navigator may know which course his[her] ship is following, 
but still cannot ascertain the distance from the signal. However, if a 
navigator can locate two known navigational aids, and knows their 
distance from each other, then elementary high school geometry 
solves the ship's exact location. (Smith, 1991:485).
Therefore, triangulation recognises that single methods have strengths and 
weaknesses which may affect the results and compromise both their reliability and 
validity. Complementary methods should therefore be used to gain the advantages 
and overcome the disadvantages of different methods. Combining methods also
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permits cross-checking of data collected by each method and allows information to 
be collected that is only available through one method. Furthermore, "particular 
types of methods are usually only interpretable through particular types of theory 
and will generally produce only selective theoretical explanations." (Smith, 
1991:508). Therefore,
[As] each method has unique informational strengths and weaknesses, 
researchers should use complementary methods, with the intent of 
counterbalancing the merits and demerits of each method. Multiple 
methods aid reliability and validity, through providing a corrective for 
irrelevant components of any measurement procedure. Because we 
cannot normally observe most of our variables directly, we may pool 
information from numerous sources to arrive at a better picture of the 
puzzle ... the aim of triangulation is to strengthen confirmability and 
generalizabilty of results. (Smith, 1991:512).
Observation of Remand Hearings
These took place over a four month period between April and July 1991 in the three 
courts in the study. Prior to this the three courts were visited and observed on 
several occasions and contact was made with the Clerk to the Justices for each court. 
Following these initial observations the courtrooms to be observed in each court 
were selected. All of the courts had more than one courtroom, with each specialising 
in different aspects of a magistrates' court's work. As a consequence Courts B and 
C had a courtroom which was the main remand court and heard a large majority of 
remand hearings that took place in that court. Court A had two courtrooms which 
were specifically remand courts where the majority of remand hearings were held. 
However, the existence of these specialist courts did not preclude remand hearings 
occurring in other courtrooms especially when unexpected adjournments were made 
in cases expected to be completed on a particular occasion. Nevertheless, the remand 
courts would provide a sample of the majority of the hearings and certainly the 
majority of first appearances of defendants. On this basis the main remand 
courtrooms in Courts B and C were observed on one day a week while Court A 
would be observed on two days a week, split between the two remand courtrooms.
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However, relatively early in the observation period the remand courts in Court A 
were reorganised so that three specialist remand courts operated. Prior to the 
reorganisation the two remand courts had dealt with defendants who were either 
remanded in custody or on bail. However, this had caused problems because of the 
lack of police and prison officers available to escort defendants in custody to the 
courts and had resulted in delays in bringing them to court. Therefore, one of the 
three new remand courts was set aside purely for cases where the defendant was in 
the custody of the police or the court. Some defendants on bail did appear in this 
court but only when their cases were linked with defendants in custody. The other 
two remand courts dealt exclusively with defendants on bail, whether to the police 
or to the court. After this reorganisation it was decided to observe the same two 
courtrooms as before, which covered the custody court and one of the bail courts. 
This would obviously result in a larger number of custody cases being observed.
The Clerks to the Justices were contacted to make them aware that the research was 
being undertaken and hopefully to gain their support. They were asked if they would 
provide a court list, which would provide basic details of the defendants appearing 
in each court, for use by the researcher during the observations. Courts A and B 
provided these lists on every occasion that the court would be observed and also 
permitted the researcher to sit either on the journalist benches or the probation bench 
during the hearings. This was particularly useful as it provided an opportunity to get 
to know the regular participants in the court who were helpful in supplying 
additional information in the form of court and C.P.S. files, which often permitted 
missing information to be collected. The court lists themselves provided information 
on the case: the name and address of the defendant, date of birth, a summary of the 
charge and the defendant's solicitor. Some courts provided information on the 
outcome of the defendant's previous remand hearing and the employment status of 
the defendant. The lists provided a source of relatively accurate information.
Court C, however, declined to permit the researcher access to court lists or to an 
area of the court other than the public gallery. This obviously had a detrimental 
effect on the quality of the data available from this court as basic information was
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not always verbally presented to the court. Nevertheless, this problem was partly 
overcome with a change in the Clerk to the Justices, which meant that the researcher 
was given access to the court records (see below) so permitting, retrospectively, the 
addition of some of the basic information missing from the observed cases (for 
example, addresses, dates of birth and charges).
During the initial observations, details were recorded of the information routinely 
available at remand hearings which included the information contained in the court 
lists. A pro forma (see appendix 1) was then devised to permit efficient recording 
of information on remand hearings. This was particularly important as the initial 
observations suggested that many remand hearings only lasted a few minutes. The 
pro formas were then piloted in each court and subsequently revised until they 
provided a structured schedule for recording the information routinely available. 
However, space was also provided for any additional information. The information 
collected falls into the following broad categories: information relating to the 
defendant, the offence with which s/he is charged, the stage the case had reached, 
additional information supplied verbally to the court, the C.P.S. remand request and 
objections to bail, if appropriate, details of the remand outcome and the reasons for 
it where appropriate. If the defendant did not appear, details of explanations and 
outcome were also recorded.
Each courtroom was observed on the same day of the week for the whole 
observational period. This was done to make it more convenient for the courts to 
provide court lists. During the four months of observations every detail mentioned 
in the remand hearings that took place in the observed courtrooms was recorded. A 
total of 1524 remand hearings were observed. The majority were observed in Court 
A (906 cases) (60 per cent) while Courts B (314 cases) and C (304 cases) accounted 
for 20 per cent each of the sample. These proportions reflect the differences and 
similarities in the throughput of cases hi the courts.
The main difficulty encountered during the observations was the level of basic 
information available. Very little of the information contained on the court lists was
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verbally presented to the court. This was especially problematic if the defendant was 
appearing for the first time, had been arrested on a warrant or when the case had 
been transferred from another courtroom, as the court lists were often not available 
or, if they were, had information missing. Another problem was that on a 
defendant's subsequent appearance the magistrates would often say that the defendant 
was remanded in custody "for the same reasons as before" or that the conditions 
attached to his/her bail were the same as previously attached, without stating the 
actual reasons or conditions. Consequently, this information is missing from some 
cases although other participants were sometimes able to supply the information.
Nevertheless, there was an irretrievable lack of information both in court and on the 
court list about the offence. In a large number of cases only the relevant title of the 
offence was given with no indication of the gravity of the offence or value of 
property or seriousness of injury involved. This resulted in problems with the 
measurement of the seriousness of the offence (see Chapter 5). In cases where the 
defendant was charged with multiple offences, the offence used for the purposes of 
analysis in this study is the most serious offence with which the defendant was 
charged. On the whole, the most serious offence was easily identified mainly 
because the offences with which a defendant was charged were often of a similar 
nature, for example, all property offences of which domestic burglary was deemed 
to be the most serious. However, when a defendant was charged with offences 
against the person and a property crime, the former usually took priority unless the 
property crime was of a serious nature, for example, burglary or theft of a 
substantial sum of money and the offence against the person was relatively minor, 
for example, a late night fight between two males neither of whom sustained serious 
injury.
An Examination of Court Registers
The Clerk to the Justices of each court permitted access to court registers relating 
to remand hearings. The court registers provided an opportunity to gain information
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about all the remand hearings that took place in the Courts and therefore provided 
a representative picture of the remand decision in the courts studied. They also 
permitted an assessment of the reliability and validity of the observation sample. 
Several sources of bias were possible in the observation sample. Firstly, as only one 
courtroom or, in the case of Court A, two courtrooms were observed it was possible 
that there was something atypical about them. Only these courtrooms could be 
covered as the research was carried out by a single researcher. In fact it was highly 
likely that the observed courtrooms were atypical because in all courts they were the 
most likely to hear remand cases where the defendant was in custody. This primarily 
occurred because the observed courts had access to the cells. This would probably 
result in the observed courtrooms hearing the more serious cases. Secondly, the 
remand courts could only be observed on one day, or in the case of Court A two 
days, a week. Consequently, the day of the week chosen may have affected the 
typicality of the hearings. For example, defendants appearing on Monday may have 
been detained by the police since Saturday morning and as a result it is possible that 
the magistrates were more inclined to grant bail on that day.
As one of the aims of collecting data from the court registers was an assessment of 
the reliability of the observation sample the same period (April to July 1991) was 
used to collect the data. This also would permit the retrospective collection of basic 
information for Court C which was missing from the observation sample. The total 
number of remand hearings for the three courts which took place during this period 
was far in excess of the amount of data that could be handled by the researcher. 
Therefore, a sample of the data was used.
Unfortunately, none of the courts kept any figures on the throughput of remand 
hearings or even on the total number of hearings or defendants who were processed 
through the courts. It was therefore impossible to attain a total population from 
which to assess a reliable and valid sample size. The number of weeks available 
during the period selected was sixteen. The sixteen weeks available were distributed 
amongst the three courts randomly so that a similar proportion of the sample was 
selected for each of the three courts as made up the observation sample (60 per cent
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from Court A and 20 per cent from each of Courts A and B). This also permitted 
every week covered by the observations to be covered by the sample of court 
registers, albeit not in each court. In the weeks selected all of the remand hearings 
heard in each of the three courts made up the sample. The sample size is 2069 cases: 
1222 cases from Court A (59 per cent), 440 cases from Court B (21 per cent) and 
407 cases from Court C (20 per cent).
Each court recorded a different set of information on the court registers, although, 
some information was common to all three courts: the name, address and date of 
birth of the defendant, the offence(s) with which s/he was charged, the name of the 
defence solicitor and the outcome of the remand hearing. However, only one court 
routinely recorded information concerning the defendant's employment status. There 
were also variations hi the information recorded from case to case within each court. 
For example, hi some cases conditions of bail were recorded fully while in others 
they were not recorded at all. Furthermore, the stage the case had reached was also 
only recorded on some registers as was the previous remand status of the defendant. 
The lack of uniformity of recording and the fact that court officials recorded the 
information cast some doubt upon the representativeness of some of the information 
collected. Nevertheless, the core data namely the defendant's name, date of birth, 
details of the offence(s) and the remand outcome, can be assumed to be reasonably 
accurate.
To facilitate accurate, standardised and efficient recording of the information from 
the court lists a pro forma was devised to collect the information (see appendix 2). 
All available information was then transferred to the pro formas.
The data collected from both the observations and the court registers was then coded 
and analysed using SPSSx.
It has already been stated that the courts in the study kept no statistics on the number 
of hearings or defendants processed. This means that the representativeness of the 
findings cannot be assessed by this method. Furthermore, the lack of anything other
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than superficial national data on the remand process means that it is impossible to 
check the representativeness of the data collected and identify any anomalies which 
could exist as a result of local factors. For example, the area may have a high 
proportion of house burglaries which may explain any difference in the bail rate. 
The problem was further highlighted by comments made during interviews (see 
below) that Court A has a reputation locally for being a lenient court. However, a 
comparison of the custody rate found hi this study (see Chapter 4) with the national 
custody rate suggests that this is not the case. Nevertheless, if Court A is indeed a 
lenient court in terms of remand decisions in the South Wales area, it suggests that 
the other courts hi the study, and indeed hi the rest of South Wales, have custody 
rates much higher than the national average. However, due to the inadequacies of 
the national data, with only an average custody rate for the whole of England and 
Wales being available, it cannot be ascertained whether or not courts hi Wales as a 
whole, or South Wales hi particular, have higher custody rates than courts in 
England.
The Sample of Participants
The same sample of participants was used for both the questionnaires and the 
interviews. An assessment of the available time and the number of agencies and 
areas to be covered meant that approximately 50 to 60 participants would be 
appropriate for this part of the study. The aim was to investigate how the 
participants perceived both the law on bail and its practical operation, as well as to 
examine further how remand decisions are made and the role of each of the agencies 
involved. Furthermore, it provided an opportunity to collect information on parts of 
the process which the observations and examination of court registers were unable 
to investigate. The data would also facilitate an analysis of the difference between 
the perceptions that the participants have of the process and its actual operation.
One group of participants who were not studied were the defendants themselves. 
This decision was taken for several reasons, primarily relating to the time available
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to complete the study. Firstly, access to a representative group of defendants was a 
problem, especially with those remanded in custody. The probation services in both 
areas A and B had initially offered the researcher the opportunity to interview some 
of their clients who were on bail. However, this would have precluded defendants 
remanded in custody and biased the sample in favour of defendants who had contact 
with the probation service. The logistics of gaining access to prisons would have 
been very time consuming and therefore prohibitive. Secondly, a large number of 
interviews would have to be arranged to ensure a sufficient sample would be 
collected, as defendants would probably be less likely to be able to keep 
appointments than other participants. Thirdly, and most importantly, the involvement 
of defendants would have required the researcher to adopt a completely different 
methodolgical approach involving a revised interview. This would have been the 
case because a self-completed questionnaire would be inappropriate as many 
defendants have literacy problems. Also different questions would need to be asked 
in the interview as defendant's perception of, and involvement in, the remand 
process is different from that of the professional participants. Consequently, the 
decision was made to exclude defendants from the study. Nevertheless, this is not 
to dismiss the importance and validity of then: perceptions which, unfortunately, 
must be left for a future research project. In the meantime, this study provides data 
on the views of the professional participants in the remand process, in relation to 
which little research has hitherto been conducted.
The final sample was made up of 60 persons who worked in the various agencies 
that have some involvement in the remand process: viz. magistrates, clerks to the 
justices, the C.P.S., defence advocates, the police and the probation service. Several 
criteria were used to select the sample. Firstly, the sample should include 
representatives of each agency who worked in each of the three courts covered by 
the field work, thus allowing a comparison of perceptions of the personnel staffing 
different courts. Secondly, within each agency both the policy makers, usually the 
higher management of each agency, as well as those who worked in court should be 
interviewed. This would permit an assessment of the remand process at all levels. 
Within these criteria the selection of the particular individuals to be interviewed was
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in the main left to the agency and was usually done on the pragmatic basis of those 
available at the time scheduled for the interviews to take place. Two solicitors' firms 
refused to take part, as did the magistrates from Court C although no reasons for 
this were given. Despite this, the sample did cover all of the agencies involved in 
the process.
The sample was made up of 9 magistrates; 7 clerks (2 of whom were the Clerk to 
the Justices and one the acting Clerk to the Justices); 6 members of the C.P.S., 
(including the Chief Crown Prosecutor); 13 defence advocates; 15 police officers 
including an Assistant Chief Constable; and 10 probation officers, including 2 Bail 
Information Officers from Court A and 2 Assistant Chief Probation Officers.
There were unequal numbers of individuals from each agency in the sample for 
several reasons. Firstly, the magistrates from Court C refused to take part thus 
reducing the total number of magistrates. Secondly, only one administrative area of 
the C.P.S. was involved, which accounts for the small number of participants from 
the C.P.S.. Furthermore, in both Courts B and C one prosecutor was responsible for 
the remand courts observed both during the collection of quantitative data and at the 
time of the interviews, therefore only these two individuals felt able to comment on 
remand proceedings in those courts. Thirdly, the number of police officers is 
disproportionately high because the force that covered Court B thought that the 
number originally requested would produce an unrepresentative picture and therefore 
required that more officers be interviewed otherwise they would not consent to the 
interviews.
The sample comprised 52 men and 8 women. The majority of the sample were under 
45 years of age (63 per cent). Although some of the respondents visited more than 
one court which may or may not have been included in the selected courts, 28 




The objective of the qualitative research was to gain as full a picture as possible of 
the practical operation of the remand process in the limited time available. The 
questionnaire was devised to provide general information of the participants' 
perceptions of the remand process which encompassed both their views of the law 
on bail and the practical operation of the remand process. It also provided 
information on what participants thought should happen which provided ideas for 
future developments within the remand process and a general view of participants' 
own views and values.
The questionnaires were constructed after the completion of the observational 
component of the research. Accordingly they were based on observations of the 
operation of the remand process which came not only from the data and field notes 
but also from discussions with participants during the observations. A mixture of 
open and closed questions was used, to ensure respondents answered the closed 
questions and had the opportunity to express their views within less structured and 
open questions. This mixed approach provided an overview of participants 
perceptions but also allowed respondents to spend as much or as little time as they 
wished or had available completing the questionnaire. Thus, questionnaires 
completed in a short time would still provide valuable data for the research and 
hopefully respondents would provide additional data where appropriate. The 
questionnaire was piloted on a total of six participants all of whom were unrelated 
to any of the participants who would make up the sample. It was subsequently 
revised and the final version can be found in appendix 3.
The same questionnaire was sent to each participant, although magistrates were 
given additional questions concerning the training they had received on the remand 
process. The design of the questionnaire facilitated the collection of data which 
would provide an overall impression, and specific participants' opinions, of the 
operation of the remand process and how it could be improved. In addition, the 
findings from the questionnaire facilitate an analysis of different agencies' views of
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theirs and others' roles. The questionnaire provides an indication of the typicality 
of the responses given during the interviews.
The questionnaire was sent out to all 60 participants prior to the interviews so that 
the interviewees could complete it for collection at the interview (the idea here was 
that the participants would not want to face the interviewer with the fact that they 
had not completed it). In fact, five participants did not complete the questionnaire, 
two because of lack of time and three because they felt that it was inappropriate as 
they spent little, if any, time actually in court.
The responses were coded and analysed using SPSSx. Furthermore, a sample of the 
responses to the open questions was recorded for use in later analysis.
The Interviews
The interviews took place during the Spring and Summer of 1992. They were semi- 
structured with the interviewer having a list of questions to be covered. However, 
this list was not prescriptive and could be covered in any order as it was the 
respondents who directed the interview, often covering the questions in their 
responses without prompting. Only when the respondent had stopped talking were 
questions asked by the interviewer. This approach was taken as one of the aims of 
the interviews was to extract information from the respondents which was not 
available from the other methods used in the study and which might be of a sensitive 
nature. As a result many of the interviews went over the allotted time of half an 
hour, some in fact lasting more than an hour and a half. The respondents were asked 
questions about the remand process in general and their individual and agency's role 
in particular. The questions asked of respondents, therefore, varied according to 
their role hi the process.
The respondents were asked whether or not the interviews could be audio taped. The 
majority consented but six refused and notes were taken by the interviewer. The
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tapes were then transcribed for use in this report.
It was decided to use both questionnaires and interviews for several reasons. Firstly, 
the time available to participants was bound to be limited and a long interview would 
probably result in fewer people being willing to participate. However, the range of 
issues that it was thought necessary to be covered would require a long interview. 
Consequently, the combination of the questionnaire and interview provided the 
opportunity to collect a large quantity of information in a limited amount of time 
with the questionnaire being completed at the convenience of the respondent. 
Secondly, the completion of the questionnaire prior to the interview allowed the 
respondents to identify specific areas of concern which could be discussed further 
during the interview. Thirdly, the two methods were complementary and provided 
slightly different information, the questionnaires being general to all participants and 
the interviews investigating more closely the specific roles and views of individual 
participants. Finally, the questionnaires provide a guide to the typicality of responses 
provided in the interviews. This is important as respondents were likely to spend a 
disproportionate amount of time in the interviews on issues which were of major 
concern to them, which might reflect more upon the climate in which they work or 
the wider political and social climate or indeed their own political and social views. 
The questionnaires provide information on which to assess the relative importance 
or merits of the issues raised in the interviews and also to quantify the various 
opinions.
Summary
The four methods of data collection were selected to provide a detailed overview of 
the operation of the remand process hi magistrates' courts. Each method had a 
specific purpose and would facilitate the collection of data on specific aspects of the 
remand process. The four methods also provide an instrument by which to assess the 
reliability and validity of the findings provided by the other methods.
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THE SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT
The collection of data for this research project was undertaken during a specific 
period of time. Certain events occurred during this time which may have affected 
either or both the quantitative and qualitative findings. It is these issues that will be 
discussed in the following section.
Criminal Justice Legislation
The time of the collection of the qualitative data (May to July 1992) immediately 
preceded the implementation of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 in October 1992. The 
anticipated effects of the Act were uppermost in the minds of many respondents. It 
was argued by respondents that the Act could affect the remand system as its overall 
philosophy was to increase the use of community based sanctions to facilitate a 
reduction in the prison population1 . To this end, the Act placed restrictions on the 
circumstances in which an offender could be sentenced to a term of imprisonment2 . 
Although many of the more controversial parts of the Act have been repealed, this 
occurred after the completion of the interviews. It is, therefore, the perceived effect 
of the legislation which is important to this study, particularly as many of the 
respondents were going through training programmes on the Act, which may have 
affected their responses and perceptions.
The original 1991 Act had the capacity fundamentally to affect the remand process 
as it was possible that it would result in a reduction in the number of defendants 
remanded in custody for less serious offences. This relates to the fact that the Bail 
Act provides that the probable future sentence of the defendant, if s/he is convicted, 
can be a consideration in bail decisions. The Criminal Justice Act 1991 theoretically 
made it very difficult for defendants to be sentenced to imprisonment, consequently 
it makes it difficult for magistrates to justify remanding defendants in custody pre- 
trial when they are unlikely to receive a custodial sentence if convicted3 .
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Issues of Penal Policy
As discussed above, the prison remand population is the fastest growing section of 
the prison population and the remand wings of local prisons and remand centres are 
among the most acutely overcrowded parts of the prison system. This has resulted 
in constant pressure from the Government to decrease the prison remand population 
which itself is part of a wider objective of reducing the total prison population, as 
exemplified by the provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1991.
As a result, it seemed plausible that this may have an affect on the remand decision 
made by magistrates. Consequently, during the present study respondents were asked 
whether or not the overcrowding in remand prisons affected the bail decision. Of the 
52 that replied, 23 percent said that it substantially affected it, a further 29 per cent 
said that it sometimes affected the decision, 48 per cent said that it had little, if any, 
affect on the bail decision. All of the magistrates responded that overcrowding had 
little, if any, affect on their bail decision, although it is interesting to note that two 
out of the four respondents from the C.P.S. replied that it affected the decision 
substantially. This may mean that the C.P.S. decision to object to bail is affected by 
the problem of overcrowding.
Another issue mentioned above which may affect the magistrates' remand decision 
was publicity about the number of suicides of remand prisoners. Two particular 
cases which are of interest to this study are the deaths of 15 year old Phillip Knight 
in Swansea prison in July 1990 and Kenneth Nicholls in the cells in Newport Central 
Police Station after being remanded by a court in September 1991, both of which 
were widely publicised in the local media. It is possible to surmise that the publicity 
and concern generated over these cases hi particular and others in general may have 
an affect on the magistrates' decision4 .
At the tune that the research was undertaken several distinct but related events were 
happening in the penal system which may or may not have affected this study. These 
were:
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i) industrial action taken by prison officers; 
ii) the housing of remand prisoners in police cells;
iii) staff shortages in prison establishments which resulted hi the non-production 
of defendants to the court.
The first issue that needs to be addressed is that of industrial action by prison staff 
and how, or indeed if, it affects the remand process. It seems likely that, if the 
remand decision is affected by this factor, it would result in fewer defendants being 
remanded in custody. It will be illustrated below that prison officers have 
considerable scope to affect the position of remand prisoners as it was partly due to 
their industrial action during the present study that remand prisoners were being kept 
in police cells. It is also important because, as Cavadino and Dignan (1992) state:
In July 1991 there were official disputes at 49 prisons in England and 
Wales. Staff unrest shows every sign of becoming a permanent 
feature of the British penal scene. (Cavadino and Dignan, 1992:16).
During the period of observation of remand proceedings in the present study there 
was an industrial dispute taking place at the remand wing that houses the vast 
majority of male prisoners from the remand courts in the study (the action started 
on June 17th 1991). The remand wing, when working normally, housed many more 
prisoners than it was built for and more than its certified normal accommodation 
(C.N.A.). The industrial action took the form of limiting the number of receptions 
of remand prisoners to the wing to the recommended level, well under the number 
that it normally housed, so leaving the authorities with a substantial number of 
remand prisoners who were 'locked out' of the prison.
The respondents were asked whether they thought that the industrial dispute at the 
main remand prison affected the remand decisions of the magistrates. Twenty per 
cent of respondents thought that the decision was substantially affected, 37 per cent 
said that it affected the decision sometimes, while 42 per cent replied that it made 
little, if any, difference to the decision. Although both magistrates and defence 
solicitors believed that it played little, if any, role, 2 out of the 5 members of the 
C.P.S. thought that the dispute had substantially affected the remand decisions.
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As Cavadino and Dignan (1992) state the industrial action was far more widespread 
and affected other prison establishments during the time of the study. So, a further 
question was asked which related to industrial action throughout the prison service. 
The results were similar to those for the dispute at the local remand centre. 
However, a slightly higher proportion (21 per cent) thought that it substantially 
affected the remand decision.
Partly as a result of the Strangeways riot and partly because of industrial action 
being taken by prison officers, the remand wing in the local prison, which served 
all three courts in the study, was often full and unable to accommodate further 
prisoners. As a result a large number of unconvicted prisoners (about 150 according 
to the local paper) were being housed in police cells as far away as Plymouth (South 
Wales Echo 18th July 1991), although most were held relatively locally. One 
immediate effect was that remand prisoners who were being held in the prison and 
who were taken to court to appear before the magistrates were often unable to return 
to the prison and had to be accommodated in police cells. As a consequence, some 
people remanded in custody by the magistrates were opting to be remanded in their 
absence for their next appearance so that they would not lose their place in the 
prison and be held in police cells.
The magistrates were aware of this situation and were frequently reminded by 
defence solicitors that their clients, if remanded in custody, would be going to a 
police station rather than to the prison. The interesting issue here is whether or not 
the fact that the defendant will be remanded to a police cell instead of prison affects 
the decision of the magistrates. It is worth noting here the assumption that the 
conditions in which remand prisoners are kept in police stations are worse than those 
of remand prisons. This assumption, which is probably correct, is based on the fact 
that the police stations are not designed to hold prisoners long term and therefore are 
devoid of the necessary facilities, such as washing and recreational facilities. A 
further point is that the police stations where a defendant may be held may be many 
miles from his/her home town making visiting difficult, or even impossible, and this 
is compounded by the fact that there are no proper visiting facilities at police stations.
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In the questionnaire, the respondents were asked whether the fact that a defendant, 
if remanded in custody, would be held at a police station affected the remand 
decision. Of the 52 who responded, 12 per cent said it affected the decision 
substantially, 31 per cent said that it sometimes had an impact whereas 40 per cent 
answered that it affected the decision very little. 17 per cent said it never affected 
the decision. Therefore, the majority of respondents believed that it had little, if any, 
affect on the remand decision. There was no significant difference in the responses 
between the agencies but it is perhaps worth noting, as it is they who are the 
decision makers, that two magistrates said that it sometimes or frequently affected 
then- decision whereas five replied that it made little, if any difference to their 
decision.
A further issue was identified during the research study which was, in part, a 
consequence of the industrial action and of staff shortages. It relates to the remand 
proceedings themselves and, in the main, affected prisoners already serving 
sentences for other offences or those on bail for the proceedings in the observed 
court but in custody to another court. As a result of these factors, a very high 
proportion of defendants were not being produced for their remand hearing.
During the observational study 103 defendants were not produced for their remand 
hearings, that is 7 per cent of all the remand hearings observed. The most frequent 
reason cited for the non-production of defendants by prison governors was staff 
shortages. Various methods were employed by the court to get the defendant to 
court. These included writing to the governor of the prison, remanding him/her in 
custody rather than on technical bail (those on bail for the present proceedings but 
who were either in custody to another court or serving a sentence) meaning under 
the eight clear days rule, the defendant must be produced. Even then, however, all 
too often they were not.
Although this affected mainly serving prisoners (thus not involving unlawful periods 
spent remanded in custody), it still can have far reaching consequences. If the prison 
refuses to produce a serving prisoner to court for the purposes of a remand hearing
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the case cannot proceed. This delay in the case may also involve a co-defendant as 
the prosecution is not predisposed to splitting proceedings of jointly charged 
defendants. In some cases, the delay caused by the defendant not being produced 
would go on for weeks and often meant that they were released from prison before 
the case had been completed, returning to court when released for the case to 
continue.
Delay is one important issue, as 'justice delayed is justice denied', but another is 
that the defendant may receive a different and possibly harsher sentence. If the case 
had been completed and the defendant convicted while still serving a prison sentence 
for another offence it seems quite possible that they would receive a concurrent term 
of imprisonment, thus having little or no affect on their original sentence5 . However, 
if the case is completed after they have been released and they are convicted, a 
further sentence must be imposed having the effect of the remand prisoner being 
treated more harshly just because the prison would not produce them. Part of the 
rationale of a sentence of imprisonment is that the defendant, when released, will 
have a fresh start with no further proceedings hanging over him/her. However, the 
non-production of defendants defeats this objective as defendants leave prison with 
criminal proceedings still pending, committed prior to the term of imprisonment they 
have just served.
Delays in the Processing of Warrants
A further issue which resulted in delays in the system during the course of the 
research was the inefficiency with which non-appearance warrants were executed. 
In some cases, a period of months would go by before a warrant was executed and 
the defendant brought back to court. Of course, if the defendant at large was jointly 
charged, this delay would also affect his/her co-accused.
If a defendant does not appear in court to answer his/her bail the magistrates have 
the discretion to issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant. This warrant can be
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issued either with or without bail. On many occasions during the study the delays 
in the processing of warrants was remarked upon and in some cases influenced the 
course of action the magistrates took. If it was the first time that a defendant had not 
appeared, then partly because of the time taken to execute a warrant, s/he was often 
"bail enlarged" (bailed on the same terms as previously) to a further date, thus 
providing their solicitor with an opportunity to contact the defendant and get him/her 
to court. Furthermore, because of the even greater delays involved with warrants 
backed with bail than those without bail, the court tended to issue warrants without 
bail so that the likelihood of the defendant being brought to court in the foreseeable 
future was much greater. This results from the greater priority attached by the 
police, who execute the warrants, to those not backed with bail, probably because 
they are perceived to be of a more serious nature. However, it also results in the 
defendant spending some time in custody, often overnight, when the warrant is 
executed, waiting for the next court sitting, as the police have no discretion to 
release the defendant on bail. The problems with the execution of warrants, 
therefore, seem to create a situation where the decisions of the court are taken more 
for pragmatic and practical reasons than in the interests of the defendant, the court 
or of justice.
The Impact of Political and Public Opinion
In the past, several highly publicised cases, which have aroused public concern, have 
been used as instruments to argue for a change in the law on bail. The Winston 
Silcott case (See chapter 2) is an example which was widely quoted as the sort of 
case that would be prevented by s.153 Criminal Justice Act 1988. Public concern 
was also high at the time of the study about the number of offences allegedly 
committed by defendants on bail. At the time it centred around several celebrated 
cases. On a national level, there was the highlighted case in 1992 of a woman from 
Gloucester who was raped and murdered by a man who had been granted bail, 
against police advice, on a rape charge6 (see Clayton 1992) and on a local level, the 
publicity surrounding the so called "menace" from Barry who in the Spring and
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Summer of 1992 allegedly committed a multitude of offences on bail (South Wales 
Echo). The issue here is not whether these cases should be used in this way, but to 
make the point that public concern about particular events may have affected the 
remand decisions observed and responses collected in the study.
Furthermore, general concern about the level of the official crime rate or the 
increasing incidence, whether nationally or locally, of a particular crime may affect 
the remand decision. What must not be forgotten, when discussing this issue, is the 
role of the media in the forming of public opinion. Headlines such as "One theft in 
2 'by person on bail'" (The Guardian, September 5th 1992) can play a vital role in 
forming the public perception of a problem. Furthermore, without going into detail 
about the role of the media in producing moral panics (Cohen 1980), media concern 
does not always equal public concern. However, it is possible to hypothesise that 
such events and the consequent public or media concern affects the remand decisions 
of the magistrates on a day-to-day basis.
The respondents were asked in the questionnaire whether they believed that the 
magistrates' decision was affected by public feeling about an offence. 38 per cent 
of all respondents replied that it affected the decision substantially while a further 
43 per cent said that it sometimes affected the decision. 19 per cent answered that 
it had little, if any, effect on the decision. Six out of the eight magistrates that 
responded said it either affected their decision a great deal or that it sometimes 
affected their decision while out of the five respondents from the C.P.S., all said 
that it, at least, sometimes had an effect.
The respondents were asked a further question about whether or not local issues 
affected their decision. 64 per cent of respondents believed that local issues affected 
the magistrates' decision either a great deal or at least sometimes. Three out of the 
eight magistrates and three out of five members of the C.P.S. replied that local 
issues sometimes affected their remand decisions.
From these results it seems that public feeling about a particular case may have an
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influence on the remand decision while local issues seem to play a more limited role. 
Moreover, when these results are set against the results of a question about whether 
or not Government guidelines affect the magistrates' remand decision, they produce 
a picture that suggests that a larger proportion of respondents believed that the public 
feeling about the case affects the remand decision to a greater extent than 
Government guidelines7 . Besides the implications of these results for reforming the 
system, they tend to suggest that the factor of public opinion plays an important part 
in remand decisions, a conclusion that seems valid if the Prison Reform Trust's 
(1994) assertions about the effect of the publicity surrounding offending on bail are 
correct.
SUMMARY
This chapter has provided the context for the study which follows. It has stressed the 
importance of the remand decision for the defendant as well as the effect it has on 
the prison population. It has also discussed how the study was conducted and located 
the research within its specific time context. What follows is an attempt to present 
a wide ranging study of the remand process in three courts in South Wales, as a 
significant contribution to the dearth of information available on the current 
operation of the remand process.
Chapter 2 describes and evaluates the development of the present law on bail. 
Chapter 3 draws on the crime control/due process debate and the 'systems' debate 
to provide a theoretical framework which will aid the understanding of the findings. 
Chapter 4 discusses the magistrates' courts' use of bail both on a national scale and 
in the three courts in the study. Chapter 5 draws on the findings of the quantitative 
research and assesses the influence that certain factors may have on magistrates' 
remand decisions. Chapter 6 investigates the remand decision making process as 
perceived by some of the participants who work within the criminal justice process. 
Chapter 7 further discusses the decision making process by assessing the quantity 
and type of information available at remand hearings, the criteria on which the
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C.P.S. object to bail and the reasons which are stated by the magistrates for the 
refusal of bail. Chapter 8 discusses recent developments in both the law and policy 
on bail and assesses their impact. Chapter 9 highlights the two major concerns of the 
participants and discusses potential measures to alleviate these problems. Chapter 10 
draws together the major findings of the study and discusses their contribution both 
to theoretical and policy debates.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. However, this policy relates only to those offenders found guilty of less 
serious offences i.e. those that involved no elements of either sex or 
violence.
2. Which included two provisions that are particularly relevant to the remand 
system: firstly, restrictions were placed on taking the previous convictions 
of the offender into account (s.29) when passing sentence; and secondly, 
when considering sentence for offenders found guilty of multiple offences 
only the original offence and one associated offence could be taken into 
consideration. This had the effect of only two offences being taken into 
consideration for sentencing purposes, however many offences the offender 
has committed. The aim of these provisions was to stop persistent offenders, 
guilty of non-serious offences, from being automatically propelled up the 
tariff which would eventually resulted in a custodial sentence when the 
individual offences for which they had been sentenced were not perceived to 
be of a serious nature.
3. Further contradictions between practices pre and post trial may have been 
created by the original measures in the Act: firstly, although previous 
convictions have been found by earlier research studies (Bottomley 1970, 
King 197la) to be an important factor in the remand decision and can be 
taken into consideration at the pre-trial stage whatever the circumstances of 
the case, they have to be all but ignored for sentencing purposes; and 
secondly, the same point applies in respect of the number of offences that can 
be taken into consideration.
4. The issue of suicide was not a factor that was specifically discussed in the 
present study but the sole case in which it arose as an issue is worth 
recording. The defendant said that he would attempt to commit suicide if he 
was remanded in custody, nevertheless he was so remanded, at which point, 
the defendant produced an instrument and harmed himself in front of the 
magistrates. The decision to remand him in custody remained unchanged. 
Clearly, in such cases, the magistrates have to weigh up whether the risk to 
the defendant is real, as there is abundant potential in this area for the 
defendant to 'try it on'.
5. Having regard to the principle of the totality of the sentence: that a person 
should not spend a very long period hi prison simply because they have 
committed multiple offences but that the length of the sentence should 
primarily depend on the seriousness of the offences committed.
6. A charge which already comes under the provisions of s. 153 of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 which requires reasons to be given if bail is granted, against 
C.P.S. advice, for certain offences (Hucklesby 1993).
7. Do Government guidelines affect the magistrates' remand decision? 33 per
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cent said yes, substantially, 45 per cent said sometimes, 12 per cent said very 
little, with 10 per cent saying never.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LAW AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS ON BAIL
THE MAGISTRATES' COURT'S POWER TO REMAND
The Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 sets out magistrates' powers in the grant or 
refusal of bail. The MCA 1980 leaves the decision to remand and the type of 
remand almost solely to the discretion of the magistrates (except in cases of treason 
(s.8)). Under the 1980 Act a magistrates' court can remand the accused on any 
adjournment and is required to do so:
i) when adjourning the hearing before beginning to inquire into 
an offence as examining justices, or at any time during the 
enquiry (s.5(l) of M.C.A. 1980);
ii) when adjourning the case, to enable a medical examination 
and report to be made, being satisfied that the offence has 
been committed by the accused (s.30(l»;
iii) when the court commits an accused to the Crown Court for 
trial on indictment or commits an offender to the Crown Court 
for sentence (s.6(3) and s.38).
Section 5(2) provides that the court, when adjourning shall fix the time and place at 
which the hearing is to be resumed; and the time fixed shall be that at which the 
accused is required to appear or be brought before the court in the pursuance of the 
remand.
Under section 128(1) a remand can be either in custody or on bail and provides the 
magistrates' court with the power to ask for sureties, where in their judgement they 
are applicable, before the defendant is released on bail (s.!28(l)(2)). The actual 
bail/custody decision is ruled by the provisions of the Bail Act 1976 except in the 
case of treason, where the accused could not be admitted to bail unless by order of 
a judge of the High Court or the Secretary of State (sec.41).
Section 128(6) provides that the remand could be for a limited period of eight clear 
days except in certain circumstances where the period could be longer2 . Section 
128(3) provides the court with the power to further remand a defendant if s/he 
appeared on remand to the court. Furthermore, s. 129(1) of the Act allows a person 
who has been remanded to be further remanded in his absence in the event of illness
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or accident. A defendant who had been granted bail can also be further remanded 
in his/her absence in other circumstances (s.!29(2)(3)).
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AND POLICY ON 
BAH, PRIOR TO THE 1967 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT
Prior to the 1967 Act, the law on bail had developed so that the major criterion for 
granting or refusing bail was whether the accused would appear at court. Other 
factors could also be taken into consideration, not because they were important in 
themselves, but as indicators of the likelihood that the accused would turn up for 
trial. These were the seriousness of the charge, the strength of the evidence and the 
punishment for the offence.
Nonetheless, the case law prior to 1967 indicated that the likelihood that a defendant 
will turn up for trial was not the only consideration. The prevention of crime or, to 
put it another way, the likelihood of further offences being committed if a defendant 
was granted bail had been a consideration for some considerable time although it 
was not enshrined in statute until the 1967 Criminal Justice Act. The major factor 
grounding the belief as to the likelihood of further offending was the previous 
criminal record of the defendant. For example Atkinson J in the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in the case of R. v. Phillips (1947, 32, Cr.App.R. 47) said:
Some crimes are not likely to be repeated pending trial and in those 
cases there may be no objection to bail; but some are, and 
housebreaking particularly is a crime which will very probably be 
repeated if a prisoner is released on bail, especially in the case of a 
man who has a record of housebreaking such as the applicant has.... 
They [i.e. the court] wish the magistrates who release young 
housebreakers on bail such as this applicant to know that in nineteen 
cases out of twenty it is a mistake. (Bottomley, 1968:51).
This opinion was reaffirmed in several cases, confirming it as a general principle not 
just for those accused of housebreaking. For example in the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in R. v. Armstrong (1951, 2 All ER 219);
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It is clear that it is the duty of the justices to enquire into the 
antecedents of a man who is applying to them for bail, and, if they 
find that he has a bad record - particularly a record which suggests 
that he is likely to commit similar offences while on bail - that is a 
matter which they must consider before granting bail. (Home Office, 
1974:9).
However, other factors were still relevant to these considerations. For example in 
R. v. Gentry (1956, Crim. L.R 120) it was said:
As this court has pointed out over and over again it is most dangerous 
to grant bail to a man with a long record of convictions, unless the 
magistrates think that there is a real doubt as to his guilt, because he 
is sure, if he is admitted to bail, to commit offences while on bail. 
(Home Office, 1974:9).
These reported cases show that the extra criterion of likelihood of further offences, 
indicated by a substantial criminal record, was already, by 1967, an important 
reason for refusing bail. Zander (1967) also points out that a substantial criminal 
record was also seen as an indication of the probable guilt of the defendant. He 
argued that this introduced the concept of preventive detention to bail decisions, 
allowing bail to be refused on the grounds that the defendant may commit further 
offences. Consequently, he argued that the presumption of innocence was overturned 
where the accused person had a bad record, unless the evidence against him is 
slight. The Working Party (Home Office 1974) added further credence to this by 
suggesting that the provision, under section 21 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, for 
the imposition of conditions on bail indicated that the prevention of crime was a 
legitimate consideration in the decision whether or not to grant bail.
Other features of the present system were also in place by 1967 such as the 
unfettered discretion of the justices and the surety system. The objective of reducing 
the number of defendants remanded in custody was already a major driving force of 
the development of the law on bail prior to 1967 but this was to be achieved not 
through a presumption of bail but by allowing the magistrates greater discretion and 
to provide that bail could be granted without sureties 1 .
Finally the principle had already been established that bail was not to be refused for
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punitive purposes. This was first stated by Lord Russell C.J. when quashing the 
conviction in R. v. Rose (1898) and was restated in 1941 by the Divisional Court 
in R. v. Brentford Justices , ex parte Muirhead (106 JP 4) when Lord Caldecote CJ 
said:
It is entirely beyond [the justices'] jurisdiction to do what was done 
in this case, namely to remand a person in custody for the purpose of 
punishment. (Home Office, 1974:9).
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1967
The Criminal Justice Act 1967 came into force on 1st January 1968. The main 
purpose of sections 18-23 was to restrict the refusal of bail. Bottomley (1970) 
commenting on the Act when its bail provisions were still hi force, pointed out that 
the provisions were complicated with regard to cases in which they were applicable. 
However, he went on to summarise the Act's major features:
... except in a list of defined circumstances, magistrates' courts can 
no longer refuse bail to persons (17 or over) charged with offences 
which are punishable on summary conviction by not more than six 
months imprisonment; if the offence is an indictable offence, triable 
summarily, the court must have commenced to hear it summarily (by 
s. 18 or s. 19 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1952), which means that 
the magistrates still have discretionary power to remand in custody 
before a plea has been taken in such an offence. Also, in a summary 
offence, where the prosecutor or the accused claims jury trial (s. 25 
of the M.C. A. 1952), the committal for trial must be on bail [unless 
one of a number of circumstances applies].(Bottomley, 1970:100).
As Robertshaw (1983) has suggested, the 1967 Act provided a weak presumption of 
bail in that it specified that bail could only be refused in certain circumstances3 .
The 1967 Act attempted to draw up an exhaustive list of specific circumstances in 
which restrictions to the refusal of bail need not apply. However, Bottomley (1970) 
argued that it was impossible to foresee every circumstance, consequently, the Act 
was not fool proof in the sense that there would still be circumstances that arose 
which were not covered by the Act. He suggested that stating general principles (for
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example, that account be taken of the seriousness of the offence) in order to guide 
the court would have been more appropriate, as this would allow for interpretation 
by the magistrates and could be applied hi each and every case. He argued that, in 
theory, the existence of any one of these circumstances did not mean that the 
magistrates must automatically refuse bail but that they had the discretion to do so 
if they felt that it was appropriate. Bottomley (1970) criticised this from two 
perspectives; firstly, he argued that the very existence of these circumstances might 
result hi the refusal of bail wherever they applied and secondly, even when the 
circumstances did apply, the magistrates could still grant bail; this could have 
resulted in bail being granted hi what could be seen as inappropriate cases, for 
example cases in which very serious offences were allegedly committed.
A further important provision of the 1967 Act was section 21, which enabled the 
court to attach conditions when a defendant was remanded on bail 'if it is likely to 
result in his/her appearance at the time and place required or to be necessary in the 
interests of justice or for the prevention of crime'. For the first time, a secondary 
statutory criterion came into bail decisions, that of the prevention of crime.
A further provision under s.67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 was that all tune 
spent in custody before trial, including police custody, counted towards the eventual 
sentence of imprisonment (provided, of course, that the defendant was eventually 
sentenced to imprisonment). This is still the case today.
THE WORKING PARTY 
BAIL PROCEDURES IN MAGISTRATES' COURTS (1974)
The Working Party was set up in July 1971 under the following terms of reference: 
to review practice and procedure in magistrates' courts relating to the grant or 
refusal of bail and to make recommendations. The impetus for the setting up of the 
Working Party was two fold: firstly, if the use of bail could be increased, then the 
prison population would decrease reducing both its costs in financial terms and
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overcrowding; secondly, a number of research studies (Bottomley 1970, King 1971a) 
had highlighted the limitations of the present provisions on bail and had made some 
concrete proposals on how an increase in the numbers granted bail could be 
achieved. The studies will be looked at in more detail later (see below, Chapter 4), 
however, certain aspects of their findings were particularly important in the setting 
up of the Working Party and will be briefly discussed here. Issues of the lack of 
information available to magistrates during remand hearings and the fact that many 
defendants were unrepresented were highlighted by the studies as resulting in a large 
number of unnecessary remands in custody. Furthermore, the studies had revealed 
evidence that the police were using their power to grant bail as a lever to produce 
the results that they wanted (bail bargaining). Finally there was mounting evidence 
on the effects of custody, as Bottomley (1970) states persons remanded in custody 
are much more likely to be found guilty and receive a custodial sentence than those 
granted bail. Furthermore, a large proportion of those remanded in custody were 
(and still are) either acquitted or received non-custodial sentences. King (197la) 
found that over half of those remanded in custody did not return to prison after 
sentence. The Working Party itself stated that its main aim was to consider strategies 
to enable the courts to release more persons on bail without significantly adding to 
the burdens of the police or diminishing the protection afforded to the public by a 
remand in custody. It indicated that this aim was achievable and was in the interests 
of both the defendant and as a way of reducing pressure on the prison system.
The Working Party asserted that three requirements needed to be fulfilled in the 
consideration of a bail application. Firstly, all relevant information about the 
defendant and the alleged offence which could be obtained in the time available 
should be before the court. Secondly, a standard procedure should be designed to 
be followed in all applications to ensure that the information was fully considered. 
Thirdly, the decision should be taken in accordance with certain generally accepted 
criteria. These criteria were: the likelihood of the defendant's appearance; the 
likelihood of offences being committed if bail were granted; and possible 
interference with witnesses4 . Other considerations were that the defendant should be 
remanded in custody for their own safety or for further police inquires to be undertaken.
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The Working Party recommended that there should be a general presumption in 
favour of bail for all unconvicted persons who were remanded or committed for 
trial. To consolidate this position the Working Party recommended that the 
magistrates' court should give reasons for refusing bail which should be made 
available to the judge in chambers, if indeed a further application were made.
The Working Party advised that the system of personal recognizance (an undertaking 
by an offender to forfeit a sum of money if s/he fails to appear) should be replaced 
because it was ineffectual as it had little, if any, deterrent value. In considering what 
should replace this system they dismissed the introduction of a system of 'money 
bail' 5 . Instead, it recommended that absconding should become a criminal offence 
carrying maximum sentences of three months and twelve months in the lower and 
higher courts respectively, which would be tried by the court that tried the 
substantive offence. Furthermore, it recommended that the surety system should be 
retained but that sureties should not be required as a matter of course. In considering 
possible sureties, the court should be able to take account of the character of the 
proposed surety and his relationship with the principal as well as his financial 
means. However, the means of the surety should be taken into account when 
determining the amount of the surety.
As far as the requirement to have all possible information available to the court is 
concerned, the Working Party recommended that a standard form should be 
introduced which would contain information about the defendant's community ties6 .
The Working Party advised that the presumption of bail should not apply after 
conviction. However, more persons should be released on bail for the purpose of 
obtaining medical and psychiatric reports. To this end, out-patients facilities in 
certain prisons should be extended to facilitate the preparation of medical reports and 
a list of N.H.S. consultants, willing to prepare reports, should be compiled.
The Working Party advised that the procedure for applying for bail to a judge in 
chambers should be retained, but with the judge having access to the bail
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information sheet.
The Report recommended an increase in bail hostels, with the courts being fully 
informed about them. Bail hostels are places where a defendant can be required by 
the court to reside while s/he is on bail. Most hostels have rules which the residents 
are expected (or required) to abide by, for example a curfew. Bail Hostels had only 
recently been put on a statutory footing with the provision for the establishment of 
approved bail hostels, to be staffed and maintained by the probation service, under 
the Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 1973 s. 49. As Pratt and Bray (1985) observe 
prior to this legislation, such hostels had only been provided by the voluntary sector 
on what amounted to an ad hoc basis. The hostels were set up as an alternative to 
a remand in custody for homeless defendants. Finally, the report recommended that 
a person remanded in custody and otherwise eligible should ordinarily be granted 
legal aid.
The recommendations of the Working Party were received with some scepticism. As 
King (1974) pointed out, there was very little in the recommendations that was likely 
to increase the numbers granted bail. He argued that:
... the presumption in favour of bail may, indeed, help to provide the 
courts with 'an indication of the attitude they should adopt' but one 
would have thought, with all the publicity the bail system has 
attracted, those members of the judiciary whose attitudes are open to 
the influences of this sort would already be employing an informal 
presumption in favour of bail. Conversely, those magistrates and 
judges who have not so far responded to the call for a more liberal 
bail policy are hardly likely to do so on account of a statutory 
presumption. (King, 1974:452).
However, as Bottomley (1975) noted although principles may not always be 
translated into practice, 'a small crumb' of comfort lay with suggestions made in the 
Home Office Research Unit study of the effects of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 
(Simon and Weatheritt 1974):
... that the subsequent increase in the proportion of persons released 
on bail in London courts was due more to the indirect "halo" effect 
of the climate of opinion surrounding the Act upon the courts' 
approach to bail decisions in general, rather than to the specific
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operation of the relevant provisions themselves. (Bottomley, 
1975:82).
In short, he argued that the movement towards granting bail to an increased number 
of defendants was not the direct consequence of the 1967 Act and its provisions but 
was the result of a general feeling that more persons could and should be granted 
bail. He went on to argue:
... that if this new presumption in favour of bail were to be accepted 
by the magistrates' as a working principle, this very acceptance might 
itself be a crucial symptom of (rather than a direct mechanism for 
implementing) a new approach. (Bottomley, 1975:82).
Bottomley (1975) also noted, after generally welcoming the report particularly 
because it responded to and reflected much of the thinking of accumulated findings 
of academic research (Bottomley 1970, King 1971a), that "the most important 
question raised by the report is: how are the reforms on bail to be implemented?" 
(Bottomley, 1975:84). He argued that, on the whole, the Working Party avoided this 
question and only called for legislative change in a few instances such as providing 
for the statutory presumption of bail. Therefore, the problem that needed to be 
addressed was how the "excellent advice" of the Working Party could be turned into 
everyday practice. Bottomley (1975) used the example of the Widgery Report (1966) 
on legal aid7 to illustrate how, even when standards were recommended by a 
distinguished Working Party, this did not necessarily ensure that the standards would 
be put into practice particularly by the lower courts. He consequently argued that the 
most effective tools for bringing about changes in attitudes and practices were 
legislation and the rules of the court although education, publicity and circulars did 
have a role to play.
Both King (1974) and Bottomley (1975) criticised the Report for ignoring the role 
of the police in the decision. Both authors claimed that research had shown that there 
was a high correlation between the granting or withholding of police bail and the 
subsequent bail decision of the magistrates (Bottomley 1970, King 1971a, Simon and 
Weatheritt 1974). As Bottomley (1975) argued:
One of the main criticisms that can be levelled at the Working Party
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is its apparent complacency about the significance of what happens to 
an arrested person in the period immediately preceding his first 
appearance in court; although a consideration of police bail procedure 
was strictly outside its terms of reference, the Working Party felt 
confident that the police would generally follow the spirit of whatever 
might be recommended for magistrates' bail decisions, but such 
confidence is unlikely to be shared by all. (Bottomley, 1975:83).
King (1974) certainly did not share this confidence:
According to the Working Party, section 38 (i) of the M.C. A. 1952 
contains "adequate safeguards." These "adequate safeguards" 
empower the police to hold a man generally for twenty four hours 
entirely at their discretion and for longer than twenty four hours, 
provided that a senior police officer considers the case to be "a 
serious one," whatever that may mean. (King, 1974:453).
Bottomley (1975) further criticised the report for not considering the importance of 
legal representation at, and prior to, the first court appearance which had also been 
shown in his research (Bottomley, 1970) to be of great importance to the subsequent 
court remand decision. In doing so, it did not recommend that legal aid be available 
before a remand in custody even when this would seem perfectly practical under the 
newly established duty solicitor scheme.
King (1974) although welcoming the Working Party's recommendation that 
information sheets outlining the defendant's community ties should be introduced, 
argued that this in itself would be no guarantee that more defendants would be 
granted bail because magistrates would still have no way of assessing what factors 
make a person a good or bad bail risk. The major criticism of this measure was that 
it did not go far enough. The points system (see Chapter 8), used in America and, 
at the tune, widely advocated for use in Britain, was rejected by the Working Party 
because "it might be seen by magistrates as interfering with the exercise of their 
judicial discretion." The ethos of the points system can be briefly summarized as a 
system which "assigns a numerical score to the various elements hi the defendant's 
background, and is based on the knowledge that a person who achieves a certain 
level of points is unlikely to abscond." (Bottomley, 1975:87). Bottomley (1975) 
argued that it would not interfere with the magistrates' discretion as it would not be
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binding and would only be a guide to help in informing their decision.
A further criticism that King made of the Working Party's report was that it did 
little to remove the financial element from bail. Although it was recommended that 
the system of personal recognizances be abolished, it was proposed that the surety 
system remain unchanged, which King, amongst others, argued gave an unwarranted 
advantage to those defendants who have moneyed friends or relations. Together with 
the criminal offence of absconding the Working Party suggested that it would 'enable 
sureties to be dispensed with more often'. However, as King (1974) argued, before 
a court can punish a man for absconding, the police have got to catch him but "the 
sureties are often sitting ducks, or rather scapegoats, readily available to be blamed 
for not keeping strict enough control over their principal and ready to be penalised 
in his place. "(King, 1974:454). Therefore, he argued there would still be a strong 
temptation for the magistrates to demand sureties as a matter of course.
King (1974) further criticised the Report for not tackling the inequalities in access 
to the appeals procedure for bail. There were (and still are) two methods of applying 
for bail to the judge in chambers, one for those who could afford to pay for 
representation before the judge in chambers and a second system for those who have 
no money and apply on paper through the Official Solicitors Department. The first 
method is more advantageous in terms of both the time taken for the application to 
be heard and the success rate (King 1971b). An obvious solution to this anomaly was 
for legal aid to be extended to applications to the judge in chambers so that all 
appellants would be represented in person by a lawyer. However, the Working Party 
rejected this proposal and advocated improvements in the system of written 
applications which involved the judge having before him the bail information form 
prepared in the magistrates' courts. This King (1975) argued, is unsatisfactory and 
overcautious and maintained the discrepancy between those that could afford to pay 
and those that could not unchanged.
Bottomley (1975) argued that making absconding a criminal offence would be an 
unnecessary legislative change. The Working Party argued that the system of
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personal recognisances was ineffectual mainly because it had no deterrent value. 
Bottomley attacked the recommendation by firstly arguing that the non-appearance 
rate amongst those bailed on their own recognisance was unknown and, furthermore, 
the Working Party did not seem to see the absconding rates as problematic in the 
first place. He went on to cite the Home Office research (Simon and Weatheritt 
1974) which found an absconding rate of 3 per cent amongst those bailed on 
committal and 6 per cent amongst those bailed for further hearings before 
magistrates. However, a large minority, 27 per cent, of those that did not appear 
were charged with drunkenness. Bottomley therefore raised the question of "whether 
it is sensible to make failure to come to court imprisonable, when the drunkenness 
offence itself is not imprisonable." (Bottomley, 1975:85). Secondly, and following 
on from this, he argued that people failed to appear for many reasons and in many 
circumstances. For those that deliberately failed to appear there must be the belief 
that the police would not catch up with them and they could evade the charge with 
which they were accused. If so, they were hardly likely to be deterred from 
absconding by the fact that absconding itself was an offence. Finally, and probably 
most crucially, it might result in an increase in those going to prison as well as the 
length of time spent there.
Somewhat surprisingly, the official response to the Working Party's 
recommendations was almost immediate. A Practice Direction was issued 
(P.D.,576/1974) only a month after its publication stating that bail should be 
renewed during trial unless there was a real danger of the defendant absconding 
because the trial was going badly for him or there was a real likelihood that he 
would interfere with witnesses. A Home Office circular subsequently followed 
(Home Office 155/1975; see Legal Action Group Bulletin 12:308) which 
recommended that magistrates should operate in the spirit of the report. Thus, the 
practice of presuming that an unconvicted defendant should be granted bail, was 
adopted even before the Bail Bill was enacted.
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THE BAIL ACT 1976
The Bail Act came into operation in April 1978 and in general followed the Working 
Party's recommendations. It is the major piece of legislation currently governing 
remand proceedings. Section 4 of the Act provides a general right to bail, more 
commonly described as a presumption of bail, except in those circumstances set out 
in Schedule 1 of the Act. Under the Act, a person granted bail in criminal 
proceedings is under a duty to surrender to custody (s.3.1). Some commentators 
have asserted that the provision for a right to bail was unnecessary because the 
existing provisions were, in practice, being used in this way. The Act is not 
generally seen as a "great seasonal change" (HH Judge Mott 1989:849) but can be 
characterised as the law catching up with its practical operation. White (1977) states 
that the legal concept of bail was fundamentally changed by the Act but it was 
unlikely to affect significantly the practical decision making process. This was 
because, as we have seen, the presumption in favour of bail was already operational 
following the 1974 Report and arguably, even before that when the 1967 Criminal 
Justice Act introduced a presumption in favour of bail albeit in a weak form. 
However, the Act was important as it did codify the bail decision by providing 
exceptions to the right to bail and the reasons why those exceptions should apply. 
The Criminal Justice Act 1967 had provided a list of exceptions to the right to bail 
but these only applied to defendants charged with offences punishable with not more 
than six months imprisonment, leaving the magistrates with unlimited discretion in 
other cases. Furthermore, the benchmark of six months imprisonment would apply 
to all but the most serious of cases, thus providing the magistrates with unlimited 
discretion in the vast majority of cases. As Corre (1990b) states, although the 
presumption of bail may have been good practice before the 1976 Act, it was not 
universally followed as it was not a statutory provision.
The general right to bail applies to a person who is accused of an offence when:
a) he appears or is brought before a magistrates' court or the Crown Court in 
the course of or in connection with proceedings for the offence,
b) he applies to a court for bail in connection with proceedings,
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c) he appears or is brought before a magistrates' court for a breach of 
requirement of a probation or community service order, or
d) he is remanded for reports after conviction.
The right to bail does not apply:
a) after conviction,
b) to fugitive offenders, or
c) to persons charged with treason, who may be granted bail only by a judge
of the High Court or a Secretary of State (s.41 M.C.A. 1980). 
(s.4 Bail Act 1976).
Under section 5(3) of the Act, where a magistrates' court or Crown Court:
a) withholds bail hi criminal proceedings, or
b) imposes conditions in granting bail hi criminal proceedings, or
c) varies any conditions of bail or imposes conditions hi respect of bail in 
criminal proceedings,
the court shall, to enable the defendant to consider making an application to another 
court, give reasons for withholding bail or for imposing or varying conditions. A 
copy of the written record of the decision should also be given to the defendant.
The exceptions to the right to bail are set out in Schedule 1 of the Act. The 
exceptions are split into two parts: those that apply to imprisonable offences and 
those that apply to non-imprisonable offences8 .
For imprisonable offences, the defendant need not be granted bail if the court is 
satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the defendant, if 
released on bail (with or without conditions), would: 
(i) fail to surrender to custody, or
(ii) commit an offence on bail, or
(iii) interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, whether
in relation to himself or other person 
(Sch 1 part 1 para. 2 Bail Act 1976).
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In considering whether these exceptions apply, the court shall have regard to such 
of the following considerations as appear to be relevant:
a) the nature and seriousness of the offence or default (and the probable method 
of dealing with the defendant for it),
b) the character, antecedents, associations and community ties of the defendant,
c) the defendant's record as regards the fulfilment of his obligations under 
previous grants of bail in criminal proceedings,
d) except in the case of a defendant whose case is adjourned for inquiries or a 
report, the strength of the evidence of his having committed the offence or 
having defaulted,
as well as to any others which appear to be relevant (Sch 1 Part 1 para 9 Bail Act 
1976).
Further exceptions to the right to bail are outlined (Sch 1 Part 1 paras 3-7 Bail Act 
1976):
a) if the court is satisfied that the defendant should be kept in custody for his 
own protection or, if he is a child or young person, for his own welfare;
b) if the defendant is a serving prisoner;
c) where the court is satisfied that it has not been practicable to obtain sufficient 
information for the purposes of taking a decision about bail for want of time 
since the institution of the proceedings against him;
d) if the defendant has been arrested in pursuance of section 7 of the Act;
e) if the case is adjourned for inquiries or a report, if it appears to the court that 
it would be impracticable to complete the inquires or make the report without 
keeping the defendant in custody.
The requirement for recognizance was abolished under s.3(2), however, the 
defendant can still be required, before his/her release on bail, to provide a surety or 
sureties to secure his/her surrender to custody (s.3(4)). A further provision is that 
if the defendant is unlikely to remain in Great Britain to surrender to custody, then 
s/he may be required to provide, before being released on bail, a security for his/her 
surrender to custody. Provision is made to enable a third party to provide the 
security (s. 3(5)).
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The provision under s.21 the Criminal Justice Act 1967 which provided that 
conditions could be attached to bail was also enshrined hi the 1976 Act. S.6 provides 
that the defendant may be required (but only by the court), before release on bail or 
later, to comply with such conditions as appear to the court to be necessary to secure 
that:
a) he surrenders to custody;
b) he does not commit an offence on bail;
c) he does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of 
justice whether hi relation to himself or any other person;
d) he makes himself available for the purpose of enabling inquiries or a report 
to be made to assist the court in dealing with him for the offence.
The provisions of this section provide that conditions of bail can be attached, 
unattached or varied at any time during the proceedings. This provides the 
magistrates with a degree of flexibility hi dealing with new or varying circumstances 
in the case. The section, however, does not indicate what the conditions are that can 
be used or which conditions are relevant to each of the reasons under s.6 justify ing 
then- imposition. This leaves the magistrates in a position where they have wide 
discretionary powers to attach whatever conditions they see fit to impose. The 
general rationale for the attachment of conditions of bail is that they restrict a 
person's liberty while still granting them bail. If conditions of bail are breached then 
the defendant must be brought back to court for a further remand hearing where the 
magistrates have the power to reconsider the remand status of the defendant.
An important new provision provided for under the Bail Act 1976 is the offence of 
absconding. S.6(l) states that if a person who has been released on bail hi criminal 
proceedings fails without reasonable cause to surrender to custody he shall be guilty 
of an offence. Furthermore, under s.6(2) if a person who has been released on bail 
in criminal proceedings failed to surrender to custody with reasonable cause, 
subsequently fails to surrender to custody at the appointed place as soon as after the 
appointed tune as is reasonably practicable, he shall be guilty of an offence. The 
onus is on the defendant to prove that s/he had reasonable cause for the failure to
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appear. The offence under s.5 is punishable either by summary conviction or as if 
it were a criminal contempt of court.
Under s.7(l) of the Act, if a person who has been granted bail in criminal 
proceedings and is, therefore, under a duty to surrender to the custody of the court, 
fails to do so at the appointed time, then the court may issue a warrant for his arrest. 
Under s.7(3) a defendant who has been granted bail by the court can be arrested 
without warrant by a constable in the following circumstances:
a) if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not 
likely to surrender to custody,
b) if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the person is likely 
to break any of the conditions of his bail or has reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that the person has broken any of those conditions, or
c) in a case where that person was released on bail with one or more surety or 
sureties, if a surety notifies a constable in writing that the person is unlikely 
to surrender to custody and that for that reason the surety wishes to be 
relieved of his obligations as a surety.
The defendant must be returned to court within 24 hours or as soon as is practicable, 
when they can either be remanded in custody or on bail with or without conditions.
Section 5(6) of the Act can be seen as a move towards protecting defendants' rights. 
It provides that where a magistrates' court withholds bail in criminal proceedings 
from a person who is not legally represented, the court must:
a) if it is committing him for trial to the Crown Court, inform him that he may 
apply to the High Court or to the Crown Court to be granted bail,
b) in any other case, inform him that he may apply to High Court for that 
purpose.
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THE NOTTINGHAM JUSTICES CASE
As Corre (1990b) states, R v Nottingham Justices ex parte Davies (1980) 2 All ER 
775 is,
... unquestionably the single most important judgement on the subject 
of bail. It has been suggested that the case has had a more significant 
effect on bail procedure than the Bail Act itself. (Corre, 1990b:69).
The case concerns the defendant's right to apply for bail on each and every occasion 
that s/he appears in court.
Clive Davies had been remanded in custody pending his trial on a charge of rape. 
He had made two bail applications under s.4 of the Bail Act 1976 which had been 
refused on the ground that one or more of the exceptions under Sch. 1 of the Bail Act 
applied. When he subsequently made an application for bail to a differently 
constituted bench he was asked whether there had been a change in circumstances, 
to which he replied that there had not. The justices refused to allow a full hearing 
as it was their practice not to hear a full application if there had been two previous 
applications that had been refused, unless they were told that there were new 
circumstances and they considered that these justified a further full argument.
The distinction was drawn between the first and second applications on the one hand 
and the third and any subsequent applications on the other because, in the justices' 
experience, the first application was often made by the duty solicitor who had not 
had the opportunity to take full instructions from his/her client. Therefore, during 
a second application, when full instructions would have been taken, matters were 
likely to arise which had not been considered by the court on the first application.
The applicant applied for judicial review for an order of mandamus to direct the 
justices to hear full facts supporting the application. In reality, it was a test case 
brought by a group of Nottingham solicitors unhappy with the justices' general 
policy. It was contended that the justices' decision was contrary to s.4 of the Bail 
Act 1976, which states that the court has a duty to consider whether to grant bail on
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every occasion on which the accused person appears before them in connection with 
proceedings for an offence, and the fact that the same or a different bench had 
decided on a previous occasion that one or more of the exceptions to the Bail Act 
1976 applied could not absolve them on a subsequent occasion from considering 
whether he was entitled to bail. Furthermore, it was argued that under s. 128(6) 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 which states that a magistrates' court should not 
remand an unconvicted person for more than eight clear days, was subject to s.4 of 
the Bail Act 1976.
The bench in Nottingham had agreed the policy the previous month as a way of 
saving court time by refusing to hear repetitious bail applications. The new policy 
was inspired by the remarks of Ackner LJ who asserted that it would be proper, in 
the interest of both "comity and common sense", for a bench to honour the bail 
decision originally made unless circumstances had changed. "[A]ny other course of 
action could result in defendants being remanded in unseemly fashion in and out of 
prison." (Brink and Stone, 1988:155). So under this policy on or after the third 
successive application for bail, when previous applications had been refused, the 
justices could refuse to hear full argument in support of a bail application unless 
there were new circumstances which they considered justified a further application.
The Divisional Court held that the practice of the Nottingham justices was correct 
and the applicant's only remedy was an application to a judge in chambers. 
Donaldson LJ concluded that "the Nottingham practice is not only convenient but 
right."
In refusing the application Donaldson LJ ruled that the court on the previous 
occasion had been satisfied that Sch.l exceptions to s.4 applied and that:
This satisfaction is not a personal intellectual conclusion by each 
justice. It is a finding by the court that Sch.l circumstances then 
existed and is to be treated like every other finding of the court. It is 
res judicata or analogous thereto. It stands as a finding unless and 
until it is overturned on appeal. And appeal is not to the same court, 
whether or not of the same constitution, on a later occasion. It is to 
the judge in chambers. It follows on the next occasion when bail is
81
considered the court should treat, as an essential fact, that the time 
when the matter of bail was last considered, Sch. 1 circumstances did 
exist. Strictly speaking, they can and should only investigate whether 
the situation has changed since then.(R v Nottingham justices ex parte 
Davies (1980) 2 All ER 755).
He goes on to consider what these changes might be. He argues that the fact that 
time has elapsed may result in a change of circumstances. He states that the ability 
to interfere with witnesses diminishes as police inquiries progress and statements 
have been taken. Furthermore he suggests that delays in the prosecution's 
preparation of its case may mean the defendant should no longer be remanded in 
custody.
Donaldson LJ adds one qualification to his ruling: when the court is considering 
afresh the question of bail, and deliberating the question of whether new 
circumstances exist, it is bound to take account not only of a change in 
circumstances subsequent to the second hearing but also of circumstances which, 
although they existed at the time of previous hearings, were not brought to the 
attention of the court. Therefore,
The question is a little wider than 'Has there been a change?' It is 
'Are there any new considerations which were not before the court 
when the accused was last remanded in custody. (2 All ER 775).
The concept of 'new considerations', therefore includes circumstances that have not 
previously been drawn to the attention of the court.
Criticism of the Nottingham Justices Case
The case has been criticised by both academics and practitioners. Alec Samuels 
(1981) said of the judgement:
The idea that the decision of three lay magistrates, or indeed one 
stipendiary magistrate, taken last week in the course of a few 
minutes' hearing in all the bustle of the remand court, should be 
binding for the future on another court, similarly constituted, hearing 
the matter next week, is truly astonishing, not to say ludicrous. The
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reason given for their decision by the magistrates last week are likely 
to be statutory, sparse, rudimentary, stereotyped. The only record is 
likely to be the barest note by the court clerk of the decision and the 
reasons summarised.... Magistrates should decide each and every case 
as it comes before them, on its merits, without regard to the 
sensitivity, vanity or reaction of colleagues who were involved in the 
matter previously. (Samuels, 1981:132).
1. The bail decision is not res judicata
Hayes (1981) takes issue with the Divisional Court's view that the magistrates' belief 
that one of the exceptions to bail applies "is not a personal intellectual conclusion 
by each justice. It is a finding by the court that Schedule 1 circumstances existed." 
She suggests that:
... this statement is legal sophistry, and not an accurate reflection of 
the bail decision. In particular it denies that each magistrate reaches 
his decision as an individual, and implies that the court is making a 
finding of fact when in reality a Schedule 1 circumstance cannot 
'exist'. (Hayes, 1981:22).
Magistrates are lay people who talk in lay terms, not on the basis of a "disciplined 
analysis of the terms of the Bail Act 1976." Observing that the "bail decision is a 
matter of guesswork, of hunches, not capable of precise explanation," and that it is 
affected by the individual and his/her character who is making the decision, she 
concludes that:
The bail jurisdiction is too uncertain and speculative for it to be 
satisfactory to apply the doctrine of res judicata or something 
analogous thereto; that the doctrine should be applied only to concrete 
facts not to prediction, especially where the prediction is based on a 
subjective belief which does not follow automatically from the 
grounds. (Hayes, 1981:23).
To view the bail decision as res judicata (which means literally that the issue has 
been decided) is, she argues, "very strained." The reason being that the effect of the 
doctrine of res judicata is that a person is prohibited from raising a point of law 
which has previously been decided against him by a court of competent jurisdiction, 
however, the bail decision is a prediction of future behaviour and is therefore quite 
different in character, requiring a subjective evaluation of objective facts. In short,
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she is arguing that the doctrine of res judicata cannot apply to the bail decision 
because there is no finding of fact but only a prediction of future behaviour.
Hayes' view is further developed by McBride (1990) who argues that no finding of 
the court is res judicata and cites the House of Lords decision in DPP v Humphrys 
(1976) 2 ALL ER 497 that "issue estoppel has no place in the criminal law of 
England."9 Throughout the case, McBride (1990) argues, it is obvious that issue 
estoppel and res judicata have the same meaning; therefore, given that Humphrys 
was binding on the Divisional Court, it is difficult to see how the Nottingham 
Justices decision was arrived at. Even if McBride is wrong and, as Corre (1990a) 
suggests, res judicata can be distinguished from issue estoppel, nevertheless the point 
remains that the doctrine of res judicata only applies to verdicts and is, therefore, 
inapplicable to bail decisions.
Hayes (1981) agrees that magistrates should not ignore their own previous decisions 
nor those of their colleagues, and in practice they do not. Nevertheless, they should 
be able to overturn the previous decision if they believe that to do so is necessary:
This [should] not be seen as capriciousness or inconsistency or 
impugning the decision of the earlier court, but rather as a proper 
exercise of the court's duty under the Bail Act 1976. (Hayes, 
1981:23).
2. Nottingham justices is contrary to the law
Hayes (1981) argues that the judgement is irreconcilable with the very principles of 
law which Donaldson LJ said he accepted in the Nottingham Justices case; namely:
1) that the accused person is entitled to bail except as provided by Schedule 1 
to the Act;
2) that on each occasion the exceptions specified in paragraph 2 and 3 (keeping 
in custody for the accused's own protection or, in the case of a child or 
young person, for their own welfare) only apply if the justices sitting are 
satisfied;
3) the fact that a bench of the same or different constitution has decided on a
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previous occasion or occasions that one or more of the Schedule 1 exceptions 
applies, and has accordingly remanded the accused in custody, does not 
absolve the bench on each subsequent occasion from considering whether the 
accused is entitled to bail, whether or not an application is made.
Not only does Hayes argue that the decision is irreconcilable with Donaldson LJ's 
own statements, but that it fundamentally undermines the statutory provisions under 
the Magistrates Courts Act 198010 and the Bail Act 1976 s.411 . Furthermore, 
nowhere in the Act does it state that the court is bound by the decision of its 
predecessors that an exception to bail exists. Therefore, the Nottingham justices case 
has no statutory footing and until such time as it does, is contrary to the law. In this 
way the Nottingham Justices case raises constitutional issues in relation to judicial 
lawmaking.
The Consequences of the Nottingham Justices
The consequences of the Nottingham Justices case were far reaching. As Burrows 
(1982) suggests, the most serious effect, whether intended or not, "has been to 
virtually deprive defendants remanded in custody of any chance of bail between the 
second appearance and the committal stage." (Burrows, 1982:409) He argues that 
this has happened because of several changes in magistrates' courts' procedure 
following the Nottingham Justices' decision. Firstly, a pattern for bail applications 
has emerged, with most magistrates' courts allowing two bail applications at the 
beginning of a custodial remand. However, some courts were only allowing one 
application, a practice facilitated by the imprecise wording of Donaldson LJ's ruling. 
After these applications have been exhausted, if no new considerations are deemed, 
by the magistrates, to exist, the defendant is remanded in custody until committal. 
Secondly, the decision has had the effect of making old style committals12 very 
unattractive because of the time they take to proceed through the courts. Increasing 
numbers of cases are, therefore, being sent to the Crown Court for trial, on paper 
committal, even when the evidence is weak and where, arguably, had an old style
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committal taken place, they would never have gone.
Moreover, Burrows (1982) highlights the difficulty in determining what amounts to 
a change in circumstances and adds from his observations that the magistrates' courts 
seem extremely reluctant to accept any situation as a change in circumstances. 
Burrows (1982) goes on to argue:
... that one might reasonably expect that some or all of the following 
would be sufficient; acquiring a job, offering sureties, securing an 
address at which the defendant can reside, deterioration of health of 
dependants at home, completion of police inquiries so interference 
with witnesses is less likely and securing an address away from the 
scene of the alleged offence. Yet all these have been held insufficient 
at various appearances. Indeed it is not easy to find a practitioner 
who has successfully argued a change in circumstances. (Burrows, 
1982:409).
He highlights that the decision as to what constitutes a change in circumstances 
results in a further area where inconsistencies can arise and that the situation is made 
more problematic in that the Divisional Court gave little guidance on this point other 
than by way of two examples13 .
This problem is highlighted by the deliberations as to whether committal in itself is 
a change in circumstances. In R v Reading Crown Court ex parte Malik (1981) 
Donaldson LJ ruled that:
Although there may be exceptional circumstances, as a general rule 
the moment of committal for trial must...be an occasion upon which 
an accused person is entitled to have his right to bail fully reviewed. 
In any particular case, the eligibility of the accused for bail may or 
may not have improved, but it is almost inevitable that there will be 
a change in circumstances. For example, the court will be in a much 
better position to assess 'the nature and seriousness of the offence' 
(Sch.l para 9(a) Bail Act 1976). In addition , the strength of the 
prosecution case can for the first time be fully assessed, both by the 
committing court and by the accused himself. This can be very 
material in considering the likelihood that the accused may fail to 
surrender to custody (Schl, para.2(a)). (R v Reading Crown Court ex 
parte Malik (1981) 72 Cr App R 146 (DC).
Donaldson LJ also held that the same principles, relating to renewed applications,
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applied to the Crown Court as to the magistrates' court.
However, the ruling on committal was overturned by R v Slough Justices ex parte 
Duncan (1982) 75 Cr App R 384. It was held that the crucial factor is the existence 
of substantial grounds for belief, not the belief itself. Therefore, it was argued that 
if a previous court had found that substantial grounds existed, a later court must 
accept that finding unless there was a material change in circumstances, as otherwise 
they would be acting as an appeal court. Therefore, justices need not hear an 
application for bail on committal if the only change was the committal itself.
Corre (1990b) focuses on another area of concern in relation to changes in 
circumstance. He states that even after the Divisional Court's ruling that the test was 
'new considerations', both practitioners and the courts still used, as their criterion, 
'change in circumstance'. New considerations is a "less stringent and more easily 
identifiable test. It means that the court may consider matters which, although they 
existed, were not before the court on the last occasion." (Corre, 1990b:74) 
However, a strict change in circumstances does not include this provision and is, 
therefore, more restrictive. Brink and Stone (1988) suggest that the justices in 
Nottingham deliberately applied the more restrictive definition of change of 
circumstances to get over the problem of not knowing what arguments had been 
heard previously, because, as already alluded to above (Samuel 1981), the court does 
not keep a full and accurate record, on which they can rely, of arguments previously 
put forward. The test of change of circumstance gets over this problem because it 
guarantees "that the information now before the court was not considered during a 
previous application." If this is indeed the reason then it might also explain why 
courts and practitioners are reluctant to use the less restrictive definition.
It was suggested (Hayes 1981) that, inevitably, the Nottingham Justices case would 
result in trials within trials: first the court would hear the arguments for, and 
determine whether or not, there had been a change in circumstances, and secondly, 
hear a full bail application. Hayes (1981) argues that this 'fruitless exercise' will 
use up the court time that it is trying to save. However, Burrows (1982), who agrees
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that the decision, in theory, should be a two stage affair, observed that, in practice, 
this was not happening; on hearing a submission for change in circumstances, both 
this and the bail decision were being decided simultaneously. He goes on:
Magistrates, being only human, seem reluctant to place themselves in 
a position of having accepted a sufficient change in circumstance has 
taken place, but then being unable to grant bail.(Burrows, 1981:410).
He asserts that this practice is wrong. It means that the bail decision is being taken 
on incomplete facts, but more importantly, that the presumption of bail is being 
turned on its head and "there is now a strong presumption against bail at each 
remand."
A further requirement deserves a mention here as it compounds the difficulty of 
applying for bail. Under the Law Society's policy (found in a letter dated June 26, 
1981 from the Law Society to partners of firms who undertake legal aid work) legal 
aid would not normally be paid for appearances at the weekly remand unless the 
appearance was necessary. Burrows points out that:
...'necessary' essentially means whether a bail application is to be 
made, although it may also cover a previously arranged meeting to 
take instructions. What it doesn't cover is an off chance attendance 
to see whether circumstances have changed sufficiently to enable a 
bail application to be made - and this is often the way that such 
changes come to light. (Burrows, 1981:).
Another major consequence of the Nottingham Justices case is that there would be 
an increased number of bail applications to the judge in chambers. As Samuels 
(1981) argues this is a lot more trouble for everyone than a brisk bail application in 
front of the magistrates. Furthermore, legal aid is not available for these 
applications, as already mentioned, and this results in inequality because of the dual 
system for applications, and the fact that preparation for such proceedings takes 
approximately five days.
Arguably the most important consequence of the Nottingham Justices was 
highlighted by the research of Brink and Stone (1988) who found that many 
defendants, as many as between one half and three quarters, were not making a bail
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application on their first appearance but delaying their applications or not making 
them at all. The overriding reason given for this by solicitors was the risk inherent 
in a request for bail. They identified the reason for this as the practice of some, but 
not all, courts of only allowing one bail application. Lord Donaldson's ruling, 
although providing that two applications should be allowed before fresh 
circumstances must be present, as there may be insufficient information available on 
the first occasion, left to local policy the question of whether or not to allow two 
applications. Brink and Stone (1988) argue:
As a result, even the very best solicitors are loath to put information 
forward to the court hearing on bail until they have convinced 
themselves that the request for bail will succeed. Indeed, this risk of 
forfeiting a client's only chance for bail was uniformly cited by the 
solicitors as the most powerful constraint on their willingness to 
request bail for their clients. (Brink and Stone, 1988:154).
In the one court that allowed at least two applications for bail, Brink and Stone 
(1988) found that only 16 per cent did not apply for bail on the first occasion, a 
figure significantly below the average found. They conclude:
In short, remand prisoners are failing to ask for bail, not because they 
want to go to prison, but because they are advised that the best way 
to obtain bail is not to ask for it - at least not yet. (Brink and Stone, 
1988:154).
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1982
To some extent the consequences of the Nottingham Justices case were mitigated by 
the provisions of s.60 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982, which came into force in 
May 1983, by extending the jurisdiction of the Crown Court to grant bail. Under 
s.22 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, if magistrates remanded a defendant in 
custody, at any stage of the proceedings, the defendant had the right to apply for bail 
to a High Court judge in chambers. However, as already stated, legal aid was not 
generally available for this procedure. Under s.60 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 
an application for bail may be made to the Crown Court, provided that the 
magistrates' court which remanded the defendant in custody has issued a certificate
89
stating that they have heard full argument on a bail application before so doing. 
Section 60 amends s.5 of the Bail Act (1976) to impose a duty on the magistrates 
to issue such certificates. This does not change the right to apply to a judge in 
chambers for bail but the advantage is that legal aid is made available for bail 
applications to the Crown Court. This provision also overcomes the problem of a 
dual system for applications to the judge in chambers which had been widely 
criticised as inequitable.
Schedule 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 amends s.128 of the Magistrates' 
Courts Act 1980. Section 128(6) states that, before conviction, a magistrates' court 
may not remand a person for a period exceeding eight clear days except in certain 
circumstances14 , the most important being if the defendant consents to be remanded 
for a longer period.
This provision is generally known as "a consent to remand in absence". The 
adjournments must be for the shortest possible period. If the defendant does consent 
s/he can be remanded in custody up to three times. On the fourth occasion the 
defendant must be brought before the court for a hearing and a determination. If a 
defendant withdraws his consent at any time, then the normal provisions of s. 128(6) 
of M.C.A. 1980 apply and s/he must be brought before the court for the next 
hearing and any further remands in custody cannot be for a period exceeding eight 
clear days.
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1988
Section 154 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 was an attempt to rationalise and 
clarify the situation in relation to the procedure for hearing subsequent bail 
applications following the Nottingham Justices case. It has been argued (Corre 
1990b) that Brink and Stone's (1988) study, cited above, which recommended a 
reversion to the original Nottingham Justices practice of permitting two full bail 
applications before new considerations had to be present, influenced the Home
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Office in enacting s.154 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Section 154 basically 
gives statutory approval to the Nottingham Justices' decision while attempting to 
clarify some areas which had been inconsistently applied.
Section 154 inserts a new part, following part II of Schedule 1, into the Bail Act 
1976 and sets out the procedure if bail has been refused at a previous hearing. 
Section 154 provides:
1. If the court decides not to grant the defendant bail, it is the court's duty to 
consider, at each subsequent hearing while the defendant is a person to whom 
section 4 above applies and remains in custody, whether he ought to be 
granted bail.
2. At the first hearing after that at which the court decided not to grant the 
defendant bail he may support an application for bail with any argument as 
to fact or law that he desires (whether or not he has advanced that argument 
previously).
3. At subsequent hearings the court need not hear arguments as to fact or law 
which it has heard previously.
Section 154(1) reaffirms the general right of bail under s.4 as did the Nottingham 
Justices case. However, s. 154(2) changes the criterion under which subsequent 
applications can be made from a change in circumstances or new considerations, to 
"fresh argument". Therefore, it puts a duty on the magistrates not only to hear fresh 
facts but to hear fresh argument. Thus "the question is whether the argument is new, 
not whether the facts are new." (Emmins and Scanlan, 1988:184). This means that, 
as well as new facts, a fresh argument can be constructed and put before the court 
using facts that have been previously aired during a bail application.
Furthermore, this section provides a statutory footing to permitting two bail 
applications as of right. However, this is something of a double edged sword 
because this right only applies to the hearing immediately following the hearing 
when bail was refused. Therefore, a defendant must apply for bail at two sequential 
hearings or his/her right is forfeited. The wording of the section is particularly 
relevant as "hearing" does not mean the same as "appearance", so a right to a 
second application can be lost if the defendant consents to a remand in his/her
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absence after an unsuccessful bail application. This is a result of s. 154(1) which 
provides that a remand hi absence is a hearing, at which the question of bail must 
be considered, as is a hearing when the defendant is present but does not apply for 
bail. As Corre (1989) concludes:
Section 154 will be welcomed hi many quarters as a restatement of 
the presumption hi favour of bail. It is regrettable that an important 
principle is drafted hi such a way as to make it not unlike those junk 
mail offers that urge you 'hi order to take advantage of this special 
offer, you must apply within eight days'. (Corre, 1989:497).
However, hi the case of R. v Dover and East Kent Justices, ex parte Deane (1992) 
(Crim. Law R. 33) it was held that the statutory hearings which take place in court 
when a defendant is remanded hi his absence do not constitute a hearing. Thus if a 
defendant is remanded in custody on the first occasion and subsequently is remanded 
in his/her absence the next occasion that the defendant appears hi court is the 
subsequent hearing under s. 154.
Section 154(3) states that the court does not have a duty, at subsequent hearings, to 
hear arguments that have been heard previously. This does not exempt the court 
from considering bail under s.4 of the Bail Act 1976. The court must hear an 
application for bail but it does not have to hear arguments that have been heard 
previously. As Corre (1990b) points out "this may mean that the defendant has 
nothing to argue, but the principle remains" (Corre, 1990b:79). This reverses the 
situation under the Nottingham Justices case where applications had two tiers; firstly, 
a consideration of whether there were new considerations and secondly, a bail 
application where both old and new arguments could be considered (R v Barking 
Justices ex parte Shankshaft (1983) 147 JP Rep:399)15 .
Two further fundamental changes to the bail procedure were enacted under the 
C.J.A. 1988. The first relates to serious offences and the second relates to remands 
in custody for more than eight days without the consent of the defendant.
Section 153 of the Act inserts after paragraph 9 part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Bail Act 
1976, para 9A which states that if:
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a) the defendant is charged with an offence to which this paragraph applies; and
b) representations are made as to any of the matters mentioned in paragraph 2 
of this part of this Schedule; and
c) the court decides to grant him bail, the court shall state the reasons for its 
decision and shall cause those reasons to be included in the record of the 
proceedings.




d) attempted murder; and
e) attempted rape.
Therefore, when a defendant is charged with one of the offences under section 153 
and is granted bail, the court must give reasons for doing so and these must be a 
point of record. This reverses the previous situation, which still exists for all other 
offences where reasons are required to be given by the magistrates when a defendant 
is remanded in custody or granted conditional bail. Benger (1990) argues that the 
section does not overturn the presumption of bail:
... as the matters which the court must consider and be satisfied 
[about] remain the same ... The Government, and Parliament 
accepted, that in ... very serious cases the public was entitled to be 
reassured by a statement of the reasons that the court has considered 
the arguments and arrived at a clear conclusion. (Benger, 1990:116).
However, it can be argued that the s.153 decision, in essence, is an overturning of 
the presumption of bail for the offences mentioned. In providing that reasons must 
be given if a defendant is granted bail, it suggests that some justification of this 
action is necessary, which in itself suggests that it is contrary to the norm.
The genesis of s.153 was public concern over several cases where the defendants 
were charged with serious offences when they were already on bail for other serious 
offences. The most prominent of these was the case of Winston Silcott16 .
The second major change under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 concerns remands in
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the absence of the accused. S.I55 inserts a new section s.!28(A) into the M.C.A. 
1980, providing that the current maximum of eight clear days for which a defendant 
could be remanded in custody, can now be extended in certain circumstances. 
Section 128(6) of the M.C.A. 1980 already provides some exceptions to the eight 
day rule: for remands for medical or social inquiry reports which can be up to three 
weeks and remands for summary trial on either way offences which can continue 
until such time as a properly constituted court may sit. The circumstances that are 
necessary under s.155 are that the defendant is before the court, that s/he has 
previously been remanded in custody and that the parties have had an opportunity 
to make representations and the court has set a date on which it expects the 
proceedings to take place. If these conditions are satisfied, then the court can remand 
a defendant in custody for twenty eight days or not later than the date of the next 
stage in the proceedings, whichever is less. The consent of the defendant is no 
longer required. 'The next stage of the proceedings' means, in essence, the next 
"effective hearing". Effective hearing means a hearing for a purpose other than 
remanding a person in custody again, for example, determination of mode of trial 
and committal proceedings.
A safeguard was enacted under s. 155(2) which adds a new paragraph to Sch. 1 of the 
Bail Act 1976 which requires the court to have regard to the total length of time the 
defendant has spent in custody when considering an extended remand. The 
motivation for this provision is to stop magistrates too readily remanding defendants 
in custody for twenty eight days. Emmins and Scanlan (1988) argue:
... that it is a welcome reform, for it should concentrate the 
magistrates' minds on the real effect a refusal of bail will have ... in 
reality ... the decisions taken on the accused's first and second 
appearances will virtually determine whether he is in custody for the 
whole period up to trial since, once bail is refused twice, it is very 
difficult to reopen the question on subsequent appearances. (Emmins 
andScanlon, 1988:186).
An important safeguard in the provision is that the section does not apply on the 
occasion of the first remand in custody, only to the second or subsequent remands 
in custody. This is of course of primary importance in the light of s. 154 of the
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Criminal Justice Act 1988 which only provides for a second bail application, without 
fresh argument, in the hearing immediately following the one where bail was 
refused. Therefore, if the court had the power to remand a defendant for twenty 
eight days from the first hearing, the second bail application would automatically be 
forfeited17 .
This provision was first tried on an experimental basis in four areas in October 
1988. On December 2 1991 it was extended to all petty sessional areas by the 
Magistrates' Courts (Remands in Custody) Order 1991. The impetus for the 
provision was the increasing realisation that a remand in custody for only eight clear 
days was both inconvenient and inefficient. If the defendant did not consent to a 
remand in his/her absence, then s/he had to be returned to court every week, when 
for long periods no progress was being made in the case. The inefficiency of this 
system came to light when the Home Office scrutinised the court escort system (see 
May and Morgan 1982, May 1985). This noted that a significant number of hearings 
were purely formal and did not in any way advance the case, simply resulting in a 
further remand in custody. It was estimated that the number of unproductive 
hearings was approximately 68,000 per annum. Furthermore, as a result of the 
Nottingham Justices case and s.154 C.J.A. 1988, permitting only two fully argued 
bail applications without fresh argument, in effect if there is no fresh argument, the 
decision is res judicata and the defendant will have no further applications for bail 
and will be further remanded in custody, perhaps up until the completion of his/her 
trial. Consequently, the defendant's appearance in court for the sole purpose of 
applying for bail is not now necessary after two applications have been made, unless 
there is fresh argument.
Of course, the problem of unproductive hearings had already been partially tackled 
by the provision for extended remands in custody if the defendant consented. 
However, some defendants still insisted on being produced for every hearing. The 
Government argued that the provision would save court time, by permitting cases 
to be dealt with more quickly and court business to be organised more efficiently; 
that it would save on prison resources arising from unproductive escort duties and,
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finally, that it would result in savings in legal aid. However, Emmins and Scanlan 
(1988) point out some of the possible disadvantages of s. 155. Firstly, they argue that 
it might result in further dilatoriness in the preparation of cases. Secondly, it would 
result in further problems for defence solicitors in maintaining contact with then- 
clients as they would not even have the weekly remand hearings in which to do so.
There is an additional power under s.!31ofM.C.A. 1980 to remand a defendant in 
custody for 28 clear days if s/he is already serving a custodial sentence for another 
offence.
Section 131(1) of the Act inserts into section 3 of the Bail Act 1976, the stipulation 
that a defendant who is required as a condition of his bail to reside at a bail or 
probation hostel may also be required to comply with the rules of the hostel. A 
further amendment of Sch 1 of the Bail Act (para.8) as a result of s. 131(2) of the 
1988 Act, provides that a defendant can be required, as a condition of his/her bail, 
to reside at a bail or probation hostel for an assessment of his/her suitability for a 
sentence hi a way which would involve a period of residence in a probation hostel. 
Thus, after a defendant has been convicted of an offence, the court can grant 
him/her bail, subject to a residence condition at a bail or probation hostel, to assess 
the suitability of a particular sentence.
CUSTODY TIME LIMITS
Custody time limits were introduced by s.22 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 
1985 and the Prosecution of Offences (Custody Time Limits) Regulations 1987 (S.I 
1987 No.299), as amended by S.I. 1991 No. 1515. The reason for then- introduction 
was the increasing realisation that delays in the pre-trial process were resulting hi 
defendants spending lengthy periods on remand. These delays were compounded by 
the fact that a high proportion of defendants were being committed to the Crown 
Court for trial. This obviously had a knock-on effect for the remand population in 
penal establishments. Basically, the provisions restrict the time spent in custody
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awaiting trial and provide that if the time limit is exceeded then the defendant must 
be bailed. They were introduced on an experimental basis in the first instance but 
now cover all petty sessional areas. Maximum remand periods for those defendants 
in custody are 70 days to committal and 56 days to the commencement of summary 
trial 18 . A custody time limit begins at the close of the day on which the defendant 
is first remanded and expires at midnight on the day of expiry (R v Governor of 
Canterbury Prison ex parte Craig (1990) 2 All Er 654).
The custody time limit can be extended if an application is made to the court before 
the expiry of the time limit. The application can only be granted if there is good and 
sufficient reason for doing so and if the prosecution has acted with all due 
expedition. If the time limit expires the defendant must be granted bail 19 .
The requirements of the provisions are strict and as Taylor LJ pointed out (R v 
Sheffield Magistrates' court ex parte Turner (1991) 1 All ER 858) any failure to 
comply with the strict requirements has "drastic effects". Taylor LJ also emphasised 
the consequent importance of the duty of the prosecution to comply with those 
requirements, in view of the danger to the public which may arise from failure to 
do so. This is important because the court has no discretion to extend the time limit 
after it has expired. Here, Taylor is alluding to the situation when a defendant must 
be granted bail, which must be unconditional, because of the failure of the 
prosecution to apply for an extension at an appropriate time. This situation is 
illustrated well by the case of R v Governor of Armley Prison ex parte Bond and 
Ward (1990) (The Times 23rd November)20 . In making this judgement, the court 
stated that the order to extend the time limit had to be clear, and set out a procedure 
to be followed:
1. the prosecution must make the application clearly and unmistakably;
2. the defendant or his representative must have an opportunity to object to the 
application;
3. the Chairman of the bench must announce in the clearest possible terms what 
order has been made (including relevant dates and details); and
4. the clerk must ensure that a proper and permanent record is made of that
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order.
The Divisional Court concluded that:
... [the] defendants were entitled to bail - in circumstances, be it 
noted, in which not only the prosecutor but also the justices would 
not have agreed to the grant of bail, so the grant of bail arose not on 
the merits, but simply out of procedural irregularity. 21
At the time when the custody time limits were introduced, they were criticised for 
not being strict enough. The actual limits that were introduced, it has been argued, 
simply reflect the usual time that is taken to prepare a case and consequently, will 
not result in a speeding up of the preparation process, nor, hi consequence, to a 
reduction in the remand population. It has been further argued that where extensions 
were necessary they would always be granted because they would be the complicated 
cases where the prosecution had made every effort to collect the relevant evidence, 
for example, hi cases which involved forensic evidence. A more fundamental 
criticism of the tune limits reflects Taylor LJ 's comments (cited above) that the 
magistrates are highly unlikely to refuse an extension and release a person on bail 
purely because the tune limit has been exceeded, when there has been no change in 
the original grounds for the refusal of bail. The magistrates would put themselves 
at risk, hi this position, of incurring the wrath of public opinion.
THE LAW RELATING TO OFFENDING ON BAIL
The perceived problem of offending on bail and the arguable increase in its 
incidence which was discussed in Chapter 1 has resulted in several important 
changes hi the law.
The Bail (Amendment) Bill was introduced as a Private Member's Bill hi 1992. It 
had two main components: (i) it overturned the presumption of bail for defendants 
who had allegedly offended on bail, (ii) it introduced a right of appeal for the 
prosecution against a decision of the magistrates to grant bail in certain 
circumstances (see Hucklesby 1993). The Bill gained all party support, although not
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before the first of these proposals had been dropped, and subsequently became the 
Bail (Amendment) Act 1993. This provides that the prosecution has the right of 
appeal against a magistrates' decision to grant bail when certain circumstances apply. 
The circumstances are that the defendant has been charged with or convicted of an 
offence punishable by five years imprisonment or more, or an offence of taking a 
conveyance without authority (s.12 Theft Act 1968), or aggravated vehicle taking 
(s.!2A Theft Act 1968). The prosecutor may appeal to a judge at the Crown Court 
but only if objections to bail were put to the original court. Oral notice must be 
given to the magistrates' court at the conclusion of the hearing and written notice 
served on the accused and the court within 2 hours. Once the notice is received the 
magistrates must remand the defendant in court pending the appeal which is a 
rehearing in front of a judge which must take place within 48 hours.
Another provision which resulted from the concern over the incidence of offending 
on bail was s.29 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 which was inserted by the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 which provides that offending on bail must be treated as 
an aggravating factor when sentencing a defendant. This is a mandatory provision 
which covers all offences whatever their seriousness and has been criticised for not 
allowing the seriousness of the offences to be taken into consideration.
SUMMARY
Several important trends can be found in the history of bail. Firstly, the 
establishment of criteria on which the bail decision could be based. This included 
the prominence of the need to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial; to which 
the risk of further offending was added by the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and 
interference with the course of justice by the Bail Act 1976. Secondly, the impetus 
behind many of the legal changes to the remand system has been to reduce the 
prison population which culminated in the presumption of bail which was introduced 
by the Bail Act 1976. Although some of this impetus for reducing the prison 
population was for humanitarian reasons, these were coupled with a need to reduce
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public expenditure. This is a goal which has become increasingly important since 
1979 and has arguably become the major vehicle for change, not only in the remand 
process but in the criminal justice process as a whole. Examples of cost cutting 
changes to the remand process are the Nottingham Justices case, latterly s. 154 of 
the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and remands for 28 days. The search for economy and 
efficiency has therefore been a major driving force behind changes to the remand 
process which has provided a rationale for attempts to reduce the prison remand 
population as well as explicit cost saving provisions.
However, in recent years there has been a partial reversal of the major trend to 
reduce the prison population which is illustrated by s. 153 of the Criminal Justice Act 
1988 and the Bail (Amendment) Act 1993 and the proposals contained in the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill (1993). The trend is one of the removal of 
the presumption of bail for two types of defendant. Firstly, there are those 
defendants who have allegedly committed a further serious offence (murder, 
manslaughter or rape) having been already convicted of or awaiting trial for, such 
an offence (s.153 Criminal Justice Act 1988 and clause 20 of Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Bill 1993). Secondly, there are those defendants who have allegedly 
reoffended on bail (Clause 21 Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill 1993). The first 
of the provisions can be characterised as part of the wider 'bifurcation' policy on 
law and order which distinguishes between run of the mill offenders who can safely 
be granted bail and serious, violent offenders who needed to be remanded in custody 
for public safety. However, the policy on the second group, the alleged reoffenders, 
can be characterised as diametrically opposed to this policy, as many of the 
defendants would be run of the mill offenders. These issues will be returned to in 
more detail in Chapter 10 when the proposals of the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Bill (1993) will be discussed.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Surety is a security in the form of money to be forfeited upon non- 
appearance in court, offered either by the defendant him/herself or by other 
people of suitable financial resources, character and relationship to the 
defendant.
2. The circumstances under MCA 1980 (s. 128(6) are:
i) the court may remand a person for a longer period if the two parties 
agree and consent;
ii) where a person is remanded for inquiries under section 10(3) or 
section 30 of the Act, after conviction but prior to sentence, the 
remand may be for the period of the adjournment, which is limited 
to a maximum of three weeks if the remand is in custody and four 
weeks if it is on bail;
iii) where a person is on trial for an either way offence, and the 
court is not constituted and sitting in such a place as enable it 
to proceed with the trial;
iv) where the court adjourns a trail, the person may be remanded 
for the period of that adjournment;
v) when a person is remanded in custody and s/he is already 
detained under a custodial sentence, s/he may be remanded for 
twenty-eight clear days (s.131).
3. The circumstances outlined by the Act where a court could remand a 
defendant in custody were:
a) where s/he was charged with an offence punishable with a term of 
imprisonment of not less than six months and the defendant had 
previously been sentenced to a term of imprisonment or borstal;
b) where s/he had previously failed to comply with the conditions of any 
recognisance entered into while released on bail;
c) where s/he had been charged with an offence allegedly committed 
whilst on bail;
d) where it appeared to the court that it was necessary to detain him/her 
to establish his/her address;
e) where it appeared to the court that the defendant was of no fixed 
abode or ordinarily resident outside the United Kingdom;
f) where the offence charged involved an assault on or threat of violence 
to another person, or involved firearms or explosives, or was one of
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indecent conduct with or towards a person under the age of 16; 
g) where s/he was likely to commit an offence if granted bail;
h) where it appeared to the court that it was necessary for his/her own 
protection to remanded the defendant hi custody for their own 
protection.
Bail could also be withheld if a defendant did not enter into proper 
recognisances or provide satisfactory sureties. Furthermore, under subsection 
6, the above provisions did not apply to adjournments for medical reports 
(under sec.26 of the M.C. A. 1952) 'if it appears impracticable to obtain such 
a report without remanding the defendant in custody'.
4. The Working Party's criteria were further elaborated upon:
1. the likelihood of the defendant's appearance. In considering this 
ground a number of indicators were to be taken into account: 
i) seriousness and nature of the offence charged; 
ii) the strength of the case against the defendant; 
iii) the defendant's previous record; 
iv) the likely sentence if the defendant is convicted; 
v) the defendant's community ties.
2. The likelihood of offences being committed if bail were granted. The 
major factors to be taken into account in deciding whether this 
criterion applied were the nature and seriousness of the alleged 
offence and the defendant's previous record.
3. Possible interference with witnesses. The important criteria here are 
the seriousness of the alleged offence and whether the defendant has 
a past record of violence or threatening behaviour.
5. This is the system used widely in the United States where "normally a person 
granted bail is required to produce the money hi cash, a person who can 
raise that money hi cash can seek the assistance of professional bail 
bondsman, who will lend the money for this purpose at a high rate of 
interest, then" decision being governed by a commercial assessment of the 
risk involved in a particular case." (Home Office, 1974:para. 109).
6. Community ties are aspects of a person life that can be said directly or 
indirectly to measure the stability of that person's life and more specifically 
suggest whether the defendant is likely to abscond; for example, whether or 
not s/he has a stable home address, whether s/he is in employment and 
whether or not s/he has dependants living with her/him.
7. In 1966, the Widgery Committee recommended that, subject to means, 
magistrates should grant legal aid to those defendants who are in real danger 
of losing their liberty. However, a survey conducted six years later found
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that over 80 per cent, of those defendants given custodial sentences were 
unrepresented (M. Zander 1972).
8. For non imprisonable offences the provisions are: under Sch.l Part 2 of the 
Act, the defendant need not be granted bail if:
a) it appears to the court that, having been previously granted bail in 
criminal proceedings, he has failed to surrender to custody hi 
accordance with his obligations under the grant of bail; and
b) the court believes, in view of that failure, that the defendant, if 
released on bail (whether subject to conditions or not) would fail to 
surrender to custody;
c) if the court is satisfied that the defendant should be kept in custody 
for his own protection or, if he is a child or young person, for his 
own welfare;
d) he is a serving prisoner;
e) he has been arrested in pursuance of s.7 Bail Act 1976 
(Sch.l Part 11 paras 1-5 Bail Act 1976).
9. Issue estoppel is "estoppel arising in relation to an issue that has previously 
been litigated and determined between the same parties or predecessors in 
title. The issue must be an essential element of the claim or defence hi both 
sets of proceedings. It does not prevent fresh evidence from being introduced 
in relation to the issue previously determined." (A Concise Dictionary of 
Law, 1990).
10. Which states that an accused person cannot be remanded hi custody for a 
period exceeding eight clear days.
11. Which states that a defendant is entitled to bail as of right each tune he 
appears or is brought before a magistrates' court.
12. There are two types of committal; old style committals are where there is a 
full consideration of the evidence against the accused to decide whether there 
is a pruna facie case against him/her. Paper committals are where, under 
certain circumstances, the accused can be committed for trial without 
consideration of the evidence.
13. These were: situations where the statements had been completed by the 
police and therefore the likelihood of interference with witnesses had 
diminished and secondly, where the prosecution have been unduly dilatory 
in bringing the case.
14. Section 128(6) states that, before conviction, a magistrates' court may not 
remand a person for a period exceeding eight clear days except: 
i) if the person is remanded on bail, the period of the remand may be
longer than eight days if he and the other party consent; 
ii) where the court adjourns a trial, the person may be remanded for the
period of the adjournment;
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iii) if on trial of an either way offence, the court is not at the time 
constituted and sitting hi such a place as will enable it to proceed with 
the trial.
At the end of the period of the remand, the defendant must be brought back 
before the magistrates who may remand him/her for another eight days. 
There is no limit to the number of tunes this may happen. It was the 
realisation that in fact most of these hearings were mere formalities that was 
the impetus for Schedule 9. The contents of Schedule 9 are as follows: 
"where a person has been remanded in custody, it may further remand him 
without his being brought before the court if certain conditions are satisfied. 
The conditions are as follows:
- he is before the court; and
- he has attained the age of seventeen; and
- he is legally represented in that court; and
- he has given his consent; and
- he has not been remanded hi his absence for more than two such 
applications immediately preceding the application which the court is 
hearing."
15. R v Barking Justices ex parte Shankshaft (1983) 147 JP Rep:399 which 
relates to what facts can and cannot be presented as subsequent bail 
applications. The justices had agreed with the defendant that there were new 
considerations and therefore permitted a further bail application. However, 
they submitted that during the application they could only consider the fresh 
grounds and not the old ones that had been put forward on previous 
occasions. The Divisional Court ruled that they had misdirected themselves. 
Cornyn J said:
You can only make a second application of any value or use 
to anybody if you take into account the whole circumstances, 
the old as well as the new. You cannot regard it as a half 
shut, half open door. That is not doing justice to the 
individual or justice in the eyes of the public.
16. Winston Silcott was on bail for the murder of Tony Smith, when it was 
alleged that he had murdered PC Blakelock during the Broadwater Farm riots 
in Totterham, North London. Silcott was charged with the murder of Tony 
Smith, who had been stabbed to death, during an argument at a party in 
December 1984. Applications for bail were initially refused for these 
proceedings, the major ground being fear that he would interfere with 
witnesses. The basis for this ground was that Silcott had allegedly poured 
scalding water on a friend of the murdered man while on remand. 
Furthermore, he had a string of previous convictions. Silcott was 
subsequently granted bail by a judge in chambers. Suggestions were made at 
the time that the judge had not been presented with the full facts, but this 
cannot be substantiated. In June 1985, Silcott was brought before the 
magistrates' court because he had allegedly broken his curfew. He was 
readmitted to bail as the breach was not seen as sufficiently serious to
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warrant a remand in custody. The trial for the murder of Tony Smith took 
place in February 1986, when Silcott was convicted and gaoled for life. Prior 
to this he had been remanded in custody on the further charge of the murder 
of PC Blakelock, which had taken place on October 6, 1985. Silcott was 
convicted and sentenced for the murder of PC Blakelock in March 1987. 
However, Silcott's conviction for the murder of PC Blakelock has since been 
quashed by the Court of Appeal. This epitaph to the case highlights the 
precariousness of remanding a defendant in custody on the grounds that he 
has allegedly committed further offences.
17. Section 128(A) of the M.C.A. 1980 also does not apply where the 
magistrates' court has granted bail with a surety or sureties and has 
adjourned the case for longer than eight clear days, but the defendant is in 
custody because the surety or sureties have not been taken. In this instance 
the defendant must be brought before the court at the end of eight clear days 
or earlier (r.23 Magistrates' Court Rules 1981).
18. The following rules apply in magistrates' courts for custody time limits:
i) for either way offences, the maximum period of custody between the 
defendant's first appearance and the commencement of summary trial, 
or, as the case may be, the time when the court decides whether or 
not to commit the accused to the Crown Court for trial, is seventy 
days (eighty four days in Birmingham petty sessional areas); 
ii) for an either way offence tried summarily, if the court decides to 
proceed to summary trial before the expiry of the fifty six days 
following the day of the defendant's first appearance, the maximum 
period of custody between the defendant's first appearance and the 
commencement of summary trial is fifty six days;
iii) for indictable only offences (except treason) the maximum period of 
custody between a defendant's first appearance and the time when the 
court decides to commit him to Crown Court for trial is seventy days 
(eighty four in Birmingham petty sessional areas).
When 'old style' committals (see above) take place (under s.6(l) of the 
M.C.A. 1980) the reference to the time when the court decides whether or 
not to commit a defendant to the Crown Court for trial refers to the time 
when it begins to hear evidence for the prosecution.
19. The Bail Act 1976 is, therefore, modified as follows:
i) the exceptions to the right to bail in sch.l do not apply;
ii) there can be no requirement made for sureties or security;
iii) no conditions can be imposed on bail;
iv) there is no power of arrest by a constable if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not likely to surrender to
custody; 
v) there is no power of arrest by a constable if a surety wishes to be
relieved of his obligations as a surety.
However, the time limit ceases to be effective if the defendant escapes from
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the custody of the magistrates' court or if a defendant who has been released 
on bail, because of the expiry of a custody time limit, fails to surrender to 
custody at the appointed time or is arrested for breach, or likely breach, of 
bail conditions.
20. In this case, the C.P.S. indicated to the magistrates, when the defendant 
appeared, that the prosecution would be applying for an extension. The 
application was never actually made but the defendant was further remanded 
in custody to his committal date. On the day following the hearing, the 
defendant's solicitor wrote to the justices' clerk requesting that the defendant 
be released on bail, as no extension of the custody time limit had been 
granted. The clerk, the magistrates and the prosecution were of the opinion 
that everyone was in agreement that the extension had been granted until the 
committal date. The Divisional Court held that although the prosecuting 
solicitor had indicated that he was going to make an application for an 
extension, he had never actually done so. Therefore, the defendant had to be 
released on bail because the court was of the opinion that the defendant 
himself had to understand why his liberty had been taken away.
21. The other case which is of relevance here is that of R. v Wirral District 
Magistrates' Court ex parte Meikle (C.L.R. 1990:801-3). The defendant had 
been charged with murder on November 9 and conspiracy to blackmail the 
defendant on November 17. The time limit in relation to the murder charge 
had expired on the 12th January whilst the time limit on the conspiracy 
charge had a further eight days to run. On January 24, the defendant was 
further charged with theft from the victim's house. On February 1 there were 
further charges of robbery and burglary. On March 29, the time limit on the 
theft charge only was extended. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the 
five charges laid against the defendant should be construed as one for the 
purposes of the custody time limit regulations and therefore, the time limit 
had expired on January 19 and that the justices had no power to remand the 
defendant in custody on January 24. The Divisional Court stated that it could 
not be held that all five charges be treated as one as the regulations (1987) 
refer to "offence" in the singular, thus each offence attracts its own time 
limit.
The effect of this case is that in practice, a defendant can be remanded in 
custody for a period exceeding the time limit if new charges have been laid 
against him/her as each offence has its own custody time limit.
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CHAPTERS
THE REMAND PROCESS IN CONTEXT: THEORETICAL 
AND OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
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An analysis of the remand process cannot be undertaken in isolation. It is only one 
part of the criminal justice process, through which a person charged with a criminal 
offence proceeds from arrest to final disposal. Consequently, it is necessary to place 
the process of remand within the context of the criminal justice process in order to 
understand its practical operation and its interdependence with other parts of the 
system. However, on another level, the criminal justice process itself cannot be seen 
in isolation from the wider political and economic environment in which it operates. 
These two levels, although distinct, interact and often become blurred when issues 
of practice are tackled.
The discussion in this chapter will deal with, firstly, theoretical approaches which 
have attempted to explain the operation of the criminal justice process which will 
contribute to the understanding of the findings of this research; secondly, the concept 
of the criminal justice process as a "system"; and thirdly, the practical implications 
of the "systems" approach to an investigation of the remand process. The aim is to 
provide a theoretical and operational framework within which the ensuing research 
findings can be understood.
MODELLING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
The sociological frame of reference, with its built in procedure of 
looking for levels of reality other than those given in the official 
interpretations of society, carries with it a logical imperative to 
unmask the pretensions and the propaganda by which men cloak their 
actions with each other. (Berger, 1966:51).
This section will review the work which has attempted to provide a theoretical 
framework with which to analyse the operation of the remand process within the 
wider criminal justice system. King (1981) defines theory as:
general principles or a set of general principles formulated to 
explain the events in the world or relations between such events. Not 
only do such theories provide explanations for past social behaviour, 
but they can also offer predictions as to the future. (King, 1981:8).
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Two theoretical approaches will be examined for use in later analysis. Both of the 
approaches arose out of a need to find an explanation of the considerable difference 
between what should happen (the rhetoric of the law) and what actually does happen 
(the practical operation of the law) in the criminal justice system - in short, the 
difference between the 'law hi the books' and the 'law in action'. The approaches 
are: firstly, the models of the criminal justice system as first outlined by Packer 
(1969) which were further developed by King (1981) and which seek to explain this 
discrepancy hi terms of the differing values of the individuals and agencies who 
work within the criminal justice system and the subversion of the law by criminal 
justice agents; and secondly, McBarnet's approach (1981) which focuses on the law 
itself.
Modelling the Process: King's approach
Models of the criminal process are an attempt to explain the difference between the 
law and its practical operation. As Packer (1969) states the criminal process:
... can be described, but only partially and inadequately, by referring 
to the rules of law that govern the apprehension, screening, and trial 
of persons suspected of crime. It consists at least as importantly of 
patterns of official activity that correspond only hi the roughest land 
of way to the prescriptions of procedural rules .. .we are just 
beginning to be aware how very rough the correspondence is. 
(Packer, 1969:149).
Therefore, as King (1981) states, this approach constituted an attempt to,
develop a framework for the understanding of the relationship 
between rules and behaviour within the criminal justice system, for 
without such a framework it is fruitless to talk of reforming the 
system by changing formal rules. In the past there has been a 
tendency ..... to assume that changes hi the law and legal procedures 
will result automatically in desired changes in the way the system 
operates in practice. Too often the good intentions of the reformers 
have been thwarted by the capacity of interest groups to interpret and 
adapt would be reforms so that they fit neatly into existing patterns 
of behaviour. On other occasions reforming the rules has led to 
unforeseen and undesired changes in the behaviour of those who 
operate the system. (King, 1981:3).
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Attempts to model the criminal justice process began with the work of Packer (1969) 
who identified two models of the criminal justice system - crime control and due 
process. His work was then elaborated upon by King (1981) who identified six 
models1 . These models will not be discussed in detail here as they are commented 
on elsewhere (see King 1981). However, three of King's models - crime control, 
due process and the bureaucratic models - are directly relevant to the operation of 
the remand process and will be used extensively to explain the findings of this 
research. Thus, the implications of each model for the remand process will be 
discussed below.
CRIME CONTROL MODEL
The crime control model can be characterised as an assembly line which moves 
people along with the minimum of difficulty towards the final outcome (sentence).
Under the crime control model, the primary aim of the remand process would be to 
prevent crime. This would mean that there would be a "presumption of custody" to 
prevent offending on bail. There may also be an element of punishment in 
remanding defendants in custody to deter them and others from further offending. 
This would be tempered by the need to take into consideration the harm caused by 
the commission of the alleged offence which would be a major factor in the bail 
decision. Consequently, if the crime control model was operational within the 
criminal justice process the two main criteria on which the bail decision would be 
based would be the risk of further offences being committed and the nature and 
seriousness of the offence.
The crime control model emphasizes the efficient processing of cases. Therefore, 
successive bail applications would be seen as an inefficient and unnecessary 
impediment to the speedy conclusion of the case. As a result, the number of bail 
applications available would be kept to a minimum or indeed, non-existent. 
Furthermore, the principle of uniformity would mean that defendants in similar 
circumstances should be treated alike which would enhance the deterrent aspect of
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a remand in custody. The principle of uniformity would also include court 
procedures and therefore, there would be a routine way of conducting bail hearings.
Crime control emphasizes the ability of the police and prosecution to screen out 
innocent defendants at an early stage. Therefore, there is a presumption of guilt for 
those involved in the criminal process. As a consequence, the remand process would 
be dealing with guilty defendants thereby neutralising many of the arguments against 
any presumption of custody. It also means that the decisions of the police and 
prosecution would be held in high regard and would rarely be overturned by the 
court.
Crime control also stresses the importance of informal processes to speed up the 
conviction of the defendant. On the one hand, this may result in the disregard for 
legal controls and, on the other, decisions made out of court are accepted, or even 
encouraged and rarely disagreed with. Furthermore, it would permit practices such 
as bail bargaining. In other words, it allows the participants in the process a high 
degree of discretionary power and condones executive rather than judicial remand 
decisions mainly because executive decisions are quicker.
DUE PROCESS MODEL
The due process model can be seen as analogous to an obstacle course where each 
stage of the process is a hurdle whereby, if it is hit, the person falls out of the race 
and consequently does not complete the process. Under this model, each and every 
remand hearing would be seen as an opportunity for defendants to prove their 
innocence or, at least, to apply for bail.
The primary function of the criminal process under due process is to safeguard the 
defendant from the exercise of arbitrary power by the state and the onus is on the 
state to prove the case. Therefore, there is a presumption of innocence which means 
that the remand process is dealing with legally innocent defendants. For this reason, 
there would be a presumption of bail to protect the rights of the defendant.
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Furthermore, defendants would be entitled to make a bail application on each and 
every occasion that they appeared hi court especially because any decision that is 
made is never final.
Due process insists on formal, adjudicative fact finding which results in an 
adherence to legal rules. If the rules are not adhered to then defendants should, at 
least, be granted bail or have the case against them dismissed. Moreover, all 
defendants should have the opportunity to discredit the case against them which 
would be facilitated by legal representation at all stages.
BUREAUCRATIC MODEL
The bureaucratic model, like the due process model, adheres to the idea of the 
protection of the individual. This is achieved by ruling out any form of 
discrimination against any individual or group by working within a system of 
predetermined rules of procedure and evidence which limit or even exclude any 
discretionary decision making. Therefore, the bureaucratic model is concerned with 
processing defendants according to standard procedures. Consequently, bail hearings 
would proceed according to the law and relevant rules and regulations.
The bureaucratic model is also concerned with the distribution of resources in an 
environment where there are conflicting interests and more specifically is concerned 
with the economic use of resources. As a result, it requires the use of time saving 
methods to process cases and discourages time wasting by the use of sanctions. 
Furthermore, to prevent duplication and, therefore, inefficiency the model dictates 
that each agency has a clear delineation of its role which takes account of the 
particular skills and resources available as well as any limitations.
The bureaucratic model also stresses the importance of records, as they provide a 
readily accessible and reliable source of information on what happened on all 
previous occasions.
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As a consequence, a remand process run on bureaucratic principles would have 
standard rules and procedures to follow with little, if any, room for discretionary 
decision making. This should result in consistent decisions so that like cases are 
treated alike. However, it allows little room to manoeuvre to take individual 
circumstances into consideration. To facilitate this all decisions would be accurately 
recorded.
Another feature of a remand process run on bureaucratic principles would be the 
drive for economy and efficiency which would involve various cost-cutting and time 
saving measures.
MODELLING PARTICIPANTS
King argues that the due process and crime control models also provide ideal types 
for identifying and categorising the attitudes and perspectives of the various criminal 
justice agencies and the individuals who work in them. To varying degrees they 
reflect the values and perspectives of one or more of the regular participants in the 
criminal justice process. Thus, he argues that the due process perspective is likely 
to be held by defence lawyers, that crime control perspectives are likely to be 
adhered to by the police and prosecution. He qualifies his statement by stating that 
not all personnel in a particular agency will view the system from this perspective, 
for example, some police officers will believe that citizens should have rights that 
protect them from the state. Furthermore, he argues that an individual participant 
may not adhere to any particular one of these perspectives but may select certain 
parts of each of them, depending on the particular case or individual with which they 
are dealing. It also follows that any one participant may change their perspective 
over time.
These perspectives are not exclusively held by those involved in the process, as they 
are present in other groups such as the media and politicians and the general 
population, nor does King claim that they are representative of any particular
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individual.
Further Additions to the "Models" of the Criminal Justice Process
Bottoms and McClean (1976) in "Defendants in the Criminal Process" outline a 
further model which they call the "liberal bureaucratic model" which they argue 
characterises the criminal process. They argue that the liberal bureaucratic model is 
typically, but not exclusively, held by humane and enlightened clerks to the justices. 
It differs from the crime control model by seeing the overriding function of the 
criminal justice process, not as the repression of criminal behaviour, but that of the 
protection of an individual's liberty and the need for justice to be done and to be 
seen to be done. This is similar to the due process model, however,
... the liberal bureaucrat is a practical man; he realises that things 
need to get done, systems have to run. It is right that the defendant 
shall have substantial protections; crime control is not the overriding 
value of the criminal justice system. But these protections must have 
a limit. If this were not so, then the whole system of criminal justice 
.... would collapse. Moreover, it is right to build in sanctions to deter 
those who might otherwise use their 'Due Process' rights frivolously, 
or to 'try it on'; an administrative system at State expense should not 
exist for this kind of time-wasting. (Bottoms and McClean, 
1976:229).
Therefore, the liberal bureaucratic model has the twin aims of protection of 
defendants' rights and administrative efficiency with the latter being of overriding 
importance.
Bottoms and McClean (1976) argue that the values of the liberal bureaucratic model 
are "everywhere to be found in the actual operation, and even in some of the formal 
rules, of English courts." (Bottoms and McClean, 1976:230). Somewhat surprisingly 
they also include defence lawyers under this model and argue that:
... the provision of defence counsel, sacred tenet of the Due Process 
Model, is no guarantee of the operation of the values of Due Process 
where the dominant structure of the court system is Liberal 
Bureaucratic; for lawyers must and do work within the system.
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They go on:
The same applies to the other Due Process rights formally available 
under our system. Hence the legal system is able to maintain the 
formal semblance of a Due Process model, while in fact being largely 
committed to a Liberal Bureaucratic model. (Bottoms and McClean, 
1976:231).
Bottoms and McClean (1976) also point out that the values of the liberal bureaucratic 
model necessarily reinforce crime control values, in the sense that emphasising 
efficiency promotes one of the central tenets of crime control. Therefore they argue 
that:
...despite the superficially apparent similarity of the value-systems 
underlying the Liberal-Bureaucratic and Due Process Models, in 
practice the Liberal bureaucratic Model offers much stronger support 
to the amis of the Crime Control Model than the Due Process Model. 
(Bottoms and McClean, 1976:232).
Blumberg (1967) comes to a similar conclusion when he portrays the criminal justice 
system as working under a model of 'bureaucratic due process'. He argues that due 
process is an ideology which provides a veil for the operation of 'bureaucratic due 
process' with its goals of excellence and efficiency.
Basically, Blumberg (1967) is arguing that there is a difference between the rhetoric 
and the practical operation of the criminal justice process because the procedure is 
reshaped due to the fact that it is run by bureaucratic organisations. The rhetoric is 
one of due process while in reality the agencies which work within the system 
rework the rules so that they are consistent with the bureaucratic values of 
efficiency, high production and the maximisation of individual careers. This happens 
because due process criteria introduce an element of chance and uncertainty which 
is not tolerated under the bureaucratic principles of the organisational environment 
of agencies. Consequently, bureaucratic due process represents the practices which 
the agencies have devised to reduce elements of chance in the respective working 
environments. Basically, due process is undermined by the drive for efficiency.
According to Blumberg, the remand process would be one of negotiation where the
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court hearing would be a formality because the decision had already been made out 
of court. This negotiation is likely to involve practices such as bail bargaining. 
Negotiation has the additional benefit of avoiding public scrutiny. He goes on to 
argue that the court functions as a closed community which conceals the nature of 
its operations not only from outsiders but from some of the participants themselves 
which facilitates evasions of due process requirements. Furthermore, it socialises its 
members and participants into following its objectives which are not part of its 
official goals of justice or due process. Within this structure, individuals' 
occupational and career commitments take precedence over official goals. In other 
words, a court culture develops which pays lip service to due process ideals but 
works towards the primary bureaucratic goal of maximum efficiency through the 
instrument of negotiation.
ANALYSING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
THE NEED FOR A WIDER REMIT
As Bottomley (1979) points out the most common research undertaken on the 
criminal justice system is that of positivist empiricism which has concentrated on the 
disparities between decision makers at various stages in the criminal justice process. 
It therefore concentrates on procedural and comparative issues and assumes a 
consensus exists as to the desirable objectives of the system. Low (1978) argues
... As far as research is concerned, therefore, rational liberal values 
have prevailed .... liberalism has ensured that research in the criminal 
justice area has assumed a social administration rather than a strictly 
sociological character ..... The officially stated goals of the system 
are largely taken for granted, and the sole concern is with the means 
with which they are realised. This leads to the research having a 
pragmatic quality. The accent everywhere is empirical. (Low, 
1978:14-15 quoted in Bottomley, 1979:88).
Bottomley (1979) goes on to state that as a consequence of the focus on procedural 
issues, where disparities have been identified it has been assumed that the direction 
of change is obvious; removing the inequalities through providing uniform
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procedures. He highlights the push towards improving decision making by providing 
relevant information. However, this does not ensure that the mere provision of this 
information will automatically improve the decision making process.
Bottomley (1979) states that criminal justice research is reluctant to confront issues 
surrounding the concept of justice. Either it is uncritically assumed to determine the 
direction that criminal procedure should follow or to have been displaced by the 
informal private justice of the different occupational groups within the criminal 
justice system or by the routinised administrative pressures of bureaucracy. Although 
this type of research does have a vital role to play, he stresses that it cannot be 
undertaken in a vacuum without critically evaluating the underlying assumption of 
a consensus as to the objectives of the criminal justice system or as to justice.
Griffiths (1970) criticises Packer's models on this very point. He argues that Packer 
presents ideological assumptions about the nature of the criminal justice system and 
more specifically about the function of the criminal law. Packer (1969) argued that 
his models were two ends of a continuum but Griffiths contends that they do not 
exhaust the possibilities. He argues that a problem with Packer's models arises 
because he assumes the general substantive functions of the criminal law, retribution 
and prevention, are fixed. Griffiths argues that for Packer:
... the function of the criminal sanction is to help prevent or reduce 
socially undesirable conduct through the detection, apprehension, 
prosecution and punishment of offenders. This is the only function 
that its rationale permits. (Griffiths, 1970:293).
Furthermore, Griffiths (1970) argues that this conception of the function of the 
criminal law relies on an additional assumption about the relationship between the 
state and the individual, which is assumed to be one of conflict. He argues that the 
threat to society from a breakdown in law and order by individual criminal conduct 
is of paramount importance to the crime control model whereas due process is 
concerned with the need to protect the individual from the coercive power of the 
state. Griffiths therefore sees the two models as one, which he calls the 'Battle 
model' because they are just alternative responses to the problematic relationship
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between the state and the individual which Packer (1969) assumes is irreconcilable.
THE LAW: ITS RHETORIC AND SUBSTANCE
The genesis of McBarnet's (1981) analysis arose from the paradox that:
... all the rhetoric of justice we are familiar with presents a picture 
of a system of criminal justice bending over backwards to favour the 
defendant rather than the prosecution ..... The whole flavour of the 
rhetoric of justice is summed up in the idea that it is better for ten 
guilty men to go free than one innocent man to be wrongly convicted. 
Why then the paradox that the vast majority of cases processed 
through a criminal justice system so geared to favouring the accused 
results hi a finding of guilt? (McBarnet, 1981:1-2).
In analysing this paradox McBarnet argues that only one side of the question of how 
the criminal justice process works in relation to the principles of law has been 
analysed, that of the operation of justice. Therefore, the hypothesis of the analysis 
always seems to be:
... concerned with why people who routinely operate the law also 
routinely depart from principles of justice - depart from them in 
either or both of two ways - violating the principle of equality before 
the law by being more likely to arrest, convict, or sentence [certain 
groups] ... [and/or] violating the principle of a criminal justice system 
geared to safeguarding the accused by routinely subverting the rights 
... [of the accused]. So we are presented with a picture of how social 
and human factors undermine the workings of a criminal justice 
system geared to constraining state officials and favouring the 
accused. (McBarnet, 1981:3).
Meanwhile it has not:
... focused on the system itself, seen its aims as problematic rather 
than to be taken for granted, treated rules as a significant factor in 
explaining its practices, or seen its assumptions and rhetoric, its 
concept of necessity, fairness and civil liberty, as requiring analysis 
and explanation too. The net result is that research into how the 
criminal law works overlooks the most obvious element, the law 
itself. (McBarnet, 1978:23-24).
Therefore, McBarnet is arguing that the law has been ignored; its nature and its role
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in the criminal justice process have been assumed. It is assumed that the law 
incorporates rights of the accused and the problem has simply been to consider why 
and how the police or court subvert, negate or abuse them. Thus:
In .... studies of criminal justice then, 'law' stands merely as a 
supposed standard from which the enforcers of law routinely deviate; 
legal procedures are simply assumed to incorporate civil rights. The 
'law in action' is scrutinised but what the 'law in the books' actually 
says is simply taken as read, it remains unproblematic and 
unexplored. (McBarnet, 1981:5).
In contrast, McBarnet (1981) argues that the law cannot be assumed to incorporate 
the principles of due process and it is therefore necessary to analyse the law itself 
not just the people who operate it.
In making the law itself a valid area for analysis, it changes the focus of attention 
away:
... from routine activities of petty officials of the state to the top of 
the judicial and political hierarchies where rules are made and 
sanctions operated, switching our question from the effectiveness or 
otherwise of rules and sanctions... to the intentions themselves ......
Shifting the focus to the political and judicial elites also shifts the 
focus to the very core of the operation of the state. ...... To question
whether the law in fact incorporates the rhetoric of justice is to 
question the ideological foundations of the state. (McBarnet, 1981:8).
McBarnet (1981) concludes in her study that there is a distinct gap between the 
substance and the ideology of the law.
A wide range of prosecution evidence can be legally produced and 
presented, despite the rhetoric of a system geared overwhelmingly to 
safeguards for the accused, precisely because legal structure, legal 
procedure, legal rulings, not legal rhetoric, govern the legitimate 
practice of criminal justice, and there is quite simply a distinct gap 
between the substance and the ideology of the law. (McBarnet, 
1981:155).
Therefore,
... if the practice of criminal justice does not live up to its rhetoric 
one should not look only to the interactions and negotiations of those 
who put the law into practice but the law itself. One should not look 
just to how the rhetoric of justice is subverted intentionally or
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otherwise ... [by criminal justice participants]: one must also look at 
how it is subverted in the law ... Deviation from the rhetoric of 
legality and justice is institutionalised in the law itself. (McBarnet, 
1981:156).
McBarnet (1981) argues that Packer's distinction between due process and crime 
control is a false one and that due process is indeed for crime control. She argues 
that the gap between the substance and the administration of law does not occur 
because individuals or agencies subvert the law but that the law, both in its substance 
and its procedure, allows, facilitates and upholds the deviation from the substance 
of the law. In this way, the operation of the law is not a subversion of the substance 
of the law but exactly what one would expect to find. Therefore, the substance of 
the law, which provides the rhetoric of due process, actually works for crime 
control.
This raises the question of how the law achieves the twin aims of upholding an 
ideology of due process while actually facilitating crime control. McBarnet (1981) 
argues that this is partly due to the mystique and inaccessibility of the law which 
protects it from scrutiny by the vast majority of people. She argues that it is the 
rhetoric of the law not the law itself which is well known and that it is not until the 
law is also accessible that the gap between the two can be revealed. Another factor 
is that of judicial reasoning. She argues that judges when deciding a point of law 
reiterate the rhetoric of the law while deciding the case without adherence to that 
rhetoric. Therefore:
The rhetoric lives on in the statute but is routinely negated in the 
courts by judicial reasoning. (McBarnet, 1981:160).
McBarnet (1981) goes on to argue that in a legal system based on case law it is 
relatively simple for the ideology of due process to be upheld while working towards 
crime control as:
... it operates at the level of the concrete case: highly particularistic. 
Hence the justification of excepting the specific case from the 
application of the general rule without destroying the general rule per 
se. The rhetoric and the law operate at two different levels, the 
abstract and the concrete, and the contradiction is operationally 
negated and a clear clash prevented by each being pigeon-holed out
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of the other's realm of discourse. The rhetoric is rarely actually 
denied, it is simply whittled away by exceptions, provisos, 
qualifications. Law in this form is rather like a Russian doll. You 
begin with the rhetoric and a single, apparently definite, condition 
which on closer inspection turns out to contain another less clear 
condition which in turn opens up to the unpredictability of 'it all 
depends on the circumstances' - which criteria we use in your case 
depends on your case. ..... The conflicting rhetoric of due process
and practical demands for crime control are thus both simultaneously 
maintained and the gap between rhetoric and practice is managed out 
of existence. (McBarnet, 1981:161).
McBarnet (1981) argues that this has implications for the reform of the system. Any 
reform which is implemented, if the assertions made above are correct, adds to the 
rhetoric of the law while being subverted in practice and furthermore, may result in 
a further whittling away of the original principles. Therefore, McBarnet concludes, 
before any additional reforms are undertaken, a deeper change in the form of law 
is required.
McConville et al (1991) dispute McBarnet's analysis on two fronts. Firstly, they 
argue that both the law and the system's low level officials should be studied and 
secondly, that the system is characterised by both due process and crime control 
philosophies simultaneously.
On the first point, McConville et al (1991) argue that the gap between the "law in 
action" and the "law in books" can only partly be explained by the law itself. The 
law enables itself to be subverted because of the discretion it affords to interpret the 
law. In other words, the malleability of the law allows it to be undermined so that 
many practices of criminal justice agents are perfectly lawful and only offend due 
process values. However, this is only a partial explanation, as some of the practices 
of criminal justice agents do break the law. In other words, some of the practices 
which occur in the criminal justice process are not condoned by the law. As 
McConville et al (1991) state:
Concentrating on the elasticity of the law should not blind us to the 
fact that malleability is finite. (McConville et al, 1991:175).
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Consequently, they argue that both the law and the agents who operate it should be 
studied as:
... the law tells us what the police can do, it does not tell us what the 
police do do. Although this does not exempt the law and its 
controllers from scrutiny, the [petty officials] also cannot be 
exonerated from responsibility. (McConville et al, 1991:176).
This is especially the case when the petty officials can be instrumental in changing 
the law to coincide with their practices or values. The most recent example of this 
is the pressure the police have exerted on the Government concerning the need for 
a change in the law relating to offending on bail which has now been enshrined in 
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill 1993.
McBarnet (1981) assumes that the content of the rhetoric of the law is 'Due 
Process'. However, McConville et al (1991) argue that this cannot be assumed and 
go on to give examples of instances where the rhetoric of the law is for Crime 
Control. They, therefore, argue that the fundamental principles of criminal justice 
can be seen:
... as constituting, or deriving from, both Due Process and Crime 
Control ideologies. (McConville, 1991:179).
This is the second disagreement with McBarnet (1981) who concluded that 'due 
process' is for 'crime control'. However, McConville et al (1991) argue,
... that one does not exist for the other; rather both form part of the 
fabric of the law in all its manifestations - principles, rules and 
practice. (McConville et al, 1991:180).
They argue that due process and crime control have always co-existed uneasily with 
both the law and practice favouring crime control rather than due process. Despite 
this, their relative importance rises and falls over time. McConville et al (1991)
argue that
"If we are now in an era of retreat from Due Process ... this may be 
connected to the massive post-war extension to suspects and 
defendants of legal advice and representation - to the actual 
utilization, in other words, of Due Process." (McConville, 1991:180).
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In other words, the increase in crime control measures hi recent years, such as those 
proposed in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill 1993, is part of a backlash 
against the extension of Due Process which it is argued by some has brought the 
balance too far hi favour of the defendant.
Consequently, McConville et al (1991) argue that the rhetoric, the substance and the 
practical operation of the criminal justice system should be investigated on all levels 
from the petty officials to the structure of society. Without this a full explanation of 
the gap between the "law in books" and the "law hi action" is unachievable.
THE RHETORIC OF THE LAW ON BAIL
The discussion above makes it apparent that to facilitate any analysis of the remand 
process, it is necessary to outline the rhetoric of the law on bail. For McBarnet, the 
stated objectives, as prescribed by the rhetoric of the law, are functional only hi the 
sense of providing an ideological veil behind which the reality of the process can be 
obscured. That reality includes a hidden agenda of crime control aims and objectives 
which may be contrary to those stated in the rhetoric of the law which espouses due 
process. If this is the case it is not necessary to examine the rhetoric of the law. 
However, an analysis of the remand process would be incomplete if the rhetoric of 
the law were not examined, particularly because they provide a standard by which 
to measure not only the practical operation of the remand process but also the law 
relating to bail. Furthermore, McConville et al (1991) argue that the rhetoric cannot 
be assumed to be for due process and that it is contradictory in nature, a conclusion 
which seems valid hi relation to the law on bail.
The rhetoric of the law on bail ostensibly has a fairly clear objective: that every 
defendant has the right to bail. This is based on a due process ideology which arises 
out of the doctrine that the defendant is innocent until proven guilty which is the 
fundamental due process premise of the criminal justice system. This means that the 
remand process by its very nature is dealing with defendants who are innocent
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(except in cases where a defendant is remanded after conviction but prior to sentence 
for inquiries to be made to facilitate the sentencing process). A further assumption 
underlies the objective that all defendants have a right to bail, this being that the 
state, hi the guise of the criminal justice system, does not have the right to imprison 
innocent people. Although the authenticity of these ideologies can be questioned, the 
majority of defendants are granted bail which suggests that due process does have 
a place in the remand process.
According to the rhetoric of the law, the problem with the remand system arises 
when a second ostensible objective is added which is contradictory to the first, 
namely, that of protection of the public. This is fundamentally a crime control 
doctrine. To facilitate the second objective the first objective must be compromised 
which suggests that although due process is part of the rhetoric of the law it is 
secondary to crime control. Furthermore, McConville et al (1991) argue
The idea that the interests of the community are antithetical to rights 
and liberties of individual citizens is a Crime Control view. 
(McConville, 1991:180).
This follows from an inherent assumption that the public will be protected if a 
defendant is remanded in custody (this follows the wider objective of the criminal 
justice system of incapacitation). There is also a related underlying assumption that 
the imposition of conditions of bail, to some degree, satisfies the criterion of 
protection of the public, by imposing restrictions on the defendant.
So on the level of rhetoric, at least, the remand process is fundamentally an attempt 
to deal with the conflicting interests and rights of the individual (the defendant), and 
society (the public) in the pre-trial arena - in other words, the conflict between due 
process and crime control. Many of the discussions that will follow arise out of these 
two conflicting objectives. Indeed, this has already been alluded to earlier in this 
chapter in the discussion of the theoretical approaches to the criminal justice system. 
This leaves the analysis open to the criticism of being 'liberal reformist'. However, 
the objective is to achieve the twin aims of demystifying the practical operation of 
the remand process and deconstructing the law by which it operates. What is then
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provided is a comprehensive analysis of the remand process which will be firmly 
placed within the context of the criminal justice process.
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS AS A "SYSTEM"
There is wide agreement that the various stages of the criminal justice process and 
the agencies in charge of these stages are closely related and are part of a "system". 
In consequence, no stage within this process can be viewed in isolation as the 
policies and practices which it follows have consequences for other parts of the 
system and the policies and practices of other stages of the system impinge upon and 
have consequences for the stage under scrutiny. As a result, the operation of the 
remand process must be seen in the context of the whole criminal justice system. 
Moreover, the remand process itself and the law on bail straddle almost all of the 
stages of the criminal process as bail is an issue from when the defendant is charged 
to his/her final disposal with the legal provisions relating to bail being the same 
throughout the court based remand process except for minor differences once the 
defendant has been convicted. Furthermore, and partly as a result of this, every 
criminal justice agency is involved, at some point, in the remand process. In short, 
the remand process can be seen as a sub-system within the criminal justice process 
and thus as a microcosm, as well as an integral part, of the criminal justice process 
as a whole. Therefore, the discussion of the criminal justice process as a system also 
applies to the remand process. It will be argued that as a consequence, an analysis 
of the remand process would be incomplete, and possibly fruitless, if the wider 
context of the criminal justice system were not taken into consideration.
Official recognition of the concept of a criminal justice system can be seen in the 
Home Secretary's evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Select 
Committee in 1984, in which, referring to his strategy for the Home Office, he 
stated that:
Our principal preoccupation is, and I believe ought to be, the 
Criminal Justice System which, incidentally, I wish to see treated in 
all that we do as a system, (quoted in Pullinger, 1985b:18).
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Pullinger (1985b) defines a system as "an organised or connected group of objects" 
or "a set or assemblage of things connected, associated or interdependent, so as to 
form a complex unity." (Pullinger, 1985b:19). He argues that this definition is 
relevant to the criminal justice process "as an interacting network of agencies which 
displays certain formal properties common to all systems." (Pullinger, 1985b:18).
In conceptualising the criminal justice process as a system it is necessary to define 
the boundaries of the concept of the criminal justice system. Pullinger (1985b) 
argues that there is considerable agreement as to what constitutes the criminal justice 
system. This is a combination of sub-systems of the police, the C.P.S., magistrates' 
courts, Crown Court and higher courts, the legal profession, the prison service and 
the probation service. He goes on to argue that the criminal justice system is 
hierarchical in the sense that hierarchy can be defined as consisting of "entities 
which may be meaningfully regarded as wholes, which are built up of smaller 
entities which themselves are wholes .. and so on." (Checkland, 1981 quoted in 
Pullinger, 1985b:22).
Although there seems to be little argument that these sub-systems make up the 
criminal justice system, there is less agreement about what constitutes these sub- 
systems. Pullinger (1985b) includes organisations which Feeney (1985) characterises 
as being closely related to, but not part of, the system. For example, Pullinger 
includes the Howard League for Penal Reform in his prison sub-system while 
Feeney (1985) states that medical, mental health, welfare, education and private 
security systems are closely related to, but not part of, the criminal justice system. 
It must also be noted that there is a hierarchy within the sub-systems of agencies and 
individuals and these may also have competing and conflicting aims and objectives. 
For example, in the prison sub-system prison governors' primary objective is 
efficient and smooth running prisons while the prison officers may be more 
concerned with overtime payments.
Another area of debate reflected in the examples cited above, is whether or not the 
criminal justice system is an 'open' system. This debate centres around whether or
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not the wider social, economic and political environment in which the system 
operates is taken into account when utilising the systems approach. The Home Office 
computer model (Morgan 1985b) utilises a definition which relies on the system 
being closed, where the wider environment is assumed to have no effect and the 
criminal justice system works in a kind of vacuum. Thus, it defines the system as 
those parts over which the Home Office or the Lord Chancellor's Department can 
exert influence and which significantly affect the passage of the defendant through 
the system. All other elements of the criminal justice process and its wider context 
are extraneous. This definition ignores the fact that the criminal justice system is 
part of and affected by the general political, economic and social environment in 
which it operates. For instance: the input into the system is affected by police 
decisions; the system relies on outside bodies for a proportion of its resources; the 
law is imposed by Parliament and the appeal courts and both the Government and 
the public can have a strong influence on operational policies through political and 
public pressures especially as "law and order" is such a high-profile political issue.
Whatever definition of the criminal justice process as a system is used, Pullinger 
(1985b) argues that it is possible to identify key ideas from the systems approach 
which are particularly relevant to the criminal justice system. Firstly, he highlights 
the importance of channels of communication and control within a system. Lines of 
communication between the various stages and their control centre(s) (policy making 
bodies) provide channels for feedback which can facilitate change and permit the 
system to be flexible and adaptable to changes, outside of its control, in its working 
environment. Secondly, because a system is greater than the sum of its parts, it 
possesses properties, called emergent properties, that are not possessed by any of its 
constituent parts. As a consequence, the system, as an entity, must be studied to 
extrapolate these 'emergent properties' as they cannot be established by studying the 
various parts of the system as isolated units. Thirdly, he argues that the criminal 
justice system is an open system which means that it is affected by the environment 
in which it functions. Finally, he uses the idea of a purposeful system (the idea that 
a system has a specific or set of specific purposes to achieve), which permits an 
analysis of the objectives, goals and aims of the criminal justice system. He
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identifies one of the problems with the criminal justice system as the different and 
often conflicting objectives of the system's various parts, both as agencies and 
individuals within those agencies, but argues that one of the strengths of the systems 
approach is that it can attempt to reconcile its parts.
Pullinger (1985b) argues that interdependence is the key concept hi a systems 
approach to criminal justice and its pre-eminence can be illustrated by the emphasis 
placed on it by the Home Office Research and Planning Unit whose 1984/85 
programme stated:
In order to study the criminal justice system at any point it is 
necessary to be aware of the interdependence of its component parts. 
Changes at any point have repercussions elsewhere: it is impossible 
to affect output at any one point without considering inputs elsewhere. 
(Home Office, 1984 quoted in Pullinger, 1985b:18).
Feeney (1985) concurs that interdependence is a central concept hi conceptualising 
the criminal justice process as a system and defines it as,
... meaning that what one criminal justice agency does is likely to 
affect and be affected by other agencies and that a detailed knowledge 
of the kinds of interactions that are likely to take place is essential for 
undertaking system improvements. (Feeney, 1985:10).
Therefore, the idea has the explicit objective of improving the system across agency 
lines.
Feeney (1985) argues that in the criminal justice process interdependence occurs at 
many different levels: national/local; agency head and working officer; strategic, 
tactical and mechanical. Strategic level choices include large questions of system 
design and structure and are usually made on a national level, for example the 
creation of the Crown Prosecution Service.
Tactical level choices involve the resourcing issues for particular criminal justice 
agencies. These choices can be made on many different levels but tend to be made 
locally rather than nationally. An example of this kind of choice is the prioritisation 
of police duties for resource allocation purposes within the given budget. Feeney
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(1985) goes on to state that it is at this tactical level that the criminal justice agencies 
are fundamentally linked by the process of discretionary decision making, through 
which cases are adjudicated and transferred from one agency to another. Here, he 
recognises that the criminal justice system and its component parts work in a clearly 
defined order. The police are the first sub-system involved, making discretionary 
decisions as to whether or not to arrest and charge a person. In this way, they 
largely determine the workloads of the other parts of the system. Once it has 
charged a defendant, the C.P.S. takes over control and makes the decision whether 
or not to prosecute the defendant. Once this decision has been made, the magistrates' 
courts sub-system takes over. The decisions taken in the magistrates' courts affect 
the workload of the Crown Courts in two major ways: firstly, where bail is refused 
by a magistrates' court, the defendant has the right to apply for bail to the Crown 
Court; and secondly, where the magistrates decide that the case must be tried hi the 
Crown Court. Furthermore, the courts may ask for assistance from the probation 
service, in the form of pre-sentence reports and the eventual sentence may have 
ramifications for either the prison service or the probation service. Therefore, the 
workloads of any one of the sub-systems is regulated by the actions of the previous 
sub-systems.
The final level of choices is mechanical. These are largely efficiency issues, 
involving the development of the simplest and most efficient ways of implementing 
policies and running the system as a whole. These considerations are increasingly 
important and to some degree can be said to be the impetus behind the 
implementation of the systems approach to criminal justice by public bodies such as 
the Home Office. This reflects the increasing realisation by these bodies that the cost 
of agency independence within criminal justice was a lack of coordination resulting 
in the wasting of resources by a duplication of effort.
Many recent reforms to the criminal justice system seem to have been on a 
mechanical level, having the aim of increasing the efficiency of the system. For 
example, the provisions under s.154 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 which, as we 
have seen, limits the number of bail applications to two without fresh facts, followed
129
the practice of the Nottingham Justices which was expressly implemented to save 
court time. However, efficiency is not the only goal of criminal justice. If it were 
then, as Feeney (1985) points out, the most efficient system would be to have one 
agency that dealt with the whole of the criminal justice system. The structure of the 
criminal justice system at present can be called "multi-organisational":
... it is a system of densely interconnected but largely autonomous 
organisational units. They do not operate as a single organisation for 
two mam reasons: (i) there is a strong and justified belief that the 
advantages of decentralised control outweigh those of the control from 
the centre; and (ii) the parts pre-date the whole, and often have a 
strong wish to remain independent. (Pullinger, 1985b:24)
Feeney (1985) argues that one of the advantages of decentralised control within 
criminal justice is fairness which is widely regarded as best served if crime detection 
and the punishment of offenders are kept separate from the finding of guilt and the 
imposition of sentences. Pullinger (1985b) adds that independence provides 
safeguards against the subversion of justice and benefits from the advantages of 
division of labour. The continuing importance of these principles can be illustrated 
by the formation of the C.P.S. as an independent prosecution service. Therefore, 
Feeney (1985) states that:
... ensuring the independence of each separate decision-maker as to 
policy matters, necessarily requires a grant of some independence 
concerning efficiency matters as well. (Feeney, 1985:12-3).
Therefore, Pullinger (1985b) agrees with Feeney (1985) that this requirement for the 
existence of the independent parts of the criminal justice system means that some 
efficiency must necessarily be lost.
Within this context Feeney (1985) reviewed the findings of the "systems" approach 
to the criminal justice process. He basically argues that although the criminal justice 
process has many of the characteristics of a system it is dysfunctional in the sense 
of the lack of cooperation of its component parts. The research has,
expos[ed] a great deal of divergence in the way that agencies 
approach^ ] particular problems and show[s] that the policies followed 
by one agency often undermine or [are] at cross-purposes with those 
followed by other agencies. It also demonstrate^] just how complex
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and interdependent the various parts of the systems actually are. 
(Feeney, 1985:8).
Indeed, the dysfunction of the system has been said to be so acute that the criminal 
justice system is not a "system" at all but a process. Evidence of the problems 
associated within the criminal justice process were evident during this research and 
are exemplified by the problems of delay in the processing of cases, the delay in the 
execution of warrants and in the problem of non-production of defendants for 
remand hearings. However, these are also evidence of the importance of 
coordination because to resolve them requires the cooperation of more than one 
agency.
Pullinger (1985b) argues that, in the light of these findings, what is needed is a 
plausible overall objective or set of objectives for the criminal justice system as a 
whole, which subsumes the diverse objectives of its various independent parts. 
Furthermore, he points out that the system can only work effectively if there is 
communication between the agencies which is facilitated by properly designed 
information channels which link them. He argues that control, which he identifies 
as an important component in any system, is also dependent upon information. 
Furthermore, because of the complexity of the criminal justice system, it is 
important that the flow of information is managed effectively.
Lord Justice Woolf (1991) commented on the lack of cooperation and coordination 
between criminal justice agencies and recognised the need for effective planning and 
communication within the criminal justice system both on a national and local level. 
He recommended the setting up of criminal justice consultative councils to aid 
collaboration, identify problems and alert agencies of issues that affected the system. 
To this end, the Home Office has recently set up these councils but it is too early 
to predict their success. Furthermore, attempts have been made on a local level to 
increase communication through the use of committees such as court users 
committees. Although no research has been undertaken to assess the effectiveness 
of these strategies the comments made during this research suggest it to be patchy 
and open to subversion by any one of the agencies or individuals involved. It is
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difficult to see how such a complex system can operate efficiently and effectively 
without a set of coherent and achievable objectives.
It is in the context of the criminal justice system that the remand process has to be 
studied. The remand process is only one part of the criminal justice system. For 
example, the input into the remand process - the number of defendants with which 
it deals - is dependent on police effectiveness in arresting persons and on then- 
decisions whether or not to charge a defendant, and on the C.P.S. decisions to 
proceed with the prosecution. The remand process itself also significantly affects 
other parts of the criminal justice process, such as the prison population. On a wider 
scale, the remand process is an important component of the philosophy of "innocent 
until proven guilty"; if this were to be undermined by changes to the remand 
process, there would be a profound and significant impact on the system as a whole. 
Consequently, in order to study the remand process, the role played by the system 
as a whole and its component parts must be studied to analyse their impact on the 
remand process. Furthermore, any recommendations for change must be made with 
reference to other parts of the criminal justice system and to the wider environment 
hi which this works; otherwise there is a danger that the reforms will be subverted, 
whether or not intentionally, by other parts of the system.
Summary
This section has attempted to provide a framework from which to embark on an 
analysis of the remand process. It has been argued that the remand system is part of 
and therefore must be placed in the context of the criminal justice system as a 
whole. If it is not, a distorted picture of the reality of the operation of the process 
will develop. As part of the criminal justice system, the different agencies are 
inextricably linked and interdependent as they perform different, but related 
functions within the system as a whole, and the remand process in particular. Having 
said this, it must be borne in mind that each of the component parts is an 
independent unit which to a large extent has discrete regulatory and professional
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bodies; for example, defence solicitors work under the rules and regulations of the 
Law Society, whereas C.P.S. personnel are officers of the Crown. This 
independence results in the agencies having their own philosophies, aims and 
objectives and working practices to achieve them, albeit within the context of their 
interdependence with other agencies and the system as a whole. It has also been 
pointed out that even within the various agencies, different individuals have different 
priorities which may or may not conflict with those of the agency as a whole or 
indeed with the criminal justice system. Consequently, four levels of analysis can 
be outlined:
a) the criminal justice system;
b) the different agencies of the criminal justice system;
c) the hierarchies within the agencies;
d) the individuals who work for the agencies.
Within these levels several important issues need to be addressed:
1) the official and unofficial aims and objectives;
2) formal and informal rules governing their working environment;
3) the working environment including pressures from other agencies and
regulatory bodies.
These must be examined in relation to how they affect the tasks that the agency as 
a whole and the individuals within each agency are expected to perform. 
Furthermore, the agencies must be compared with each other to extract the 
similarities and differences between them, hi relation to then- working practices 
which will facilitate an investigation of any tensions that may exist between them.
This exercise is made more difficult by the lack of a coherent philosophy as to the 
overall amis and objectives of the criminal justice system. Moreover, the criminal 
justice system is part of the wider political, social and economic environment, which 
provides a further level of analysis. Questions to be asked here include: how is the 





When examining the remand process all of these levels of analysis must be borne in 
mind. The remand process involves the majority of criminal justice agencies, so if 
the contention is correct that their independence may result in stresses and conflicts 
between the different levels, it is of paramount importance to examine the process 
on all levels to create a full picture.
One final level must be added, that of the rhetoric and substance of the law. This 
involves an investigation of the substantive law relating both to the general criminal 
law and, more specifically, to the remand process. This includes both statute and 
case law and more informal rules such as Home Office guidelines.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PARTICIPANTS IN THE 
REMAND PROCESS
It has been argued that the remand process must be seen in the context of the 
criminal justice system as a whole. In this section, specific aspects of the criminal 
justice system which affect the remand process are addressed. These issues, although 
not within the specific remit of the study, have a profound effect on the working of 
the remand process in magistrates' courts. Both the findings of previous research 
conducted on the remand process and the present research study will be utilised to 
conduct this evaluation of how wider criminal justice issues impinge on the remand 
process in court.
THE POLICE
The police play an important role in the remand process, as they are the first point 
of contact the defendant has with the criminal justice system. Once a person has 
been arrested police bail becomes an issue. It is important to note that since the
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creation of the C.P.S. (see below) the role of the police in remand proceedings has 
been diminished. Prior to the inception of the C.P.S. (when the police were 
responsible for prosecutions) the police were not only responsible for determining 
the question of police bail, but also for objecting to court bail, where necessary. 
This resulted, more often than not, in the police being present in court and often 
being called to the witness box to provide information relevant to the remand 
hearing. The previous research studies that will be cited were undertaken under the 
old system.
Although the police still have the sole responsibility for bail/custody decisions at the 
police station, the C.P.S. have taken over the responsibility for objecting to bail in 
court. The current process involves the police making an initial decision as to 
whether or not to bail a defendant either to the police station or to the magistrates' 
court. If bail is withheld then the defendant is kept in police custody until the first 
available court hearing. If the defendant is granted police bail to the magistrates' 
court the remand period is longer, usually about three weeks (although this varies 
depending on the court to which the defendant is bailed). The case file is then sent 
to the C.P.S. and includes a remand sheet on which the police record their 
recommendation as to the remand status of the defendant and, where applicable, 
their objections to bail. The form is a pro forma on which the police tick the 
relevant objections to bail (following the exceptions to the right to bail under the 
Bail Act 1976) and provide any information about why they believe the exceptions 
exist (also largely following those outlined in the Bail Act 1976). The form also 
provides space for the police to indicate the conditions of bail that they believe 
would be appropriate were the defendant to be granted bail by the court. Their role 
in the remand process, in practice, usually ends here although they can attend court 
and are sometimes asked, under oath, to provide evidence as to the facts of the case 
in court. This rarely happens. In the present research study, for example, on only 
one occasion during the court observations was a police officer asked to provide 
such information. As a result, the police role in court remand proceedings has 
largely been superseded by the C.P.S..
135
This is not to suggest that the police role in the remand process is of no importance; 
indeed the findings of the research suggest otherwise.
Statutory provisions
The statutory provisions governing police detention are set out in Part IV (ss.34-52) 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (see appendix 4). Basically, the police 
have a wide discretion, subject to statutory guidelines, either to detain a suspect in 
police custody until the first available sitting of the magistrates' court or to release 
a suspect on police bail again to appear at magistrates' court.
The police can also apply to the magistrates' court for an extension of the time a 
suspect can be lawfully detained for further enquiries to be made (PACE 1984, s.48, 
see appendix 4). The period of detention can be for a period not exceeding three 
clear days. This is commonly known as a remand in police custody2 .
National Statistics on the use of police bail
In 1992, 35 per cent of defendants who appeared in magistrates' court had been 
arrested and charged by the police. Thirty per cent were arrested and bailed and 5 
per cent (106,000) were arrested and detained by the police. In 1991, the year to 
which the research findings relate, 38 per cent of defendants were arrested and 
charged by the police. Thirty two per cent were arrested and bailed while 6 per cent 
were arrested and detained in police custody.
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Table 3.1 Proportion of defendants proceeded against in magistrates' courts by 
how dealt with prior to first court appearance.
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Summoned 70 70 70 70 73 66 63 61 61 63 65 
Bailed 24 24 25 25 23 30 31 32 34 32 30 
Detained 65553556665
Total 2233 2316 2197 2154 2180 1874 1908 1916 1968 2046 2137 
(thousands)
Source: Table 8.1, Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1992 (Home Office, 
1993a).
The differences in the proportion of defendants summoned, shown in table 3.1 can 
be primarily explained by changes in the law relating to certain offences. For 
example, the drop in the proportion of defendants summoned between 1987 and 
1990 can primarily be explained by the extension of the fixed penalty system for 
certain motoring offences. The increase in the proportion summoned between 1991 
and 1992 principally resulted from an increase in proceedings for summary offences. 
However, the proportion of defendants who are charged and detained in police 
custody is remarkably constant and suggests, as expected, that changes in the 
proportion summoned to the court has little, if any, effect on these figures.
Fourteen per cent of those arrested and charged were kept hi police custody prior 
to their first court appearance in 1992 - a figure which has been constant at 14-15 
per cent since 1988. Prior to 1988, the figures had been somewhat higher with 
between 16-18 per cent of defendants arrested and charged being held in police 
custody between 1978 to 1985. However, in 1986 the figure dropped below both of 
these constants to around 13 per cent only to rise to 16 per cent in 1987.
The proportion of defendants kept in police custody varies substantially depending 
upon whether the defendant is charged with a summary or indictable offence.
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Table 3.2 Proportion of defendants proceeded against in magistrates' courts by 
type of offence and how dealt with prior to first court appearance.
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Indictable 
offences
Summoned 22 21 22 21 22 21 19 16 15 14 13
Bailed 64 65 64 65 67 66 67 69 71 71 73
Detained 14 14 15 15 12 13 14 16 14 15 14
Total 
(thousands)







62 68 71 78 74 72 68 68 72 76
31 27 25 20 23 25 28 28 24 21
8532234443
Total 435 483 437 423 467 465 503 530 541 544 578 
(thousands)
Source: Table 8.1, Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1992 (Home Office, 
1993a).
Table 3.2 suggests that the seriousness of the offence is an important indication of 
whether or not a defendant will be detained prior to their first court appearance with 
defendants charged with indictable offences being much more likely to be detained 
in police custody.
The importance of the police decision
Previous research studies (Bottomley 1970, King 197la) suggested that the police 
played an important role in the court remand decision in two ways: firstly, the police
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decision to detain or bail a defendant prior to the first court appearance was found 
to be correlated to the court remand decision; and secondly, a correlation was found 
between police objections to bail and the court decision. As stated previously, the 
police no longer object to bail directly to the court. This is now undertaken by the 
C.P.S. and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. However, the police still 
have an indirect input into bail objections presented to the court, as they make 
recommendations to the C.P.S.. In this way the police role hi objecting to bail has 
become hidden from scrutiny as the final decision lies with the C.P.S.. To 
investigate the police role in bail objections, the focus of research must be shifted 
to the treatment of their recommendations by the C.P.S., a subject outside the remit 
of this research but briefly discussed in Chapter 6.
The second area where the police can influence the court remand decision is their 
decision to detain or bail a defendant prior to his/her first court appearance: the 
police bail/custody decision. Before proceeding to evaluate previous research on this 
particular question, it is worth noting that the studies cited were undertaken prior to 
the implementation of P.A.C.E 1984 hi 1986 when the police were working under 
different statutory provisions. Simon and Weatheritt (1974) concluded that whether 
or not a defendant was granted police bail was at or near the top of the list of items 
significantly related to the granting of bail by magistrates. This concurred with a 
previous study (Bottomley 1970) which found a very strong relationship between 
what Bottomley calls initial police action hi ensuring the accused's appearance at 
court and the outcome of the first court appearance (in terms of the bail/custody 
decision). Of those that appeared hi police custody, 83 per cent of those in the urban 
court (his study distinguished between a court hi an urban area and a group of courts 
in rural areas) and 90 per cent of those hi the rural courts were remanded in 
custody. Of those that had been released on police bail, 92 per cent were remanded 
on bail by the magistrates. Furthermore, Bottomley (1970) found differences 
between urban and rural courts. A larger proportion of those that appeared in police 
custody in the urban court were remanded on bail than by the rural court (40 per 
cent as opposed to 10 per cent). On the other hand, of those not held in police 
custody, one per cent were remanded in custody by the urban court as opposed to
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14 per cent by the rural court. These figures suggest that the police bail decision had 
a greater influence on the magistrates in rural rather than urban courts.
A more recent study (Jones, 1985) also found a correlation between the police 
bail/custody decision and the court remand decision. In 89 per cent of cases where 
the magistrates granted bail, the defendant had been bailed by the police. Where 
magistrates remanded a defendant in custody 90 per cent had been detained in 
custody by the police.
However, Doherty and East (1985) found that a high proportion (71 per cent) of 
defendants held in police custody were granted bail by the courts. The disparity 
between these figures and those of Bottomley (1970) may be explained by the police 
practice of keeping a person in police custody purely and simply because they have 
recommended that conditions be attached to the defendant's bail.
The findings of the present study confirm the importance of the police bail decision 
in the subsequent court decision. Three hundred and five defendants were observed 
on their first court appearance. Of these, data is available on previous remand status 
in 2773 . Of the 277 cases, 145 had been released on police bail and 132 had been 
detained in police custody. Of those on police bail 80 per cent (116 cases) were 
granted unconditional bail by the magistrates, 18 per cent (26 cases) were granted 
conditional bail. Only one person (0.7 per cent) released on police bail was 
remanded in custody by magistrates. Of the defendants kept in police custody 36 per 
cent (48 cases) were remanded in custody, 53 per cent (70 cases) were remanded on 
conditional bail, and only 7 per cent were granted unconditional bail. So, this 
evidence suggests that just over a third of defendants detained by the police are 
remanded in custody by the court. A substantial majority are detained only to be 
released on bail by the court in the morning.
The large proportion of defendants granted conditional bail following detention in 
police custody reflects the policy, mentioned in many of the interviews, that the 
police routinely keep defendants in custody when recommending to the C.P.S. that
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conditions be attached to bail. As one solicitor commented:
If the ... custody officer requires conditions on the bail, they will 
keep him [the defendant] hi custody and not release him on bail ... so 
it means that even those people ... who are inevitably going to have 
then- bail on the following morning are kept in custody just so the 
court can rubberstamp the condition. (45).
This finding is further supported by analysing the C.P.S. recommendation to the 
court for defendants granted conditional bail having been detained in police custody 
prior to their court appearance. Nevertheless, not all defendants granted conditional 
bail had been detained hi police custody prior to their first court appearance. In 79 
per cent of the 70 cases where the defendant was kept hi police custody and 
subsequently granted conditional bail by the courts, the C.P.S. had requested 
conditional bail. In only 21 per cent had the C.P.S. recommended that the defendant 
be remanded in custody. Thus, the evidence suggests that nearly 80 per cent of 
defendants granted conditional bail are detained by the police simply for the purpose 
of attaching those conditions not because they believe that the defendant should be 
remanded in custody4 . It, therefore, appears that the police routinely detain 
defendants in custody purely so that the court can attach conditions. Indeed, further 
evidence for this practice was discovered during the interviews when police officers 
stated that the C.P.S. had issued a policy guideline so that if conditions were deemed 
necessary by the police the defendant must be detained in police custody. This 
practice is premised on the view that if conditions need to be attached to bail, for 
whatever reason, then the defendant cannot be trusted to be released without them, 
even for a short period (usually overnight). Conversely, it would seem strange for 
the C.P.S. to request that conditions be attached to bail if the defendant has been 
released on police bail and had attended court and no further incidents have 
occurred. Consequently, it appears that for the majority of those detained hi police 
custody, the issue is not whether they should be remanded in custody but that, in the 
police's view some restriction on their liberty is required hi the form of conditions. 
Another consequence of this policy is the considerable police resources that are used 
by holding these defendants in police custody, not to mention the inappropriateness 
of the policy from a due process standpoint.
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The above figures highlight the issue, brought up consistently in the interviews, of 
whether or not the police should have the power to attach conditions to police bail 
and if so, in what circumstances. A provision proposed in clause 22 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Bill 1993 would allow the police, in reality the custody 
officer, to attach whatever conditions s/he sees fit in accordance with the Bail Act 
1976, thereby giving the police the same power as the court. The majority of 
respondents in the interviews were in favour of giving the police power to attach 
conditions. However, several respondents were aware that it increased the power of 
the police which could result in its abuse and therefore wanted some restrictions on 
their power. One suggestion was that the police should only have the power to 
impose a limited range of conditions. Another was that the police decision should 
be reviewed by the court at the earliest opportunity. A seven day period was thought 
appropriate by some, others wanted a quicker review if the defendant contested any 
of the conditions. As a member of the C.P.S. summed up:
If the police ... [could] impose conditions ... provided there is a 
safeguard whereby people released on that [sic] bail can go before the 
next available court with their solicitor if they feel aggrieved, it 
would save the police a lot of time, a lot of resources, it would save 
prosecutors, the defence solicitors a lot of time-consuming routine 
work, it would save the courts a terrific period of time. There has to 
be a safeguard because the danger is the police become too powerful. 
But I think that provided there is a right of appeal immediately, to the 
next court, that would be an adequate safeguard. (22).
As reported above, Bottomley (1970) found differences between courts in the level 
of concordance between the proportion of defendants detained in police custody and 
the court decision. Similar variations were found in the present research.
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Table 3.3 shows that the variation in the court decisions for those granted police bail 
is small except that Court B is more likely than the other courts to attach conditions 
to bail when a person has been granted police bail. However, the variation between 
courts becomes much more pronounced when a defendant has been kept in police 
custody. If a defendant is kept in police custody to appear at Court C, they are twice 
as likely to be remanded in custody than if they appeared in Court A. This disparity 
may, of course, be a result of differences in other factors related to the court bail 
decision in particular the decision of the C.P.S. to object to bail.
What is nevertheless clear is that the police decisions may have a substantial effect, 
albeit indirect, on the court bail decisions. So, is the relationship between police and 
court bail decisions problematic? The Home Office Working Party (1974) obviously 
did not think so when it stated:
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... a high correlation between the views of the police and the 
decisions of the courts is to be expected, since the considerations 
which each should have in mind are in many respects similar. (Home 
Office, 1974:para. 91).
However, if the police bail decision is related to the court remand decision as this 
and previous research has suggested, further research into the police bail decision 
needs to be undertaken to confirm that the Working Party's assumptions are correct. 
What is clear is that the introduction of PACE 1984 and the establishment of the 
C.P.S. have not had a significant effect on the relationship between the police and 
court remand decisions.
THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE
One of the most important changes in the criminal justice system in recent years was 
the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service (C.P.S.). The C.P.S. was created by 
s.l of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 and started to operate in 198(?. The 
function of the C.P.S. is:
... to take over the conduct of all criminal cases against both adults 
and juveniles (apart from minor motoring offences which have been 
excluded from the system) which are instituted by or on behalf of the 
police. (Zander, 1988:212).
This means that it is the C.P.S. who, after charge, conduct all criminal proceedings 
in the magistrates' courts including remand proceedings and who brief counsel for 
Crown Court proceedings. The way the system operates in practice is that once a 
person is charged by the police or information is laid against him/her, the papers hi 
the case are sent to the appropriate branch office of the C.P.S.. The evidence is then 
reviewed by a Crown Prosecutor and a decision is made whether or not to continue 
the proceedings and whether or not further charges are necessary.
When making decisions about the case, including whether or not to object to bail, 
the C.P.S. will liaise with the police and indeed, as mentioned above, the police 
make remand recommendations to the C.P.S.. However, the C.P.S. is, both in
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conception and law, an independent agency with the exclusive power to decide 
whether to continue the proceedings and whether or not to object to bail. Having 
said this, the independence of the C.P.S. is compromised by the fact that it has no 
investigative powers and the decision to institute proceedings is still made by the 
police.
The creation of the C.P.S. has radically restructured areas of responsibility within 
the criminal justice system. The police role is confined to the investigation of crime 
while the C.P.S. is responsible for prosecution - a role historically conducted by the 
police. Although the C.P.S. have faced operational problems since its creation, what 
is of concern in this research is that the establishment of the C.P.S. had the potential 
to change fundamentally the practical operation of the remand process. Indeed, one 
of the aims of the present study is to assess what difference, if any, the creation of 
the C.P.S. has had on the remand process. For example, previous research studies 
(Bottomley 1970, King 197la) identified a significant relationship between police 
objections to bail and the court remand decision. Does the relationship between 
whether or not objections to bail were put to the court and the court remand decision 
still exist after the creation of the C.P.S.? This and other issues will be discussed 
in detail later. At this stage, however, the role of the C.P.S. in the remand process 
has to be identified. When the C.P.S. receives a case file from the police, it contains 
a form which outlines the police recommendations on the remand status of the 
defendant. The Crown Prosecutor reviews the file and makes an independent 
decision, albeit on information provided primarily by the police, on whether or not 
to object to bail and, if so, on what grounds. They then present their decision to the 
magistrates during the first court appearance and any subsequent appearances and 
provide any relevant information where necessary. Consequently, it is the C.P.S. 
who decide whether or not to object to bail and if so, on what grounds and which, 
if any, conditions are applicable.
The effect of the creation of the C.P.S. and their role in the remand process will be 
a central feature of this study. The fundamental importance of C.P.S. decisions to 
the practical operation of the remand process will become apparent in the chapters
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to follow and will be returned to in detail in Chapter 10.
ISSUES OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION
The research previously conducted to investigate the remand process (King 197la, 
Zander 1971) attempted to evaluate the importance of legal representation to the 
decision. This was perceived to be a potentially important influence on the outcome 
of the remand decision as a minority of defendants were legally represented. For 
example, King (1971a) found that only 36 per cent of defendants were represented 
at any point in the proceedings, a figure which dropped to only 20 per cent at the 
first court appearance. Zander's (1971) findings are similar with 31 per cent of the 
defendants being legally represented in his sample as a whole. This proportion 
varied considerably between the stages of the case with only 10 per cent of 
defendants being legally represented on their first appearance.
The findings of the research were contradictory and suggested that if legal 
representation influenced the magistrates' decision it did not in every case. King 
(197la) found that although the proportion of defendants granted bail was similar for 
those represented and unrepresented (68 per cent and 67 per cent respectively), in 
cases where the police objected to bail, there was a small difference in the bail rates 
(25 per cent for those represented and 21 per cent for those that were not). 
Moreover, King (1971a) found that represented defendants were more likely to have 
more favourable information about their background made known to the court. 
Zander (1971) also found no significant difference in bail rates between those 
defendants who were legally represented and those that were not. However, when 
the police opposed bail, represented defendants were twice as likely to be granted 
bail (31 per cent as opposed to 16 per cent). A further study by Bottoms and 
McClean (1976) supported these findings.
Doherty and East (1985) found legal representation to be an apparent disadvantage 
in terms of the outcome of the remand hearing (the bail rate being 78 per cent for
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those represented and 94 per cent for those not represented), although they argued 
that this could be partly explained by the differential rate, between the two groups, 
of the police objecting to bail (19 per cent for those represented and 6 per cent for 
those unrepresented). Another factor to be taken into consideration is that a far 
larger proportion of the defendants were legally represented (80 per cent) which may 
have resulted in a change in the make up of the sample, in terms of other factors 
which may have affected the decision.
In conclusion, the previous research suggested that legal representation was not a 
factor which influenced the remand outcome unless the defendant faced police 
objections to bail where legal representation was loosely correlated to the remand 
outcome.
The issue of legal representation is largely unimportant in the present study as the 
vast majority of defendants were legally represented (94 per cent) from the start. 
Only 2 per cent of defendants were not represented (for the remaining 4 per cent no 
data is available). Furthermore, if a defendant appeared in court unrepresented, as 
a matter of course, the magistrates or the clerks to the justices made every effort to 
persuade them to seek legal advice. Moreover, none of the defendants that were 
unrepresented were remanded in custody, all were granted bail either unconditionally 
or conditionally. This situation is the result of three factors: the right of a person to 
consult a solicitor at the police station6 , the nationwide adoption of the duty solicitor 
scheme7 and the wide availability of legal aid8 .
For these reasons the number of defendants who are not legally represented during 
bail hearings is very small. However, the focus of concern has shifted to the quality 
of that legal representation. Although this is largely outside the scope of this study 
some of the data collected reflects this concern. Two questions were asked in the 
questionnaires which throw some light on the issue. Firstly, respondents were asked 
what they thought of the quality of the information provided by defence solicitors 
during bail proceedings. Of 52 replies, 20 per cent said the quality was poor, 35 per 
cent said that the quality was fair, and 43 per cent replied that the quality was either
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good or very good. Therefore, a slim majority of respondents thought that the 
information provided by defence solicitors was of only fair or poor quality. 
Secondly, the respondents were asked directly what they thought about the quality 
of legal representation. The responses were grouped into those that highlighted good 
aspects and those that highlighted poor aspects. Of the 32 respondents, 34 per cent 
said that legal representation was of good quality, 22 per cent said it was of variable 
quality and depended on the individual solicitor concerned, 28 per cent replied that 
it was of poor quality (16 per cent gave neutral answers). Although the results are 
not an objective measure of the quality of legal representation but subjective opinions 
of participants, the results suggest that there is a perceived need for the improvement 
in the quality of legal representation in bail proceedings.
STIPENDIARY AND LAY MAGISTRATES
Previous research studies have looked at whether or not there is a difference between 
the bail rates of stipendiary and lay magistrates. Both King (197la) and Zander 
(1971) found no noticeable difference between the bail rates of the two, although 
King (197la) argued that this was somewhat surprising as one would expect the 
stipendiary to remand more people in custody as s/he tends to deal with the more 
serious cases. However, both studies did identify a difference in the cases where the 
police objected to bail; stipendiaries overrode police objections hi a greater 
proportion of cases. The significance of the type of magistrate conducting the 
remand hearing did not appear to increase after the introduction of the Bail Act 1976 
as Doherty and East (1985) also found no significant difference in the bail rate 
between lay and stipendiary magistrates.
The present study also looked at the issue of lay and stipendiary magistrates, albeit 
from a slightly different perspective than previous studies. Instead of focusing on 
whether there is a difference in bail rates between types of magistrates (although this 
will be tested) the present study concentrated on the perceived difference in the 
quality and consistency of remand decisions between the types of magistrates. Which
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type of magistrate hears a remand application is particularly important to this study 
for several reasons. Firstly, for historical reasons, the South Wales area has a high 
proportion of stipendiary magistrates. In fact, Court C is served by two stipendiary 
magistrates who between them cover the main remand court on almost every 
occasion that it sits. Thus, all of the data collected from Court C, apart from two 
sittings when the stipendiary was unavailable, relates to the remand decisions of one 
stipendiary magistrate. This facilitates a comparison of the remand procedures and 
outcomes by lay and stipendiary magistrates, albeit hi different courts, and also the 
remand procedures in a court almost wholly overseen by stipendiary magistrates, 
thus allowing a test of the assumption that courts who have a stipendiary attached 
to them operate more efficiently and effectively. Secondly, the qualitative research 
suggested a possible area of reform should be that stipendiary magistrates sit at all 
remand proceedings, or at the very least, where there is a contested bail application. 
While this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9, it is important at this stage to 
stress that the proposal that remand proceedings should be heard by stipendiary 
magistrates taps into the wider debate as to the role and effectiveness of lay 
magistrates and, therefore, has implications for the criminal justice system as a 
whole. The proposed change rests on the assumption that stipendiary magistrates 
make 'better' decisions, more efficiently. It is this assumption that will now be 
examined.
For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to say that the lay magistracy has a 
long standing historical role in the administration of justice. Indeed, the origin of 
that role can be traced as far back as the Justices of the Peace Act 1361. There are 
over 28,000 active lay magistrates in England and Wales (J.P.N.,1990:726). Lay 
magistrates are so called firstly, because they are not paid for their work as 
magistrates (although they are able to claim expenses) and, secondly, because they 
do not need to hold legal qualifications (although there is no bar on legally qualified 
people becoming magistrates)9 . Magistrates are appointed on the advice of an 
Advisory Committee by the Lord Chancellor. Although the appointment of 
magistrates is not a central issue to this study it is important to note that concern has 
been voiced about the method of appointment of magistrates which results in a
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magistracy which is unrepresentative of the community which it serves, a central 
tenet for the existence of the lay magistracy10 . Another cause of concern about the 
lay magistracy is the level of training received11 . Most magistrates have only 26 
hours of basic training over three years and the vast majority of the learning is done 
'on the job'.
All the magistrates interviewed in the present study had received basic training 
which included training on the Bail Act 1976. The Clerk to the Justices in Court A 
stated that stage 1 (within the first six months) included a full three hour lecture on 
bail including the procedures and practices and the law on bail and stage two would 
include practical exercises which would encompass bail. However, only half said 
that they had received any on-going training and only one perceived it as a regular 
occurrence. Moreover, none had received any on-going training on the remand 
process in particular although some remembered training at the time of the 
introduction of the Bail Act 1976. Two (out of eight) thought that experience was 
the best training. All the magistrates believed their training to be adequate and only 
one thought that it could be improved by refresher sessions. These results indicate 
that the level of training on the remand system that magistrates receive is very small 
and most of their training is done on the job.
The level of training that the magistrates receive has been focused upon in the 
present study primarily in response to criticism of the inadequacy of magistrates' 
decision making in the remand process and more specifically the inconsistency of 
decision making between different benches. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 
9 but it is worthy of note that the inconsistency of lay magistrates' decisions, at all 
levels at which they operate, is well documented12 . It is under this agenda that 
several respondents suggested that one reform to the remand system should be the 
increased use of stipendiary magistrates.
Stipendiary magistrates are barristers or solicitors of at least seven years standing. 
The posts are salaried. Historically, they were appointed where there were not 
enough lay justices to cope with the work and where there was resistance to the
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appointment of men who acquired wealth through industry or trade. The role of a 
provincial stipendiary was to supplement rather than replace the lay magistrates.
The main advantage of stipendiary magistrates is their supposed speed and 
efficiency. In 1986, a joint Home Office and Lord Chancellor's Department 
document (The Size of Benches) stated that one stipendiary was equivalent to 36 lay 
justices in terms of judicial resources because a stipendiary works much faster than 
a lay bench. It is worthy of note that the same report indicated that the stipendiary 
should deal with the whole spectrum of cases although they should normally hear 
cases that are likely to last a couple of days or those involving difficult points of 
law.
Proposals have been put forward to extend the role of stipendiary magistrates in the 
criminal justice system and even to replace all lay magistrates with stipendiaries. A 
more realistic proposal may be that each bench or area should comprise at least one 
stipendiary. It is useful here to summarise the main advantages and disadvantages 
of a system of lay magistrates and stipendiary magistrates to put future discussions 
in context.
Firstly, in terms of financial cost, a system of stipendiary magistrates would be very 
expensive although arguably with the faster processing of cases and no need for a 
legally qualified clerk this may not be the case. Secondly, it is unlikely that there 
would be enough candidates to fill the posts of stipendiary magistrates whereas there 
are too many applicants for lay magistrates' positions. Thirdly, stipendiaries are 
legally qualified and therefore possess a certain level of knowledge and competence. 
However, lay magistrates have access, where necessary, to legal advice through the 
clerk. Furthermore, the assumption that legal qualifications are necessarily a good 
thing can be questioned. Finally, it is claimed that the present system gives the 
citizen a part to play in the administration of justice and one of the major advantages 
of the lay system is the concept of 'justice by one's peers', thus Raine (1989) points 
out that it makes the system seem more human, open and democratic. Furthermore, 
the lay system is claimed to reflect the values, interests and expectations of the local
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community, though in practice this is an arguable assumption given the 
unrepresentativeness of the lay magistracy.
There is a tendency for some commentators to see the appointment of stipendiary 
magistrates as the panacea for all the problems of the criminal justice system. 
However, the comments of Lord Bridge of Harwich in a House of Lords judgement 
are an important reminder of the importance of the lay magistracy to the criminal 
justice system:
[stipendiaries] ... are competent professional judges, [lay benches 
consist of] ... citizens from all walks of life chosen for intelligence 
and integrity, required to undergo some training before they sit and 
are advised by legally qualified clerks. They give unstinting voluntary 
service to the community and conduct the major part of the criminal 
business of the courts. Without them the system of criminal justice in 
this country would grind to a halt. (Re McM (1985) AC 528 quoted 
in Emmins:171).
CLERKS TO THE JUSTICES
The Clerk to the Justices is in charge of the administration of magistrates' courts and 
the legal aid system, the training of magistrates and is also the chief legal adviser 
for the court. In practice, because of the workload of the clerk, s/he is rarely in 
court and his/her staff of court clerks are the people who oversee the day to day 
running of the court. These court clerks, since 1980, must possess one of several 
qualifications which indicate a prescribed level of legal competence.
The role of the justices' clerks is laid down in the Justice of the Peace Act 1979 
(s.528(3)) which describes it as:
... including the giving to the justices .... at the request of the justices 
or justice, of advice about law, practice or procedure [concerning the 
discharging of then- functions as justices].... and that the clerk may, 
at any time when he thinks he should do so, bring to the attention of 
the justices or justice any point of law, practice or procedure that is 
or may be involved in any question so arising ...
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A Practice Direction (25 July 1981) states that the justices' clerk has responsibility 
for advising the magistrates on questions of law, or mixed law and fact, and as to 
matters of practice or principle. Furthermore, justices' clerks, where necessary or 
if requested to do so by the magistrates, should refresh the justices' memory on any 
matters of evidence and draw attention to any issues involved in the matters before 
the court. Court clerks can be asked to retire with the magistrates to advise them on 
the law. Moreover, the clerk can join magistrates in the retiring room of his/her own 
volition, if s/he believes there is a point of law on which the justices might need 
assistance which s/he inadvertently failed to advise them upon in open court. As 
Emmins (1992) points out it is important:
... that the clerk should neither interfere with the magistrates' 
decision on the facts or through retiring with them for no good reason 
for doing so, put him/herself in a position where s/he might appear 
to be interfering with their decision. (Emmins, 1992:198).
So, the role of the clerk is one of neutral arbiter who can advise magistrates only 
on the law or the facts of the case. They are not supposed to play any role in the 
decision-making of the magistrates.
However, McLaughlin (1990) disputes the portrayal of clerks as neutral arbiters and 
argues that they have both formal and informal powers that affect the situation both 
inside and outside the courtroom. He quotes from the work of Darbyshire (1980) 
who stated:
... one striking conclusion from this research, is that the role of the 
clerk in summary proceedings is far more important than seems to 
have been established previously. No longer can the behaviour of lay 
magistrates be examined without taking into account the behaviour of 
their clerks, (quoted in McLaughlin, 1990:362).
McLaughlin (1990) concluded that the court clerk's role is important:
... not only in what they are seen to do (advising magistrates, 
administering courts), but also in what they are not seen to do (in 
giving advice in the retiring room, setting court lists, and training 
magistrates). (McLaughlin, 1990:367).
Magistrates and clerks questioned in the present study tended to see the role of the
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court clerk as advisor to the magistrates on the law as well as summing up the 
arguments of both sides where a contested bail application was made. Their role was 
not to make a judgement as to the outcome of the remand hearing. However, one 
respondent stated that:
... in [Court C] the magistrates clerks rarely provide such advice with 
the result that irrelevant considerations are raised by the defence. 
(21).
A principal clerk in Court A described her role as giving advice to the magistrates, 
correcting any wrong information or law which was given, recapping on information 
given to the magistrates and going over any points when asked. This is further 
illustrated by the comment that:
[the advice you give to the magistrates is] just points of law, practice 
but on procedure as well. So if you are dealing with practice and 
procedure as far as the prosecutor and defence is concerned that tags 
onto a second role ensuring that the information that they give is 
correct and that it is information that they can give. For example in 
a bail application you have got to make sure that what they are 
saying, they are allowed to put to the magistrates ... [we are 
basically] like a referee ... ensuring that what they are saying is right, 
and they are entitled to say it, which basically boils down to law, 
practice and procedure and then relaying it to the magistrates. (28).
A clerk from Court B sees his role slightly differently; one of clarification and 
elaboration:
... I see my role, almost I suppose as a devil's advocate when I go 
out to see the magistrates [in the retiring room], to prompt them, to 
get them to think, to get them to structure their decision basically 
without telling them what decision to make ... I can highlight some 
of the points, sort of remind them of the points that the advocates 
have made, give my opinion as to whether or not any of the 
information is relevant or irrelevant and highlight some of the 
information that may be extremely relevant and information which 
may not be relevant at all. ... Whether it influences their decision - 
I think it influences their decision making process ... [and if that is 
the case] ... in a sense I influence their decision. (42).
The clerk also completes the bail form which is the record of the decision. As one 
clerk said:
The form that's actually completed ... is merely a written record of
154
what the magistrates have actually decided and announced in open 
court. (43).
The bail form is a pro forma where boxes are provided to tick to record the 
decision. If bail is refused the grounds for refusal are recorded. This is very 
important so that the next bench knows the grounds for refusal especially if they are 
hearing an application for fresh facts. Furthermore, if conditional bail is granted the 
specific conditions are recorded.
The Clerk to the Justices in Court A highlighted the different roles that are taken by 
clerks in different courts, but made it clear what he perceives the role of the clerk 
to be:
... I accept ... that there are a number of places where the clerks are 
more ... proactive or intrusive .... I would hope that they had 
enough confidence in the justices to let them make informed decisions 
and the purpose of their retiring with the bench would be to make 
sure the decision is informed, rather than to subvert that process. 
That's what I hope they do, I don't want them to shirk their duty in 
getting advice over, but I don't want anyone to think that the decision 
is being made other than by the bench. (26).
There was also some evidence of the different practices of clerks:
... there is no consistency in practice amongst clerks ... I've seen 
some clerks who will quite clearly give somebody advice on the law, 
I've seen at least one clerk who, if a defendant is known to her, she 
will seek to influence the decisions towards a remand in custody and 
has done so both in court quite subtly and I'm fairly sure has done it 
in the retiring room at well. She is always the clerk that will tend to 
either go to the retiring room unasked or will set things up that they 
are going to have to ask her ... (34).
In particular respondents were critical of the clerks in Court A:
... the clerks in [Court A] take a backward role, they don't get 
involved in court as such ... I feel that if the clerks were to better 
advise magistrates and guide them a bit more that would at least help 
the situation that presently exists. (22)
However, the clerk's role in the practical operation of magistrates' courts appears 
to be very important. For example, a clerk in Court A illustrated a way in which 
clerks can and do indirectly affect the remand decision. She stated that she and her
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colleagues were well aware of the reputations of individual magistrates as to whether 
they were lenient or hard in the sense of granting or refusing bail. Therefore, as the 
person responsible for the composition of the benches of magistrates on a day to day 
basis, she selected benches on the basis of evening out the bias of particular 
magistrates providing a mixture of those magistrates who were perceived as lenient 
and those that were hard - for example, selecting a magistrate who always gave bail, 
a magistrate who was inclined to remand a defendant hi custody and one neutral 
magistrate. This has obvious implications for the outcome of the remand decision.
One respondent thought that the clerk's role in the remand process was crucial and 
was one area where improvements could be made. He commented:
... courts have a culture, the culture is essentially set by the clerk to 
the justices more than anybody else and that culture will allow for 
individual idiosyncrasies or it won't... it'll affect the sort of training 
that magistrates get, the training the clerks get and the supervision the 
clerk get ... so all I'm saying is that court clerks are key people in 
terms of getting a more standardised implementation ... (25).
Summary
The rhetoric of the law states that clerks are neutral arbiters. However, this and 
previous research suggests that they play a vital role in magistrates' courts. The 
findings from this study do not provide concrete evidence that clerks directly affect 
remand outcomes but that they indirectly affect the practical operation of the remand 
process by the way they conduct themselves in and out of court. Furthermore, as the 
primary trainers of lay magistrates, they are in a position to affect magistrates' 
perceptions of their role and the decisions that they make.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This chapter has provided the theoretical framework for the thesis. It reviewed the 
"systems" approach and the various "models" outlined to explain the operation of
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the criminal justice process, which will be used to inform the ensuing discussion of 
the findings of this research. The applicability of any one or more of the models to 
both the practical operation of the remand process and the law that governs it will 
be returned to in Chapter 10. However, the importance of taking a "systems" 
approach to this research has been made apparent in the discussion of how criminal 
justice issues and changes affect the operation of the remand process. The discussion 
has made it apparent that the remand process cannot be seen in isolation from the 
wider criminal justice system and has shown that any of the findings of, or proposals 
within, this study must be put into the context of the criminal justice process and the 
wider social, economic and ideological debates.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Crime control, due process, bureaucratic, medical, status passage and the 
power model.
2. During the period of observation of remand hearings in magistrates' courts 
six applications for remands in police custody (s.48, PACE 1984) were 
observed. Interestingly, only one application was heard by lay magistrates in 
Court B which does not have a stipendiary attached to the court, whereas five 
applications were observed in Court C where the stipendiary magistrate 
regularly sits and who was sitting during these applications. The 
preponderance of applications in Court C may not, therefore, suggest that the 
police in area C are more likely to ask for a remand to police custody than 
the police in areas A and B, but that these types of application tend to be 
heard by the stipendiary magistrate, if available. This would explain why no 
applications were observed in Court A, as the stipendiary magistrate sat in 
a court that was not observed during the study. Conversely, it may indicate 
that the police more readily apply for further detentions to a stipendiary 
magistrate as they perceive that it is more likely to be successful.
Of the applications that were observed five were granted and the sixth was 
remanded in custody for seven days. What is surprising is that no 
applications for bail were made in these cases and, indeed, in only four of 
the cases were the reasons, in the form of objections to bail, outlined and in 
only three cases was there any further discussion or information given to the 
magistrate(s). In fact, the focus of these applications seemed to be whether 
the defendant should be remanded in police custody or to prison, not whether 
s/he should or should not be granted bail. These findings, limited as they are, 
suggest that although applications under s.48 of P. A.C.E. 1984 are relatively 
rare, the right to bail is overturned and the choice the magistrates have, in 
reality, is between a remand to police custody or a remand hi custody for 
seven days.
3. Of the 28 remaining cases (out of the 305) 18 did not appear in court so 
although on police bail, they were excluded from the figures and no data is 
available on the remaining 10 on their previous remand status.
4. However, it is possible that police and court bail/custody decisions are based 
upon different criteria or that the C.P.S. routinely disagree with the police 
assessment of bail risk.
5. It is headed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (D.P.P.), and is, at 
present (there are plans to amalgamate some of the existing areas), split into 
29 areas in England and two in Wales each headed by a Chief Crown 
Prosecutor, each of whom is responsible to the Director for supervising the 
operation of the service in their area. Each of the areas is split into branches, 
each of which is responsible for servicing a group of magistrates' courts and 
is headed by a Senior Crown Prosecutor. The Crown Prosecutors who staff
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these offices are either solicitors or barristers. Every Crown Prosecutor has 
the same powers as the D.P.P. in regard to the institution and conduct of 
proceedings (s.l(6)). Crown Prosecutors are given guidance on general 
principles to be applied by them hi determining whether to institute or 
discontinue proceedings by the Code for Crown Prosecutors issued by the 
D.P.P. under s.10 of the Act. The principles are, broadly, that 
commencement or continuation of proceedings must satisfy the so-called 
evidential and public interest criteria.
6. Under the provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, except 
in very limited and well defined circumstances, a suspect held by the police 
must be allowed to consult a solicitor at any time and free of charge 
(s.58(l)). The suspect must be informed of this right by the custody officer 
when s/he arrives at the station. The request for a solicitor must be met as 
soon as is practical unless certain circumstances apply (s.58(6)).
7. The duty solicitors scheme, which covered all the courts in the study, 
provides legal advice and representation without a means test or the payment 
of a contribution at court. A duty solicitor has an obligation to provide 
advice to persons in custody, and where appropriate make a bail application. 
They also have the discretion to advise persons charged with an imprisonable 
offence, (and in exceptional cases non-imprisonable offences) whether or not 
they are in custody. The 24 hour duty solicitor scheme also covered the 
courts hi the present study and provides legal advice to suspects and others 
hi the police station. Having said this, there have been problems with the 
operation of the 24 hour scheme which signal that its coverage and 
effectiveness may be reduced hi the future. Solicitors argue that the rates of 
remuneration are low and this has resulted in some solicitors pulling out of 
the scheme causing an unacceptable level of work for the remaining solicitors 
bringing several schemes to the brink of collapse. This may also be an 
important consideration with the court based scheme in the future, especially 
with fixed rate legal aid payments. Unfortunately, the duty solicitor scheme, 
especially those that run around the clock, are likely to be the hardest hit 
with a large number of solicitors withdrawing. Moreover, there has been 
some concern about the quality of the services provided under the scheme. 
A research report commissioned by the Lord Chancellor's Department 
(Sanders A. et al, 1989), was critical of the quality of the service provided 
by duty solicitors particularly their reliance on telephone advise rather than 
attending the police station hi person. The Board, therefore, changed the 
rules to require a solicitor to attend the police station in certain specific 
circumstances. However, there is still some concern relating to the use of 
legal executives at the police station instead of qualified solicitors.
8. If a legal aid order is granted it means that the costs incurred in conducting 
a defence are paid for by the state and not the accused. The provisions 
concerning legal aid are enshrined in the Legal Aid Act 1988 (ss.8-13). Legal 
aid is available both at the police station and throughout court proceedings.
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Most legal aid orders are subject to the defendants' financial eligibility. In 
other words, they are means tested. One notable exception is that all persons 
arrested for or attending voluntarily at the police station in connection with 
an offence are entitled to free legal advice and assistance from the duty 
solicitor or from their own solicitor (for further details on the provision of 
legal aid see Emmins (1992)).
A substantial proportion of defendants in the present study would probably 
be eligible for legal aid, on financial grounds, as the vast majority of the 
defendants in the sample were unemployed. The most accurate figures of 
employment status in the study are available from the court registers. Of the 
1070 cases where data was available 67 per cent were listed as unemployed 
with a further 3 per cent being listed as in full time education. This means 
that 70 per cent of the sample would almost definitely be eligible for legal 
aid.
9. The only qualification laid down in statute on the appointment of lay 
magistrates is a residence condition (s.7 Justices of the Peace Act 1979), 
although a magistrate must also be a British subject. However, there are 
certain categories of persons who will not be appointed, for example the over 
sixties and those convicted of serious offences.
10. See Baldwin (1976) on the political, social class and ethnic bias of the 
magistracy and Raine, 1989.
11. Since 1966, all magistrates are required to undertake a course of basic 
training. All magistrates are currently required to attend an induction course 
before adjudicating in court. This should involve instruction on the 
obligations imposed by the judicial oath; human awareness, including 
awareness of different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds; and 
criminal process and procedure. During basic training, they will attend court 
as observers and participate in practical exercises covering their 
responsibilities in court. Year 1 of basic training involves sitting in court, 
visits to institutions (6 hours) and further training courses (12 hours). Years 
two and three each require 4 hours training. Justices appointed after January 
1 1980 are also required to undertake 12 hours refresher training every three 
years. There is a list of approved topics but no prescribed syllabus.) The 
philosophy behind the training of magistrates is largely learning by doing; 
that there is no substitute for experience.
12. Jones (1985) found marked regional differences in the use of custodial 
remands; for example the custody rate was 7 per cent in Bedfordshire and 37 
per cent in North Yorkshire. He concluded that the differential rates could 
not be explained by the different types of cases coming before the court. 





This chapter focuses upon the outcome of remand hearings in magistrates' courts - 
in other words, the use of bail by magistrates' courts. This chapter will provide an 
analysis of the official national statistics on the use of bail since 1967 when the first 
legislative changes were introduced which provided for a presumption of bail. The 
findings of previous research studies will be examined to provide additional evidence 
on the use of bail. Finally, the outcome of remand hearings in this study will be 
discussed which will include an investigation of the differences and similarities of 
remand decisions between the three courts in the study.
THE NATIONAL BAIL RATE
The national statistics on the use of court remand provide an overview of national 
trends in bail rates. However, as the Home Office itself states they must be treated 
with caution and viewed as "broad estimates only, due to data quality problems" 









































































































































































































































1. 1977 figures relate to period July to December only and to indictable offences 
only.
Figures up to and including 1976 only relate to standard list offences which included 
all indictable and triable either way offences and some more serious summary 
offences. The figures from 1984 to 1992 have been adjusted to take account of poor 
recording which the Home Office stated resulted in the bail rate being a few 
thousand too high and the custody rate a few thousand too low. Even prior to this 
date the figures seem to have been constantly revised. Sources: 1967 to 1976: 
Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1977 (Home Office, 1978); 1977 to 1979:
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Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1979 (Home Office, 1980a); 1980 and 1981: 
Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1981 (Home Office, 1982a); 1982-1992: 
Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1992 (Home Office, 1993a).
Table 4.1 shows that there has been a steady decline in the proportion of defendants 
remanded in custody since 1967. The proportion of defendants remanded in custody 
now stands at approximately 10 per cent (1992) as it has since 1990. This trend is 
apparent for all years since 1967 except 1977 when the custody rate increased from 
11 per cent hi 1976 to 19 per cent in 1977. This is probably due to the data relating 
to different categories of offences. The 1977 data does not include the less serious 
offences (summary offences) even though it appears but is not stated that the label 
indictable offences includes triable either way offences. All other years include some 
of the more serious summary offences. After 1977 the custody rate resumes its 
decline, albeit from a higher starting point. It is also worth noting that between 1974 
and 1976, the period when the Working Party's Report and the Bail Act 1976 were 
being debated, the custody rate fell sharply from 19 per cent in 1973 to 11 per cent 
in 1976 which suggests that even prior to the enactment of the Bail Act the climate 
was one which accepted the need to increase the use of bail.
Although the proportionate use of custody has declined, there is an upward trend in 
the actual number of defendants remanded in custody. In 1978, 39,000 defendants 
were remanded in custody compared to an all time high of 51,000 hi 1991 which 
dropped to 49,000 in 1992. There has also been an upward trend in the total number 
of defendants remanded on bail which has increased from 199,000 in 1978 to 
459,000 in 1994. These two figures reflect an increase in two things: firstly, in the 
number of persons proceeded against which increased from 1.99 million hi 1978 to 
2.14 million in 1992 which resulted in an increase hi the total number of persons hi 
the process. This reflects the rise in the official crime rate. Secondly, there was an 
increase in the proportion of those proceeded against who are remanded which has 
increased steadily since 1981 when the figure stood at 320,000 to 508,000 in 1992 
which suggests that there has been an increase in the number of hearings which are 
not completed on the first occasion.
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Consequently, the national statistics show two important trends: (i) a decrease in the 
proportion of defendants remanded in custody and (ii) an increase in the actual 
number of defendants remanded on bail and in custody which reflect wider changes 
in the criminal justice process.
The overall figures obscure a large disparity in the treatment of defendants in the 
remand process depending on whether they have been charged with an indictable or 
summary offence.
Table 4.2 Number of defendants remanded by the courts by offence type 
(indictable (I), summary (S)).
Date Total Remanded 
(OOO's)
I I

















































































































S= summary offences other than motoring; I=indictable offences
Source: Tables 8.4 and 8.5: Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1992 (Home
Office, 1993a).
Table 4.2 shows that defendants who are charged with indictable offences are much 
more likely to be remanded by the court than defendants charged with summary 
(non-motoring) offences. Furthermore, of those remanded by the court a much 
higher proportion are remanded in custody when they are charged with indictable 
offences than when charged with summary (non-motoring offences). This suggests 
that the seriousness of the offence, as measured by the distinction between indictable
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and summary offences, is an important consideration in the court's decision to 
remand a defendant in the first place and to remand him/her in custody.
The proportion of defendants charged with indictable offences who are remanded by 
the court has increased steadily since 1982 from 48 per cent to 63 per cent in 1992. 
The trend for summary (non-motoring) offences since 1982 is more complicated with 
the proportion being steady at 10 per cent between 1982 and 1985, dropping slightly 
in 1986 to 8 per cent which is probably explained by problems with the introduction 
of the C.P.S., after which it rises again for 1989 and 1990 before declining to a 
figure of 13 per cent in 1992. However, for both indictable and summary (non- 
motoring) offences the actual numbers remanded by the courts has increased steadily 
since 1987.
The proportion of defendants charged with indictable offences remanded by the court 
who are remanded in custody has decreased steadily since 1982 with 11 per cent 
being remanded in custody in 1992. The actual number of defendants remanded in 
custody has fluctuated between 40,000 and 45,000 since 1982 with the exception of 
1986, when the figure shows a significant drop probably as a result of the creation 
of theC.P.S..
The proportion of defendants charged with summary (non-motoring) offences who 
are remanded in custody has fluctuated around the 5 per cent since 1982. However, 
this obscures a doubling of the actual numbers of defendants charged with such 
offences that are remanded in custody between 1988 and 1989 from 2,400 to 4,900 
although this has since dropped off to 4,500 in 1992. It seems, therefore, that a 
greater number of defendants charged with summary (non-motoring) offences are 
being remanded in custody. This may be explained by the changes in the 
classifications of offences from either way offences to summary offences in the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 especially the offence of taking and driving away. 
Consequently, what are now summary only offences may in reality still be treated 
as more serious by the courts. Nevertheless, because of the disparity in the number 
of defendants charged with indictable and summary offences the growth in the
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overall numbers remanded in custody can be explained equally by increases in both 
groups.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH STUDIES
Criminal Statistics can only provide a limited and fragmented amount of information 
about the operation of the remand process. Research studies, on the other hand, 
provide a different and, potentially, more comprehensive analysis of the remand 
process particularly as they enable an examination on an individual case level. They 
are, therefore, a valuable complement to the Criminal Statistics.
The first study conducted on the remand process hi England and Wales was 
commissioned by the Home Office and was published in 1960 (Time Awaiting Trial, 
1960). The research was carried out on a representative sample of one hundred 
magistrates' courts in England and Wales, which together dealt with 37 per cent of 
all persons dealt with by magistrates' courts during April 1958. The study found that 
of the defendants appearing in magistrates' courts, 64 per cent were released on bail 
for the whole pre-trial period and 30 per cent were remanded in custody.
Ten years later Bottomley (1970) found almost totally the reverse. His study, 'Prison 
Before Trial', was conducted in four courts, one of which was an urban court and 
three rural courts. One of the aims of his research was to ascertain whether there 
was a difference between the bail rates and procedures of rural and urban areas. This 
hypothesis was based on the fact that previous research on the sentencing policies 
of different magistrates' courts found differences hi the sentencing practices between 
courts and suggested that these were related to certain social and economic 
characteristics of the community that the court served. These included: population 
density, crime rate and social class distribution. It therefore seemed plausible that 
these same factors affected the remand decision and the area of the court may be an 
important indicator of remand outcomes. Bottomley (1970) also suggested that the 
frequency of the regular court sittings may affect remand outcomes. Bottomley
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(1970) collected data from two sources. Firstly, court observations were undertaken 
of actual decision making during 1965 and 1966. Secondly, the court registers from 
1964 for the urban court and 1963-65 hi the rural courts, were studied to gauge the 
frequency of remands in the three courts.
The court registers provided the data on the bail rate in Bottomley's (1970) study. 
The sample was made up of 1,767 cases from the urban court and 599 from the 
rural courts. The proportion of defendants remanded in both the urban and rural 
courts was approximately 36 per cent. The number of defendants remanded who 
made up the sample was 213 defendants for the rural court and 203 for the urban 
court making a sample of 416 persons. Of these, 61 per cent of defendants who 
appeared in the urban court and 56 per cent of those hi the rural courts were 
remanded in custody. Only 30 per cent hi the urban court and 31 per cent hi the 
rural court were remanded on bail. The custody rates are, therefore, very similar for 
the urban and rural courts. However, they are substantially higher than those found 
by the 1960 Home Office study. Furthermore, Bottomley (1970) discovered different 
rates for the urban and rural courts between those tried summarily and those tried 
by the Crown Court. When the defendant was tried summarily the urban court 
remanded 60 per cent in custody compared to 45 per cent in the rural court. In the 
urban court 31 per cent were released on bail compared to 44 per cent hi the rural 
court. For those committed to Crown Court by the urban court 60 per cent were 
remanded in custody compared to 46 per cent hi the rural courts.
The Cobden Trust study (King 197la) covered eighteen London magistrates' courts 
and five provincial courts. Over a period of a week in 1970-71 volunteers observed 
1,001 remand hearings. The study found a much higher bail rate than Bottomley 
(1970) of 67 per cent. A slight disparity was again found between those tried 
summarily and those committed for trial. Sixty one per cent of those committed for 
trial were granted bail while 64 per cent of those tried summarily were granted bail. 
King (197la) also found differences in the percentage of defendants granted bail 
between the courts in the study. For example, over 80 per cent of defendants who 
appeared in Liverpool magistrates' court were granted bail compared to just over 50
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per cent in Brighton.
The difference in the results of Bottomley's and King's studies when they were both 
conducted in more than one court and completed within a relatively short space of 
time is remarkable. Bottoms and McClean (1976) argue that Bottomley's results 
which revealed a high custody rate, were out of line as they were contrary both to 
national trends and other studies. Bottoms and McClean (1976) comment that:
...it is clear that Bottomley's results are very much out of line with 
all other studies ... The only possible conclusion is that Bottomley, 
through sheer bad luck, selected two separate areas of the country in 
which the courts' practice in bail/custody decisions was radically 
different from the national pattern. (Bottoms and McClean, 
1976:195).
Simon and Weatheritt (1974) looked at the use of bail and custody in fifteen London 
magistrates' courts before and after the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 
1967, which had the aim, inter alia, of reducing the use of custodial remands. They 
found that there was a substantial increase in the proportion of defendants granted 
bail between 1966 and 1969. In 1966, 47 per cent of defendants were granted bail 
at each stage of the proceedings, whereas in 1969 the comparable bail rate was 62 
per cent. The bail rate had, therefore, increased by a third between the two dates. 
However, they concluded that this was more to do with the continuing trend in the 
use of bail rather than the Act itself. So, prior to the introduction of the Bail Act 
(1976) the studies suggest, that there was already a trend towards releasing a larger 
proportion of defendants on bail, a conclusion confirmed by the trends in the official 
statistics.
Bottoms and McClean's (1976) study was a local study conducted in Sheffield 
magistrates' court in 1971/2. They observed 892 remand decisions and found a bail 
rate of 54 per cent which was significantly below that found by King (1971a). They 
suggested that the differences between theirs and others' findings reflected local 
police views and the proportion of cases where they objected to bail.
Zander (1979) conducted the first study after the introduction of the Bail Act (1976).
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The study observed 261 bail hearings in London magistrates' courts. He found the 
bail rate to be 83 per cent, substantially higher than the figures prior to the Act and 
in line with the national figures.
Cutts (1982) carried out a comparative analysis of bail rates before and after the 
introduction of the Bail Act 1976. Two studies were carried out in a large North 
Midlands city in 1976 and 1981. Although he warned that the figures are not 
completely comparable, he found a large increase in the bail rate from 37 per cent 
in 1976 and 56 per cent in 1981. Nevertheless, both figures are substantially lower 
than those found by other studies in the same period (Zander, 1979) and the national 
bail rate at the time.
Doherty and East (1985) conducted a study hi Cardiff magistrates' court over a six 
month period between August 1981 and January 1982. A total sample of 496 remand 
hearings were observed. Eighty per cent of defendants in their study were granted 
bail which is slightly below the comparable national figure of 86 to 87 per cent.
Summary
The previous research undertaken on the remand process clearly confirms the trend 
over tune, found in the official statistics, for an increasing proportion of defendants 
to be granted bail. Thus, by the mid 1980s both national and local studies were 
showing that at least 80 per cent of all defendants remanded by magistrates' courts 
were being released on bail. These findings correspond with the official figures.
However, many of the previous studies found substantial variations in the bail rates 
in different courts (Bottomley 1970, King 1971a). Furthermore, the review of 
previous studies has also highlighted local variations in the use of bail. For example, 
this seems to be the explanation of the divergence of findings of King's study and 
Bottomley's study and also of differences between the findings of Cutts (1982) and 
East and Doherty (1985). The most comprehensive research into variations in courts'
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use of bail was undertaken by Jones (1985) in his study based on official statistics. 
He found that the proportion of defendants remanded in custody varied from less 
than 10 per cent (Bedfordshire 7 per cent, Gwent 8 per cent) to over 30 per cent 
(Dorset 31 per cent, North Yorkshire, 37 per cent) in some courts. As Jones (1985) 
pomts out there are several possible explanations: that police practices vary in men- 
use of arrest and their use of and recommendations for custody, the nature and 
seriousness of the offence may differ and the number of cases where the defendant 
is remanded and not dealt with at first appearance may differ. Despite these factors, 
Jones (1985) argues that the differences he found cannot be fully accounted for by 
these factors. It therefore appears that there are differences in courts' policies and 
practices in relation to remands.
Furthermore, a Home Office Statistical Bulletin (7/87) published in 1987 which 
covered the use of custodial remands between 1980 and 1986 confirmed that:
... there was considerable variation among petty sessional divisions 
in the use made of remands in custody. (Home Office, 
1987c:para.lO).
The Bulletin used a measure of custodial remands per 1,000 indictable offences. 
Some examples of the variations found were: Birmingham 106, Bristol 82, Cardiff 
19, Newcastle 162, Sheffield 92 and Wakefield 26. The Bulletin went on to suggest 
that part of this variation reflected differences in the proportion summonsed rather 
than charged. However, Gibson (1987) concludes,
A glance at the Home Office remand figures certainly leaves the 
thought that the kind of justice which a person receives may be 
affected by whereabouts hi the country the events happen to occur. 
(Gibson, 1987:521).
The Government appeared to recognise that variations in the use of custodial 
remands existed as a Home Office circular (25/88) stated:
Attention has been drawn recently to local variations in the 
proportions of defendants who are granted bail. In the interests of 
justice and of public confidence, the approach adopted by courts when 
taking decisions on bail should be reasonably consistent, subject of 
course to the differing mixes of offences and defendants encountered 
in different courts ... But, as a general principle, the decision on
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whether a defendant is remanded hi custody or is bailed ought not to 
depend upon the particular attitude of the bench before which it 
appears. (Home Office, 1988c:para.4).
THE FINDINGS OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH
This section concentrates on the bail rate found hi this study, both overall and at 
different stages of the remand process. Furthermore, the non-appearance rate will 
be briefly discussed. Possible explanations for the differences in bail rates found in 
the study will also be addressed.
The registers sample will supply the data on the bail rate as this provided a 
representative picture of the remand decisions of the courts in the study. Analysis 
of the observation sample suggests that it is based on unrepresentative data and 
therefore does not provide a full illustration of the remand decisions of the courts 
in the study. However, the observation sample was never intended to be 
representative of all the remand decisions made by the courts. It was always likely 
to be unrepresentative for two particular reasons. Firstly, during the observations the 
courts were only observed on one day (or in the case of Court A two days) per week 
whereas the register sample covers each court for a complete week. It may be that 
the day on which the court was observed was atypical in relation to the types of 
cases heard during the rest of the week. Secondly, the register sample covers all of 
the courtrooms at each court whereas the observations were only undertaken in one 
(or in the case of Court A two courtrooms), albeit the main remand court(s).
Nevertheless, in this context, it will be discussed in this section: firstly, to confirm 
the trends found in the registers sample; secondly, to provide data where it is 
unavailable from the registers sample; thirdly, to provide possible explanations of 
the findings from the registers sample and; finally, to provide a background for 
latter discussions.
During the discussion of the use of bail the registers and observation samples will
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be analysed to investigate the representativeness of the samples and to provide 
potential explanations for the different bail rates found in the two samples.
THE BAIL RATE OF THE THREE COURTS
The registers sample provided a representative sample of decisions in the three 
courts.







Overall(%) A (%) B (%) C (%)
54 54 60 50
34 32 31 22
5 2










Total sample 1690 998 365 326
1. Technical bail is when a defendant is on bail for the offences for which s/he is 
presently appearing but who, in reality, is in custody either because s/he has been 
remanded in custody by another court or because s/he is serving a sentence.
Table 4.3 shows that the overall bail rate for this study was 88 per cent, or just two 
per cent below the corresponding national figure. 54 per cent of defendants were 
granted unconditional bail while 34 per cent were granted conditional bail. There are 
no national statistics on the use of conditional bail so it is impossible to compare 
these figures with national estimates. However, several research studies have
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indicated that the use of conditional bail has increased steadily since its introduction 
under the 1967 Criminal Justice Act. In 1967, Simon and Weatheritt (1974) found 
that 8 per cent of defendants in then- sample had requirements attached to their bail. 
By 1971, according to King (1971a), the figure had increased to 15 per cent of 
remanded defendants. After the enactment of the Bail Act in 1978 the figure 
continued to increase: Zander's (1979) study of London magistrates' courts found 
one third of defendants were subject to conditions of bail and East and Doherty 
(1984) put the figure at 38 per cent (for further discussion see Hucklesby, 1994). If 
these figures are correct, it seems that the steady increase in the use of conditions 
of bail has levelled off at about a third of defendants who are remanded.
The custody rate for the whole sample was, therefore 12 per cent. However, this 
masks considerable variation between the three courts in the study. The figures 
indicate that Courts A and B have similar custody rates of 9 per cent whereas Court 
C has a custody rate of 25 per cent, more than double the rates of the other two 
courts in the study and well above the national figure. This disparity may have 
occurred as a result of differences in the type of cases heard in the three courts. 
However, although differences in the samples for measurable factors were found 
between the three courts these do not account for the differences in the custody rates 
of the courts (see appendix 5). Whatever factors are taken account of, the custody 
rate for Court C is greater than for the other two courts. However, because of the 
nature of the variables recorded it is possible that there are differences hi the 
constitution of the samples from the courts which cannot be measured from the 
available data. The most probable explanation is the seriousness of the offence. 
However, the data collected does not allow for an analysis of the seriousness of the 
offence within each offence category. The circumstances surrounding the case are 
unavailable so that the injury and/or monetary value involved was not apparent. For 
example, the offence of theft is a broad definition which can involve sums of money 
from £1 to £1 million.
Another possible explanation of the disparity is whether lay or Stipendiary 
magistrates sit in the court. Court A has a Stipendiary magistrate. However, he
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never took the remand courts and would only hear a very small proportion of the 
total number of remand hearings, so that the vast majority of remand hearings were 
heard by lay magistrates. Court B does not have a Stipendiary magistrate therefore 
all remand hearings were heard by lay magistrates. Court C, on the other hand, has 
two Stipendiary magistrates who took the main remand court on the vast majority 
of occasions that it sits. It is well known that Stipendiaries tend to hear the more 
serious cases and this may account for the disparity. However, it is difficult to see 
how it can account for all of the difference in the custody rate as the sample of court 
registers was taken from all of the courtrooms in each court. Thus, the remand 
decisions of lay magistrates are included in the sample from Court C and a 
stipendiary's decisions are included in the sample from Court A. This is not to say 
that this may not be an explanation especially with the likelihood that a Stipendiary 
magistrate influences the more general culture of the court.
Another possible explanation is the frequency of court sittings which may 
particularly affect the number of defendants appearing for the first time. Court A sat 
on every day of the week including Saturday morning, Court B sat on four days a 
week and Saturday morning, where necessary whereas Court C only sat on two days 
a week. This is because Court C is in a petty sessional division which covers a large 
geographical area with a number of small local courts. As a result, the courts work 
on a rota basis on different days of the week. Consequently, defendants from outside 
the immediate area of Court C can be brought there for their first appearance and 
defendants from the area of Court C can be taken to appear in other courts. What 
affect, if any, this has on the constitution of the sample is not apparent, although 
with the same Stipendiary magistrates servicing many of the other courts on the rota 
it seems unlikely that the more serious cases are specifically diverted to Court C. 
Furthermore, there is the possibility that the differences can be explained by the 
social and economic environment of the area surrounding the court.
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Observation sample
The custody rates for all the courts found in the observation sample are significantly 
higher than those found in the registers sample (see appendix 6). This is probably 
explained by the fact that the observation sample is made up of more serious cases 
which resulted in a bias towards custody cases in the observation sample. Despite 
the unrepresentativeness of the sample, a similar trend can be seen in the observation 
and registers sample. In other words, the observation sample also shows that Courts 
A and B have similar custody rates (16 and 17 per cent respectively) whereas Court 
C has a much higher rate (41 per cent). There is no discernible difference between 
the samples from the three courts in the observation sample (see appendix 7). Again, 
it is possible that the seriousness of the offence explains the difference particularly 
in light of the fact that the vast majority of the Court C sample was collected when 
a Stipendiary magistrate was presiding over the remand court. Two scenarios are 
possible: firstly, that the Stipendiary dealt with the more serious cases; or secondly, 
that he remanded a higher proportion of defendants in custody. It has already been 
said that it was impossible to measure the seriousness of the case or, indeed, the 
offence but it is difficult to see how the cases heard in Court C can be of a more 
serious nature than those heard in one of the courtrooms in Court A which heard 
only cases where the defendant was hi custody either to the police or to the court. 
As a consequence one would have expected the custody rate for Court A to be 
higher than the figures suggest.
The seriousness of the offence appears to be the most plausible explanation of the 
differences in bail rates between the observation and registers sample particularly as 
there were no significant differences in measurable variables between the two 
samples (see appendix 8). The high degree of similarity between the samples 
suggests that a fairly representative sample has been collected of the remand hearings 
that are heard in each of the three courts.
Nonetheless, this similarity between the samples does not explain why there is a 
disparity in the custody rates between the observation and registers sample. The 
most probable explanation for this difference is that the observed sample is made up
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of a larger proportion of more serious cases than the registers sample and this may 
have resulted in a bias towards custody cases in the observation sample. This 
explanation is based on the presumption that the seriousness of the offence is a major 
criterion for the refusal of bail, a presumption backed up by evidence from the 
official statistics and previous research studies.
The data collected does not allow for an analysis of the seriousness of the case or, 
indeed, the seriousness of the offence within each offence category. Yet the 
differences which have been found in the type of offences which made up the sample 
do appear to support the hypothesis that seriousness of the offence may be the 
crucial difference between the two samples. For example, a higher proportion of 
defendants in the observation sample were charged with breaking and entering than 
in the registers sample (see appendix 8), offences which would generally be 
perceived as of a serious nature whereas a higher proportion of defendants in the 
registers sample were charged with theft which is generally perceived to be a less 
serious offence.
Further anecdotal evidence supports this supposition. The courtrooms that were 
observed provide some evidence as they appeared to deal with the more serious 
cases. Only one courtroom in Courts B and C and two courtrooms in Court A were 
observed during the study, all of which were the main remand courtrooms and were 
likely to hear the more serious cases. This happened for several reasons. The 
reorganisation of Court A during the study meant that a disproportionate number of 
the sample observed were hi the custody of either the police or the court. 
Furthermore, the main remand courtroom hi Court B was the only courtroom in the 
Court to have immediate access to the cells and as a consequence usually dealt with 
all the defendants who were hi custody. However, the situation was similar hi Court 
C which although having two courtrooms with access to the cells the observed 
courtroom was the main custody court as this was where the stipendiary magistrates 
sat. Basically, the registers sample probably dealt with a broader spectrum of cases 
with a larger proportion of less serious cases than the observation sample.
177
Summary
The overall bail rate for the registers sample was 88 per cent which is very close to 
the national figure of 90 per cent for England and Wales in 1992. Furthermore, 
there was a substantial variation in bail rates between the Courts A and B and Court 
C according to the registers sample. Even though it appears that the observation 
sample is made up of more serious cases than the registers sample and is, therefore, 
unrepresentative of remand decisions as a whole, the two samples are more similar 
than dissimilar. The only discernible difference between them is the seriousness of 
the cases which has resulted in inflated custody rates in the observation sample. The 
pattern of remand decisions between courts is very similar with both samples 
showing that Court C remands a substantially higher proportion of defendants in 
court than either Court A or B and has a custody rate well above the national figure. 
Courts A and B appear to have similar custody rates in both samples which 
correspond to the national figure. The most plausible explanation of the variation is 
that because a stipendiary heard a large proportion of remand hearings in Court C, 
he is more likely to hear the more serious cases which would be expected to result 
in a higher custody rate.
However, the discussion has shown that this potential explanation is unlikely to fully 
account for the disparity.
A more detailed analysis of the bail rate will now be undertaken to provide a further 
insight into the remand decisions made by the courts in the study.
THE BAIL RATE AT FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT HEARINGS
The differences in bail rates between the courts exist both when the defendant is 
appearing for the first time and on subsequent appearances. Thirty one per cent of 
the registers sample and 20 per cent of the observation sample were appearing for 
the first time.
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Total sample 1635 953 364 318
Table 4.4 shows that a higher proportion of defendants in the registers sample as a 
whole and for the three courts separately are granted bail at their first appearance 
than on subsequent occasions. The difference is statistically significant 
(Chi2 = 12.25 > 0.001). However, Court C has a substantially lower bail rate than the 
other courts at both stages of the proceedings. This confirms the findings of the 
analysis of the overall bail rates for the registers samples.
The finding that defendants are more likely to be granted bail at their first court 
appearance rather than subsequent appearances is contrary to what might be expected 
as it is often assumed that defendants are granted bail after they have spent a period 
in custody whether by choice (withholding a bail application) or at the magistrates' 
discretion. The findings concur with those of King (197la) who found that 75 per 
cent of defendants were granted bail at their first appearance compared to 61 per 
cent at subsequent appearances. He concluded that this suggested that magistrates 
rarely changed their minds at subsequent hearings once a remand decision had been 
made. Moreover, the present findings suggest that magistrates remand defendants in 
custody who have previously been granted bail. There are several possible 
explanations for this. Firstly, an increased likelihood of a defendant being remanded
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in custody rather than rebailed having allegedly reoffended or breached bail in some 
other way; secondly, an increase in the number of defendants who breach their bail; 
or thirdly, an increase hi the number of defendants being caught breaching their bail.
THE BAIL RATE BEFORE AND AFTER CONVICTION
Zander (1971) found that 27 per cent of his sample of 597 were remanded after 
conviction. Of these 32 per cent were remanded for probation reports, 19 per cent 
for medical or psychiatric reports, 26 per cent for another type of report with a 
further 26 per cent remanded for more than one report. 50 per cent of those 
remanded after conviction were remanded hi custody. However, the custody rate 
varied according to the type of report requested. Of those remanded for probation 
reports 25 per cent were remanded hi custody whereas 65 per cent of defendants 
remanded for medical or psychiatric reports were remanded in custody. King 
(197la) found that 41 per cent of defendants were remanded in custody after 
conviction and that 41 per cent of those remanded for medical or psychiatric reports 
were bailed.
A smaller proportion of defendants were remanded after conviction in the present 
study than found by Zander (1971) or King (1971a). Twelve per cent of the registers 
sample (245 cases) were remanded after conviction. The vast majority of the cases 
where the information on why the remand post conviction was necessary (138 cases) 
were remanded for pre-sentence reports (110 cases). Eleven were committed to 
Crown Court for sentence, seven for a DVLC print out and three for psychiatric 
reports. Five defendants included hi the figures above were remanded for more than 
one reason (3 for a pre-sentence report and a DVLC printout and 2 for a pre- 
sentence report and a psychiatric report). The observation sample provided a similar 
picture of why defendants are remanded after conviction with the vast majority being 
remanded for pre-sentence reports.
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Table 4.5: Bail rate before and after conviction from the registers sample (in 
percentages).
Overall A
Before conviction 86 89








Total 1636 953 365 318
Table 4.5 shows that defendants are more likely to be granted bail after they have 
been convicted of an offence than before their guilt has been proven. This was the 
case for all three courts although the figures suggest that there is a disparity between 
courts in the granting of bail both before and after conviction with Court C again 
being the court where a defendant is most likely to be remanded in custody. 
However, the disparity between the courts decreases quite substantially post 
conviction. This may reflect the fact that the Stipendiary hi Court C rarely dealt with 
post conviction cases unless there had been a contested plea which suggests that the 
majority of post conviction remands would be dealt with by lay magistrates. 
Consequently, this appears to provide evidence towards the explanation of disparities 
between the courts in the study being caused by the Stipendiary magistrates 
remanding more defendants in custody.
Nevertheless, these findings are the opposite to what might have been expected as 
those defendants found guilty may be perceived to be more likely to abscond. This 
is especially the case as the majority of remands post conviction are for the 
preparation of pre-sentence reports which in themselves indicate a certain level of 
seriousness as they are only required in cases where there is a risk of imprisonment 
or to assess the suitability of a defendant for a community sentence. Nevertheless,
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the restriction on magistrates' sentencing powers and the use of custodial sentences 
means that a large proportion of offenders convicted and sentenced in magistrates' 
courts are likely to receive a non-custodial penalty making it difficult for magistrates 
to justify a custodial remand. Another potential explanation of the findings is the role 
of the C.P.S.. In cases where a defendant has been convicted, the C.P.S. cannot 
object to bail (presumably because the prosecution is over), in other words, they 
play no part hi the proceedings. If it is indeed the case that, as discussed later (see 
Chapter 5), magistrates invariably follow the recommendations of the C.P.S., when 
the C.P.S. play no part in post conviction remand hearings, the magistrates may 
misinterpret this believing that the C.P.S. do not object to bail thus more readily 
granting bail.
THE BAIL RATE FOR THOSE COMMITTED FOR TRIAL OR 
SENTENCE AT THE CROWN COURT
In 1992, 22 per cent of defendants committed for trial at the Crown Court were 
committed in custody (Home Office 1993a). A figure well above the national rate 
which reflects the seriousness of most offences which are committed to Crown Court 
for trial.
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Source: Table 8.8: Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1992 (1993a).
Table 4.6 shows that the proportion of defendants committed for trial has remained 
relatively constant at between 20 and 22 per cent since 1982. However, this obscures 
significant changes in the actual number of defendants committed which obviously 
affected the actual number of defendants remanded in custody. Between 1982 and 
1988 there has been an upward trend in the number committed for trial (and as a 
consequence the number committed hi custody) from approximately 88,000 in 1982 
to 114,000 in 1988, although there was a substantial decrease in 1986 probably as 
a result of the introduction of the C.P.S.. After 1988 there was a substantial 
decrease hi the numbers committed for trial probably as a result of the 
reclassiflcation of certain offences under the Criminal Justice Act 1988. After 1989, 
the figures increase slightly before decreasing substantially in 1992, probably as a 
result of the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 which attempted to reduce 
the numbers of offenders receiving custodial sentences and as a result may have 
decreased the number of defendants committed for trial.
National statistics suggest that there has been a substantial drop in the proportion of 
defendants committed in custody since the previous studies on the remand process
183
were conducted, a trend which is also illustrated by the studies themselves over 
time. The Home Office study (1960) distinguished between those defendants tried 
summarily and those committed to the Crown Court. Of those committed to the 
Crown Court, 58 per cent were granted bail, whereas, 61 per cent of those tried 
summarily were granted bail and 5 per cent were mixed remands (those defendants 
who spent, at least, part of their remand period in custody), and 34 per cent were 
remanded in custody. Simon and Weatheritt (1974) found an increase in the 
proportion committed for trial on bail from 51 per cent in 1966 and 72 per cent in 
1969. Bottoms and McClean (1976) found that 61 per cent of defendants committed 
for trial were granted bail. Therefore, the previous studies appear to show a steady 
increase in the number of defendants committed for trial on bail since the 1960s.
The present study can only provide limited evidence of the proportion of defendants 
committed in custody to the Crown Court. This is a result of incomplete recording 
in the court registers. For example, in Court A the figures suggest that only two 
defendants were committed for trial, both of whom were bailed, a figure which 
seems exceptionally low for this court. According to the registers sample Court B 
bailed 87 per cent of defendants committed for trial which is 7 per cent higher than 
the comparable national figure. On the other hand, Court C only bailed 53 per cent 
of defendants committed for trial which is significantly below the national figure.
The findings of the observation sample are appropriate here as committal for trial 
provides some control 1 for the seriousness of the offence this being the most likely 
reason for the unrepresentativeness of the observation sample. The observation 
sample also shows a wide disparity in the use of bail between the courts when the 
defendant was committed for trial or for sentence at the Crown Court. Of those 
committed for trial or sentence 78 per cent in Court A, 92 per cent in Court B and 
53 per cent in Court C were granted bail. Consequently, this appears to confirm that 
there is a wide variation in courts' use of bail at the committal stage.
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NON-APPEARANCE RATES
Defendants who are granted bail are bailed to appear in court at a specific place and 
time. Although not directly relevant to the use of bail, the reasons for and the course 
of action taken by magistrates when a defendant does not appear are an important 
part of the decision making process. Non-appearance rates are also a measure of the 
failure rate of those granted bail.
The national figures suggest that in 1992 a total of 362,000 defendants bailed by the 
courts failed to appear. By far the largest number are defendants charged with 
indictable offences (331,400 compared with 72,400 charged with summary (non- 
motoring) and 67,300 for summary (motoring)).
Table 4.7: Percentage of defendants who fail to appear having been granted bail 
by magistrates' courts by offence group in England and Wales.
1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 
Indictable 8.4 7.9 7.8 5.9 6.0 5.3 4.8 4.0
Summary 6.0 4.9 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.2 4.8 5.0 
(non-motoring)
Sources: Table 8.11 Criminal Statistics 1992 (Home Office, 1993a), Table 8.10 
Criminal Statistics 1989 (Home Office 1990a), Table 8.12 Criminal Statistics 1987 
(Home Office, 1988a), Table 8.13 Criminal Statistics 1986 (Home Office, 1987a).
Table 4.7 shows that the proportion of defendants charged with both indictable or 
summary (non-motoring) offences who fail to appear after being granted bail by the 
magistrates' courts has steadily increased since the mid 1980s. Furthermore, the 
figures show a defendant charged with an indictable offence is more likely to fail to 
appear than a defendant charged with a summary (non-motoring) offence.
Similar problems were encountered with recording of the data on the court registers 
relating to non-appearance as existed at the committal stage. Therefore, any findings 
from the court registers must be treated cautiously2 . However, data is available from
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the observation sample which will be used bearing in mind that it is unrepresentative 
of the decisions made in the court as a whole.
Four hundred and twenty nine defendants in the observation sample failed to appear 
at their court hearing; that is 28 per cent of the whole sample. This figure is well 
above the national rate which may reflect the unrepresentativeness of the sample. 
However, what is of interest is the variations between the courts in the way they 
dealt with those defendants who failed to appear.






in custody1 15 8 23 30
Technical bail2 22 19 25 28 

















Total sample 427 280 64 83
1. Defendants who had consented to be remanded hi their absence or who had not 
been produced; 2. Defendants who are on bail for the offences being dealt with at 
the hearing but who are in custody either remanded by another court for a different 
set of alleged offences or who are serving a sentence; 3. Under s. 129(3) 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, where a defendant who has been released on bail, the 
court can enlarge bail ie appoint a later time for surrender to custody, in the 
accused's absense.
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Table 4.8 suggests that there is a wide disparity between the courts hi the 
magistrates' decisions when the defendant is not present (a similar trend can be 
distinguished hi the registers sample). For example, 43 per cent of defendants who 
did not appear in Court A were bailed enlarged (see note 3 under table 4.8) whereas 
in Court C only 17 per cent of defendants who did not appear were bail enlarged. 
However, some of the categories hi table 4.8 relate to non-appearances that were not 
blatant defiance on the part of the defendant. For example, the extended custody 
category includes those defendants who have consented to not appear and those that 
were not produced by the prison service. In other words, the non-appearance was 
either agreed or was not the defendants fault. Some but not all of the variation 
between courts can be explained by these factors.
Table 4.9: Difference between Courts hi the outcome of remand hearings when 
the defendant fails to appear by whether an explanation was provided 
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Table 4.9 shows that if an explanation for defendants non-appearance was provided 
to the court, for example medical problems, defendants were much more likely to 
be bail enlarged. However, if no explanation was provided to the court a warrant 
was likely to be issued for arrest of the defendant which can be issued either with 
or without bail. However, only eight warrants with bail were issued during the 
observation period which tends to suggest that they are not often used. Warrants
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without bail were the usual course of action of the courts if no explanation of the 
non-appearance was given. It appears, therefore, that the magistrates' decision when 
a defendant fails to appear is partly dependant upon an explanation being 
forthcoming. However, whether or not an explanation was forthcoming does not 
fully account for the variation and therefore suggests that courts made different 
decisions on the course of action to be taken when a defendant failed to appear. 
Nevertheless, the importance of an explanation being provided to the court suggests 
that defence solicitors play a crucial role in a situation when a defendant fails to 
appear as they are the principle source of any explanation.
DISCUSSION
The findings suggest that Court C consistently has a higher custody rate than the 
other two courts in both the registers and observation samples. Furthermore, both 
of the samples indicate that the custody rates for Courts A and B are very similar. 
However, although the pattern of remand outcomes is very similar for the registers 
and observation samples, there is a disparity in the actual proportion of defendants 
granted unconditional bail, conditional bail or who are remanded in custody. The 
observation sample consistently shows that a larger proportion of defendants are 
remanded in custody than the registers sample, whatever the court. The most 
probable explanation for this is a difference hi the types of cases heard by the courts. 
Although all measurable variables were tested, and no significant difference was 
found to account for the differences in custody rates between the samples, it seems 
likely that it can be explained by differences in the seriousness of the cases in the 
sample, with the observation sample including a higher proportion of more serious 
cases.
The disparity between the remand outcomes in Courts A and B and Court C may 
have occurred because magistrates in the three courts actually do make different 
remand decisions based on the same facts which would result in a finding of 
inconsistent decisions between the courts. However, it is equally possible that the
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differences in remand decisions between courts can be explained by differences in 
the types of case and/or defendants who appeared in the courts. Having said this, 
none of the measurable variables investigated fully accounted for the differences.
One possible source of the disparity is differences in the proportion of defendants 
who are kept in police custody prior to their first court appearance which was shown 
in Chapter 3 to be a significant variable hi the court's decision. Data is only 
available for those defendants who were appearing in court for the first time and this 
is only available from the observation sample, therefore no firm conclusion can be 
drawn from the findings as to whether or not the proportion of defendants kept in 
police custody may explain the differences found in custody rates. Nevertheless, the 
findings show that there is a difference in the number of defendants kept in custody 
by the police for the three courts. Prior to their first court appearance, in Court A, 
48 per cent of defendants were kept in police custody compared to 62 per cent hi 
Court B and 44 per cent hi Court C. It is therefore possible that differences in 
remand rates can be explained by this factor. However, this seems unlikely as the 
court with the lowest proportion of defendants kept in police custody (Court C) has 
the highest court custody rate. Furthermore, a large number of those kept in police 
custody are detained for the simple reason that the police wish conditions to be 
attached to a defendant's bail (see Chapter 3).
A further possible source of the differences may be variations in the proportion of 
defendants who were summonsed or arrested in each court. However, this is likely, 
especially for the observation sample, as the majority of defendants were arrested 
and not summoned because the main remand courts were observed. Furthermore, 
it may reflect differences in the proportion of defendants whose cases are disposed 
of at their first appearance where a remand is unnecessary. In courts where a large 
proportion of defendants are disposed of on their first appearance, it seems likely 
that only the more serious cases would be remanded which may result in a higher 
custodial remand rate. Conversely, in courts where a high proportion of cases are 
adjourned a smaller proportion of defendants would be expected to be remanded in 
custody. Unfortunately no data is available on the number of defendants summonsed
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and arrested to appear in court from the study or indeed from the Courts themselves 
who stated that they did not keep records of such information, not even broad 
estimates.
The proportion of defendants for which the C.P.S. requested a remand in custody 
may also explain the differences in custodial remand rates between the court. This 
is because both previous research and the present study have found a strong 
correlation between the C.P.S. request and the outcome of the remand hearing (see 
chapter 5). The C.P.S. requested a remand in custody in a higher proportion of 
cases hi Court C (26 per cent) than in either Court A (12 per cent) or Court B (13 
per cent). In fact, there is nearly total concordance between the C.P.S. request and 
the bail rates for the three courts. Furthermore, in a similar number of cases for 
each court, no request was made to the court by the C.P.S. It seems, therefore, that 
for the three courts in the study there is a variation in the C.P.S. requests to the 
court. Moreover, where the C.P.S. requested a remand in custody, it was granted 
in 95 per cent of cases in Court C, 82 per cent of cases in Court A and 79 per cent 
in Court B. This suggests that the C.P.S. not only requested a remand hi custody in 
a larger proportion of cases but that these were granted in a larger number of cases 
in Court C. This implies that the C.P.S. has more influence on the magistrates' 
decisions hi some courts than in others and that the variations in court bail rates may 
reflect variations in C.P.S practices or, indeed, that the magistrates or the court 
affect C.P.S. practices in objecting to bail. Having said this, there is still a wide 
variation in the number remanded hi custody when the C.P.S. makes no remand 
request. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the variation hi bail/custody rates between 
the courts can be fully explained by C.P.S. practices.
It seems, therefore, that the differences hi the remand outcomes between the courts 
(both in the registers sample and the observation sample) cannot be fully explained 
by any of the factors which it has been possible to measure. Consequently, this 
suggests that the courts hi the study made different remand decisions in the same or 
similar circumstances, confirming the findings of previous research which have 
consistently found that remand decisions made by courts vary geographically. For
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example, Jones (1985) concluded:
... that considerable variation did exist between the areas hi the 
overall proportion of defendants remanded hi custody by the courts. 
Much of this variation can be accounted for ... However, after 
allowing for these factors there are still areas in which the court rate 
of custodial remands did not approximate to that which might have 
been predicted. (Jones, 1985:117).
Nevertheless, not all of the courts in the study have different bail rates. Court A and 
B have remarkably similar bail rates. However, further analysis of the data suggests 
that there was some variation in the types of cases and defendants that appeared in 
Courts A and B, therefore, it seems likely that hi individual cases which have similar 
characteristics different decisions were made. As a consequence, it may be more of 
a coincidence, rather than consistency hi decision making, that Courts A and B have 
similar bail rates.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The proportionate use of bail and custody provides a background to the later findings 
of the study and highlights some of the similarities and differences in the use of bail 
by the courts. However, these findings provide very little insight into the remand 
process; in fact with a national custody rate of 10 per cent (Home Office, 1993a), 
the lowest ever, attention has arguably switched from decreasing the number of 
defendants remanded in custody to concerns over the behaviour of defendants on 
bail. Nevertheless, the fact that about 90 per cent of all defendants are granted bail 
is little comfort to the individuals who are remanded in custody especially when they 
are often kept hi appalling conditions: local prisons, remand centres and police 
cells. Furthermore, evidence still suggests that a large proportion of defendants are 
remanded in custody only to be acquitted or receive a non-custodial sentence. 
Conversely, there are also defendants who are granted bail only to breach their bail 
which gives rise to concern over the number of offences committed by defendants 
on bail. These three factors alone make it important to assess the bail risk a 
defendant poses as accurately as possible.
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In the next chapter, an attempt is made to investigate the influences on the 
magistrates' decision through an examination of the differences in the samples of 
defendants who were remanded in custody and those granted bail by the magistrates 
during the present study.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Committal for trial provides a control, albeit imperfect, for seriousness of the 
offence which would be expected to be one of the most important factors in 
a decision to commit a case to the Crown Court. If a case is committed for 
trial or sentence at the Crown Court, this should be an indication that the 
offence hi itself is of a serious nature or that the defendant was charged with 
a large number of offences. However, it is also possible that defendants 
elected trial by jury and as this is possible in any case where the defendant 
is charged with a either-way offence. This factor may thus include offences 
which are not deemed to be serious.
2. The data is not fully comparable because of the way the data was recorded 
in the registers. For example, it was not explicitly stated on the court records 
whether or not the defendant had appeared. Therefore, although some of the 
categories of outcome without doubt relate to defendants who did not appear 
others are less easy to distinguish, for example technical bail means that the 
defendant is either serving a sentence or is remanded to another court 
however, the defendant can be granted technical bail whether or not s/he 
appeared. Indeed, the data suggests that hi Courts A and B no defendants 
were further remanded in custody in their absence this seems highly unlikely.
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CHAPTERS 
INFLUENCES ON THE DECISION
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The aim of this chapter is to identify some of factors that might be related to the 
remand decision, that is to say, the factors that, if present, may result in defendants 
being more likely to be remanded hi custody. Previous research, both before and 
after the introduction of the Bail Act 1976, has consistently shown that certain 
factors seem to be related to the remand decision. Not only, therefore, may the 
factors be identified but an inquiry can be undertaken into whether the decision 
making process and the factors that affect it have changed over time. Having said 
this, it is not possible to measure or even identify all of the factors that may affect 
the remand decision. This is partly because the remand process is an open system 
which means that it is impossible to control for all extraneous variables. Therefore, 
as Young (1992) argues it is impossible to link the cause and effect. In other words, 
it is impossible to prove that the fact that a defendant was remanded in custody was 
directly caused by any specific factor. The only strategy is to identify the various 
processes involved in a decision, whilst recognising that other unidentifiable or 
unmeasurable factors may influence the decision. Moreover, it is impossible to say 
precisely how any factors identified maybe related to the remand decision as even 
when present they may not directly influence the magistrates', or, indeed, any other 
agent's decisions. This is particularly the case when a collection of individuals is 
making decisions, all of whom may be operating with different decision making 
criteria.
Some possible influences on remand decisions will be identified through an analysis 
of the similarities and differences in the characteristics of defendants who were 
remanded in custody and those released on bail. The data used in the analysis comes 
from both the observation and registers samples. The samples provide two sources 
of data: (i) documentary information on certain characteristics of the defendants and 
the case against them, for example the age and sex of the defendant, the offence 
with which they were charged and whether or not the C.P.S. objected to bail; (ii) 
observational data, which was collected on certain factors that were mentioned 
during the hearing, for example whether the defendant was already on bail for other 
offences. This was the only available method to collect data on certain factors. 
Consequently, it is less reliable than the first source as there was no way to verify
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the information given. Furthermore, it does not preclude the relevance of the factor 
to individuals in the rest of the sample which means that the remaining sample 
cannot be used as a control as there may be defendants within this sample for which 
the category under scrutiny also applies but which was not mentioned in court. 
Nevertheless, it was possible to relate the findings to the average custody rate for 
the whole sample. Moreover, an analysis of the cases where information was 
provided to the court suggests that these cases are atypical as information is rarely 
supplied to the court when there is no disagreement between the C.P.S. and the 
defence about the outcome of the remand hearing which means that defendants are 
more likely to be at risk of custody. In other words, information is usually supplied 
when a contested bail application is made where a defendant is at risk of a remand 
in custody.
This is a finding which confirms previous studies' findings. East and Doherty (1984) 
found that information was much more likely to be given in those cases where there 
was a contested bail application which suggests that these cases are for whatever 
reason of a more serious nature. This is in line with other studies that have found 
that information is disclosed in court in a relatively small proportion of cases 
(Bottomley 1970). Although this issue is looked at in detail in Chapter 7 it is worth 
noting here that in only 514 cases out of the total sample of 1524 was any 
information disclosed in court, so, although the findings below can give us some 
insight into possible factors that influence the remand decision, the findings must be 
treated with caution as the sample may not be representative of all those who appear 
in court, especially those that are bailed.
Having indicated the potential problems with the data, what it does provide an 
indication of certain factors which may influence the decision. Furthermore, for the 
observation sample, the magistrates themselves only had the same information 
available to them as the researcher had. However, simply because the information 
is available to the court does not necessarily mean that it played a part in the 
magistrates' decision. It was impossible to establish what attention was paid to the 
information or what inference the magistrates made from the fact that they are not
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given information on a particular issue. In short, it is impossible to say that if XYZ 
conditions exist a defendant will be remanded in custody.
OFFENDING RELATED FACTORS
This section will identify some of the offence related factors which may influence 
the magistrates' decisions. These include: information on the nature and seriousness 
of the present offence; the offending history of the defendant such as the previous 
convictions of the defendant, whether or not the defendant has previously served a 
custodial sentence and the bail history of defendants which includes offending on bail 
and previous failure to appear.
Nature and Seriousness of the Offence
The nature and seriousness of the offence may be related to the remand decision in 
several ways. Firstly, if the offence is of a serious nature it is argued that a 
defendant maybe more likely to abscond to escape justice especially if the offence 
is likely to result in a custodial sentence. Secondly, if the offence is of a serious 
nature it arguably demonstrates the defendant's capacity to cause harm to the 
community which may be repeated if released on bail. Furthermore, research (Avon 
and Somerset 1991, Northumbria Police 1991) has shown that defendants charged 
with certain types of offences (for example, theft of motor vehicles) are more likely 
to commit further offences on bail (see Chapter 1). Finally, it is argued that if the 
offence is serious and the likelihood of a custodial sentence is high, the defendant 
is more likely to attempt to interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course 
of justice. Moreover, certain types of offences, for example drugs offences, are 
often linked to networks or rings of crime where further inquires or arrests may be 
put in jeopardy if the defendant is released on bail. Certain types of offences may 
also put a defendant at risk from reprisals from the victim or his/her family and 
friends, for example, sex offences and may result in a conclusion that the defendant
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should be remanded in custody for his/her own protection.
Previous research into the operation of the remand process has utilised two indices 
relating to the nature and seriousness of the offence. The first of these is a 
classification of offences according to whether they were tried summarily (in a 
magistrates' court) or committed and tried in the Crown Court. The second index 
is a classification of offences by types. For example Bottomley (1970) used a three- 
fold classification of violence against the person, larceny and false pretences and 
breaking and entering.
The seriousness of the offence
Whether or not a defendant is tried summarily or at the Crown Court provides a 
measure of the seriousness of the offence, but not its nature, and is based on the 
distinction between summary and indictable offences. However, this measure of 
seriousness is not without its flaws as a substantial number of offences are triable 
either way (either in the magistrates' court or the Crown Court) and in these cases 
not only do magistrates have the power to commit a defendant to Crown Court for 
trial, because the particular circumstances of the case warrant it, but the defendant 
has the right to elect for trial by jury at the Crown Court. Therefore, cases that are 
committed to Crown Court are not necessarily more serious than those heard at the 
magistrates' court. Furthermore, if defendants have a large number of charges to be 
processed, whether individually of a serious nature, they are more likely to be 
committed to Crown Court for trial. Bottoms and McClean (1976) argue that the 
decision as to whether or not to commit a person to Crown Court for trial is also 
affected by the defendant's previous record. Having said this, a committal to Crown 
Court is a useful, if imperfect, measure of the seriousness of the offence.
The national statistics show that defendants charged with indictable offences are 
more likely to be remanded in custody than defendants charged with summary 
offences (see Chapter 4, table 4.2). Furthermore, defendants who are committed for 
trial are on average twice as likely to be remanded in custody on their committal to
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Crown Court than the average custody rate. In 1992, 22 per cent of defendants 
committed to the Crown Court where remanded in custody compared to the average 
figure of 10 per cent in 1992 (see Chapter 4: table 4.6). Previous research also 
found a strong correlation between the custody rate and the type of court the case 
was tried in (Bottomley 1970, Simon and Weatheritt 1974: see Chapter 4). 
Consequently, both the national statistics and previous research studies suggest that 
there is a relationship between the seriousness of the offence and the remand 
decision.
As explained in Chapter 4, the data relating to whether a defendant was tried 
summarily or at the Crown Court is very limited in this study and makes a 
comparison of the differences in custody rates between those tried summarily and 
those committed for trial of limited value. Nevertheless, where the data is available, 
21 per cent of defendants in the observation sample who were committed for trial 
at the Crown Court were remanded in custody, which is very similar to the official 
rate of 22 per cent.
Further evidence of the importance of the seriousness of the charge was uncovered 
by East and Doherty (1984, 1985) when they found a significant difference in the 
bail rate between those defendants who were charged under section 1 of the Theft 
Act 1968 with offences where the amount of money involved was below £100 (91 
per cent) and those where the money involved was over £100 (74 per cent).
A similar analysis was undertaken in the present study to examine whether the 
monetary value involved in offences of theft was related to the remand decision. 
This assumes that monetary value is used as an indicator of the seriousness of the 
offence1 .
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Table 5.1: Bail/Custody rates for defendants charged with theft by the value of 






















Table 5.1 shows that there is a substantial difference between the custody rates for 
those charged with theft of over £2000 compared to those charged with theft of 
under £2000*. The difference is highly statistically significant (Chi2 = 17.15: > 0.001) 
which suggests that there is a strong relationship between the remand decision and 
the monetary value of the property stolen. Furthermore, those charged with theft of 
over £2000 are more likely to be granted bail with conditions which also suggests 
that the seriousness of the offence is related to the remand decision. This finding 
confirms Doherty and East's (1985) findings and, assuming that monetary value is 
a measure of seriousness, suggests that the seriousness of the offence is related to 
the remand decision.
Nature of the offence
Although the nature of the offence in itself may be related to the remand decision, 
any findings can also provide evidence of the importance of the seriousness of the 
offence. This is because certain offences are perceived by most people to be more 
serious than others. For example, offences against the person are usually perceived 
to be more serious than property offences and burglary more serious than theft.
The national statistics provide only limited evidence of the custody rates for different 
groups of offences. This is because they only provide statistics on the nature of the
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offence at the committal stage of proceedings. This obviously precludes all those 
defendants tried in magistrates' courts and suggests that the offence is of a relatively 
serious nature (see above). Consequently, the custody rates are higher than would 
be expected were they to cover all remand hearings.
Table 5.2: Proportion of defendants committed in custody by the nature of the 
offence (1992).
Offence Percentage in custody




Theft and Handling stolen goods 12






Total number committed: 94,400; Total number committed in custody 20,400. 
Source: Table 8.8 Criminal Statistics England and Wales 1992 (Home Office, 
1993a).
Table 5.2 shows that the is a large variation in the proportion of defendants 
committed for trial in custody by offence type. The highest proportion of defendants 
remanded in custody were charged with robbery which is double the average for all 
types of offences. The proportion of defendants charged with burglary is also well 
above the average for all offences types. However, the proportion of defendants 
charged with theft and handling or fraud and forgery or motoring offences who are 
remanded in custody is lower than the average. Nevertheless, apart from robbery 
there appears to be no clear distinction between defendants charged with property
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offences and those charged with violence. The figures do suggest that the perceived 
seriousness of offence groups influences whether a defendant is committed in 
custody as both robbery and burglary, which are intuitively perceived as serious 
offences, have relatively high custody rates, at least at this stage of the proceedings.
Without exception the previous research that has been conducted found a close 
correlation between the remand decision and the nature of the offence with which 
the defendant was charged. Bottomley (1970), who used the three fold classification 
of offences cited above, found that 30 per cent of those charged with violence 
against the person were remanded in custody, 42 per cent of defendants charged with 
larcenies and false pretences and 75 per cent of those charged with breaking and 
entering were remanded in custody. However, these findings suggest that the nature 
of the offence overrides its seriousness as the findings show that a defendant charged 
with property offences is more likely to be remanded in custody. This is despite the 
fact that intuitively, an offence involving violence against the person would be 
perceived as more serious than property offences. This illustrates a consistent pattern 
which is evident from previous research that bail is more likely to be refused when 
a defendant has been charged with offences against property than violence against 
the person. As King (197la) comments "... the use of violence is not in itself a 
criterion adopted by magistrates for the exclusion of bail." (King, 1971a:17). This 
pattern seems to have continued after the implementation of the Bail Act 1976 as 
East and Doherty (1984, 1985) found that custody rates for property offences were 
significantly higher than those for offences against the person. This may be because 
the main factor considered for those charged with property offences is the likelihood 
of repetition of the offence.
The findings of this study confirm the importance of the nature of the offence in the 
remand decision. Offences were classified into eight groups according to the type of 
offence (see appendix 9). Although each category distinguishes offences by their 
nature, they do not differentiate between offences hi terms of seriousness whether 
in terms of monetary value or injuries/damage caused. Consequently, each category 
includes a broad spectrum of seriousness. However, as discussed above certain types
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of offences are perceived as more serious than others.
Table 5.3 Outcome of remand hearings by type of offence for defendants 































Total 1607 56 31 13
Table 5.3 shows that there is a significant variation in the proportion of defendants 
remanded in custody by offence type hi the registers sample. The differences are 
very similar to those found in the national figures. Motoring offences, property 
damage and interference with the police or the course of justice have relatively low 
figures which are substantially below the 13 per cent average for all offences. On 
the other hand, breaking and entering is well above the average, at 21 per cent, and 
offences against the person are slightly above the average at 16 per cent. 
Nevertheless, it appears from these figures that defendants charged with breaking 
and entering (burglary) are at greater risk of being remanded in custody than 
defendants charged with offences against the person. The findings are broadly 
similar to those of Bottomley (1970) and Doherty and East (1985).
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Although the actual custody rates for the observation sample are probably 
unrepresentative of remand decisions as a whole, the differences in custody rates 
found in the registers sample between defendants charged with different types of 
offences were also found in the observation sample (see appendix 10). Both of the 
samples show similar trends in the custody rate for different offences with the 
exception of dangerous and offensive behaviour (for an explanation of this finding 
see appendix 10).
To facilitate an assessment of whether or not these differences are statistically 
significant three offence types were used which broadly correspond to those used by 
Bottomley (1970). They were offences against the person, theft and deception, and 
breaking and entering. A statistically significant difference was found in bail rates 
for both samples between these categories of offences (registers sample 
Chi2 = 17.44:>0.001; observation sample Chi2 = 11.25: > 0.005) which suggests that 
the type of offence is related to the remand decision. However, when the remand 
decisions for all property offences (property damage, theft, deception and breaking 
and entering) were compared with those for offences against the person no 
statistically significant relationship was found for either sample (registers sample: 
Chi2 =2.29; observation sample: Chi2 =0.56). This finding can probably be explained 
by the low custody rate for defendants charged with property damage (4 per cent 
registers sample and 6 per cent observation sample). In general, this category 
includes relatively minor offences (although it does include cases where the 
defendant was charged with arson but these make up a small proportion of the total) 
which intuitively would result in a low custody rate. Even if this is a probable 
explanation, the result is contrary to the findings of previous research (King 197la) 
and may suggest that the use of violence in the course of alleged offending has 
become an important factor in remand decisions. This finding may reflect the ever 
present moral panic about the presence and, indeed, increase in the amount of 
violent crime in British society which intuitively must affect the perceptions of the 
magistrates of this type of offence.
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Summary
In conclusion, both official statistics and previous research studies suggest that there 
is a correlation between the nature and seriousness of the offence and the remand 
decision. This study has also found a relationship between both the nature and the 
seriousness of the offence. However, this study did not find definitive evidence to 
confirm the findings of previous research that defendants charged with property 
crime are more likely to be remanded in custody. Nevertheless, defendants charged 
with breaking and entering were more likely to be remanded in custody than 
defendants who were charged with offences against the person which suggests that 
the inconclusive findings may be a result of the broad spectrum of seriousness 
encompassed hi the categories. Despite the fact that a relationship has been found 
it is always possible that it is the product of a third intervening variable such as 
previous criminal record.
Previous Convictions
The previous convictions of defendants may be related to the remand decision in 
several ways. Firstly, if defendants has numerous previous convictions they may be 
thought more likely to abscond primarily because of the increased likelihood of 
receiving a custodial sentence. These factors can also result in a belief that 
defendants may interfere with witnesses. Finally, previous convictions demonstrate 
a capacity to commit crime and can result hi the belief that defendants are likely to 
reoffend.
The information relating to the previous convictions of defendants in this study is 
limited. The information is available only in the observation sample and only then 
when information about whether or not the defendant had previous convictions was 
mentioned in court during the bail hearing. However, anecdotal evidence suggests 
that previous convictions are perceived, by the C.P.S. and defence solicitors, to be 
an important influence on the remand decision. In only a third of hearings was any
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information provided to the court (514 out of 1524 hearings) but in a substantial 
minority of these (40 per cent) information was provided about the previous 
convictions of the defendant. However, it is impossible to state categorically that the 
magistrates were unaware of the previous convictions of the defendant (they may 
have had the papers from previous hearings). Therefore the comparisons are 
restricted to those cases where it was stated that the defendant did not have previous 
convictions.
Table 5.4 Outcome of Remand Hearings for defendants with and without 
previous convictions (observation sample).
Outcome Previous Convictions







Total Sample (n) 170 32
Table 5.4 shows that there are substantial differences in the remand decision between 
those defendants who have previous convictions and those that do not. The data 
shows that defendants who have previous convictions are much more likely to be 
remanded in custody. This difference is statistically significant (Chi2 =7.95: > 0.005). 
However, although the finding is suggestive it should be treated with caution because 
of the nature of the sample.
The type of offence that the defendant had been charged with has already been 
shown to be related to the remand decision. It is, therefore, possible that 
relationships between the remand decision and offence type or, indeed, previous 
convictions, may be explained by the other factor. Indeed, Bottoms and McClean 
(1976) argue that whether or not a defendant has previous convictions may explain 
the difference found in previous studies between the remand decision for those tried
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on indictment and those tried summarily.
A statistically significant relationship between previous convictions and the nature 
of offence charged was found (Chf=13.331:>0.005). The data shows that 
defendants charged with breaking and entering are more likely to have previous 
convictions (97 per cent) than defendants charged with theft and deception (87 per 
cent) and offences against the person (71 per cent). Consequently, we can surmise 
that previous convictions may account for at least some of the relationship between 
type of offence and the remand decision. The sample size for those defendants who 
had no previous convictions, that is where this information was actually available to 
the court, was so small as to make a comparison meaningless. Nevertheless, an 
analysis could be undertaken on those whose previous convictions were made known 
to the court.
Table 5.5 Custody Rate by offence group for defendants who had previous 
convictions (observation sample).
Offence















Table 5.5 shows that for those defendants whose previous convictions were made 
known to the court, the relationship previously found between the nature of the 
offence and the remand decision persisted. However, when the three offence 
categories were used the relationship was not statistically significant (Chi2 =2.97). 
Having said this, when all property offences were taken together, a highly significant 
difference (Chi2 = 18.32: > 0.001) was found between the remand decisions for those 
charged with property offences and those charged with offences against the person
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where the defendant's previous convictions were known to the court. This suggests 
that at least part of the relationship between offence type and the remand decision 
can be explained by whether or not the defendant had previous convictions. 
However, it also suggests that the relationship between previous convictions, offence 
charged and the remand decision is complicated. Having said this, what is clear is 
that a defendant who has previous convictions is less likely to be granted bail 
whatever the offence with which they are charged3 .
THE BAIL HISTORY OF THE DEFENDANT
The bail history of the defendant can be important to the remand decision in several 
ways. If a defendant has absconded, committed an offence whilst on bail or breached 
his/her conditions of bail then they are, arguably, more likely to do so again.
Defendants Previously Subject to Bail
Information about this factor was only available from the observation sample when 
the information was disclosed to the court. The category includes those defendants 
who had been subject to bail in the past but who were not currently on bail at the 
time of the hearing.
The fact that the defendant had been subject to bail in the past was mentioned in 102 
cases in the observation sample. Of these defendants 68 per cent were remanded in 
custody which is well above the average for the sample as a whole. In the majority 
of cases where the defendant had been subject to bail this information was provided 
by the C.P.S. (65 cases compared to 10 cases from a defence solicitor and 29 when 
it was mention by both the C.P.S. and the defence) which suggests that it is more 
likely to be put forward by the C.P.S. in support of objections to bail than as a 
positive point towards the granting of bail which may have resulted in the increased 
custody rate. The small number of occasions when it was mentioned that a defendant
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had not previously been on bail (a positive point) supports this finding especially 
when in 5 out of the 10 cases this information was also provided by C.P.S..
Other Offences for which the Defendant was on Bail
Data was collected on the number of defendants who were already on bail for 
another alleged offence prior to the present proceedings. One hundred defendants 
were already on bail for another alleged offence. Of these 61 per cent were 
remanded in custody, which suggests that this factor also influences the remand 
decision.
Bail Offences
Two sets of data are available that relate to the offences of failing to surrender to 
custody (Bail Act 1976 s.6(l)) or, having failed to surrender, failing to surrender to 
custody at the appointed place as soon as is practicable (s.6(2)). For the purposes 
of this study both of these offences were recorded as failure to appear. The source 
of the first set of data from the observation sample was whether or not it was made 
known to the court that the defendant had failed to surrender in the past whether 
during the present or past proceedings.
Information on this factor was given in 93 cases. In 14 of these the defendant had 
not previously failed to appear. Of these 14 defendants 86 per cent were remanded 
in custody while only 66 per cent of those who had previously failed to surrender 
were remanded in custody. This is contrary to what would be expected. This 
suggests that the source of the information may be important. In the majority of 
cases where the defendant had failed to appear the C.P.S. provided the information 
which again suggests that this factor was put forward as a reason not to grant bail 
whereas in all 14 cases where it was stated that the defendant had not failed to 
appear in the past the defence was the source of the information. Consequently, this
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factor appears to be used by the C.P.S. to support their objections to bail which may 
have resulted in the unexpected findings and probably reflects the fact that where 
additional information was made available, the defendant was more likely to be 
facing C.P.S. objections and, therefore, at risk of custody.
The second set of data relates to defendants who were charged with bail offences at 
the time of the hearing. The data was collected either from the charge being 
recorded on the court list or the C.P.S. actually laying the charge at the hearing.
Table 5.6 Outcome of remand hearings by whether or not a defendant was 
charged with an offence of failure to appear (observation sample).
Outcome
Total
Offence of failure to appear








Table 5.6 shows that 72 per cent of defendants who were charged with a bail offence 
were still granted bail which is surprising considering the historical and legal 
significance of failing to appear and suggests that the majority of defendants charged 
with a bail offence are trusted to appear at a later date. What is not clear from the 
findings is the number of occasions when a defendant failed to appear or the length 
of time that elapsed between the offence and the hearing or, indeed, any possible 
explanations which may explain this finding. Consequently, the findings suggest that 
a majority of defendants charged with a bail offence are rebailed but that there is a 
slightly increased risk of a remand hi custody.
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Breach of Bail Conditions
Data on the number of defendants who had breached their bail conditions was 
recorded from two sources for the observation sample: (i) if it was recorded on the 
court lists, (ii) if it was dealt with at the observed hearing. Using both these sources 
there were 31 instances of breaches of conditions recorded for those defendants 
present at the hearing. Of these 31 cases, 48 per cent were remanded hi custody 
which compares to a 21 per cent custody rate for those who were present at the 
hearing and who had not breached the conditions of their bail or if they had, the 
court was not aware of the breach. The difference is statistically significant (Chi2 = 
15.13: >0.001). However, the two samples are hi some respects incompatible as the 
control group includes defendants who have never been granted conditional bail. 
Furthermore, some of the defendants who were recorded as having breached then- 
conditions were already in custody at the time of the hearing as the breach of the 
conditions may not necessarily have occurred immediately prior to the hearing. 
Nevertheless, the findings of the observation sample show a substantially higher 
custody rate for those who allegedly breached their conditions of bail and it, 
therefore, seems likely that there is a link between the remand decision and whether 
or not a defendant has breached conditions of bail hi the past4 .
A further source of data on breach of conditions was obtained during the 
observational period. A breach was recorded if the defendant was being dealt with 
for the alleged breach at the observed hearing. This provides a measure of the 
immediate effect of a breach of conditions on the magistrates' decision. Of the 25 
cases where the proceedings involved a breach, 40 per cent of defendants were 
remanded in custody, 56 per cent were readmitted to conditional bail and in one case 
the defendant was released on unconditional bail. Both Courts B and C remanded 50 
per cent of those that appeared before them for breaching bail in custody while only 
37 per cent of those appearing for the same reason in Court A were remanded in 
custody.
Both samples suggest that a defendant who has breached his/her conditions of bail
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is more likely to be remanded in custody although for the registers sample the 
difference is not statistically significant. This anomaly may have occurred due to 
recording error particularly as a breach of conditions of bail is not an offence which 
means that the only penalty available to the court is a decision whether or not a 
defendant should be readmitted to bail. It, therefore, seems a fair assumption that 
it does not necessarily have to be a point of record.
DEFENDANT RELATED FACTORS
Defendant related factors can be split into two categories: those that relate to 
personal characteristics of the defendants and those that relate to the defendant's 
community ties. The characteristics of defendants discussed below are those of age, 
sex and ethnic origin. The age of the defendant may be related to the likelihood of 
absconding or reoffending and may therefore affect the remand decision. For 
example, it is well documented that young adults account for a major proportion of 
the official crime rate. However, it is difficult to account for why the sex or ethnic 
origin of a defendant may affect the remand decision other than blatant 
discrimination or chivalry in the case of women (see Heidensohn 1985).
The Age of the Defendant
Although this study is not specifically concerned with those defendants who were 
juveniles (at the time of the study those aged under 17) at the time of the hearing, 
data was collected on juveniles who were jointly charged with adults and thus 
appeared in the magistrates' court as opposed to juvenile courts (as they were then 
called). Of these 54 defendants none were remanded in custody. This is a 
significantly different finding from that of Jones (1985) who found that 11 per cent 
of juveniles in his study were remanded in custody. It reflects the stated policy that 
juveniles should not be remanded to prison and indicates, at least during this study, 
that this policy was being put into practice when a juvenile appeared in the
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magistrates' court.
No consistent pattern of remand outcomes emerges when the age of the defendant 
is taken into consideration. However, the observational sample shows a disparity 
between the custody rates of defendants who are under 25 and those over 25 (26 per 
cent and 17 per cent respectively) which is highly statistically significant 
(Chi2 =10.84:>0.001). However, no statistically significant relationship can be 
found for the same sample hi the registers data which suggests that a third variable 
may account for any differences in custody rates between age groups.
The most likely factors to account for the findings relating to the age of the 
defendant are the type of offence and the previous convictions both of which have 
already been shown to be related to the remand decision. When the offence with 
which the defendant was charged was taken into consideration for the observation 
sample, the difference between defendants aged under 25 and over 25 disappeared 
for those charged with offences against the person. However, for defendants charged 
with either theft and deception or breaking and entering the age difference was still 
statistically significant (theft and deception: Chi2 =6.19:>0.025; breaking and 
entering: Chi2 =11.42:>0.001). When all property offences were taken together, the 
age of the defendant was still found to be statistically significantly related to the 
remand decision (Chi2 = 12.8: >0.001). This suggests that the age of the defendant 
is related to the remand decision for defendants charged with property offences but 
not for those charged with offences against the person. This may be explained by the 
previous record of the offender, with offenders charged with property offences 
having a larger number of previous convictions - in particular given the concern 
about the "persistent young offender," especially in relation to auto crimes such as 
theft of and from cars. Intuitively, a much larger proportion of offences involving 
violence against the person are likely to be "one offs".
A relationship between the type of offence charged and whether or not a defendant 
has previous convictions has already been found. However, a slightly different 
analysis between defendants charged with offences against the person and all
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property offences together shows that there is a statistically significant difference in 
whether or not a defendant has previous convictions (Chi2 =5.75:>0.25). Those 
defendants charged with violence against the person were less likely to have previous 
convictions than those defendants charged with property offences. This suggests that 
whether or not a defendant has previous convictions may explain the disparity hi the 
relationship between age and the remand decision according to offence type. 
Although there is a difference in the proportion of defendants aged under and over 
25 who have previous convictions (86 per cent and 80 per cent respectively) the 
difference is not statistically significant (Chi2 = 1.20). Consequently, it seems that 
whether or not a defendant has previous convictions is not related to age but to the 
nature of offence. Therefore, it appears that any differences in remand decisions are 
related to the nature of the offence with which the defendant is charged and not to 
the age of the defendant.
The Sex of the Defendant
As expected a much larger number of males than females was observed during 
remand hearings. Of the total sample of 1524, 11 per cent were female (175 cases). 
There was a large disparity between the custody rates of males and females with 23 
per cent of males but only 8 per cent of females being remanded in custody. This 
difference is statistically significant (Chi2 = 19.3: > 0.001). A similar picture 
emerges from the registers sample where females make up 10 per cent of the 
sample. The custody rates for this sample are 14 per cent for males and two per cent 
for females. This finding is consistent with other studies. As Jones (1985) concludes 
"It is clear that the court remand decision varies significantly by the sex of the 
defendant" (Jones, 1985:108). However, as Doherty and East (1985) argue, this 
difference may well be explained by differences in the type of offence charged.
A highly statistically significant difference was found between the offences with 
which males and females were charged in the observation sample 
(Chi2 =71.47: >0.001). A higher proportion of females than males were charged
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with property damage (10 per cent of females but only 4 per cent of males), theft 
(46 per cent of females as opposed to 27 per cent of males), and deception (14 per 
cent of females but only 5 per cent of males). Moreover, males were much more 
likely to be charged with breaking and entering (27 per cent) than females (6 per 
cent). The offences with which a higher proportion of females were charged tended 
to be those with the lowest custody rates, for example property damage has the 
lowest custody rate of all offences at 4 per cent. Whereas, more males were charged 
with breaking and entering offences which has a relatively high custody rate (29 per 
cent). This suggests that the relationship between the sex of the defendant and the 
remand decision may be partly explained by the nature of the offence charged.
When the sex of the defendant was taken into consideration there was still a 
difference in the custody rates for different offences. Males are still far more likely 
to be remanded in custody whatever the offence with which they are charged. This 
suggests that both the type of offence and the sex of the defendant are related to the 
remand decision. Having said this, the custody rate for males charged with offences 
against the person is much higher than the similar figure for the whole sample (37 
per cent compared with 24 per cent) which may indicate that the two factors of 
offence type and the sex of the defendant can work together. That is to say that if 
a defendant is charged with an offence against the person and is male he is far more 
likely to be remanded in custody than either a female charged with a similar offence 
or a male charged with a different offence.
Another factor that may account for the relationship between the sex of the 
defendant and the remand hearing is the previous convictions of defendants. A larger 
proportion of male defendants for whom it was mentioned had previous convictions 
(89 per cent) than female defendants (31 per cent) and this difference is highly 
statistically significant (Chi2 = 37.2: >0.001). Having said this, when previous 
convictions are taken into consideration there is still a large disparity between the 
custody rates for males and females: for those with previous convictions, 56 per cent 
of males and 20 per cent of females were remanded in custody and for those with 
no previous convictions the figures were 33 per cent and 19 per cent respectively.
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Consequently, it seems that whatever the nature of the offence and the previous 
record of the defendant, males are much more likely to be remanded in custody than 
females.
The Ethnic Origin of the Defendant
Data were collected on the ethnic origin of the defendant during the court 
observations. However, the data has major limitations as it was a subjective 
assessment of a defendant's apparent ethnic origin as recorded by the researcher. 
Non-whites made up 9 per cent of those defendants who were present in court for 
their hearing. This is nearly double the proportion of ethnic minorities found in the 
population as a whole which is no more than 5 per cent (quoted hi Brown and 
Hullin, 1993:108). Non-whites had a lower custody rate than whites (14 per cent as 
opposed to 22 per cent). The non-white category can be further broken down into 
blacks (23 cases) of whom 9 per cent were remanded hi custody, Asians (29 cases) 
of whom 14 per cent were remanded hi custody and others which included, inter 
alia, mixed race and oriental (44 cases) of whom 16 per cent were remanded in 
custody. Consequently, whatever measure of ethnic origin is used non-whites have 
a lower custody rate than whites. Furthermore, there is no significant difference 
between the samples in terms of sex or type of offence charged. These findings are 
contrary to the findings of Walker (1989) who found that blacks were consistently 
more likely to be remanded in custody with Asians less likely to be remanded in 
custody than white defendants. However, a study by Brown and Hullin (1993) found 
virtually identical custody rates for whites and Afro-Caribbeans who faced a 
contested bail application and concluded that "no racial bias is indicated in the 
remand decisions of magistrates" (Brown and Hullin, 1993:111). The findings of this 
research, although limited, seem to suggest a similar conclusion.
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COMMUNITY TIES OF THE DEFENDANT
Historically, the community ties of the defendant have been linked to the likelihood 
that s/he may fail to appear, the rationale being that lack of community ties permits 
the defendant to disappear as s/he has nothing to lose.
The Address of the Defendant
Previous studies have found a link between the remand decision and whether or not 
the defendant had a fixed address. Bottomley (1970) found that 83 defendants (10 
per cent) were of no fixed abode and that all but six of these were remanded in 
custody. Doherty and East (1985) also found that those defendants who were of no 
fixed abode were more likely to be remanded in custody (75 per cent) than those 
who had a fixed address.
The address of the defendant is perceived to be important to the remand decision for 
two reasons, both of which are related to the risk that the defendant may abscond 
and, consequently, may not face trial. If a defendant has no address (is of no fixed 
abode) or lives outside of the area of the court s/he is arguably more likely to 
abscond because of the lack of community ties in the area. Secondly, if a defendant 
fails to turn up at court at the appointed time and place s/he can be more easily 
traced if there is a fixed address even if it is out of the immediate area of the court. 
Therefore, the most significant issue regarding address is likely to be if the 
defendant has a fixed address. However, whether or not the defendant lives locally 
is also likely to affect the remand decision as a defendent who lives out of the area 
has to make a greater effort to attend court and is, arguably, more likely to fail to 
appear.
The findings of this study confirm this rationale with 83 per cent of those defendants 
whose hearings were observed and who lived locally being granted bail as opposed 
to 62 per cent of those who lived out of the area5 . The difference in remand
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decisions for those defendants who lived locally and those that lived non locally was 
statistically significant (Chi2 =43.09: >0.001). This finding is confirmed by the 
registers sample which also shows a statistically significant relationship 
(Chi2 =20.1: > 0.001) between the address of the defendant and the remand decision.
However, the similarities between the samples end when the offence with which the 
defendant was charged is taken into consideration. For the observation sample, the 
difference persists when the offence is taken into consideration but a more 
complicated picture arises from the more representative registers data. Although, the 
difference between defendants who live locally and non locally does not persist for 
offences against the person or for theft and deception, it does persist when the 
offence charged is breaking and entering. This suggests that whether the defendant 
lives in the local area of the court is a related hi the remand decision but that its 
effect is spurious and in part may be explained by the offence with which the person 
is charged. Having said this, the difference persists between remand decisions for 
those defendants who live locally and those that live outside the area when the sex 
of the defendant is taken into consideration.
Only 24 defendants in the observation sample were recorded as of no fixed abode. 
This is a relatively small number so the findings must be treated with caution. 
However, 46 per cent of those of no fixed abode were remanded in custody 
compared to 22 per cent of those defendants who had an address. This is a 
statistically significant difference (Chi2 =9.03: > 0.005) and suggests that a defendant 
without a stable address is more likely to be remanded in custody. Significantly, 
none of the defendants who were recorded as of no fixed abode were remanded on 
unconditional bail. This suggests that not only are defendants who are of no fixed 
address more likely to be remanded in custody but that if they are granted bail then 
it is likely that conditions would be attached to their bail.
The data from the registers sample confirms the findings of the observation sample, 
although the difference between the remand decisions for those with and without an 
address is more marked in the registers sample. Twenty five defendants were
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recorded as of no fixed abode. Of these 72 per cent were remanded in custody 
compared to only 12 per cent of defendants who were recorded as having a fixed 
address. However, 2 defendants were granted unconditional bail.
Therefore it appears that defendants who are of no fixed abode or who live outside 
the immediate area of the court are more likely to be remanded in custody.
Employment
As far back as 1960, the Home Office study (Time Awaiting Trial) concluded that 
whether or not a defendant is in employment has a significant influence on the 
remand decision. The study found that two thirds of defendants who were granted 
bail were in employment compared to less than a third of those in custody. 
Bottomley (1970) also found a relationship between employment status and the bail 
decision with 74 per cent of those granted bail in employment whereas only 46 per 
cent of those remanded in custody were employed. Furthermore, Bottomley found 
a link between the length of time the defendant had been in his/her current 
employment and the granting of bail.
Only one source of data on employment status is available from the present study 
and that is when it was recorded in the court registers. Furthermore, the data was 
not recorded for every case and very much depended on the court's policy. 
However, data is available in 1070 cases where the defendant was present at the 
remand hearing. Of these cases, 67 per cent were unemployed, 3 per cent were in 
full time education, 2 per cent were housepersons or retired and 28 per cent were 
in employment. Twelve per cent of unemployed defendants were remanded in 
custody compared to 6 per cent of employed defendants (this is statistically 
significant: Chi2 =5.938: > 0.025). Furthermore, a higher proportion of unemployed 
defendants who were granted bail were subject to conditions (37 per cent compared 
with 29 per cent). These findings suggest that defendants who are unemployed are 
more likely to be remanded in custody and if granted bail, more likely to be subject
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to conditions. The rationale behind these findings again relates to the fact that a 
defendant is less likely to abscond if s/he has a job as they have more to lose. 
However, they also have more to lose by committing further offences which may 
increase the likelihood that they may lose their job and also they are likely to have 
less time in which actually to commit further offences.
COURT RELATED FACTORS
The factors covered in this section are the previous remand decision and the 
influence of the C.P.S., both of these probably have a direct effect on the 
magistrates' remand decision. It has already been found (see Chapter 3) that the 
decision of the police to detain a defendant prior to their first appearance is related 
to the court's remand decision. It therefore seems likely that the prosecution's view 
will also affect the decision.
Previous Court Remand Decision
A previous remand decision of a court is likely to have an effect on the court 
making the decision. This is partly because if the circumstances of the case on which 
the previous decision was made are unchanged then these should result in a similar 
decision. However, in some cases the circumstances may have changed which may 
result in a different decision being made or the same decision on different criteria. 
The idea that a remand decision should not change over time except where the 
circumstances of the case differ is, in fact, laid down in law, firstly by the 
Nottingham Justices case and latterly by s.154 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, 
albeit, after two applications for bail have been made. Furthermore, during the 
interviews, magistrates stated that they would rarely overturn a previous decision of 
another bench without a change in the circumstances of the case laid before them. 
This can be argued from the point of view of consistency across benches of 
magistrates but also from, arguably a less satisfactory viewpoint, that magistrates
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should be seen to support one another's decisions.
Previous research has supported this contention, consistently showing that the 
previous remand decision is correlated with the present remand decision. Doherty 
and East (1985) concluded "... if a defendant is already on bail at the time of the 
hearing then [s]he is very likely to be bailed again" (Doherty and East, 1985:260). 
In their study, only four per cent of those previously granted bail were subsequently 
remanded in custody. Having said this, the correlation is less pronounced for 
defendants who had been previously remanded in custody with 27 per cent of these 
defendants subsequently being granted bail.
The findings from the present study confirm those of the previous research.
Table 5.8: Outcome of the remand hearing in relation to the preceding remand 
decision in the case (observation sample).
Previous Remand Decision 








Table 5. 8 clearly indicates that the previous remand decision is rarely overturned by 
magistrates. Consequently, once a defendant has been remanded either on bail or in 
custody their remand status is unlikely to change. The percentage of defendants 
previously remanded in custody who were further remanded in custody is much 
higher than that found by Doherty and East (1985) (73 per cent) and probably 
reflects the provisions for limiting the number of bail applications under s. 154 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988.
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Table 5.9: Outcome of remand hearing in relation to the preceding remand 
hearing (observation sample).
Previous Remand Decision
Outcome Unconditional Conditional Custody













Total 324 205 212
Table 5.9 further breaks down the findings into remands in custody and those 
granted bail with and without conditions. It shows the pattern which would be 
expected from assuming a hierarchy of remand decisions from a remand hi custody, 
the granting of conditional and unconditional bail. It shows that for defendants who 
were previously remanded in custody but who are subsequently granted bail, 
conditions are almost always attached to their bail. Conversely, if there is a reason 
to revoke unconditional bail, the defendant is far more likely to have conditions 
attached to the bail than be remanded in custody. But if the defendant is already 
subject to conditions of bail, bail is more likely to be revoked altogether and the 
defendant remanded hi custody. This suggests, as would be expected, that 
conditional bail is used as a staging post between remanding a defendant in custody 
and granting unconditional bail. Furthermore, once conditions have been attached 
to bail they are very unlikely to be removed6 .
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The Role of the Crown Prosecution Service
Previous research both before and after the introduction of the Bail Act 1976 
(Bottomley 1970, King 1971a, Bottoms and McClean 1976 and Doherty and East 
1985) consistently found a correlation between the police remand request and the 
magistrates' remand decision. King (1971a) concluded that "magistrates, particularly 
lay magistrates, still rely very heavily on the police's opinion as to whether or not 
bail ought to be given" (King, 1971a:45). Bottoms and McClean (1976) also found 
that "magistrates everywhere generally accept the police view" (Bottoms and 
McClean, 1976:196). However, Doherty and East (1985) outlined a more 
complicated picture and concluded that the police view was far less influential than 
previous studies had suggested. They argued that the police gave recommendations 
to the court in only 20 per cent of cases and in only 18 per cent of all cases did the 
police object to bail. Furthermore, hi only 61 per cent of cases where the police did 
object to bail were the defendants remanded hi custody. However, only 31 per cent 
of defendants who faced police objections were granted bail as opposed to 90 per 
cent of those who faced no objections. They argued that this evidence did not mean 
that the police view played no part in the remand decision but that "there is less 
evidence in our study of the police view being dominant" (Doherty and East, 
1985:256).
Since the creation of the C.P.S. hi 1986, they have the responsibility of objecting 
to bail, where appropriate, during remand hearings. In other words, the police role 
in remand hearings is now carried out by the C.P.S.. Therefore, an important 
question is whether the prosecution's viewpoint is still as influential on the 
magistrates' remand decision now that the C.P.S. is the prosecuting agency instead 
of the police.
The C.P.S. made a remand request during a hearing hi 60 per cent of the cases (903 
cases). In 6 of these cases the police, through the C.P.S., applied for a further 
remand in police custody. The C.P.S. requested a remand in custody in 25 per cent 
of the cases where the C.P.S. made a request, that is 15 per cent of the whole
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sample. Conditional bail was requested in 32 per cent of cases while unconditional 
bail was requested in 42 per cent of cases. Therefore, in 44 per cent of cases in the 
whole sample the C.P.S. explicitly stated that they were not applying for custody. 
Furthermore, of the 621 cases where the C.P.S. made no request, 429 were where 
the defendants were not present in court. So, in fact, the C.P.S. made a remand 
request in 82 per cent of the cases were the defendant was present in court. This 
seems to suggest that the C.P.S. plays a greater, more active, role in remand 
proceedings even when there is no dispute about the granting of bail than when the 
police conducted proceedings. Whether this is because the magistrates routinely 
asked the opinion of the C.P.S. or because the C.P.S. make a point of stating their 
opinion is not clear.
Moreover, the C.P.S. seems to play an even more active role in remand hearings 
when the defendant is appearing for the first time. The C.P.S. made a remand 
request in 95 per cent of cases where the defendant was appearing for the first time 
compared with only 45 per cent of cases where the defendant was appearing on a 
second or subsequent occasion. This finding is what would be expected if two points 
are taken into consideration. Firstly, on a second or subsequent occasion a remand 
decision would already have been made on a previous occasion which would be 
known to the court and secondly, it could be safely assumed that unless otherwise 
stated the C.P.S. agreed with that decision or, at least, saw no reason to change it. 
Therefore, the decision would be unlikely to be overturned unless new issues had 
arisen.
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Table 5.10: The outcome of remand hearings related to the C.P.S. remand request 
(observation sample).
Outcome of C.P.S. Remand Request 
Remand Hearing

















Total 190 378 286 229
Table 5.10 shows a high concordance rate between the C.P.S. remand request and 
the magistrates' remand decision. In 95 per cent of cases where the C.P.S. made a 
request the magistrates agreed with that request. This becomes particularly apparent 
when the cases where the C.P.S. did and did not make a request were compared. 
Table 5.10 basically shows that if the C.P.S. are satisfied that the defendant can be 
released on bail then usually the magistrates grant bail. However, the C.P.S. 
viewpoint seems still to be dominant in cases where no application for a remand in 
custody is made as there is a high concordance rate between when the C.P.S. asked 
for, and the magistrates attached, conditions to bail. There is less concordance 
between the C.P.S. request and the magistrates' decision when the C.P.S. requested 
custody. However, in a substantial majority of these cases (86 per cent) the 
magistrates still agreed with the C.P.S. request. These findings, therefore, suggest 
that there is quite a strong relationship between the C.P.S. remand request and the 
magistrates' decision which seems to indicate that the magistrates invariably follow 
the C.P.S. request. Although these findings are highly suggestive, it is possible that 
the magistrates make an independent assessment of the case, on similar facts as the 
C.P.S., and simply make the same decisions. Nevertheless, further evidence of the
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C.P.S.'s influence, which will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, appears to indicate 
that the C.P.S. viewpoint is indeed very influential in the magistrates' decision.
King (197la) found that lay magistrates were much more likely to uphold police 
objections than were stipendiary magistrates. However, the findings from this study 
do not support this.
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Table 5.11: The outcome of the remand hearing related to the C.P.S. remand 















































Total 58 46 78
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A Stipendiary magistrate sat in Court C during the court observations. Table 5.11 
shows that the concordance rate between the magistrates' decisions and the C.P.S. 
remand request is higher in Court C than hi Courts A and B. This is the opposite 
to King's (1971a) findings and suggests that the Stipendiary magistrate was more 
likely than lay magistrates to agree, not disagree, with the C.P.S. recommendation. 
Of course, the findings are not conclusive as the two types of magistrates work in 
entirely different courts which may have different cultures. Furthermore, the C.P.S. 
may have different procedures and/or working practices in the different courts or, 
indeed, for different types of magistrate that could change the proportion of cases 
in which they made a request for custody or, possibly, a request at all.
Table 5.12 The C.P.S. Remand Request in Different Courts (observation sample)
C.P.S. Remand Court 
Request
A (%) B (%) C (%)













Table 5.12 shows that there is a disparity between the courts hi the proportion of 
hearings in which the C.P.S. made remand requests. Furthermore, the C.P.S. seems 
to make different requests in different courts. For example, hi 43 per cent of cases 
where the prosecution made a recommendation in Court C that request was for a 
remand hi custody, whereas the corresponding figure for Courts A and B is 21 per 
cent. This disparity may of course be caused by different types of case particularly 
as stipendiaries are often perceived as dealing with the more serious cases. However, 
an alternative explanation is also possible. The high request rate for custody hi Court 
C may be a result of an expectation that the stipendiary more readily remands more
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defendants in custody irrespective of whether or not the C.P.S. requests it - perhaps 
therefore, the C.P.S. may request a higher proportion of custodial remands because 
they perceive that they are more likely to be granted. Further evidence of disparities 
between courts can be gauged from the fact that in Court B the C.P.S. requested 
conditional bail hi 41 per cent of cases whereas the corresponding figure for Court 
A is 31 per cent.
In summary, it seems that the remand request made by the C.P.S. is an important 
factor in the remand decision. The fact that it is now the C.P.S. and not the police 
who make that request seems not to have affected the findings of previous research 
that the prosecution's view was dominant in many remand decisions. If anything the 
role of the C.P.S. has become more active in that hi the vast majority of cases (82 
per cent) the prosecution made a remand request. This is a higher level of input into 
remand hearings than has been found in previous studies and may be a consequence 
of the slightly different role played by the C.P.S. compared to that which the police 
played. The police could be characterised as prosecution-minded and perhaps less 
ready to admit that they would permit a defendant to be granted bail. Therefore, it 
is possible that they simply kept quiet in court if they did not actively wish to object 
to bail. The C.P.S., on the other hand, have a wider public service remit and are 
independent of the investigative process and, thus, may be more willing to 
acknowledge that a defendant can safely be granted bail. In short, whatever the 
reason, the C.P.S. plays a key role in the remand hearing.
However, in only 187 (12 per cent of the whole sample) of these cases did the 
C.P.S. actually tell the court the reasons for their request, in other words, the 
grounds for then" objections. This indicates that in the majority of situations the 
C.P.S. request is taken by the magistrates at face value without any inquiry into the 
reasons for the request. So although the C.P.S. are asked about their request on the 
majority of occasions they are not asked to elaborate on the reasons for that request.
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Table 5.13: Relationship between C.P.S. objections to bail and the magistrates' 
remand decision (observation sample).
Outcome C.P.S. Objection

















1. The adjusted figure relates to cases where the C.P.S. requested a remand in 
custody and objected to bail whereas the unadjusted figures relate to cases where the 
C.P.S. objected to bail but requested either a remand in custody or conditional bail.
2. Data is only available on the outcome of the remand hearing in 184 of the 187 
cases where the C.P.S. objected to bail.
Table 5.13 shows that defendants who face C.P.S. objections to bail are far more 
likely to be remanded in custody than those who do not (63 per cent as opposed to 
13 per cent). However, contrary to what would be expected, the conditional bail rate 
for those defendants who face C.P.S. objections is not substantially higher than for 
those that do not. This may be explained by the fact that out of a total number of 68 
cases where the defendant was granted conditional bail in the face of C.P.S. 
objections, 33 were cases where the C.P.S were objecting to the defendant being 
granted unconditional bail and were, therefore, requesting that conditions be attached 
to the defendant's bail. In all of these cases the defendant was granted conditional 
bail. Therefore, if these cases are excluded from the analysis (see adjusted figures), 
an even greater difference is found between those where the C.P.S. objected to bail 
and were asking for a remand in custody and those where they did not (76 per cent 
remanded hi custody and 23 per cent granted conditional bail). Therefore, when the 
C.P.S. requested that the defendant be remanded in custody and actively objected 
to bail the majority of defendants were remanded in custody.
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Nevertheless, the custody rate in the cases where the C.P.S. requested custody and 
objected to bail (76 per cent) is lower than the custody rate for those defendants 
where the C.P.S. requested custody but did not verbally present their objections to 
the court (96 per cent). This suggests that the importance of the C.P.S voicing their 
objections rather than just stating their request is minimal. Having said this, it seems 
likely that the explanation lies in whether or not a bail application was made. The 
findings suggest that the C.P.S. are far more likely actually to voice the objections 
to the court when a bail application is made - in other words, when there is a 
contested bail application and they have to argue through the reasons for their 
decision which is a situation which is more likely to result in a defendant being 
granted bail than an uncontested request for a remand in custody by the C.P.S..
Contested bail applications were made on 132 occasions during the study. In 116 of 
these cases the C.P.S. not only made a remand request but also presented their 
objections to the court. Considering that the C.P.S. only stated their objections in 
187 cases in the sample as a whole (151 if those where they were objecting to 
unconditional bail are excluded) a very high proportion of these were when a bail 
application was made. This seems to confirm the view that in most cases, the C.P.S. 
only elaborate on their request if the application is contested. But equally apparent 
is the fact that if the C.P.S. application is contested, the magistrates are also more 
likely to grant bail than if no application is made by the defendant and the C.P.S. 
viewpoint is uncontested. This seems then to explain why the custody rate is lower 
when the C.P.S requests custody and objects than when they simply request custody. 
It also suggests that a defendant can successfully contest a C.P.S. request to remand 
him/her in custody.
In summary, the findings suggest that one of the crucial factors in the magistrates' 
decision is the C.P.S. remand request. In only a small minority of cases are C.P.S. 
objections actually heard by the court and this is much more likely to occur if the 
defendant is making a bail application. It is, therefore, difficult to gauge the effect 
of the objections made by the C.P.S. as the cases are non-comparable. Nevertheless, 
a larger proportion of defendants are remanded in custody when the C.P.S. do voice
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objections to bail in court than when they do not. The conclusion, compounded by 
the findings that suggest that the C.P.S. request is influential, must be that the 
C.P.S. viewpoint is significant in the magistrates' decision to grant or withhold bail.
Table 5.14 The influence of the C.P.S. on the court remand decision (observation 
sample).
C.P.S. no request 
C.P.S. request bail
C.P.S. request 
custody, no bail 



































Table 5.14 summarises the conclusions above. When the C.P.S. request that a 
defendant be remanded in custody and no bail application is made by the defendant 
the request is granted in the vast majority of cases. However, a slight difference can 
be seen when C.P.S. objections are verbally presented to the court from when they
232
are not. This suggests that in a small minority of cases, where the C.P.S. request 
a remand in custody and no bail application is made, the magistrates do ask the 
C.P.S. for their reasons for their request and in these cases the magistrates are more 
likely to grant bail. Having said this, it is possible that the C.P.S. requests in these 
cases were particularly weak. Conversely, if a bail application was made by a 
defendant the chances of their being granted bail increase substantially. In fact, it 
seems that, even if the C.P.S. request a remand in custody, if they do not voice their 
objections, the majority of defendants would be granted bail. This suggests that 
making a bail application is of paramount importance to the magistrates' decision to 
grant or refuse bail. On one level this is exactly what would be expected. However, 
it does mean that if no application is made by, or on behalf of, the defendant the 
magistrates invariably do not question the C.P.S. request. So that in a situation 
where a defendant does not make an application, whether by choice or because they 
have already used their two automatic applications, the question of bail never really 
arises and the defendants are all but automatically remanded in custody. This means 
in cases where the C.P.S. request a remand in custody, the presumption of bail is 
overturned and it is left to the defendant to apply for bail and only when this occurs 
will the magistrates question the C.P.S. decision.
SUMMARY
This chapter has looked at some of the potential influences on the magistrates' 
remand decision. The factors discussed do not cover all of the possibilities as certain 
factors which may influence remand decisions are unmeasurable or unidentifiable. 
Furthermore, even when the findings have supported the influence of certain factors 
this can only be suggestive of a causal relationship as there may be other factors, not 
measured, which explain the apparent relationship.
Nevertheless, of the offence related factors measured, the nature and seriousness of 
the offence and whether or not a defendant has a previous criminal record appear to 
be related to the decision. Secondly, certain aspects of the bail history of the
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defendant seem to be important such as the breach of bail conditions and alleged 
further offending whilst on bail. The only defendant characteristic that was shown 
in this study to influence the remand decision was the sex of the defendant with 
females far less likely to be remanded in custody. The community ties of the 
defendant, or at least whether or not s/he was employed and where, if anywhere, a 
defendant lived was also shown to be related to the remand decision. Finally, the 
previous remand decision of the court and the remand request made by the C.P.S. 
have been shown to be correlated to the court remand decision.
Furthermore, it is likely that any combination of these factors will increase further 
the likelihood that a defendant will be remanded in custody. Therefore, a male 
defendant who is unemployed and of no fixed abode who is charged with burglary, 
has previous convictions and who has previously breached bail is the most at risk of 
being remanded in custody. However, what is not possible to state is the priority that 
magistrates place on any one or, indeed, any combination of these factors.
Of the factors examined it seems likely that all of them may have some influence 
upon the magistrates' decision. However, it is impossible to tell which, if any, of 
these factors are directly related to the magistrates' decision. These findings, then, 
are only suggestive of causal processes and are not indicative of a definite causal 
link. This is especially the case as the magistrates and other participants interviewed 
constantly made reference to the fact that there were no hard and fast rules and the 
decisions that were taken depended on the circumstances of each case.
Bearing in mind that there appears to be a high concordance between the remand 
requests of the C.P.S. and the magistrates' eventual remand decision, it seems likely 
that many of the factors shown in this chapter to be related to the magistrates' 
remand decision are also related to the C.P.S. decision whether or not to object to 
bail.
In the next chapter these issues will be returned to from a slightly different 
perspective namely, the perspective of the participants in the process.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. In the observation sample the monetary value involved in many of the cases 
of theft was unavailable as it was not recorded on the court list or in the 
registers. In fact, the monetary value of the theft was rarely recorded in the 
observation sample as it was infrequently mentioned in court especially if the 
value of the property was less than £2000 (only 4 out of a total of 297 
charged with theft). However, the custody rate of 31 per cent for those 
charged with theft over £2000 is well above the custody rate for all 
defendants charged with theft (17 per cent) which suggests that the value of 
the property allegedly involved is linked to the remand decision.
2. £2000 chosen as at the time of the study this was the upper limit of the 
magistrates powers for fines and compensation orders.
3. The relationship between the previous convictions of the defendant and the 
remand decision seems only to apply for males. As the number of females 
with stated previous convictions is very small, the validity of the results is 
questionable. However, the findings clearly show a relationship between 
previous convictions and the remand decision for males but not for females. 
A related factor to previous convictions is whether or not a defendant has 
previously served a custodial sentence. The fact that a previous custodial 
sentence has been served suggests that the previous convictions of the 
defendant are either of a serious nature or that s/he was sentenced for a large 
number of offences at the same time which in itself suggests that they would 
have a greater impact on the remand decision. Data is only available on 
whether or not a defendant had previously served a custodial sentence from 
the observation sample when it was mentioned during the hearing. Overall 
this factor was mentioned in 54 cases, 36 who had previously served a 
custodial sentence and 18 who had not. An analysis of the 54 cases found 
that 83 per cent (36 cases) of those who had served a custodial sentence were 
remanded in custody and 55 per cent of those who had not served a custodial 
sentence. Both figures are significantly higher than the average for the whole 
sample and the difference in remand outcome between the two samples is not 
statistically significant (Chi2 = 3.24). This is contrary to what would be 
expected and may be explained by the nature of the sample. Nevertheless, 
the fact that in 33 per cent (18 cases) of the cases it was mentioned that no 
custodial sentence had been served in itself indicates that some participants 
in the process perceive it as an important factor hi the remand decision. 
However, because of the nature and small number of such instances hi the 
sample the finding of a relationship between previous custodial sentence and 
the outcome of the remand hearing is not statistically significant and 
therefore no conclusion can be drawn from the findings.
4. The data from the court registers also provides information on defendants 
who have breached then- conditions of bail. Although the results must be 
treated with caution as a result of the small sample size (27 cases), the data
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shows that defendants who have breached their conditions of bail are more 
likely than those who have not or, at least, those that the court were unaware 
of, to be remanded in custody (22 per cent compared with 13 per cent). 
However, this difference is not statistically significant (Chi2 =2.24).
5. For Courts A and B non local was defined as being outside of the petty 
sessional area which basically corresponds to the city/town boundaries. 
However, Court C was part of a large rural petty sessional division where 
the courts of the area only sat on certain days of the week. Therefore, 
remand hearings for defendants were often not heard in the local court. The 
geography of the area was studied to prescribe the boundaries for this court.
6. The same trend was found in the registers sample with the remand status of 
the defendant rarely being altered from the previous remand decision. 
However, the actual figures are not presented here as data on the previous 
remand decision was only available in approximately a quarter of the sample 
and this may have resulted in a biased sample.
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CHAPTER 6
PARTICIPANTS' PERSPECTIVES ON THE DECISION
MAKING PROCESS
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In this chapter the participants' perceptions of how the remand system operates will 
be addressed. This will help to provide a better understanding of the remand 
process, as well as a different perspective on its operation from that provided by the 
quantitative findings.
The participants in any process provide an inside view of its operation. They can 
highlight issues for which the use of quantitative methods are inappropriate as well 
as help to prioritise the issues of greatest importance raised in quantitative research. 
Furthermore, their comments may help to explain certain findings which would 
otherwise be obscured as they were not immediately apparent from the quantitative 
findings.
PARTICIPANTS' OPINIONS OF THE REMAND PROCESS
There are undoubtedly some people who are held in custody 
unnecessarily, everybody knows that. There are a lot of people who, 
no matter what improvements to the system, would get remanded in 
custody come hell or high water ... some of them may well need to 
be remanded in custody. (33).
What Should the Law Say?
In order to assess the general trends in participants' views respondents were asked 
what they thought should be the major criterion for refusing bail. Table 6.1 below 
shows that the vast majority of answers fall within existing legal parameters outlined 
by the Bail Act 1976.
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Table 6.1: What should be the major criterion for the refusal of bail?
Protection of the public 17
Risk of further offences n
Nature of the offence 1 o
Bail history 10
Absconding 7
Interference with witnesses 7
Previous convictions 5 
Those outlined in the Bail Act 1976 5
Persistent Offending 4
Victim's wishes 3
Offending on bail 2
Other 6
No. of respondents 52
Having said this, the most common reason, protection of the public, is a general 
principle which itself does not appear in the Bail Act but reflects two of the main 
exceptions cited in the Act. Primarily it reflects concern about further offences being 
committed. Table 6.1 indicates that fear of further offending is perceived to be the 
most common reason that should be used for refusing bail as it not only appears 
under protection of the public and fear of further offences, which is the second most 
commonly stated reason, but is also reflected in the categories of previous 
convictions, persistent offending and offending on bail. Therefore, it seems that 
controlling the level of crime committed by defendants on bail is perceived as the 
main factor that should be the primary reason for refusing bail. This reflects the 
findings of the quantitative research and suggests that crime control is seen by many 
participants as the primary, but not the only, criterion for refusing bail. 
The only category mentioned that does not directly relate to the provisions of the 
Bail Act 1976 is that of the victim's wishes. There was some concern voiced during 
the interviews that the victim's wishes were not taken into consideration when the 
remand decision was being made. Those who voiced concern were particularly
239
aware of the trauma that was caused to the victim in rape cases and the 
consequences for the victim knowing or, in many cases, not knowing, if the 
defendant was out on bail.
Respondents were then asked whether they believed that the law should specify that 
a defendant be remanded in custody when specific circumstances exist. The majority 
of respondents who replied believed that defendants who allegedly commit offences 
on bail (36 defendants out of 51) or who breach conditions of bail (28 out of 48) 
should be remanded in custody. However, in this case the risk of absconding seems 
to be as important as risk of further offences as 35 out of 51 who responded believed 
that if the defendant had failed to surrender s/he should be remanded in custody. 
This seems to suggest that participants believe that an actual incident, rather than 
simply a risk, of absconding requires that a defendant be remanded in custody. 
However, it seems that the importance of this factor decreases with time as only 20 
out of 44 respondents believed that failure to surrender in the past should result in 
a remand in custody. Having said this, 18 out of 38 who replied thought that 
defendants who had no fixed address, a factor traditionally related to absconding, 
should be remanded in custody. It must be noted that this figure seems exceptionally 
high, bearing in mind the availability of bail hostels. However, only 10 out of 47 
who replied believed that a defendant who was a citizen of another country should 
be remanded in custody.
In the light of changes to the law relating to bail in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, 
respondents were asked whether they believed that defendants charged with specific 
offences should automatically be remanded in custody. Only a minority of 
respondents believed that defendants charged with domestic burglary (14 out of 46 
respondents) or robbery (21 out of 44) should be remanded in custody. However, 
the majority of respondents believed that defendants charged with rape (30 out of 48) 
or murder (34 out of 50) should be automatically remanded in custody. Rape and 
murder are covered by existing provisions under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
(s. 153) whereby reasons for the release of defendants charged with such offences on 
bail must be given, provisions which are proposed to be tightened up further by the
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Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill 1993 (see Chapter 10). It is, therefore, 
unclear whether the responses of the participants reflect these provisions or a more 
general attitude towards defendants who have allegedly committed these offences. 
Nonetheless, there seems to be a minority of respondents who believe that even 
when a defendant is charged with one of the most serious offences this should not 
result in an automatic remand in custody.
A further point to note is that most respondents believed that there should be an 
automatic presumption of custody in cases where the defendant had allegedly 
interfered with witnesses (41 out of 51 respondents). Eight respondents considered 
that the present system worked well and there was no need for a change in the law.
The Number of Defendants Granted Bail
Respondents were asked about their general perceptions of the number of defendants 
granted bail to provide a measure of their overall opinions of the operation of the 
remand process. Fourteen respondents wished to see an increase in the proportion 
of defendants granted bail while 16 respondents wanted the number to decrease. Of 
the 21 who thought that the proportion of defendants granted bail should stay the 
same, 16 believed that there was a need to improve the selection of the individuals 
granted bail. Forty eight respondents gave reasons for their answer. A substantial 
minority (21 cases) stated that the incidence of offending on bail meant that either 
the number of defendants granted bail should be reduced or that improved selection 
of those granted bail was necessary. Five respondents stated that increased provision 
of community facilities would permit a larger number of defendants to be released 
on bail. A further two respondents said that blatant discrimination existed in the 
granting of bail.
Respondents were asked if they thought that there were any measures which, if 
introduced, would increase the number of defendants granted bail. Only three 
respondents believed that there were no such measures whilst a further three wanted
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to see more prison remand places provided to allow more defendants to be remanded 
in custody. Twelve respondents stated that increasing the bail hostel accommodation 
would result in more defendants being released on bail with a further 5 respondents 
stating that an increase in other types of accommodation would have the same effect. 
Nine respondents suggested that information was the key to increasing the number 
of defendants granted bail, with six specifically mentioning an expansion of bail 
information schemes. Twelve respondents mentioned support networks for bailees, 
nine of whom believed that increased supervision of defendants granted bail may 
increase the number released while a further three respondents believed that 
unproved community facilities would also increase the number granted bail. Six 
respondents wished to see stricter penalties for breaching bail, including breaching 
conditions, failure to appear and offending on bail. Two respondents believed that 
defendants charged with minor offences should be automatically released on bail. 
Three respondents mentioned that the speeding up of the court process would 
decrease the number of defendants in custody as they would spend a shorter time 
awaiting trial. Furthermore, this would decrease the likelihood of those on bail 
breaching it.
The vast majority of respondents (43 out of 50 who answered the question) thought 
that there was a need to improve the selection of defendants. As a solicitor 
commented:
I think sometimes ... the wrong people are given bail ... sometimes 
when someone really deserves to be granted it then they will be 
refused. (57).
Of the 48 respondents who gave reasons for their answer, fifteen gave responses 
relating to better selection of those granted bail. Eleven mentioned the problem of 
reoffending on bail, two stated that too many defendants were granted bail with a 
further two stating that those who breached bail should be automatically remanded 
in custody. Ten respondents believed that increased information at hearings would 
result in better selection with a further two respondents mentioning the quality of the 
information presented. Four believed that selection would be improved through 
increasing the consistency of decisions. A further two mentioned better training of
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magistrates. Having said this, five respondents believed the present system to be 
valid and workable.
Eight respondents believed that no measures could be introduced to improve the 
selection of defendants. However, thirty seven respondents proposed measures for 
improving selection. Twenty nine of their answers related to information available 
to the court at the hearing, seven related to the magistrates with four believing that 
magistrates' training should be improved while three wanted to see more stipendiary 
magistrates sitting for remand hearings. Three respondents believed that the use of 
guarantees or sureties would improve the selection as relatives and/or friends are 
only likely to provide these when they have faith in the defendant.
THE LAW RELATING TO BAIL
When respondents were asked what they regarded as the main features of the law 
on bail, the majority stated that it was the presumption in favour of bail (30 cases). 
Nineteen of these linked this presumption of bail with the exceptions to the right to 
bail found in Schedule 1 of the Bail Act 1976, in other words, that the court must 
have reasons for refusing bail. This was summed up by one magistrate who said,
... the liberty of a person is precious and the courts have a duty to 
safeguard that and any accused person ought to be entitled to this 
liberty because he is innocent until he or she has had his trial. But if 
the offence is serious ... if the magistrate is convinced by the 
prosecutor's objection ... to him being released on bail, then so be it. 
He loses his liberty and is remanded in custody ... bearing in mind 
that the person is entitled to their [sic] liberty. (31).
Twenty six respondents interviewed believed that the law was adequate, with 24 
believing that it was not (one respondent gave no opinion). Of those that believed 
that the law was adequate 10 respondents were positive about the law on bail, seven 
because it was flexible and three because it provided the correct balance between the 
rights of the individual and the protection of society. These positive points were 
expanded upon in the interviews. Of the Bail Act one member of the C.P.S. said, 
I think the Bail Act is very good. I've always thought it was good and
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I can't see any reasons why it should be altered ... I don't see any 
major difficulties with the Bail Act ... I've always found it a very 
good statute. (59).
Flexibility was mentioned by many respondents as the main advantage of the Bail 
Act. A solicitor commented that the Bail Act provided the framework for structuring 
discretion by providing exceptions to the right to bail which afforded protection to 
the public, while allowing the magistrates to override those exceptions when there 
was valid positive information about the defendant available. He concluded,
... it gives the magistrates discretion ... it gives them guidelines, it 
gives them a sort of formula which they apply and work through, but 
it doesn't fetter them into saying so there you are, that's a remand in 
custody and that's the end of it. They're still able to exercise 
discretion. (45).
However, several other respondents stated that the discretion that the Bail Act 
allowed was problematic. A solicitor commented,
I think there should be stricter guidelines for magistrates ... 
[discretion] yes, there's loads of it and at the moment it is in the 
prosecution field ... out of a hundred remands that they ask for they 
will get ... the majority of them. (57).
Another solicitor agreed with one caveat,
... it lacks guidelines ... I would like to see greater clarity and 
definition to what the magistrates have to follow. ... the problem with 
that is that once you start stiffening guidelines, magistrates are 
inclined to be straitjacketed, in other words, they then say "Ah well 
you know the law now says that this is a second offence committed 
on bail, we have to remand in custody." (44).
Of those that believed that the law was inadequate, nine believed this to be the case 
because of the number of defendants who allegedly reoffended on bail. A further 
five respondents believed that the law on bail allowed too many defendants to be 
granted bail, two of these believing that as a consequence it did not adequately 
protect the public. A clerk argued that:
I don't think the law is in need of much reform at all, the only 
stiffening I would like to see is that of public protection zoom up the 
charts in terms of what they are trying to do with bail. (26).
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Thirteen respondents identified problems with the application of the law hi practice 
which included seven who believed that the magistrates did not apply the law 
properly and six who believed they applied it inconsistently. A further four said that 
if the law was followed it was adequate, which seems to indicate that sometimes it 
was not followed (this point is discussed in greater detail hi Chapter 9).
Twenty six respondents said that they would like to see the law changed while only 
seven positively would not. Of those that wanted a change in the law nine wanted 
the provisions tightened up in relation to offending on bail either to make it a 
specific offence or to result in an automatic remand hi custody. One police officer 
wished to see the introduction of a presumption of custody so that defendants would 
have to supply reasons why they should be granted bail. However, another police 
officer commented on the problem that the remand centres could not accommodate 
them. Three respondents wanted to see the nature and seriousness of the offence 
become an exception to bail hi its own right. As a clerk commented of the Bail Act 
1976,
... seriousness of the offence, that's only a consideration at the 
moment hi the court, it's not a ground for remanding someone hi 
custody ... I think if an offence is serious hi itself, then magistrates 
can treat that as a ground for refusing someone bail because ... hi 
some situations, although the offence is serious, there are no grounds 
really for remanding the person in custody and the prosecution are in 
difficulty trying to portray a case in court for a remand in custody 
and the court should be able to look and say this is a very serious 
offence, that's sufficient criteria not to grant someone bail. (49).
A member of the C.P.S. concurred with this:
... I often feel it's quite false to introduce some part of the Bail Act 
to those serious cases (murder, rape) ... you've got the offence of 
rape in the middle and you've got to think, right I've got to have a 
ground under the Bail Act here, as opposed to us thinking, that's a 
risk here that he'll interfere with witnesses, it's an offence of rape, 
right, I think we should apply for custody on this. So often he might 
be kept in custody on a serious matter and you're struggling to, under 
the Bail Act. (41).
But as one police officer pointed out it is already an important consideration, a view 
shared by the majority of respondents,
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... two people were up for a serious sexual offence and I think that 
on that condition alone the fact that it was so serious I think it was 
the only ground on which they granted a remand, so I think they do 
generally take it on board ... It might not be written into the law. 
(38).
Furthermore, it would make the law inflexible. An example often cited was that not 
all alleged murderers need to be remanded in custody,
... domestic murders ... as long as you're satisfied that she's not 
going to abscond or she's not going to interfere with witnesses, then 
no [they] shouldn't be remanded in custody. (37).
Moreover, several respondents were aware of different interpretations of a serious 
offence which is a vague term and could be open to abuse. For example, a 
prosecutor said,
... the theft of £25,000 might be considered to be a serious offence 
but may not justify custody on a first time offender but rape or 
aggravated burglary or armed robbery on a first time offender would 
be completely different. But there are some people who would 
consider a £25,000 theft, which is theft of a Mercedes, on the same 
lines. (20).
Along similar lines another member of the C.P.S. felt that the Bail Act should be 
amended to permit the refusal of bail for the protection of the public. He argued that 
it would cover "a multitude of sins." (21). His rationale for the introduction of this 
provision was similar to that of those who believed the seriousness of the offence 
should itself be a ground for refusal of bail. "[The ground] if it was available to 
justices, could be used in those serious cases where there are no other concerns." 
(21). However, protection of the public seems more akin to the idea of 
"dangerousness", a prediction of future behaviour, rather than seriousness of the 
offence, a past behaviour (see Chapter 10).
One member of the C.P.S. believed that the Bail Act should be changed to omit the 
word "substantial" from Schedule 1, because it often provided a way for the defence 
to argue that the ground did not apply. In other words, it would result in it being 
easier to remand a defendant in custody when the prosecution thought that it was 
necessary. As one police officer remarked, "it's difficult to prove substantial
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grounds." (37).
A further three respondents wanted some rules governing the standards of 
information supplied during a bail application. A solicitor commented,
I think it's important that the court has good factual representations 
made to it, and often the information available [is not correct] ... but 
the police don't perhaps rush then to correct information which was 
given out ... the decision to remand him was made on fact, on 
assertions of fact which we now know are not fact and that frequently 
happens ... often cases where you hear the prosecution outlining they 
can sound fiercer but when you actually get into the case and find out 
what it's all about and it's not in any way as bad as it sounds ... the 
bench [makes] its decision on what transpires to be exaggerated 
allegations then it's not really fair is it, it's going to result in people 
being in custody unnecessarily. (23).
Despite these comments, the vast majority of respondents, except the magistrates 
themselves, remarked that the problem with the remand process did not stem from 
problems with the legal provisions but from their implementation. As the Bail 
Information officer remarked,
I personally wouldn't alter the Bail Act, because at ground level you 
haven't got a Bail Act, you've got as many Bail Acts as there are 
benches of magistrates ... the problem is not the Act, it's in its 
interpretation. (23).
Many issues were raised about the implementation of the legislation which will be 
discussed in Chapter 9.
THE REMAND DECISION
Exceptions to the Right to Bail
Of the three main exceptions to bail under the Bail Act 1976, most respondents 
thought that risk of further offences was the most important, again confirming the 
view that crime control considerations are the most important in the remand 
decision. A solicitor commented,
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You hardly ever see a case where [risk of further offending] is not 
used. The other two come into it [absconding and interference with 
witnesses], but that's the one they normally say. (57).
Reasons for this belief were usually that offences had been committed whilst on bail 
and the previous record of the defendant, particularly if the offences are of a similar 
nature. One solicitor commented of the ground of risk of further offences,
... [it's] put forward as the main ground nearly always, that if he is 
released ... there is a belief that he will commit further offences, and 
they've got no grounds for saying that at all ... The magistrates take 
one look at the guy, the demeanour ... they see he looks a bit rough, 
he's probably been in a cell for several hours by that time and then 
they will take a look at the seriousness of the offence and say well 
yes, if you release him he's bound to do something else. That seems 
to pervade a lot of their thoughts and yet there's no substance in most 
of it as far as I can see. (56).
Another magistrate was not so convinced of its importance:
[Risk of further offences] I take that as part of the risk of the system 
... in most cases I wouldn't put that as a high priority for refusing 
bail. (16).
Nevertheless, two magistrates said that all of the heads were equally important to 
their decision. Possible interference with witnesses was not frequently mentioned, 
although one magistrate said:
... the possibility of interfering with witnesses, that one surprisingly 
comes up fairly regularly ... in many cases they have already tried to 
interfere with prosecution witnesses and that would have a fairly 
strong bearing on a decision. (18).
Another magistrate indicated it to be important but that she felt that in prioritising 
the three statutory exceptions, this would be at the bottom.
Several respondents mentioned the exception of 'for the defendant's own protection' 
which they agreed was primarily applicable in cases of a sexual nature involving 
rape or child molestation. The fear was that the victim's friends, relatives or the 
community may attempt to "lynch" the defendant, when they are incensed and 
threaten to cause the defendant physical harm. One solicitor commented that
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defendants charged with this sort of offence are likely to face huge problems in 
prison which would also threaten their physical and mental wellbeing and, therefore, 
there was no justification for remanding offenders for their own protection.
Influences on the Magistrates' Decision
The questionnaire provided an opportunity to gauge the relevance and priority of 
various influences on the magistrates' decision. The exercise was not undertaken to 
provide an in-depth analysis of the influences which will be discussed below, but to 
provide a subjective assessment of their importance, of the typicality of their use. 
This was so that particularly topical issues, which would almost inevitability 
dominate the discussions in the interviews, would not be seen to take precedence 
over more mundane influences. Accordingly, respondents were simply asked what 
influences they thought were important hi the magistrates' decisions.
The findings (see appendix 11) suggest that participants thought that the most 
important influences on the magistrates' remand decision are offence-related factors 
and the defendant's bail history. These were seen by participants as more important 
than factors relating to the defendant or his/her community ties. For example, in 
each category over 60 per cent of respondents stated that the type of offence, 
whether a defendant had allegedly committed an offence on bail, and the defendant's 
failure to appear in the past were very important considerations in the remand 
decision, whereas factors relating either to the defendant's characteristics or 
circumstances were largely seen as unimportant by the majority of respondents. Even 
the fact that a defendant had a stable address was only seen as important to the 
magistrates' remand decision in 38 per cent of cases.
Nonetheless, the largest majority of respondents believed that which magistrates 
were sitting was a very important influence on the outcome of the remand decision. 
This reflects the concerns of many participants about the different decisions made 
by different benches of magistrates, which will be discussed in Chapter 9.
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Furthermore, the majority of respondents believed that evidence that a defendant 
would interfere with witnesses was a very important factor in the magistrates' 
decision. However, as already mentioned, the validity of the evidence to back up 
such a fear is difficult to assess and challenge and this perhaps explains the 
perception that it is an important factor in the decision.
The strength of the evidence against the defendant is a consideration under the Bail 
Act 1976. 45 per cent of respondents believed the strength of the evidence to be a 
very important factor in the remand decision. However, the respondents' answers 
to the questions suggest that there is some imbalance between the importance of the 
strength of the prosecution case and the strength of the defence's case: 53 per cent 
of respondents believed that the strength of the prosecution case was very important 
to the magistrates' decision whilst only 36 per cent of respondents believed this of 
the defence case.
During the interviews, the respondents were asked in more detail about the 
influences on the magistrates' decisions. On the whole, respondents gave the sort of 
replies as they did in the questionnaires. Again, these were almost wholly related to 
the offence or the previous history of the defendant. The influences mentioned by 
the vast majority of respondents were the nature and seriousness of the offence, the 
previous offending history of the defendant, the strength of the prosecution evidence, 
whether the offence was committed on bail (although it seemed to take several 
offences to result hi a remand in custody: see below) and whether the defendant had 
breached his/her bail conditions. Positive information about the defendant was seen 
very much as peripheral to the decision.
NATURE AND SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENCE
The magistrates generally viewed the nature and seriousness of the offence as the 
most important consideration. This was inextricably linked to their perception that 
one of their tasks was the protection of the public. The magistrates, on the whole,
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believed that the nature and seriousness of the offence was all important as a 
defendant charged with such an offence is more likely to fail to attend court and,
"... there must also be a distinct danger that they might be tempted 
to interfere with the course of justice to ensure that things don't come 
out [sic]. (Magistrate, 16).
All of the respondents mentioned the importance of the nature and seriousness of the 
offence as the major influence on the remand decision and its importance cannot be 
overstated.
OFFENCES ON BAIL
All of the respondents mentioned the alleged commission of offences on bail as an 
important influence on the magistrates' decisions. Although this issue will be 
discussed in Chapter 9, it is interesting to note that differences were found in the 
magistrates' perception of its priority. The majority of magistrates from Court B 
mentioned offences committed on bail as being important and one magistrate (29) 
said that it was "uppermost in his mind" but even the importance of this depended 
upon the type of offences allegedly committed. However, the magistrates from Court 
A were less adamant that offending on bail was an all-important factor. One 
magistrate from Court A commented,
I think as to whether they commit offences whilst on bail, at the end 
of the day that does not have a great deal of weight, because if they 
are not going to have a custodial sentence they are going to be out 
committing them in the fairly near future anyway ... so I would 
probably put that at the bottom of the list. (18).
It seems, then, that the magistrates from Court A have a more lenient attitude 
towards defendants who allegedly commit offences on bail which may explain why
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some respondents remarked that this court, in particular, was lenient towards those 
offending on bail.
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS
The majority of respondents mentioned the importance of the previous convictions 
of the defendant and whether they were of a similar nature. One magistrate (17) 
indicated that previous convictions were only important if the offences were of a like 
nature. The defendant's previous offending history was seen as an indication of the 
likelihood either that they would commit further offences or that they may abscond 
because of the increased likelihood of being sentenced to custody. Of equal 
importance was the fact that a defendant did not have a previous record which was 
seen as a positive factor with which to counter C.P.S. objections.
PREVIOUS BAIL HISTORY
Other factors frequently mentioned included if the person had failed to appear or 
breached his/her conditions of bail or as one magistrate (30) put it "that bail has 
been granted before and has been wasted." Having said this, the majority of 
magistrates said that they would not usually withdraw bail on the first occasion if a 
defendant had breached his/her conditions.
THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION CASE
As shown earlier the strength of the evidence against the defendant was not seen as 
particularly important to the decision. However, one solicitor believed it to be the 
strongest criterion partly because it is very difficult to rebut:
you are not hi a position to rebut what the prosecution are saying 
because you haven't had a chance to find your own evidence. When 
you do then you tend to want to keep that back ... because you just
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don't want the prosecution to know what you've come up with. (56).
Furthermore, the solicitors commented that the C.P.S. were reluctant for the defence 
to see the file about the case prior to the hearing and as a result the defence 
solicitors often had no indication of the facts of the case as outlined on the file. 
Having said this, the members of the C.P.S. seemed to think that the solicitors were 
at an advantage because they had been present at the interviews at the police station.
COMMUNITY TIES
Generally the community ties of the defendant were seen as unimportant to the 
remand decision. One magistrate commented,
... the seriousness of the offence is very important ... it's not affected 
by whether he's married or has children, or has a job, that wouldn't 
come into it at all. In other words, because a person's got a job it 
wouldn't influence me about remanding them [sic] in custody ... If 
the offence warrants custody then other items don't come into it at 
all. (31).
Not all respondents held this view however; another magistrate (30) said that the 
defendant's community ties were important and that magistrates "wanted to know as 
much about the defendant as possible."
Basically, community ties were not perceived to negate the more important 
objections to bail. One solicitor commented that
Whether he's got a job on Monday isn't going to affect the fact 
whether he's on bail for other offences and whether or not he might 
reoffend and neither is it going to affect the fact that he might 
interfere with witnesses or he might abscond. I mean those are the 
core issues, and the fact that he's got a job or is applying for a job 
on Monday, is just a little nicety but the magistrates aren't really 
interested, and they won't give a multiple offender bail just because 
he's got a job on Monday. It's not something quite frankly that they 
will take into consideration ... community ties ... it depends on the 
offence ... they ... don't pay regard to that. (07).
On the whole the community ties of the defendant were thought by solicitors to be
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most relevant when the objection to bail was risk of absconding. As one solicitor 
commented,
The Bail Act says roots and community ties ... it is something 
particularly if it says Oh, he might fail to surrender to bail either 
because of the serious nature of the offence or because there is a 
failure to surrender to bail on his record, if he's always lived in
***** Street and his Mum and Dad are there and he signs his dole in
***** House, it's a point that should be emphasised. Where's he 
going to go? Everything he's got, he's never been anywhere else, I 
think yes, certainly for a person living in this area it's something to 
be emphasised ... I think that is something that does help magistrates 
in feeling assured that a defendant is not going to disappear, if you 
can assure the magistrate that he lives here, his family is here, his 
parents, his wife, kids, whatever it is. (05).
If this is their main relevance, then this may explain why they were seen as of little, 
if any, importance by most respondents, as the evidence from this research is that 
risk of further offences has become the most commonly used objection to bail on 
which a defendant's community ties have little or no impact.
The one exception to the respondents' comments about community ties was that the 
defendant needed a permanent address which they linked to the belief that a 
defendant may not turn up for trial. As one solicitor said,
Somebody of no fixed address, whatever offence they have 
committed, is very unlikely to get bail unless you can find a probation 
hostel for them ... information about for example, family support, 
family networks, community networks, that doesn't seem to make a 
tangible difference to any decision, having a physical location to put 
somebody hi does seem to make a difference. (46).
The fact that a defendant was of no fixed abode seemed to be of more importance 
to the decision of the police to keep a defendant in police custody than it was to the 
court remand decision. Respondents, other than the police, only mentioned the 
subject infrequently when they stated that suitable accommodation was usually 
found. The probation service was seen as important in this situation as they could 
provide an address. However, all the police respondents mentioned it as important 
and indicated that they usually kept a defendant in police custody if s/he did not have 
a permanent address. The reason for this seemed to be that the most important factor
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in the police decision was whether the defendant would turn up to court and if s/he 
did not that the police would know where to find them. This was seen as particularly 
problematic when a defendant had no permanent address, whereas the court put 
primacy on the fear of further offending on which the defendant's address has no 
discernible influence.
A probation officer (58) pointed out that employment was not a persuasive factor in 
the granting of bail because only about one hi five defendants was in employment. 
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that those defendants who have employment do 
not have a better chance of being granted bail.
FUTURE SENTENCE
The majority of the magistrates did not seem to consider the possible future sentence 
in then- decision to grant bail. They generally believed that they were making 
decisions on the facts that were presented at the time, although one magistrate did 
mention it as an important factor in her decisions. Nonetheless, one magistrate said,
... I don't think we ought to mastermind the decisions of the court 
that eventually hear the case. We must come to a decision at that 
moment under the circumstances presented to us as to whether there 
is a remand on bail or in custody and the eventual sentence mustn't 
be pre-empted, mustn't be assumed. (15).
A member of the C.P.S. concurred,
... the Bail Act really has nothing to do with the actual method of 
dealing with offences. I mean if somebody [continuously shoplifts 
whilst on bail] ... well under the new Criminal Justice Act [1991] the 
eventual sentence is not likely to be a custodial one, but we've still 
got grounds under the Bail Act, which is fear of further offences, ... 
the likely outcome is not going to be a custodial sentence. That's 
entirely different from the grounds under the Bail Act." (41).
One possible reason for this belief was put forward by another member of the 
C.P.S.:
I always found that a bit of a nonsense to argue that somebody should
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not have been remanded in custody because at the end of the day they 
only got a community based sentence. That argument has been put a 
lot, but quite simply when the judge or magistrates came to sentence, 
knowing that they have spent three months in custody, knowing that's 
equivalent of a six month sentence, they've made allowance. (59).
However, the solicitors appeared to place importance on it:
... If you have a defendant who is not a candidate for a custodial 
sentence you can argue ... that it is therefore unjust to imprison him 
for something which at the end of the day he just could not 
conceivably receive a prison sentence for. (03).
A clerk explained this argument,
... that's a perfectly valid argument because part of the bail decision 
is the likely outcome of the case, in terms of its impact on likelihood 
to appear. If the likely outcome of the case is a community disposal 
and there are no other features of the case, then the person should 
have bail. (26).
The possible future sentence is usually connected with arguments to grant bail. 
However, several police officers said it can be, and should be, used as an argument 
to remand a defendant in custody.
Several respondents commented that this position could change in the light of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991 with its emphasis on community-based sentences. One 
member of the C.P.S. believed that it would become harder to remand a defendant 
in custody because of the likelihood of a community based sentence. He stated:
... I think it will have a profound effect on the number of defendants 
who are admitted to bail, because it's very difficult to justify keeping 
a person in custody even on the grounds that they are committing 
further offences, when at the end of the day, they are unlikely to 
receive a custodial sentence. (47).
The majority of respondents who commented concurred with this assessment of the 
effect of the Criminal Justice Act 1991, including a solicitor who argued that even 
if a defendant had committed offences on bail the new Act would result in the 
granting of bail as,
they are going to be given a non custodial sentence then one has
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to conclude that if they are going to commit offences whilst on bail, 
they are going to commit offences after they have been sentenced 
anyway. (44).
Consequently, a member of the C.P.S. warned,
... We are going to be left with a slightly incongruous situation if we 
are not careful, that people, unconvicted people spend time on 
remand on the grounds that they have committed offences whilst on 
bail, and yet at the end of the day they get a community based 
sentence ... I think the two things are not exactly irreconcilable but 
difficult to reconcile (47).
As a result, he argued the Bail Act 1976 may have to be revised and this provides 
a good example of how legislative changes which do not mention the remand system 
may affect the remand process. However, several respondents, although recognising 
the probable impact on the operation of the remand process disagreed that a change 
in the law relating to bail was necessary.
Summary
The discussion has highlighted the perceived importance that some of the participants 
in the process attach to offence related factors in the remand decision. On the whole, 
the community ties of the defendant were not seen as significant. This may be 
explained by the predominance of the ground for refusal of bail of fear of further 
offences in the decision on which community ties have little impact. 
There was also some evidence that participants had different perceptions of the 
relevant influences on the decision. This appeared to be most marked by the defence 
solicitors' assertions that community ties, the possible future sentence and delay 
were important to the decision whereas the magistrates and the C.P.S. perceived 
these to be relatively unimportant. This tends to suggest a disjunction between those 
who have the power to make remand decisions and those attempting to persuade the 
decision makers to grant bail. If this is indeed the case then the defence solicitors 
are concentrating on the wrong issues in their bail applications and may partly 
explain the success of the C.P.S. recommendations.
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THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE COURT
On the whole, respondents thought that the magistrates had enough information to 
make their remand decision. However, they were less positive about the information 
available on the first appearance:
On the whole yes, yes, maybe it wouldn't be on the first occasion 
that an application for bail is made, but by the second occasion I 
would have thought they would have enough information. (Clerk, 42).
The magistrates interviewed were confident that they had sufficient information on 
which to make a decision. One magistrate stated,
I've never been of the opinion that we have not had all of the 
information that has been necessary. I can't honestly say that an 
occasion has arisen where there hasn't been sufficient information. 
(30).
Nevertheless, one magistrate did comment that he would like more verification of 
information that they were given:
I think occasionally the information that we get could be backed up 
with more written evidence of some sort ... occasionally it would 
make our deliberations a little bit easier if we could say well we don't 
need to consider that point because we've got documentary evidence 
to say yes, that is true ... that's already proven. (18).
Some other participants had reservations about the information available:
... certainly in my experience bail applications are made quite briefly 
and with little information about either people, their circumstances, 
certainly about what bail possibilities there are. (32).
Evidence suggests that the magistrates may not be aware of all the information. 
Respondents suggested that the C.P.S. did not always have all the available 
information about the defendant's previous offending history. As one member of the 
C.P.S. commented about defendants' records,
We've had difficulties ... with the quality of the records that are 
coming from the police because of their new systems and place, up 
to date records have not been coming to us ... It's kept centrally ... 
and there is a bit of a time-lapse between the record coming and the 
defendant being arrested. So quite often at the first court appearance 
you don't have fully up to date record and of course you need that as
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far as the application for a remand in custody is concerned. (59).
Furthermore, another solicitor commented that very often the C.P.S. would only 
have available to them the defendant's last three previous convictions as this was all 
that was available over the phone from the criminal records office. A solicitor (06) 
put it another way: "I don't think I've ever found them to be up to date." This 
problem did not seem to be confined to previous convictions but also related to cases 
that were currently in the system. One solicitor commented,
... the prosecutors don't have access always to each and every file 
that a defendant may have against him, he [may] know that he is on 
bail for one offence, two offences, but he may not know he is on bail 
for half a dozen offences, so the magistrates don't necessarily get all 
the information which they could have. (02).
When respondents were asked what information they thought was most useful to 
magistrates to assist them hi their decision the responses were overwhelmingly in 
favour of offence-related information. In 74 out of 85 answers, either information 
relating to the offence or the bail history of the defendant was mentioned. Of the 
remaining eleven answers, five related to information about the defendant's personal 
circumstances, four related to the provision of accurate information and two to 
information about the victim of the alleged offence. It therefore seems that 
participants in the remand process perceive as important accurate information about 
the defendant's offending behaviour and not his/her personal circumstances which 
is consistent with the findings that offence related factors take priority in the 
magistrates' remand decisions.
UNCONTESTED REMAND DECISIONS
The findings of the quantitative research suggested that the magistrates invariably 
follow the recommendation of the C.P.S.. This seems to be partly explained by the 
fact that many remand decisions are undisputed. There was a substantial amount of 
evidence from the qualitative research which suggests that remand decisions were 
often made, in effect, by other participants. A common theme throughout the
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interviews was that in only a limited number of cases was a decision actually made 
by the magistrates. This occurred most obviously where the C.P.S. had made a 
substantive decision, prior to the hearing, not to object to bail which was then 
granted by the court or the defence were not challenging a custody application. One 
instance of this was highlighted by a probation officer,
... [a] large majority of people that come through court are just 
unconditionally bailed anyway ... and again ... a very small 
proportion of people that will inevitably be remanded in custody for 
good reason. (32)
In other cases, the prosecution and defence had agreed upon an outcome prior to the 
hearing. As one magistrate stated,
Well I think probably 80 per cent of remand cases there's no arguing 
about it anyway, either the C.P.S. are not opposing bail on certain 
conditions, or occasionally you get a situation where the defence 
aren't opposing custody for whatever reason, could be because 
they've already had their statutory applications, or it may be that they 
don't want to make a statutory application at that time... So I would 
think probably between 80 and 90 per cent, there's no real decisions 
... if the C.P.S. are not opposing bail, it would be unusual for the 
magistrates to think it ought to be custody. That's not to say that it 
can't happen, but very rarely. (18).
Another magistrate concurred and in some instances disputed the outcome,
... I wouldn't say that I get involved in that many disputed remands. 
An awful lot of them, when they come forward, there may be a 
degree of ... bail bargaining ... between the defence and the 
prosecution so that by the time they come up either the C.P.S. is 
possibly saying well conditional bail and one gets the impression that 
may be the defence have said that provided that they do not oppose 
bail they will agree to conditions ... there have been a few occasions 
when I've been surprised that the prosecution haven't asked for a 
remand in custody when I have felt that probably it would have been 
called for, but if the C.P.S. don't put a case up for remand, ... it 
doesn't seem ... right for magistrates to decide off their own back 
with no evidence being given them to remand in custody ... it is 
surprising how often it seems to be recognised by both sides what is 
a reasonable line of action to take. (16).
There was also evidence that the defence solicitors sometimes agreed with the 
C.P.S. recommendation to prevent an application for a remand in custody:
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... I sometimes go along with the C.P.S. anyway, better to have 
conditional bail than a remand in custody, better to agree the 
conditions than get the C.P.S. to ask for a remand in custody, which 
they might do otherwise. (55).
Moreover, defence solicitors sometimes agreed with the C.P.S. assessment that the 
defendant should be remanded in custody either by dissuading him/her from making 
a bail application or presenting the application hi such a way that the court would 
realise that the solicitor was not expecting bail to be granted.
In addition, all respondents stated that the magistrates rarely overturned these 
undisputed decisions:
... if the prosecutor agrees bail, the court can still in theory remand 
somebody in custody ... but as you can imagine that's very, very 
rare. I can only remember it happening once. (Bail Information 
Officer, 23).
Therefore, the evidence indicates that a large proportion of cases are decided prior 
to the actual court appearance where the magistrates "rubber stamp" the decisions 
agreed between the prosecution and the defence solicitor. This most usually occurred 
when the prosecution recommended the granting of bail with or without conditions 
but it sometimes occurred when the defence were not applying for custody. In only 
a small proportion of cases where the prosecution and defence were in dispute, when 
a contested bail application would be made, did the magistrates play a full role hi 
the decision. Consequently, hi the majority of cases, the de facto decision makers 
are not the magistrates but the C.P.S. or, indeed, the defence.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE C.P.S.
The quantitative findings suggested that even when a contested bail application was 
made the magistrates were far more likely to agree with the C.P.S. recommendation 
than with a defence application. Consequently, the C.P.S. remand request seems to 
be a major influence on the magistrates' decision as the magistrates rarely disagree
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with the C.P.S.'s recommendation. As one magistrate said:
... I think for the protection of the public you've got to come down 
on the side of the C.P.S. or the police who say we want this 
character in custody. (29).
However, this does not necessarily mean that the magistrates simply "rubber stamp" 
C.P.S. decisions as they may take a decision for different reasons. However, this 
did not normally seem to be the case. As a member of the C.P.S. commented, when 
asked if the magistrates usually refused bail on the grounds proposed by the C.P.S.,
In this area yes ... they only follow the grounds that we [the C.P.S.] 
make. (41).
Of course this does not necessarily prove that the magistrates agree with the reasons 
put forward by the C.P.S.. However, another member of the C.P.S. stated,
... when I make a remand application in front of the stipendiary 
magistrate ... he usually agrees with my decision ... so it's quite 
common that my view of whether or not the defendant should be 
granted bail will equate with that of the police and also ultimately 
with the court. (47).
A probation officer commented:
... on a lot of occasions the magistrates very clearly take their lead 
from the C.P.S., the C.P.S. oppose bail, it just reinforces that well 
you are going into custody unless we hear some really good 
arguments now. (34).
A solicitor said,
... I mean sometimes you hear the magistrates saying now where's 
our solicitor, rather than where's the prosecution ... if they [the 
C.P.S.] paint a bleak view you can guarantee that the magistrates will 
accept that all the time. I don't think there's hardly ever any 
exceptions." (57).
Nevertheless, the quantitative findings indicated that in a small minority of cases the 
magistrates refused to accept the C.P.S. recommendation. The qualitative findings 
also suggest this to be the case as the members of the C.P.S. interviewed did not 
always agree with the magistrates' decision, which seems to imply that at least in 
some cases, the magistrates do not agree with the recommendations made by the
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C.P.S.. One prosecutor remarked,
... you make these objections ... hi the strongest possible terms, 
putting before the court as you perceive it all those sound reasons 
under the Bail Act and they grant bail. It's as if the magistrates pay 
no attention to the inherent discretion of the C.P.S. (21).
Furthermore, the members of the C.P.S. who worked in Court A were very critical 
of the magistrates' decisions as they felt that they released far too many defendants 
on bail, particularly persistent offenders.
Despite these last comments, it seems that not only do the magistrates usually agree 
with the recommendation for the C.P.S. but that they usually agree with the 
rationale for that decision. If this is, indeed, the reality of the situation, it places the 
C.P.S. in a very influential position as regards bail. One prosecutor agreed with this 
assessment when he stated,
In my opinion, the decisions that are made there [before court] by the 
prosecutors are possibly the key decisions that are made hi the entire 
remand process. (21).
One reason for this is probably the importance of offence-related factors to the 
decision, information about which is primarily supplied to the court by the C.P.S.. 
Moreover, the C.P.S. role in the remand decision appears to be strengthened further 
by the magistrates' perception of the information supplied by the C.P.S..
THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED
TO THE COURT
Information about offence-related factors has been shown to be of vital importance 
to the remand decision. The source of the majority of this information is the C.P.S. 
which may partly explain the influence of their recommendation on the magistrates' 
remand decision. Furthermore, its importance is compounded by the different 
perceptions held by respondents of the information which is supplied by the C.P.S. 
and the defence solicitors. These perceptions were summed up by a magistrate:
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... all the facts and statistics come from the C.P.S.. What you get 
from the defence solicitor is normally [about] why this guy shouldn't 
be remanded in custody, he's got a wife and two children ... these 
sort of things, they play on the heartstrings, they don't actually give 
a great deal of concrete information, it's more mitigating sort of 
reasons why the guy shouldn't be locked away. (18).
Therefore, the information supplied by the C.P.S. was perceived by the magistrates 
as factual:
The C.P.S. [information] tends to be factual, so it's weightless ... it's 
a fait accompli. He has got convictions, he has absconded, or not 
answered, virtually the same difference, he has done house burglaries 
before, whilst on bail, or he has now been rearrested again whilst on 
bail from a previous hearing. That's fact. (29).
Even solicitors recognised the problem,
... you really are dealing with the facts as they are presented by the 
prosecution, you can't really get very far behind those facts, you can 
try but you don't get very far ... I don't think that the positive 
arguments count very much when the main fact before them is that 
this defendant was granted bail. (55).
Indeed, one magistrate commented that when she had heard something from the 
C.P.S. she often thought that bail would definitely be refused and when asked if she 
then changed her mind in favour of the defence,
Yes, occasionally I have, yes but don't ask me one, I can't 
remember. (30).
This finding is confirmed by one clerk's observation that the quality of the 
prosecution evidence was very important to the decision:
I think they [the magistrates] are more likely to pay credence to what 
is said by the prosecution than the defence in practice ... quite often 
some of the suggestions made by defendants' advocates are quite 
ludicrous, but normally the prosecution will be honest enough to 
admit whether or not they've got a strong case against the defendant, 
that if one of the reasons for the magistrates' decision is the fact that 
he is already on bail and that he has a lot of convictions for similar 
offences then there's not much the defendant's solicitor can do to 
refute that anyway. He may have something to say about the present 
offence, but the other matters are a matter of record. (42).
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This view seems to be based more upon the type of information supplied than the 
personalities involved as 81 per cent of respondents stated that the information 
provided to the court by the C.P.S. was of good or fair quality. However, 19 per 
cent believed the information supplied by the C.P.S. to be of poor or very poor 
quality. Seventy seven per cent of respondents stated that information supplied by 
defence solicitors was of good or fair quality while 21 per cent believe it to be of 
poor quality.
There were some comments made about the information that was supplied by both 
the C.P.S. and the defence. These revolved around the validity and reliability of the 
information given. Respondents commented that defence solicitors often used 
unverified information. A member of the C.P.S. commented
... there are [defence solicitors] who are less than honest ... that 
particular problem doesn't exist I think on the prosecution side. I, 
therefore, perceive the prosecution as unbiased if you like and 
therefore, giving a truer representations of the facts to the court than 
the defence. Time and time again we've had representations of the 
facts in bail and custody issues where "I am confident my client will 
be acquitted", "I am confident my client will be convicted of a lesser 
charge" where in the end the chap is convicted. (21).
Information was routinely given to the court by defence solicitors which had no 
direct relevance to the case. As a clerk said, "they are well versed in red herrings" 
(27). Even the defence solicitors mentioned that they included information in their 
applications that is not directly relevant to the decision:
... the only people he's going to meet in Cardiff prison are far more 
sophisticated criminals than him. So I try all those sort of things ... 
They don't usually, I mean the magistrates aren't stupid and they 
confine themselves to the issues at hand ... so I mean they really 
shouldn't be directing their minds to how much it's going to cost to 
keep a person in **** Prison and whether they are going to meet 
more sophisticated criminals than them, because they aren't things 
that are included in the Bail Act and they are not exceptions so they 
shouldn't consider them but you know, I throw them in anyway. I 
mean to say they don't wash, I mean they are only human ... it's 
bound to operate on their minds to a certain extent. (46).
However, the magistrates were aware of the situation:
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I think that if you have listened to so many [defence solicitors] over 
the years you realise whether what is being said is the normal pattern 
or whether there is any extraordinary things about what they are 
saying... phrases which are standard but occasionally you will get the 
different phrase which you know is particular to this case. (31).
In other words, "you've got to try and weed out the truth from the near truth" 
(magistrate, 18).
Two reasons were suggested for this situation. Firstly, a defence solicitor's job was 
to get their client bail and secondly, they relied upon information which the 
defendant had given them which could be 'total rubbish'. This meant that defence 
solicitors' assertions were thought to be unreliable. Several magistrates agreed with 
the one who said,
I'm quite prepared to believe that the defence solicitor is telling the 
truth but they are not necessarily telling the whole truth in presenting 
then: client's case. (16).
One magistrate (14, no tape) was less diplomatic and accused some defence solicitors 
of lying. However, a clerk outlined a situation when a solicitor may not impart all 
the available information:
... [if the C.P.S.] haven't got then- files to substantiate anything ... 
I think in those circumstances you could get solicitors trying to pull 
the wool over peoples eyes. (28).
It was far less common for magistrates to be sceptical about the information supplied 
by the C.P.S.. However,
I don't take them as facts, I mean the charge is a fact of life, but the 
fact [is] that the C.P.S. might try and gild the lily a bit while they are 
telling you about it, when asking for a remand. (29).
These opinions about the reliability of information supplied by the defence may be 
a partial explanation of the general comments made about magistrates relying more 
heavily on the information from the C.P.S. than on information from the defence. 
However, this view was not shared by all the respondents, in particular the police: 
Defence solicitors stand up and say all manner of things and it's just
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completely accepted by the court isn't it ... what I'm saying is that 
many magistrates are swayed by what the defence solicitors say. 
Some defence solicitors have got the ear of the court, they can say 
anything they like, knowing thats going to be accepted by the bench. 
(51).
Although the comments made about the information supplied to the court relate to 
both the C.P.S. and the defence and generally one side is critical of the other, the 
views of the magistrates have been revealing. The majority, although saying they 
listened to both sides of the argument, generally saw information supplied by the 
C.P.S. as objective while defence information was treated with caution. This is 
despite the fact that many respondents argued that the information that the C.P.S. 
had on overnight cases was fairly limited. Furthermore, as one solicitor said,
... the defence solicitor is saying what the defendant has told him and 
what the defendant has told him cannot always be relied on, there is 
a subtle difference. I don't think any lawyer ... manipulates what the 
client has told him. I rely exclusively on the information I have got 
from him ... but isn't the prosecutor doing the same thing, he's just 
reading a piece of paper and if you believe that police officers always 
tell the truth I think that perhaps you are being a wee bit 
unreasonable. (07).
Despite this last comment, the magistrates' perception of the information provided 
by the C.P.S. as largely objective, factual and unproblematic is a contributory factor 
to their reliance on the recommendation of the C.P.S.. This is compounded by their 
perception of the information supplied by the defence as more subjective and 
untrustworthy. In addition, it has been shown in the quantitative findings that 
offence-related factors appear to be very important in the remand decision, 
information about which is principally supplied by the C.P.S.. It seems, therefore, 
that the C.P.S. play a crucial role in the magistrates' decisions. Consequently, it is 
important to investigate how the participants and the C.P.S. themselves perceive how 
the C.P.S. assess the bail risk a defendant poses and decide upon a remand 
recommendation to present to the court.
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C.P.S DECISION MAKING 
C.P.S. Objections
The members of the C.P.S. who were interviewed basically said that the main 
factors in objecting to bail were the grounds laid down in the Bail Act 1976. Other 
participants were also asked for their comments about the process by which the 
C.P.S. object to bail. One solicitor said:
The prosecution just basically read out the police version of events, 
you know they say we think that he is likely to commit offences or 
he might abscond or whatever, and then they just hand in a list of 
previous convictions, and that's all they usually need to do ... they 
don't really direct themselves to the actual issues under the Bail Act, 
they just read out the version of the events and say that you know he 
may offend, or he is likely to abscond or whatever and that's it, but 
they don't actually explain why he might. (57).
Some respondents remarked that the C.P.S. most often used the objection of risk of 
further offences. A magistrate stated,
I mean hi a case of a person who has ... previously offended, which 
is the most frequent reason as to why ... the prosecution is likely to 
be opposing bail, there may be lots more reasons, but I believe most 
of the time it's because there's previous offences. (16)
A solicitor further commented that, although risk of further offences was the most 
frequently used objection,
What tends to happen in matters of any seriousness is that the 
prosecutor invariably uses nearly all the grounds for objection. Some 
of them may be what I would call lightweight but if somebody is 
charged with a serious offence and has a bad bail record and you say 
that he is likely to fail to surrender and he is also likely to say if he's 
got an antecedent history and there's a risk that he might offend, it's 
almost a reflex to bolster his objections. (02).
A solicitor concurred with this observation and commented that 'risk of further 
offences' was the hardest objection to rebut. He then added,
... they can never substantiate that. If they had to give evidence to 
that effect on oath they couldn't do it and yet they can just stand up 
with a banal comment, a bland comment that if you release him it is
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our belief that he will commit further offences, no grounds for saying 
it at all, but they'll trot it out. (56).
Another solicitor pointed out that it was difficult to refute because risk of further 
offences is the vaguest objection to bail and was often used as a catch all objection 
when the C.P.S. could not find another relevant objection.
The difficulty of refuting C.P.S. objections was not limited to this one area and 
related more generally to the problem of disputing the C.P.S. version of events:
... you always mention that a defendant disputes them, but there is no 
point really unless you can prove it at that stage or make it out to be 
so unrealistic a prosecution version of events at that time, because ... 
if the prosecutor says that my man was dressed like Mickey Mouse 
and hit someone on the head with a huge banana which is six foot 
long, you say a load of nonsense, but for the purposes of the bail 
application that's deemed to be correct. (56).
Another solicitor concurred with this statement:
... you're very often told [by the magistrates] that "I'm not trying the 
issue now, this is a bail application, don't ask me to try the facts 
now". (55).
The difficulties facing the defence in refuting the objections of the C.P.S. were 
exacerbated by the perception of the C.P.S. information as objective and factual. In 
other words,
... the strength of the prosecution evidence ... that's probably the 
strongest criterion in favour of the prosecution. (Solicitor, 56).
Influences on the C.P.S. Decision 
THE POLICE ROLE IN C.P.S. DECISIONS
One important question is how the C.P.S. utilise the information that they get from 
the police. The police provide a case file which includes details of the alleged 
offence and a form which indicates whether the police thought objections to bail
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were appropriate, and if they were, which ones and why. There is also space on the 
form for the police to indicate what conditions, if any, were appropriate. However, 
one member of the C.P.S. stated,
They [the police] do give me a form but I don't pay any regard 
whatever to that usually. I make my own decisions about bail, it's 
quite easy to do that, because there are a number of criteria which the 
prosecution have to satisfy, and usually there is information contained 
in the file to enable you to do that ... that information is apparent 
from the factual summary that the police provide, the charges 
themselves and usually the previous convictions ... so that 
information in totality is usually enough for me to formulate 
objections to bail. (47).
Another prosecutor stated,
I take it into account, how much I use is at my discretion and whether 
or not I should object to bail again is discretionary ... [I follow police 
objections] about 60 per cent of the time because the objections that 
they put down might be different from my objections ... 60 per cent 
on their grounds. (41).
In short, he seemed to suggest that hi the 40 per cent of cases where he did not fully 
agree with the police assessment, he added or deleted grounds. This approach was 
also adopted by another prosecutor who said,
... it is our job as I perceive it, to take what information is provided 
by the police and rationalise it into objections. (21).
In general, the police validated this view and said that they believed that in the 
majority of cases the C.P.S. objected to bail when the police had recommended that 
they do so (this did not mean that they believed that they did this well). However, 
all the prosecutors interviewed mentioned that they had made decisions with which 
the police disagreed which tends to suggest that at least in some cases the C.P.S. do 
not simply follow the police recommendation. This finding is confirmed by 
comments made by the majority of the police officers interviewed who were critical 
of the C.P.S.'s handling of remand cases. A defence solicitor also commented,
fairly often ... the police say to me we are satisfied to grant this 
man bail with conditions and you go to court the next morning quite 
relaxed and thinking, well there's no problem ... and the prosecution 
... say ... we are going to apply for a remand in custody ... they say 
I don't care what the police have suggested, we are independent of
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the police and we make up our own minds, so that's something which 
I come UD aeainst miite often (dft\up g qu . 46).
He went on to outline a case which clearly illustrated that bail bargaining occurred 
at the police station. In summary, he said,
... Now the police, on the basis that he was going to give them 
information not only about what he had done but what other people 
had done, were quite happy for him to be granted bail with stringent 
conditions ... so on that basis [the defendant] was happy with that, 
well of course he gets to court and the prosecution said I'm sorry 
we're not interested in that, this man's going to be remanded in 
custody. (46).
This was not the only reference to bail bargaining. A police officer said, when asked 
about it,
I'm sure they do, yes, not on taped interview though ... You'll find 
that bail bargaining ... is a C.I.D. trick. (40).
There was some evidence that the police were selective in applying for a remand in 
custody to the C.P.S. because they were aware that if their objections were not 
water tight they would not be put forward by the C.P.S. to the court. As a police 
officer said,
... the more people you put before the court the less possibility you'll 
get the remands that you really want, so by being a little bit more 
selective you've got more chance of getting the remands. If you put 
everybody before the court, I don't think some of the ones that really 
do need locking up behind bars will get it, so ... you've got to be 
really selective and if you do you'll get the ones that you really want 
behind bars. (13).
The police bail/custody decision was significant in that there seemed to be an 
assumption made that cases where the defendant had been released on police bail did 
not warrant the attention and a review by the C.P.S.. As one member of the C.P.S. 
commented, it is very unlikely that a defendant who appears in court having been 
detained in police custody is going to be granted unconditional bail and if granted 
the court would question why s/he had been kept in police custody. A police officer 
stated:
... when we've granted [bail] ... when we've got no objections they
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[the C.P.S.] don't object, no, I've never known that. (40).
A member of the C.P.S. concurred,
... [Beyond] looking behind the objections which the police ask you 
to consider ... when deciding whether to oppose bail ... I wouldn't 
say that there is any real enquiry unless there's some pressing reason 
for it, if the defence solicitor were to ask me to consider what the 
police said about it ... (47).
Therefore, it seems that the C.P.S. would only check information with the police if 
the defence disputed its accuracy. This indicates that initial police decisions are very 
important as some, at least, are taken at face value in the later stages of proceedings. 
Moreover, if clause 22 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill 1993, 
permitting police to attach conditions to police bail, becomes law fewer cases will 
be in need of review by the C.P.S..
OFFENCE RELATED INFLUENCES
As members of the C.P.S. who work in court are legally qualified it was not 
surprising that all its members stated that they applied the Bail Act to their decisions 
to object to bail and it was the Act that structured their decision. One prosecutor said 
the prime consideration was a ground under the Act. Although other influences were 
mentioned by the C.P.S., the primary influence was claimed to be the nature and 
seriousness of the offence. In line with court decisions the likelihood that the 
defendant would commit further offences was stated as the primary concern of the 
C.P.S.. Evidence used to determine whether or not a defendant was likely to commit 
further offences was stated as being the defendant's previous record, his/her general 
attitude to the police and the court. One prosecutor mentioned that she looked at 
whether certain conditions would meet her objections to bail. Further considerations 
mentioned were the likely method of dealing with the case.
272
OTHER INFLUENCES
Other factors not related to the Bail Act were also mentioned. One member of the 
C.P.S. raised the issue of quotas and their affect on the number of possible 
applications she made,
I think thrown [in] in the morning, if you've got a list where you've 
got 15 to 20 cases that have come in overnight and on the bulk of 
those you've got various police officers objecting to bail, then you 
might apply the tests more stringently than you would on a day when 
you've got 5 or 6 overnight cases that have come in, because you 
know at the end of the day that you're going to have to have a look 
at your bench first and see which magistrates you're going to have on 
your bench ... so you know they're going to deal with each type of 
case. So you apply the tests differently in accordance with your 
bench, with the number of cases and the likely results ... because the 
reality of the situation is that magistrates would, under no 
circumstances, would they remand every custody application in 
custody, because I think what they want to do is to appear fair ... 
what they do is they will remand a certain number, I don't know 
what sort of percentage, I don't know if they fix that between 
themselves but they remand a certain number and if you apply for 
custody in every case, you may well find that in a ratio of 1 to 10, 
you have all those in the custody band ... all within the custody band 
... some far more serious than others, all of which justify custody ... 
you'll end up finding your really serious offenders are out on bail ... 
so you have to be fairly selective before you start, even though you 
could quite rightly justify custody for every single one of those. So 
I think that's quite a major consideration. (20).
She went on to say that this in practice means that she selected defendants who she 
believed should be in custody and prioritised them by assessing the ones that were 
the most serious risk. For the cases at the bottom of the list she requested that bail 
is granted with conditions:
In a very big list, where you have specific offenders who would 
feature very highly in your wish for custody, then some lose priority 
... in cases where you could justify custody, it may be the sole 
reason. (20).
Other members of the C.P.S. concurred with this:
It's important that we be seen to be going for the strong cases in 
custody, the middle of the road cases we can afford to take the 
chance and let them have bail ... so yes, those people who are
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borderline probably benefit by getting bail. The prosecutors 
credibility before the magistrates is important. Once he starts asking 
for remands in custody in cases which clearly should be given bail it 
becomes very difficult to retain your credibility thereafter. (22).
You .. may take a decision which you believe to be in the best 
interests of justice and the interests of the case, that stringent 
conditions perhaps can apply ... you've made that decision from the 
magistrates point of view, that is simply perceived as "Oh bail has 
been agreed on conditions" ... one of the reasons perhaps you've 
agreed that is that you know that there is a more deserving case for 
custody which is about to be dealt with ... an overwhelming strong 
case ... it would be wrong for me to apply for custody in this case 
which can be met with conditions, when the next case is 
overwhelming a custody case. I want to maintain my credibility 
before the court by showing that I am prepared to concede conditions. 
In a way that does affect the other case, that's the reality of all 
courts, one case does affect another. (21).
The consequence of this practice is that the C.P.S. do not object to bail in all of the 
cases where they feel it is justified. It also means that because the stipendiary hi 
Court C was perceived to remand more defendants hi custody,
... and as a result you'll find that more applications for a remand in 
custody are made by [C.P.S.] lawyers in [Court C] than there are in 
[Court A]. (59).
This seems, indeed, to be the case as the quantitative data suggests that the C.P.S. 
request a remand hi custody hi twice as many cases (42 per cent in Court C 
compared with 21 per cent each for Court A and B) than the other courts in the 
study. Furthermore, the success rate of these applications varies between the courts 
(Court A, 82 per cent, Court B, 79 per cent and Court C, 95 per cent) (see Chapter 
5). The evidence therefore, suggests that not only do the C.P.S. request that more 
defendants be remanded hi custody in Court C but that those requests are more 
successful. This may explain the disparities found hi bail rates between the three 
courts in the quantitative data and further confirms the importance of the C.P.S. 
decision.
A final point worth making is that some respondents commented on the variation in 
the quality of many members of the C.P.S.. They argued that although there were
274
some good prosecutors there were also some useless ones and the police in particular 
changed the way that they dealt with a case because of this. For example, a police 
officer said that depending which prosecutor was acting, he would decide whether 
or not to be present at the remand hearing to provide additional information. A 
magistrate concurred with this assessment when he said, "... [the] presentation from 
the C.P.S., some of that is done well and some of that is done badly." (29). 
Furthermore, the Bail Information Officer indicated that there were differences in 
prosecutors in terms of perceived harshness or leniency:
... prosecutors ... there's no consistency ... we have a joke here, 
because we know that there's a rota of prosecutors, and we sort of 
say well phone up Cardiff prison, so and so's in, they'll need a wing 
to themselves, the people they will remand in custody, another 
prosecutor very rarely asks for custody ... if you look at it as a 
continuum from Attila the Hun to the failed social worker type ... it 
really is unbelievable, you can go through the same list with 
prosecutors and some will be going for half a dozen, others will be 
going for one. (23).
A solicitor further confirmed this view when he said,
... there are certain prosecutors who seem to go over the top, I would 
say gild the lily just to make very much a mountain out of a molehill 
of the case ... it's just the way certain Crown prosecutors happen to 
be. (06).
DEFENCE DECISION MAKING
The discussion has focused thus far on the importance of the C.P.S. in the remand 
decision. However, the defence also plays an important role in the decision making. 
This role can take several forms: prior to the actual remand hearing discussions 
often take place with the C.P.S. which can result in an undisputed application or 
they can advise their client not to make a bail application, both of which have a 
profound effect on the eventual decision. Finally, they take part in contested bail 
applications where, as has already been discussed, the odds are set against them. 
However, most solicitors recognised that they sometimes affected the magistrates' 
decisions and that defendants were released on bail despite C.P.S. objections. As
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one solicitor commented the effectiveness of a defence application:
Very much depends on the magistrates, very much depends on the 
individual members of the bench. You know you can persuade some 
magistrates, you know that some magistrates won't be persuaded at 
all, that they are minded to continue and believe everything that the 
Crown has to say, others can be addressed and persuaded to change 
their original stance. So much depends on the magistrates. (06).
The defence solicitors, therefore, play an important part in remand decisions and it 
is vital that some analysis is undertaken of their role. It may also provide some 
potential explanations of some of the findings already discussed, for example the 
lack of trust that seems to be apparent from many of the other participants.
Most solicitors said that they got very little information from the C.P.S. prior to the 
hearing. However,
If you can get in there early and say well look let's sit down and talk 
about it you tend to get good information, but sometimes they will 
just say "Oh, we'll go for a remand" and that's as much as you know 
before you're going to court, so you are sort of in the dark until it 
actually starts. (57).
Another solicitor commented that,
I find the C.P.S. tend to play things very close to their chest, you're 
not shown anything in writing by the C.P.S. before you make the bail 
application, you might be told the gist of what's going to be said ... 
Well, it puts you at a disadvantage, doesn't it, you're whispering to 
your client, you're sort of taking things in quickly. (55)
This seemed to be particularly significant as all the defence solicitors indicated that 
they structured their bail applications to counter the C.P.S.'s objections and these 
were the primary considerations upon which they focused. Defence solicitors did this 
because they recognised the importance of the C.P.S. objections to the eventual 
decision. It was, therefore, important to provide information to refute or negate the 
objections of the C.P.S. which revolved around offending-related data. As one 
solicitor remarked,
... [the objections put forward by the C.P.S.] are uppermost in the 
court's mind, they hear the C.P.S. first, you've got to counter those. 
That's the first step anyway and then any matters that you can argue
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in favour of bail. (55).
A solicitor outlined the general pattern of a bail application:
You've got to ascertain first of all what the objections that will be 
placed before the court will be, whether they will abscond, that he 
has no community ties, that he will interfere with witnesses and so 
forth and answer those points, usually chronologically and deal with 
each point separately ... try and answer the points which the Crown 
put before the court to oppose bail ... once you've done that ... once 
you've answered all those points you've just to crystallise everything, 
put his good points. (06).
Only after a solicitor had answered all the points raised by the C.P.S. would s/he 
go on to provide positive information about the defendant, often including 
information about possible conditions to allay the fears included in the objections. 
Sometimes these two aims overlap, for example:
... he's got a fixed home background ... a positive step in favour [of 
bail] but it also counters any allegation that he will abscond because 
he's got fixed community ties. (45).
In other words, even when an exception to bail applies, the defence can often put 
a positive bail application to override the objection. Nevertheless, one solicitor 
commented,
... you really are dealing with the facts as they are presented by the 
prosecution, you can't really get very far behind those facts, you can 
try, but you don't get very far. (55)
The information that defence solicitors use hi their applications came mainly from 
the defendant. However, relatives and friends of the defendant were also an 
important source. It was seen as positive if the family were in court. In fact, most 
clients were already known to the solicitors and this facilitated the use of old pre- 
sentence reports which provided information on the background of the defendant (a 
practice not condoned by the probation service). Solicitors also indicated that they 
got information from the probation service especially in relation to bail hostel 
accommodation but also other support services such as drug/alcohol dependency 
treatment and mental health services.
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Some defence solicitors said that they did not verify the information they received 
from the defendant. One solicitor, when asked, said "No, in case he's telling lies." 
(56). Other solicitors said they verified information but explained that it was not 
always possible and that they only checked information by phone or from past files. 
Often solicitors verified information through the defendant's relatives especially 
concerning an address.
Defence solicitors said they were sceptical of some things that defendants said, 
especially if they were cliches such as the defendant has a job which starts on the 
following Monday. In those circumstances, the defence solicitor would recommend 
some verification in the form of a letter, as the court was unlikely to take the 
information at face value. The solicitors were rightly sceptical, as one magistrate 
said,
... the old chestnut is my client has just got a job and he starts work 
on Monday, I mean you hear that so often and then you ask for 
documentary evidence of that, that's never around. (18).
The information routinely supplied to the court by defence solicitors falls into four 
categories: information about offender-related issues, the strength of the evidence, 
appropriate bail conditions and the defendant's community ties. Only positive 
offender-related information is given which includes any mitigating factors. This 
includes information on previous convictions such as the nature of the previous 
convictions and the bail history of the defendant. Secondly, questions are raised 
about the strength of the evidence against the defendant especially if the defendant 
intended to plead not guilty or there was a dispute over the facts of the case. 
Thirdly, information is given about possible conditions which could be attached if 
granted bail which included the availability of sureties. Most solicitors said that they 
discuss with their clients before the hearing what conditions they would abide by and 
most indicated that they put these conditions to the court:
... [You] suggest to the magistrates that whatever conditions they 
would like to impose then [the defendant] would be happy to abide 
by, and then it still gives them some decision making. (57).
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Proposing possible conditions was seen by solicitors as a way of negating bail 
objections. It was a way of saying that the defendant was a bail risk but that the 
appropriate conditions could counter those objections. However, one solicitor said 
that it can be counter productive proposing conditions of bail if the defendant had 
already breached those conditions, especially if further offences had been committed. 
In these circumstances he would centre his decisions on either the weight of the 
evidence or personal circumstances. The fourth category of information is the 
defendant's community ties which includes whether the defendant has a permanent 
address and, if not, alternative accommodation, whether the defendant has a job or 
a stable relationship. However, even this information was used more to rebut 
prosecution objections than as positive information in its own right. If any of these 
four areas included information unfavourable to the defendant then it would be 
ignored and the application would concentrate on the other areas where positive 
information existed.
Solicitors were split over the usefulness of using wider local and national issues in 
their bail application such as the holding of prisoners in police cells. Other issues 
like this that were mentioned by the defence solicitors were topical news of prison 
riots or a suicide. One solicitor said of using this information,
I tend to think that it can exacerbate a bail application, in other 
words, it looks as if you are literally relying on the last resort. I don't 
think it should be depended upon, if you rely on things such as that 
which are peripheral only, which do not relate to the facts of the 
offence, do not relate to the individual themselves, I think it really 
underlines the weakness of your application. (44).
However, another solicitor believed the opposite to be the case:
I think you've got to try and be anecdotal because magistrates get 
bored with purely technical argument ... I think if you can, if for 
example, the news that morning has had prison riots or something of 
that sort ... certainly it's something worthy because it topicalises it, 
yes, I certainly draw from that. (05).
Another possible type of information used by the defence in bail applications is how 
long the case was going to take to conclude. Furthermore, the assertion that if a 
defendant is remanded in custody s/he will only come out a worse offender because
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of the people s/he would meet in prison is often used in cases involving young 
offenders.
The defence solicitors provided further evidence that the particular magistrates or 
bench of magistrates affected the work of the other participants in the court. A 
solicitor commented,
I will avoid making a bail application sometimes because I'll take one 
look at the bench and I'll know we won't get bail so I'll think of an 
excuse to adjourn for a few days ... knowing full well that in a few 
days time I'll have a different bench ... (46).
Some, but not all, defence solicitors agreed with this and indicated that they change 
their minds about the appropriateness of making a bail application or the information 
contained in it depending on the magistrates who were sitting. One solicitor said:
... it depends on the magistrates ... you suss [sic] it out before hand. 
You get to know who all the magistrates are ... clients do as well, 
they know if they go before one particular magistrate they don't stand 
a chance ... but I wouldn't make the overwhelming decision. I would 
just say if you really want me to I'll make an application but I don't 
think it's the wisest choice. (57).
Evidence of the effect of the magistrates on the performance of the defence solicitors 
was also commented upon by a member of the C.P.S.:
... a lay bench ... are open to persuasion, considerable persuasion, by 
the defence advocates ... and you have probably seen how much 
greater the effort is usually made by the defence advocate to secure 
a defendant bail when the lay magistrates are sitting as opposed to the 
Stipendiary because they know what his attitude is because they 
appear before him regularly ... they know that they've got an uphill 
task, but they're always in with a chance with a lay bench. (47).
There was some criticism of the quality of the service provided by defence solicitors 
although five out of the 23 respondents who gave an opinion thought their work to 
be of high quality. However, seven respondents said that the quality of defence 
solicitors varies. As one magistrate said,
... it depends who is doing it quite honestly. The standard of 
advocacy in these courts is often very poor, but some who appear are 
very good and they are the ones that don't appear very often ... I 
would take more notice of them than I would of the legal aid
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luminaries who appear day after day after day and say just the same 
thing all the time. I think the standard of presentation for the client 
is not good... the standard that a lot of them get is repetitious thing 
almost learnt by rote by some of the solicitors ... [the] quality of 
advocacy ... I consider to be extremely poor ... it's the same old 
platitudes ... The C.P.S. seem to do it fairly well ... they present it 
clearly, concisely, you can understand it ... [solicitors] just say the 
same thing over and over again, it's a waste of breath and they don't 
do their client any good. (29).
REASONS
The findings of the quantitative research (see Chapter 7) suggested that the 
magistrates rarely articulated their reasons for refusing bail. It is, therefore, difficult 
to assess the validity of their reasoning. However, just under half of the respondents 
who gave an opinion (17 out of 37) believed that the magistrates' reasons for 
refusing bail deviated from the statutory grounds under the Bail Act 1976. Of the 
seventeen who gave reasons for their opinion three believed that the grounds given 
were used as an excuse and the real reason was because of the seriousness of the 
offence. A further five respondents thought that magistrates made their decisions on 
their "gut reaction" to the case and then found official grounds to apply to that 
decision. Seven respondents thought that the magistrates did not properly apply the 
law to their decisions and therefore made decisions on unlawful criteria.
These findings were backed up by information collected at interview. A probation 
officer commented,
... [Magistrates] just tend to give the standard requirement for why 
they have remanded in custody, that being fear of committing further 
offences, fear of absconding, interfering with witnesses, and that's the 
only reasons I hear being put forward, I've never heard any 
magistrate being more specific in their reasons than that ... but I've 
so many times heard [fear of further offences] just blatantly stated as 
a reason when there's nothing really very much said to the court hi 
the course of the proceedings to imply that might happen, and all 
three reasons just given, you know just sort of blanket statements, for 




At the moment the requirement upon magistrates to announce their 
decisions for withholding bail is tokenism, because all that will 
happen with 99 per cent of magistrates is that they will parrot back 
to the accused the specific Bail Act exceptions as they have been put 
forward by the Crown, without any attempt to elaborate upon them. 
(03).
A clerk (48, not taped) commented that the magistrates' reasons for refusing bail did 
not always coincide with the statement of grounds they provided to the court. 
Furthermore, in his experience, the magistrates sometimes gave different reasons or 
grounds hi open court than those that they discussed in the retiring room. A solicitor 
explained:
Magistrates use the wrong grounds far too often ... somebody may 
well have committed an offence on bail, it's an entirely different 
offence, there were good reasons for committing the offence, or at 
least reasons which can be explained, as opposed to the prosecution 
presenting a good case to suggest that there is a likelihood of 
repetition ... the magistrates will come back and say further offences 
are likely to be committed whilst on bail. Now this is a wholly 
misleading ground ... what they really mean is they are likely to 
dispose of the case in due course ... it's likely to be custody ... that's 
not a ground of course ... so they tend to put further offences. (44).
These findings are not surprising in the light of one magistrate's insistence that there 
was a fourth ground for refusing bail - that of seriousness of the offence (19, not 
taped). Another magistrate (14, not taped) said that if all else failed and no grounds 
applied, he would always keep a defendant hi custody on the ground of risk of 
further offences, even if there was no evidence to support this conclusion. He went 
on that the reasons for keeping a defendant in custody sometimes do not relate to the 
Bail Act 1976. However, he could always find reasons under the Bail Act 1976 to 
keep someone in. If this is the case, it suggests that the real reasons why defendants 
are remanded in custody do not relate to the grounds under the Bail Act 1976.
These findings highlight the problem that if the defence do not know the real reasons 
for magistrates' decisions to remand in custody they cannot effectively counter the 
prosecution's arguments with a view to changing their mind. Also, how can a court
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decide that fresh circumstances exist which are relevant to the grounds for refusal 
of bail if those grounds are not articulated or if the articulated reasons are not the 
real reasons? Many respondents wished to see the reasons for a remand in custody 
stated in court, not just the grounds but the rationale for applying those grounds. 
One solicitor said,
It improves justice, openness improves it, but they [the magistrates] 
won't let on what they're accepting, why won't they? It improves the 
system, it improves justice. (07)
NON-APPEARANCE
Although several respondents claimed that they had no stereotype of the type of 
offender who did not appear for his/her court hearing, the majority of respondents 
had some clear ideas of certain types of defendants who were less likely to appear 
and a clear pattern emerges. The persistent offender was often cited. They also 
formed part of a second group: those defendants who had no respect for the criminal 
justice system or the law. Another group were those defendants who were at risk of 
custody either prior to conviction or before or after sentence, again more likely to 
be persistent offenders. Other defendants frequently mentioned were those that lived 
out of the area of the court, the young, those who lived a chaotic lifestyle and those 
who had drug and/or alcohol problems.
According to the respondents the reason most likely to be accepted for a defendant's 
non-appearance, which would result in no warrant being issued for their arrest, was 
medical, although family and transport problems were also accepted as was 
confusion over the hearing date. Having said this, a substantial minority of 
respondents (11) believed that any excuses were accepted by the magistrates. The 
action that the court takes when a defendant does not appear depends on several 
factors, according to the respondents. These factors are: whether any reasons were 
supplied to the court including whether the defendant had made contact with the 
court; information concerning the reasons given for non-attendance, for example a 
medical certificate; the bail history of the defendant, more specifically, if s/he had
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failed to attend in the past; the nature and number of offences the defendant was 
charged with including evidence of alleged reoffending; the attitude of the defendant; 
and the opinion of the defence and the C.P.S.. Interestingly, several respondents 
stated that the sex of the defendant was important as the magistrates were less likely 
to issue a warrant without bail for a woman with children as this might involve the 
children being placed either with relatives or friends or in the care of the local 
authority (this was not perceived to be an issue with males).
The overriding finding concerning non-appearance was that the outcome of the 
hearing, whether or not a warrant was issued, was impossible to predict as it 
depended very much on the culture of the court and the magistrates sitting on a 
particular bench. This bears out the finding of the quantitative research that there are 
large variations in the use of different courses of action when a defendant does not 
appear. For example, in Court C no warrants with bail were issued during the 
observations and the Stipendiary magistrate expressly said that he did not believe 
these to be appropriate when a defendant did not appear. This policy was commented 
upon by a solicitor who primarily worked hi this court. He said,
The only real criticism I have of [Court C] is that I have never yet 
seen a warrant backed with bail. If someone doesn't turn up then 
either they accept that there is a good reason, medical note or 
whatever, or they put the matter back or make investigations ... or if 
they can't really find an answer then invariably - well always - the 
C.P.S. chap will make an application for a warrant not backed with 
bail, and they accede to that request. ... [Furthermore], I have never, 
when the C.P.S. have asked for a warrant not backed with bail, I 
have never seen one refused. (56).
However, the member of the C.P.S. interviewed from this court said that,
There are circumstances when I do [apply for a warrant with bail], 
for example if the defendant lives a long way out of the area, and 
there is some evidence say from the solicitor that s/he failed to notify 
him, or if there are some difficulties ... also if the offence itself is 
perhaps not of the most serious. (47).
Nonetheless, he also said if a defendant does not appear,
... usually a warrant without bail [is issued] ... really, if someone 
doesn't turn up, the only tune they don't grant a warrant without bail
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... is if there's a sick note and even then they might say Oh bad luck, 
that no good to us, warrant without bail. (47).
Another member of the C.P.S. suggested one possible reason for the limited use of 
warrants backed with bail,
... it puts the burden upon the police then to go and arrest them and 
then tell them we're going to bail you now to another date. What I 
often say is that it's better for a bail enlargement to be imposed ... 
I'm sure I have made applications for a warrant with bail, but I tend 
not to these days, it's either a bail enlargement or a warrant without 
bail. (41).
Respondents suggested that the role of the solicitor when a defendant does not 
appear is of paramount importance to the court's decision about what action to take. 
This is because they are the only participants who can, in those circumstances, 
supply information about possible explanations and/or the background of the 
defendant. One solicitor commented,
Yes I think [it makes a difference to the final outcome] if you say 
nothing, they will issue a warrant without bail. (05).
Nonetheless, some solicitors stated that they did not always stay for the case to be 
called when the defendant did not appear and they felt that if they had no 
information there was nothing they could do. Others said that they felt that it was 
their responsibility to make representations and try and avoid a warrant without bail 
being issued.
However, there was some evidence that decisions as to the course of action to be 
taken were based on practical, pragmatic grounds. For example, a clerk (48, not 
taped) commented that as warrants took so long to execute the bench would often 
take a chance and bail enlarge for a week and hope that the defendant appeared, as 
this was quicker in the long run. A member of the C.P.S. commented upon the 
problem of the delay in the execution of warrants:
The evidence strongly suggests that there is a degree of laxity in 
executing warrants, and ... more often than not the defendants turn 
up before the police execute the warrant. (47).
A Clerk commented,
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... it's pointless doing it with bail, the way the police are we may not 
see that defendant for six to seven months ... but if they've got a 
warrant without bail they tend to serve it more quickly ... (28).
There was also evidence that warrants not backed with bail were executed more 
quickly than warrants with bail.
There was some concern, particularly amongst police officers, that the courts' 
decisions to bail enlarge defendants rather than issue warrants meant that there was 
no deterrent against not turning up to answer bail. One police officer commented,
... if it's a no bail warrant, then he's been given bail in the past, ... 
so the magistrates should realise that it's a no bail warrant then you 
remand him, but they don't, it's just bail again. (37)
A member of the C.P.S. also commented,
[Defendants] may arrive two or three hours late, so they are non 
attenders ... the court would overlook that in each and every 
occasion. What frequently happens now ... they'll hold the matter 
back till the end of the list. ... The Crown may get up and say, well 
we'd like a warrant please ... and what would invariably happen is 
the defence solicitor would come in and say 'I think that if I get in 
touch with him I might be able to get him to court tomorrow, or 
definitely Thursday ... [although the C.P.S. would object] the court 
would bail enlarge and in effect the non-appearance has meant 
nothing ... he's got away with it and if it happened on another 
occasion after his appearance, probably the same thing would happen 
again. (20).
When the defendant eventually appeared in court, respondents thought that the vast 
majority of defendants were re-bailed. This again was seen as a problem by some 
respondents, the vast majority of whom believed that a defendant who failed to 
appear should be remanded hi custody.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This chapter has described the remand process hi magistrates' courts as viewed by 
some of its main actors. This has provided some further illumination upon some of
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the findings of the quantitative research. It has further supported the finding that risk 
of further offending is the primary concern in the remand process. Even defence 
solicitors, the champions of due process, recognise this by supplying information 
that primarily rebuts or negates offending-related information. It seems then that the 
remand process is dominated by crime control considerations rather than by concerns 
for due process.
The importance of crime control partly explains and is reflected by the predominance 
of the C.P.S. in the decision making as they are the primary providers of 
information concerning the offence and the past offending history of the defendant. 
However, to argue that the magistrates play only a limited role in the decisions 
seems to be negated by the fact that both the C.P.S. and the defence solicitors said 
that they changed the way that they worked depending on which magistrates they 
were working with. Nonetheless, the majority of remand decisions are "rubber 
stamped" by the magistrates and it therefore appears appropriate to portray the 
remand process as one with the C.P.S. as the effective decision makers who are in 
turn influenced by the defence and the magistrates. However, "the wild card," as it 
were, is that the magistrates have the ultimate power to overturn their 
recommendations, which they only appear to exercise where the C.P.S. are 
requesting a remand in custody and even then, in limited circumstances.
The following chapter looks at the C.P.S.'s role in the decision making process in 




INFORMATION AVAILABLE AND RATIONALE 
FOR THE DECISION
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Previous research conducted into the operation of the remand process identified 
several issues which have influenced the subsequent debates surrounding the issue 
of bail. Three major areas of concern were highlighted: the information, or lack of 
it, available at remand hearings; the role of prosecution objections to bail; and the 
lack of reasons provided for the rebuttal of bail. Since the studies were conducted, 
various changes have occurred which may have affected these issues: most notably 
the introduction of the Bail Act 1976 and the creation of the C.P.S.. The aim of this 
chapter is, therefore, to investigate the changes that may have taken place in the 
remand process as a consequence of these developments to evaluate their effect on 
the decision making process. Moreover, these three areas provide further insight into 
the decision making process not only of the court but also of the C.P.S..
INFORMATION
In the previous two chapters the influences on the magistrates' decisions have been 
discussed. However, for any decision to be made, it is vital that pertinent 
information is available on which the decision can be based. In Chapter 6 it was 
shown that magistrates believe that they have adequate information on which to base 
their decisions. However, other participants in the process were less confident that 
all the appropriate information was available. This section will discuss what and 
when additional information was made available to the court during this study.
King (197la) outlined three broad sources of information which may be available to 
a court during a remand hearing. Firstly, non-verbal information which includes the 
defendant's demeanour and gives an impression of the character and social milieu 
from which s/he comes. Secondly, formal information such as the charges against 
the defendant, previous convictions or pleas. This allows an assessment to be made 
of the offence and the type of sentence that is likely to be received if the defendant 
is convicted. Thirdly, the community ties of the defendant. These are basically the 
social and economic circumstances of the defendant such as residence, employment 
and a stable relationship. It is commonly held that these provide an assessment of
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the likelihood that the defendant will appear for trial.
The majority of studies which have been conducted to investigate the remand process 
have attempted to evaluate the amount and nature of the information available to the 
court. To achieve this they have utilised the latter two sources of information, where 
available, as it is impossible to assess the effect or, indeed, the perceptions of 
assessments of a defendant's demeanour.
The information, or lack of it, provided to the court was studied and discussed by 
many of the previous studies conducted into the remand process (most notably 
Bottomley 1970 and King 197la). The major reason for this was the consistent 
findings of the studies that little, if any, information was available to the magistrates 
during remand hearings (see for example: Bottomley 1970 and King 197la). 
Information, especially about the community ties of the defendant, was seen as a 
vehicle to increase the numbers granted bail, an explicit objective of both the studies 
and the Working Party (1974). It was argued that when little, if any, information 
was supplied to the court, especially relating to a defendant's community ties, 
magistrates were more likely to remand a defendant in custody because they did not 
have all the available information on which to assess the defendant's suitability for 
bail. Consequently, defendants at risk of custody required information to be provided 
to the court about their character to succeed in their application for bail. As a 
consequence, the studies of Bottomley (1970) and King (1971a) and also the 
Working Party (1974) concentrated on ways of increasing the amount of information 
supplied to the court which related to the community ties of the defendant not the 
offending behaviour of the defendant. As the Working Party (1974) stated:
the court will need to rely on its own assessment of the 
defendant's character in deciding whether [s]he is likely to comply 
with the conditions of his[her] bail. The extent to which the defendant 
has ... community ties is likely to be of considerable influence in 
determining whether [s]he is a good bail risk. We therefore regard it 
as a matter of considerable importance that the courts should have 
information about the defendant's community ties, since without it 
they cannot make an adequately informed assessment of the bail risk. 
(Home Office, 1974:para.62).
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Since these arguments were debated there has been a significant increase in the 
proportion of defendants remanded on bail and an increasing awareness of 
defendants who breach their bail particularly by reoffending. It is, therefore, 
questionable that the amount of information can be specifically linked to reducing 
the prison population still further. Nevertheless, it is still an explicit aim of the Bail 
Information Schemes to reduce the prison remand population (see Chapter 8). 
However, it is possible to argue that more information of a better quality should be 
provided to the court, whatever the outcome in terms of remand decisions. Indeed, 
increased amounts and quality of information, especially relating to offending related 
factors such as offending on bail, have the potential to increase the proportion of 
defendants remanded hi custody. Improving the information available to the court 
should produce decisions which are based on the fullest information available which 
ought to produce the "right" decision in a larger number of cases; that is to remand 
in custody those to which the exceptions to bail apply and to release on bail those 
for which they do not apply. The Working Party (1974) stated:
... the bail decision should be based on the fullest possible 
information about the defendant, if the court is to arrive at a rational 
decision ... This information is important, because there is no direct 
method of determining whether a person is a good bail risk. (Home 
Office, 1974:para.l26 and 127).
Therefore, even though it cannot be disputed that decisions can and often are made 
with little or no information, decisions based on information are more likely to be 
a better decision whether this be to remand a defendant hi custody or grant him/her 
bail.
The Home Office agrees that it is vital that information is available during remand 
proceedings. In 1988 a circular (No.25/1988) stated:
It is important that the relevant information about the defendant and 
his[her] circumstances should be available to the courts ... Often a 
remand hi custody might be averted if the justices had more detailed 
information about, for example, the character of the defendant or the 
conditions hi which [s]he would be living if [s]he were released on 
bail. The early availability of relevant information could do much to 
satisfy the court that the general presumption hi favour of bail should 
not be overruled, or that bail may properly be granted if relevant
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conditions are attached (Home Office, 1988c:para.5).
The arguments cited above resulted in the creation of the Bail Information Schemes 
which ami to provide positive information about the defendant to the C.P.S. in an 
attempt to persuade them not to request a remand hi custody. However, the 
information does not go directly to the court but can be used by the C.P.S. or more 
usually the defence solicitors during a remand hearing (see chapter 8). In this study 
Court A was the only court to have a Bail Information Scheme. However, as the 
information does not go directly to the court, it is impossible to gauge what effect, 
if any, this had on the information provided to the court or even what, if any, 
information supplied by the Bail Information Scheme was supplied to the court. 
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the information provided has little 
impact on the amount of information available to the court during a remand hearing. 
Firstly, there is no discernible difference in the type or quantity of additional 
information verbally presented to the three courts hi the study and secondly, the 
evidence presented in Chapter 8 suggests that they mainly provide information 
concerning accommodation for the defendant.
Previous Research
In general, previous research has found that little, if any, information is available 
to the magistrates during remand hearings. Bottomley (1970) found that in 28 per 
cent of remand hearings no information was given hi court. Bottomley (1970) goes 
on to state that these cases fall into two groups: those where the police made no 
objection to bail and those where the defendant made no bail application. In 42 per 
cent of cases where the police made no objections to bail, no information was given 
and even when information was given, it was superficial and brief. Bottomley (1970) 
concluded:
the only conclusion to be drawn ... is that, when the police did not 
object to bail, the magistrates apparently accepted on trust the 
defendant's reliability, as assessed by the police; in less than a fifth 
of the cases was any information provided about the defendant's
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background which would have been supportive evidence for the 
judgement of the police. (Bottomley, 1970:50).
In the second group, where no application for bail was made, no information was 
provided in a third of cases. The remaining two thirds had brief information 
provided either by the prosecution or the defence. All of this group were remanded 
in custody.
From his findings, Bottomley (1970) identified a trend in the amount of information 
available: if the police made no objection to bail, a minimum, if any, information 
was provided; if the police objected to bail but no bail application was made, a little 
more information was provided; if the defendant applied for bail yet more 
information was provided and cases where a defendant made an application for bail, 
were represented and the police objected to bail the maximum amount of information 
was available. He concluded:
... information was mainly provided where there was an 'adversary' 
element involved. (Bottomley, 1970:51).
Nevertheless, Bottomley (1970) stated that in only 26 out of 171 observed hearings 
was comprehensive information about the defendant or the alleged offence supplied.
In 39 per cent of cases information was only given by the prosecution or the police. 
In only 11 per cent of cases was any information supplied by the defendant or 
his/her solicitor. Bottomley (1970) also noted that different information was given 
by different parties. The defence were more likely to provide information on the 
defendant's community ties whereas the prosecution provided information on past 
and present offending, further inquiries and witnesses.
King's (1971a) findings are broadly in line with those of Bottomley (1970). In half 
of the remand cases studied, no objective information was available to the courts. 
This was the case for defendants appearing both for the first time and on subsequent 
occasions. Furthermore, in 65 per cent of cases no information was available to the 
court on the defendant's community ties. The most important factor in determining
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the amount of information available to the court was whether the police opposed 
bail. If this was the case, twice as much information was available. However, even 
then, in 22 per cent of cases no information was made available to the court and in 
a further 34 per cent of cases no information was provided on the defendant's 
community ties. It is worth noting that whether or not a defendant was legally 
represented made no significant difference to the amount of information available to
the court.
Summary
To summarise, it seems from previous research that in the majority of hearings very 
little, if any, information tends to be available to the magistrates. The studies have 
consistently found that more information is likely to be supplied if the police oppose 
bail especially if the defendant applies for bail. Furthermore, the information 
provided by the prosecution usually related to the offence or the offending behaviour 
of the defendant and while the defence were also likely to provide information on 
these factors they were more likely to emphasis the defendant's community ties.
The Information available to the Court in the Present Study
In the present study it was recorded on the pro forma during the observations 
whether any additional information was verbally presented to the court during the 
hearing (see appendix 1). Apart from this source of information, the magistrates also 
had a court list which provided information on each case. The information found on 
the lists varied slightly in the three courts. However, the lists provided information 
on the previous court remand decision, if applicable, the name, address and date of 
birth of the defendant, the solicitor appearing for the defendant, details of the alleged 
offence(s) including the charge, date and time of the offence, the name of the victim 
and in some cases the value of the property involved. On some lists it was also 
indicated the stage that the case had reached, the employment status of the defendant
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and the other defendants, if any, linked with the case. Although this information was 
available on the court lists it is impossible to gauge what, if any, significance it had 
to the magistrates' decisions. It is impossible to assess what, if any, attention was 
paid to this information or if it was, indeed, read at all. In other words, the 
availability of information hi written form does not necessarily mean that the 
magistrates paid any attention to it or that it affected the decision.
The discussion which follows draws on additional information that was presented 
verbally to the court predominantly by the C.P.S. and the defence solicitors. As it 
was mentioned to the court it can probably be assumed that the magistrates listened 
to the information! Nevertheless, the availability of information does not necessarily 
result in its use and it cannot be categorically stated that the magistrates acted upon 
the information presented. Furthermore, it is likely that some filtering of the 
information occurred in the sense that magistrates prioritised as well as discarded 
some of the information presented to them, indeed, evidence from Chapter 6 
suggests that the type as well as the source of the information affects the weight 
attached to it.
The additional information provided verbally to the court was recorded under twenty 
four headings which covered information on such things as the present offence, the 
residence of the defendant and the mention of delay in the proceedings. The source 
of the information was also recorded, that is whether the prosecution, the defence 
or the defendant or, indeed, two or all of the sources mentioned a particular piece 
of information. Furthermore, for each heading mentioned it was recorded whether 
or not the information fell into one of three groups: very little information, some 
information or a fair amount of information. Thus, the groups were used which 
reflected not only the amount but the depth of the information given. These groups 
are broadly similar to those used by King (19713)1 .
295
The provision of information
Additional information was presented verbally to the court during a remand hearing 
in 516 out of 1524 cases. This means that in only 34 per cent of cases was extra 
information, apart for that contained on the court lists, available to the magistrates 
during the hearing. Information was presented in a larger proportion of cases where 
defendants were appearing for the first time (30 per cent compared with 15 per 
cent). This would be expected as on the first occasion in court it is likely that the 
magistrates will require or be perceived to require more information to make a 
decision because they have no previous court decision to rely upon. This is 
especially the case since defendants who have made two bail applications are 
prevented from making another unless fresh considerations can be argued which 
makes the first decision of vital importance especially when the magistrates 
infrequently overturn previous remand decisions (see Chapter 5). Conversely, 15 per 
cent of defendants who had no additional information presented to the court were 
appearing for the first time. This means that a remand decision was made, when no 
prior decision had be made by the court, without any additional information other 
than that found on the court list. However, in only two of these 135 cases were the 
C.P.S. requesting that the defendant be remanded in custody and only one defendant 
was actually remanded in custody at their first appearance without any additional 
information being made available. This contrasts with 93 out of 477 (20 per cent) 
who were remanded in custody on a subsequent appearance without any additional 
information being made available. These figures seem to indicate that although there 
are a relatively large number of defendants who appear for the first time without 
additional information being supplied during their hearing, the vast majority are not 
at risk or ultimately remanded in custody. However, this does not seem to be the 
case for defendants who are appearing on subsequent occasions.
The data also indicates that additional information is supplied to the court in a larger 
number of cases where defendants are appearing after conviction than when they 
appear prior to conviction (14 per cent as opposed to 3 per cent). This can probably 
be explained by an increased level of discussion hi court about the issues such as
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probable sentence and whether or not a pre-sentence report was required. Although 
it is also possible that greater discussion took place over the remand decision after 
conviction due to changes hi the defendant's status from unconvicted to convicted.
As there is a presumption of bail one would expect that more information would be 
presented in cases where the defendant was at risk of custody, in other words where 
the C.P.S. was objecting to unconditional bail. Furthermore, as previous studies had 
found, it would be expected that more information would be provided in cases where 
bail is to be contested, that is when the prosecution were objecting to bail and the 
defendant wished to apply for bail. On the one hand, this could result in a contested 
bail application and, on the other, it may mean a disagreement over whether or not 
conditions should be a attached to bail or if so, what conditions. These expectations 
are supported by evidence from the observation sample.
The sample for which additional information was presented to the court and the 
sample where no additional information was provided are broadly very similar. 
However, certain factors do differ which provide evidence for the proposition that 
where additional information was made available to the court defendants were 
challenging the prosecution objections to bail. Firstly, twice as many defendants who 
had additional information presented to the court were likely to have been charged 
with an offence of failing to surrender to bail (18 per cent compared to 9 per cent). 
Secondly, 21 per cent of the sample where additional information was provided were 
in police custody prior to the observed hearing compared to only 3 per cent where 
no additional information was given. Although the proportion of defendants who 
were previously granted bail both unconditional and conditional is very similar for 
both samples, over twice as many defendants who had additional information 
supplied to the court were remanded in custody at the hearing immediately prior to 
the observed remand hearing (22 per cent as opposed to 10 per cent). The third 
variable that provides evidence is that of C.P.S. remand request. It follows that as 
there is a presumption of bail, that the C.P.S. is more likely to make a remand 
request if they believe that the defendant ought to be remanded on anything other 
than unconditional bail. The C.P.S. made a request in a much higher proportion of
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cases where additional information was supplied to the court than where it was not 
(82 per cent of cases compared to 48 per cent of cases). Furthermore, in a much 
larger number of cases where additional information was provided, the C.P.S. 
requested either a remand in custody (30 per cent as opposed to 7 per cent) or 
conditional bail (27 per cent compared with 15 per cent). Fourthly, a higher 
proportion of defendants made bail applications when information was contributed 
to the hearing (25 per cent as opposed to 0.3 per cent). Fifthly, the C.P.S. gave 
reasons for, and explained their objections to bail in a larger proportion of cases 
where additional information was presented (33 per cent compared with 2 per cent). 
Finally, the eventual outcome of the hearing gives some indication of the types of 
cases where information was provided by the court and the evidence suggests that 
where information was verbally presented to the court the defendant was more likely 
to be remanded in custody (28 per cent compared to 15 per cent) or granted bail 
with conditions (40 per cent compared with 30 per cent). Furthermore, only 31 per 
cent of defendants who had additional information provided verbally at their hearing 
were granted unconditional bail compared to 54 per cent of those who did not.
When all of these variables are taken together a similar trend to that found by 
Bottomley (1970) is evident in the provision of additional information. If the C.P.S. 
requested that a defendant be remanded in custody and outlined their objections to 
bail and the defendant makes a bail application then additional information was given 
in every case (106 cases). However, in the same situation but when the defendant 
did not make a bail application only 72 per cent of cases had additional information 
supplied. Furthermore, in all of the cases when the C.P.S. made no remand request, 
gave no objection to bail and the defendant made no bail application, no additional 
information was verbally supplied to the court. Consequently, the important indicator 
of whether or not additional information is provided verbally to the court is whether 
bail is contested. This is not to say that the seriousness of the case is unimportant 
as this is obviously reflected in the C.P.S. decision to oppose bail. However, it is 
cases which involve a disagreement between the C.P.S. and the defence about what 
the remand status of the defendant should be which appears to be the best indicator 
of whether additional information is verbally presented to the court. Furthermore,
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this situation is more likely to occur on the first occasion that a defendant appears 
before the court which probably partially accounts for the higher proportion of 
defendants who have additional information supplied at their first appearance.
The quantity and type of additional information
Twenty three categories of information were recorded2 . Although the average 
number of categories of information is 3.4 this hides a large disparity between cases.














































Table 7.1 shows that in the majority of cases where additional information was given 
only one or two categories of information were referred to (55 per cent of cases). 
The largest number of categories referred to was thirteen which occurred on only 
one occasion. These figures seem to indicate that even in the minority of cases 
where additional information was presented to the court, the breadth of the 
categories of information which are referred to is very small. This does not 
however, provide any indication as to the depth of the information given in each
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category which will be covered later in the chapter.
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Table 7.2 shows that the most common category of additional information was that 
of present offence which basically included details about the circumstances of the 
offence which was supplied in 283 cases. It is noticeable that a larger number of 
defendants had additional information given hi the categories relating to the present 
offence and their previous offending behaviour, for example, previous convictions, 
than about their community ties. For example, the highest incidence of a single 
category relating to community ties is that of residence which was presented to the 
court in 120 cases which is half the number hi the highest category relating to 
offending related factors. Furthermore, hi a larger number of cases the only 
information provided to the court related to offending related factors only (151 
cases) as opposed to 64 cases where the only information presented was related to 
the defendant's circumstances or his/her communities ties.
There is a very strong relationship between the number of categories of information 
supplied to the court and certain factors about the defendant or the particular case. 
The factors are very similar to those found to indicate whether or not any additional 
information was given to the court: the seriousness of the case and disagreement 
about whether bail should be granted between the prosecution and the defence. An 
increasing proportion of defendants are either already in custody either to the police 
or to the courts the more categories of information are given. Furthermore, as the 
number of categories of information increased so too does the number of cases in 
which the C.P.S. are requesting that the defendant should be detained in custody. 
Also an increasing proportion of defendants were remanded in custody at the 
observed hearing. However, the most striking correlation with the number of 
information categories mentioned to the court was whether or not there was a 
disagreement between the C.P.S. request and the defendants wishes. In other words, 
whether or not there was a contested bail application or in the case of those on bail 
disagreement about whether or not conditions should be attached to bail and if so, 
what were they to be. For example, there is a strong correlation between the number 
of categories of information mentioned and whether the defendant applied for bail 
when the C.P.S. were requesting a remand in custody. When one or two categories 
of information were supplied to the court only 5 per cent of defendants made a bail
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application but when seven or more categories of information were given to the 
court only 5 per cent of defendants did not make an application. Therefore, even 
though there is a strong correlation between those defendants who were remanded 
in custody and the number of categories of information provided to the court, it 
seems that disagreement over the remand status is particularly important. 
Nevertheless, whether or not there is a disagreement and the strength of that 
disagreement is probably dependant upon whether the defendant is at risk of custody. 
In such situations the arguments are likely to be lengthier and more information 
supplied verbally to the court from both the prosecution and the defence.
It is also possible to analyse the amount and standard of information given hi each 
category. Of the 1747 categories of information provided during the observation 
study 405 (23 per cent) fell into classification 1 (very little information), 249 (14 per 
cent) in classification 2 (some information) which was and 1095 (63 per cent) in 
classification 3 (a fair amount of information). Therefore, in the majority of cases 
where information was given to the court a fairly detailed statement was made. 
Nonetheless, classification 3 did not require a very large or detailed amount of 
information to be provided. For example, it may have been as little as "the 
defendant has failed to appear on two occasions during the current proceedings 
which he has said was due to a mix up in the dates." However, it does seem that 
when additional information is presented verbally to the court it is of a fairly 
substantial nature.
There is no discernible relationship between the number of categories of information 
referred to and the depth or amount of information given. In other words, the 
amount of information given in any particular category seems to be unrelated to the 
number of categories referred to or the defendants situation, for example, whether 
or not they are at risk of custody. It seems that it is simply related to the amount of 
information available in each category or the amount of information deemed 
necessary by either party supplying the information.
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The source of information
The source of the information was also recorded. Of the 516 cases where additional 
information was presented verbally to the court the C.P.S. was the sole source of 
information in 103 cases, in a further 73 cases the information came solely from the 
defence and in 75 cases from the defendant only. Consequently, in nearly half (251 
cases) of the cases where information was provided to the court it came from only 
one source although it is possible that this one source provided information in more 
than one category.
A possible 23 categories of information could be recorded for each case and it is 
possible that each category of information had more than one source in a particular 
case. Only 144 (out of a total of 1747) pieces of information were supplied to the 
court by the defendant. Furthermore, a large proportion of these (121 instances) 
related to information on the defendant's plea. This does not necessarily relate to an 
actual plea but may relate to information on an intended plea. However, what it does 
mean is that in very few cases does the defendant say anything other than his/her 
intended or actual plea. In some respects this is not unexpected as the vast majority 
of defendants were represented. Nevertheless, it does indicate that defendants rarely 
give any information directly to the magistrates. The onus is thus on defence 
solicitors to put forward a case for the defendant and to prioritise the information. 
Furthermore, this situation seemed to be assumed by the court as the defendant was 
usually only asked to verify his/her name and sometimes his/her address and date 
of birth and was rarely directly asked questions by the magistrates or asked if s/he 
had any comments to make.
In 598 out of the 1747 instances of additional information being presented to the 
court, it was supplied solely by the C.P.S., the defence solely supplied information 
in 709 instances, while the prosecution and the defence supplied information on 288 
occasions, with the defence or the prosecution supplying information in conjunction 
with the defendant on four occasions each. Consequently, it seems that the defence 
presented additional information on a larger number of occasions than the C.P.S..
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Furthermore, the number of categories where information was supplied by both the 
C.P.S. and the defence were relatively small which could indicate that they have 
different perceptions of the categories of information of importance to the decision. 
Conversely, it may simply reflect the categories of information for which each party 
had information available which furthered their respective causes. Moreover, where 
both the C.P.S. and the defence presented information in the same category, cases 
which involved a defendant at risk of custody or where bail was contested were not 
more prevalent. Therefore, even in cases where there is a dispute over the remand 
status, in only a minority of cases did the prosecution and the defence give 
information in the same category.
There is also a clear distinction between the categories of information referred to by 
the C.P.S. and the defence. The findings suggest that the C.P.S. tend to present 
information which relates to the offence or the previous offending behaviour of the 
defendant whereas the defence provide information on the defendant's circumstances 
or community ties which confirms the findings of previous research (see Bottomley 
1970). The information categories were divided into three groups, offending related 
information, the communities ties of the defendant and other information about the 
defendant3 . A much higher proportion of information in the offending related 
category was given solely by the C.P.S. (506 instances of information provided 
compared with 148 from the defence). Conversely, for both of the groups relating 
to community ties and other circumstances of the defendant, the defence solely 
provided a much larger proportion of the information4 . Another interesting finding 
is that although there was this clear separation in the type of information given by 
the C.P.S. and the defence, the defence were far more likely to be the sole suppliers 
of information concerning offending related factors (148 instances) than the C.P.S. 
were in providing information on the defendant's community ties or his/her 
circumstances (11 instances).
A similar conclusion can be drawn when the instances in which both the C.P.S. and 
the defence contributed information were analysed. In 208 of these instances the 
information related to the defendant's offending behaviour but in only 36 of these
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instances did the information relate to the defendant's circumstances or community 
ties. Consequently, it seems that the C.P.S. usually confined the information that it 
presented to the court to offending related factors whereas, although defence 
solicitors concentrated the information it provided on the defendant's circumstances 
or community ties, they were more inclined to also provide information on offending 
related factors. However, it is likely that the information relating to offending 
behaviour given by the defence and the C.P.S. was of a different nature with the 
defence providing information on the more positive aspects, for example that the 
defendant has no previous convictions.
Furthermore, both the C.P.S. and the defence were more likely to provide additional 
information when there was a dispute as to the remand status of the defendant. 
Moreover, there was no differences between the amount of information given in each 
category by the C.P.S. or the defence, the differences seem to be entirely random.
Discussion
The findings from this research seem to confirm the findings of previous studies 
despite some major changes that have occurred in the interim period, such as the 
introduction of the presumption hi favour of bail and the creation of the C.P.S.. In 
the majority of cases no additional information, apart from that which appears on the 
court lists, is presented verbally to the magistrates during a remand hearing. 
Nevertheless, in a third of cases some additional information is verbally presented 
to the court. These cases are far more likely to involve defendants who are at risk 
of custody and/or where there is a disagreement between the defence and the 
prosecution about the remand status of the defendant. Moreover, the number of 
different categories of information covered during the hearing was also at a 
maximum when there was disagreement about the remand status of the defendant 
when the defendant was at risk of custody. Conversely, it appears that in cases 
where the C.P.S. are satisfied that a defendant can safely be granted bail and, if 
appropriate, the defence agree to the conditions proposed, the C.P.S. do not offer,
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and the magistrates do not ask for, additional information, which tends to suggest 
that in these circumstances the magistrates take at face value the C.P.S. assessment 
of the bail risk the defendant poses. This is a finding which confirms the 
observations of participants in Chapter 6.
One major change that seems to have occurred since Bottomley's (1970) and King's 
(1971a) studies were undertaken has been the increase in the proportion of 
defendants who are legally represented. In fact, 97 per cent of defendants in the 
present study were represented (see Chapter 3). Bearing in mind, that such a high 
proportion of defendants were represented, this study seems to confirm King's 
(197la) research that the fact that defendants were represented did not apparently 
have any impact on the amount of information available to the court. It seems that 
the Working Party (Home Office 1974) made an accurate deduction that an increase 
in the number of defendants represented would not in itself be enough to increase 
the amount of information provided to the court to a satisfactory level.
C.P.S OBJECTIONS TO BAIL
In relatively few cases during the study did the C.P.S. actually give details of the 
reasons why they were objecting to unconditional bail. In only 190 cases (12 per 
cent of the total number of cases) were any details given as to why the C.P.S. were 
objecting to unconditional bail. This does not mean that in objecting to unconditional 
bail, the C.P.S. necessarily wanted the defendant remanded in custody but that s/he 
could be released on bail with conditions. In fact, in 35 cases where the C.P.S. gave 
reasons for objecting to bail they requested that the defendant be released on 
conditional bail. However, this figure is only 12 per cent of the total number of 
defendants that the C.P.S. requested should be granted conditional bail and suggests 
that in very few cases where conditions are attached to bail are the C.P.S. asked to 
provide reasons why they believe them to be necessary. Bearing in mind that certain 
criteria must be fulfilled before a defendant has conditions attached to his/her bail 
this suggests that magistrates rarely inquire as to the reasons for a C.P.S. request
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of conditional bail.
In 134 cases where the C.P.S. objected to bail they also requested a remand in 
custody, these constituting 59 per cent of the cases where the C.P.S. requested that 
a defendant be remanded in custody. Therefore, no reasons for the C.P.S.'s request 
for a remand in custody were given in 40 per cent of cases (in the remaining cases 
(21) the C.P.S. made no specific remand request or a request was made for police 
custody). Consequently, of the 515 defendants for whom the C.P.S. requested that 
they should not be granted unconditional bail, 63 per cent had no rationale for that 
request given to the magistrates. Yet if the aim of the remand process is to provide 
objective and rational decisions, then the provision of reasons must be an integral 
part of this aim.
In light of the earlier finding that the C.P.S. decision seems to be highly influential 
on the magistrates' decision it is worth investigating the types of cases where the 
C.P.S. do give reasons for objecting to unconditional bail. Furthermore, if 
magistrates withhold bail on the strength of these reasons, or indeed, the lack of 
reasons, they should be made aware of the rationale behind the decision. Firstly, it 
is worth noting that C.P.S. objections were much more likely to be presented to the 
court when the defendant was appearing for the first time than on subsequent 
occasions (44 per cent compared to 17 per cent). This is probably a result of two 
things both of which would result in a fuller argument prior to a decision being 
made: firstly, no previous court remand decision would be available for guidance 
and secondly, the first remand decision is of crucial importance especially in the 
light of the limited number of bail applications allowed as of right.
Of the 190 cases where reasons for withholding unconditional bail were given a 
larger proportion of defendants lived outside the local area than for those defendants 
for whom the C.P.S. gave no reasons. This seems to suggest that the C.P.S. regard 
defendants who live outside the immediate area of the court as higher bail risks. 
Furthermore, where objections were voiced a higher proportion of males and a lower 
proportion of females were included in the sample than when no objection was
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given. This suggests that the C.P.S. are more likely to perceive males as bad bail 
risks than females. A larger proportion of those defendants who faced C.P.S. 
objections were aged between 17 and 24 than in the sample that did not face C.P.S. 
objections (66 per cent compared with 50 per cent) although it is possible that this 
can be accounted for by differences in the previous convictions of the defendants. 
Furthermore, of those defendants who faced C.P.S. objections a high proportion 
were between the ages of 17 and 24 (66 per cent).
Several factors suggest that the cases where objections were given by the C.P.S. 
were of a more serious nature and primarily involved defendants who were at risk 
of custody. Several factors lead to this conclusion. Defendants alleged to have 
committed breaking and entering offences, perceived to be a serious offence, were 
much more likely to face objections (37 per cent compared to 22 per cent). 
Furthermore, defendants charged with relatively minor offences such as motoring 
offences, theft or deception were less likely to face objections from the C.P.S.. 
Moreover, those that faced objections were more likely to have been charged with 
an offence of failing to appear (16 per cent compared to 11 per cent) and/or have 
allegedly breach bail conditions (8 per cent compared to 1 per cent) which seems to 
indicate the importance of the defendant's bail history in the C.P.S. decision to 
object to bail.
In cases where the previous remand status of the defendant was known, 41 per cent 
were in police custody compared to only 5 per cent of cases where no objections 
were voiced and 41 per cent had been remanded in custody on the previous occasion 
compared to 10 per cent who had no objections to then- bail voiced. Furthermore, 
in a much larger proportion of cases when defendants faced C.P.S. objections a 
remand request was made by the C.P.S. (91 per cent compared with 55 per cent). 
Moreover, in the majority of cases where defendants faced objections and the C.P.S. 
made a remand request, the C.P.S. were requesting that the defendant be remanded 
in custody (78 per cent). In 20 per cent of the cases where the C.P.S. gave reasons 
for their decision they were requesting a remand on conditional bail (in 2 per cent 
of cases the C.P.S. were requesting a remand in police custody).
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There is also some evidence that a dispute between the C.P.S. and the defence is an 
important indicator of whether C.P.S. reasons for objecting to bail are given to the 
court as 61 per cent of defendants who faced C.P.S. objections made a bail 
application compared with only 1 per cent who faced no C.P.S. objections. This 
suggests that the C.P.S. only give reasons for their decision to object to bail to the 
court when they are forced to do so because a contested bail application is being 
made. Otherwise, the C.P.S. are not proactive in giving reasons and the court are 
not proactive in asking for a rationale for the C.P.S. recommendation.
Where the C.P.S. objected to bail, in only one case was a defendant granted 
unconditional bail by the magistrates. A large majority (61 per cent) were remanded 
in custody with 37 per cent being released on conditional bail (the remaining 2 per 
cent were remanded in police custody) which includes all those defendants for whom 
the C.P.S. requested the granting of conditional bail. This can be compared with the 
cases where no objections to bail were proposed where 36 per cent were granted 
unconditional bail, 23 per cent conditional bail and 9 per cent were remanded in 
custody (in the other cases no request was made). This suggests that reasons are put 
forward by the C.P.S. when the defendants are at a higher risk of custody and 
ultimately, remanded either in custody or on conditional bail. This may be expected 
however, if a rational remand decision is to be made by the magistrates, it seems 
plausible to argue that reasons for the C.P.S.'s viewpoint should be aired in every 
situation or at the very least in all incidences where the defendant is at risk of 
custody. Having said this, the available court time limits the discussion of each 
individual case and the magistrates obviously have, and to a certain extent have to, 
rely on the C.P.S. decision making process. But this does suggest that the C.P.S. 
remand decision needs to be scrutinised.
Evidence suggests that magistrates do not always agree with the C.P.S. assessment 
of the situation and in 28 cases where the C.P.S. requested a remand in custody and 
also put forward reasons for that decision the magistrates granted conditional bail. 
Consequently, even a reasoned application for a remand in custody by the C.P.S. 
can be overturned by the magistrates. Nevertheless, a much larger proportion of
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reasoned requests for remands in custody were accepted than turned down (101 
cases).
The objections to bail were recorded in this study during the observations. The 
reasons given during the observations have been grouped into 9 categories and 
mainly mirror the exceptions to and considerations for the granting of bail set out 
in Schedule 1 of the Bail Act 1976. For example, for the exception that the 
defendant may fail to appear the reasons given for this conclusion were that the 
defendant had failed to appear in the past or was of no fixed address. The fear that 
a defendant would commit further offences was argued with reference to previous 
bail history in relation to offending on bail and to his/her previous convictions.
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Table 7.3 C.P.S. objections to bail presented to the court during the 
observations.
Fail to surrender:
Will Fail to surrender 103 
Previous failure to appear 54 
No fixed abode 9 




Will commit further offences 143
Current offences on bail 8 6
Previous convictions 4 2
Previous offences on bail 11
Other offences pending 8
290
Nature of the offence: 61 
Interference with justice: 4 5
Defendants own welfare: 14
Property outstanding: 9
Current inquires: 3 
Check the identity of the defendant: 2
Other: 19
Total: 629
Table 7.3 shows that a substantial proportion of the reasons given by the C.P.S. 
were constructed to comply strictly with to the main three exceptions to bail set out
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in the Bail Act 1976. Out of a total of 629, 290 reasons related to the exception that 
there was substantial grounds for believing that if released a defendant would 
commit further offences and 185 reasons related to a risk that the defendant would 
not appear for trial. In many cases, more than one reason was given by the C.P.S.. 
It is possible that these multiple reasons related to the same category but could also 
be related to entirely different reasons. Bearing this is mind, it is interesting that the 
two most commonly cited reasons were simply statements that the defendant may fail 
to appear or that s/he may commit further offences, which provide no 'evidence' to 
support the C.P.S.'s reasoning. In fact, in 43 cases (23 per cent) where either or 
both of these objections to bail were recorded, no further reasons were supplied.
Historically, the primary reason for refusing bail has been the belief that a defendant 
will not appear for trial (see Chapter 2). It appears, however, that this reason is now 
relegated to a secondary function behind the risk that a defendant will commit 
further offences. This finding will be examined further on an individual case level 
later which takes into account multiple reasons. Also of note, is the frequent use of 
the nature of the offence as a reason for withholding bail. The nature and 
seriousness of an offence does not in itself provide an exception to the presumption 
of bail under the Bail Act 1976 although it does constitute one of the considerations 
that may be taken into account. Nevertheless, the findings of this study seem to 
suggest that it is the third most commonly used reason for objecting to bail.
The number of reasons given in each of the 190 cases where objections to bail were 
provided by the C.P.S. varied between one and ten out of a possible fourteen 
reasons.
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Table 7.4 shows that in a large proportion of cases where the C.P.S. object to bail 
five or less reasons for their objection were given. The average number of reasons 
per cases was 3.3. Although there were a possible fourteen reasons, the majority of 
the reasons given related to the three main exceptions to the right to bail; that there 
are substantial grounds to believe that the defendant would fail to appear, commit 
further offences or interfere with the course of justice. In only 7 cases did the 
reasons given for the C.P.S. objecting to bail not encompass any of these reasons.
The importance of the exception that the defendant may commit further offences is 
further highlighted by an analysis of the cases where reasons were given. In 46 
cases, the largest single category, risk of further offences - which includes any 
combination of the four sub categories (see table 7.3) - was the only reason supplied 
to the court for withholding bail. Furthermore, risk of further offences appears as 
a reason in some combination or other in 76 per cent of cases (145 cases). This can 
be compared with the incidence of grounds for believing that a defendant will not 
appear for trial which occurred in only seven cases as the sole reason given by the 
C.P.S. and is given as part of a combination of reasons in only 55 per cent of cases 
(105 cases). This seems to confirm the finding above that the risk of further offences 
is the primary reason why, according to the C.P.S., that bail should be refused.
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Table 7.5 Combinations of reasons for withholding unconditional bail during the 
observations.
Reasons Nos. of Cases
Risk of further offences 4 6
Failure to surrender and risk of further
offences 3 6
Failure to surrender, risk of further
offences and the nature of the offence 12
Risk of further offences and nature of the
offence 10
Failure to surrender, risk of further
offences and interference with justice 8
Failure to surrender 7
Interference with justice 6
Failure to surrender and nature of the offence 4
Risk of further offences and other 4
Nature of the offence and interference
with justice 4
Failure to surrender, nature of the offence
and interference with justice 4
Failure to surrender, nature of the offence,
further offences, interference with justice
and own welfare 4





It is commonly held that the nature and seriousness of the offence is related to 
whether or not a defendant will turn up for his/her trial. In other words, it is 
perceived that a defendant who is charged with a serious offence faces a harsher 
penalty if convicted and thus will be less likely to appear for trial. The findings from 
this research suggest that such reasoning is also used by the C.P.S. in conjunction 
with the exceptions of risk of further offences and interference with justice. The 
nature of the offence was mentioned in 10 per cent (61) of cases. In only two cases 
was the nature and seriousness of the offence given as the sole reason for objecting 
to bail. However, it was given as a reason hi conjunction with other reasons in 32 
per cent of cases (59 cases). In 16 cases, the nature of the offence was linked with 
failure to surrender and not to further offences, in 12 cases it was linked to further 
offences but not to failure to appear and in 23 cases it was linked with both. 
However, it was also linked exclusively to interference with the course of justice in 
five cases. It is difficult to see how the nature and seriousness of the offence bears 
any relation to the risk that a defendant may interfere with justice except the tenuous 
connection that the more serious the offence, the harsher the penalty, the more likely 
a defendant will try to prevent his/her trial going ahead. It is also difficult to see 
how the nature of the offence relates to the likelihood of the repetition of the 
offence. It may be that the more serious the offence or particular types of offence 
the more likely that a defendant will repeat the offence. This assumption is often 
alluded to in relation to auto theft but the evidence of such a link is minimal. 
Furthermore, if there is a possibility that an offence will be repeated the courts are 
likely to be more concerned if the offence is serious.
The findings suggest that previous convictions are linked both to risk of failing to 
appear and to risk of further offences, although in no cases where previous 
convictions were given as a reason for objecting to bail was likelihood that the 
defendant would fail to appear the only other factor mentioned. Nevertheless, failure 
to appear was mentioned in conjunction with risk of further offences hi 31 cases. 
Risk of further offences was also mentioned in 11 further cases in conjunction with 
previous convictions. However, it is impossible to tell whether both or only one of 
these two factors is important. Nevertheless, it does seem that previous convictions
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are linked to risk of further offences rather than failure to appear. This may be as 
a result of the increasing emphasis on offending on bail which has been inextricably 
linked with persistent offenders.
In only 16 cases were all three of the main exceptions to the right to bail applied. 
The defendant's own welfare was the sole reason for objecting to bail in only one 
case.
Discussion
The proportion of cases where reasons for opposing bail are provided to the court 
by the prosecution appears to have increased since the introduction of the Bail Act 
1976. Studies conducted prior to the Bail Act 1976 found that in very few cases 
were reasons for objecting to bail supplied to the court. Bottomley's (1970) study, 
for example, found that in only 50 of the 408 cases where the police objected to bail 
were specific reasons given. However, over a decade later and after the introduction 
of the Bail Act 1976, East and Doherty (1984) found that hi 77 of the 88 cases (88 
per cent) where the police opposed bail they gave one or more reasons for their 
decision. Although East and Doherty's (1984) findings suggest a higher incidence 
of the giving of reasons for objecting to bail than this study, both are higher than 
those found prior to the Bail Act 1976. This would suggest that the presumption in 
favour of bail has resulted in an increased incidence of the giving of reasons for 
objecting to unconditional bail to the court.
However, the findings of this study suggest that the number of reasons given in any 
one case and the type of reasoning used to object to bail does not seem to have 
changed to any great extent since the late 1960's. This is despite the fact that the 
Bail Act 1976, with its specific criteria for the rebuttal of bail, has been introduced 
and the substitution of the C.P.S. in the role of objectors to bail. Bottomley (1970) 
found that an average of three reasons were put forward by the police for objecting 
to bail which is identical to the average found in this study. However, King (197la)
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found that only an average of two reasons were given in each case as did East and 
Doherty (1984). 
The types of reasons given by the C.P.S. in the present study also show a marked 
similarity to those found in other studies (for example: Bottomley 1970, King 1971a, 
Bottoms and McClean 1976, East and Doherty 1984) albeit with the police objecting 
to bail. Previous studies (Bottomley 1970, King 1971a, Bottoms and McClean 1976, 
East and Doherty 1984) had all found that reasons relating to the likelihood of 
further offences being committed were much more likely to be provided to the court 
by the prosecution than those relating to non-appearance at trial . This study confIrms 
these fmdings. 
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Table 7.6 Categories of reasons given as a percentage of the total number of 
reasons.

























Note: FTA= fail to appear; FO= fear of fear offences.
Some important differences are apparent between the findings of the present study 
and previous studies. The importance of the nature of the offence as a reason to 
object to bail seems to have decreased with it being mentioned in 19 per cent of 
cases in King's (197la) study but only in 9 per cent of cases in the present study. 
This can probably be explained by the fact that prior to the Bail Act no exceptions 
to the right to bail were laid down in statute so that the nature of the offence was an 
obvious factor for inclusion in the decision. Nevertheless, the nature of the offence 
was not included as an exception to the right to bail hi the Bail Act 1976, although 
it was included as a consideration, and therefore, its importance to the remand 
decision would have probably diminished.
The studies also suggest that there has been an increase in the use of interference 
with witnesses/justice as a reason for opposing bail. Bottomley (1970) found that it 
was used in 16 per cent of cases in the urban court while King found that it was 
used in only four per cent of cases compared to the present study when it was given 
as a reason in 24 per cent of cases. This increase can probably be explained by the
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inclusion of this reason as a statutory exception to the right to bail.
Both the decrease in the importance of the nature of the offence and the increase in 
the importance of interference with witnesses and with the course of justice hi the 
reasons for objecting to bail since the introduction of the Bail Act 1976 suggest that 
the statutes governing the granting of bail do have an effect on the decision making 
processes, not only of the court but also of the agencies directly involved in making 
the decision.
Summary
The findings suggest that the risk of further offences is still the primary reason that 
the C.P.S. put forward for objecting to unconditional bail. There is some indication 
that its importance as the predominant factor has increased hi relation to other 
reasons for objecting to bail. In 46 cases this category of objection was the sole 
reason for objecting to bail and it was given as a reason hi all but 45 cases. As has 
already been mentioned this may have been caused by the increasing concern about 
the perceived incidence of offending on bail (see Avon and Somerset Police 1991, 
Northumbria Police 1991). Its importance is shown by the fact that in 86 cases 
alleged offending on bail was mentioned as a reason for objecting to bail. This can 
be compared to 11 cases found hi East and Doherty's (1984) study.
Furthermore, the investigation of the type of police objections to bail suggests that 
changes to the legal requirements governing the withholding of bail have affected 
how the C.P.S. articulate their objections and the prioritisation of particular 
objections. It is of course possible, although unlikely, that the differences found 
between this and previous studies hi the priority of objections to bail is simply due 
to the creation of the C.P.S..
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN C.P.S. OBJECTIONS TO
UNCONDITIONAL BAIL AND INFORMATION
PRESENTED TO THE COURT
The examination of C.P.S. objections does not provide any indication of the 
reasoning or rationale behind the reasons given by the C.P.S. for objecting to bail. 
It is possible that no additional details of the rationale for the decision to object to 
bail or for the applicability of a particular objection were given by the C.P.S. to the 
court other than a pure statement of the objection, for example, the defendant had 
previously failed to appear. It is also possible that the C.P.S. decide that they wish 
to apply for a remand in custody and find the facts to fit the exceptions. 
Furthermore, when the C.P.S. have grounds for one or two objections they may 
simply add additional reasons to strengthen their application. In other words, it is 
possible that the C.P.S. object to bail on particular ground(s) for which they have 
no supporting evidence. It is also possible that the C.P.S. take the objections to bail 
provided to them by the police and do not fully investigate their applicability but still 
put them to the court as reasons to object to bail. It is therefore, important for the 
court to assess the rationale behind the specific objections.
It is possible to examine whether or not the C.P.S. support their objections to bail 
by assessing whether additional information was forthcoming from the C.P.S. in the 
cases where they objected and if so, if it related to the specific objections outlined. 
In 27 of the 190 cases where the C.P.S. objected to unconditional bail the C.P.S. 
gave no additional information to support those objections. In 17 of these cases the 
defence also supplied no additional information to the court. Therefore, in the vast 
majority of cases where the C.P.S. object to bail further information is given by 
them to support their contentions. Furthermore, in the vast majority of cases where 
the C.P.S. objected to unconditional bail (126 cases) they provided supporting 
evidence to the court for each individual objection. Nevertheless, in a total of 28 
cases the C.P.S. gave no supporting evidence for any of the objections that they put 
forward to the court and in 12 cases the only evidence put forward in support of
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their objections was the nature of the offence. In a further 22 cases the C.P.S. did 
not supply supporting evidence for one or more of the objections they made to the 
court. Having said this, these findings must be treated with caution as the categories 
that the C.P.S. perceive as supporting a particular objection may be different from 
those generally seen as applicable and therefore used in analysis. It is worth noting 
that it is very difficult to determine the evidence that supports the objection of 
possible interference with justice. For example, the sample included cases of 
domestic violence, when the C.P.S. were obviously concerned about the possible 
threat to the alleged victim but the defendant was not previously known to the police 
or other agencies in the criminal justice process. Consequently, although they would 
object on that ground little if any of the usual reasons would apply or indeed 
information would not even have been available.
The findings suggest that the C.P.S. did provide evidence to support their decision 
to object to bail and in the majority of cases the evidence related directly to the 
individual objections to bail. However, it is difficult to be sure that the C.P.S. assess 
the applicability of information to an exception to bail in similar ways to the court 
or indeed amongst themselves. They have a wide discretion, which is not always 
questioned by the court, in objecting to bail. The importance of this cannot be 
overstated, with studies consistently finding that the magistrates invariably agree 
with C.P.S. remand requests.
REASONS GIVEN FOR THE COURT REMAND DECISION
Where bail is refused or conditions are attached to bail, or changed, the court must 
announce to the open court its reasons for the decision and these must be recorded 
and a copy given to the accused (Bail Act 1976, s.5(3) and s.5(4)). The ground or 
grounds on which the defendant was remanded should be announced in open court 
as well as the reasons which resulted in the ground(s) being applied. The purpose 
of this requirement is to enable the defendant to consider making an application for 
bail to another court with full knowledge of the grounds and the reasons for his/her
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remand in custody.
Reasons for the decision to remand a defendant in custody or conditional bail were 
given in 152 cases which is only 25 per cent of the cases where the defendant was 
either remanded in custody or on conditional bail. Out of the 152 cases, 40 were 
granted bail with conditions and 108 were remanded in custody (3 were further 
remanded to police custody). Therefore, in only 47 per cent of cases where 
defendants were remanded in custody were reasons given for that decision by the 
court. Court A was the least likely to give reasons for its decision (16 per cent of 
those not remanded on unconditional bail) compared with 35 per cent and 36 per 
cent respectively for Courts B and C. Considering that the court has a legal 
obligation to announce reasons for its decision in open court these figures seem to 
suggest a low adherence to this requirement. It is unclear from the wording of the 
legal requirement whether it is necessary for the court to give reasons for its 
decision on a subsequent remand where the reasons and circumstances are the same. 
However, even if this is how the statute has been interpreted, reasons are not being 
announced in court as required in law. In 72 per cent of cases (140) where the 
defendant was appearing for the first time and was remanded either in custody or on 
conditional bail no reasons were announced to the court.
Although, it was outside the scope of this study to check whether a written notice 
of the grounds for refusal of unconditional bail was given to the defence, it can 
probably safely be assumed that this occurred in most cases. However, the quality 
and depth of the written notices may not be of a high standard especially in light of 
the fact that the bail forms are pro formas which provide boxes to be ticked for each 
ground and provide very little space for extra comments. If the logic behind the 
giving of reasons is to allow the defendant to prepare a bail application in the full 
knowledge of why s/he was remanded, then knowing only the grounds for refusal 
is not of a great deal of help. Furthermore, if the grounds are not recorded 
accurately or the reasons that the court found for deciding the grounds applied are 
not recorded, a bench in future hearings is unable to assess whether or not the 
ground still applies or whether a fresh consideration is proven. This is especially the
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case when the court registers in Court C were the only registers to record the 
reasons for refusal of bail although other sources of this information are available, 
for example the case file kept by the court. However, what it does mean is the 
magistrates do not have the grounds and reasons in front of them during a remand 
hearing. Although, the clerk may be asked to provide them, this involves the 
magistrates in being proactive when it could be argued that the reasons should be 
routinely available to them.
The reasons given in this study were divided into six categories. Of a total of 244 
reasons, 106 (43 per cent) related to the ground of risk of further offences, 68 (28 
per cent) to the ground of failure to appear, 27 (11 per cent) to possible interference 
with witnesses or the course of justice, 24 (10 per cent) to the seriousness of the 
offence, 3 (1 per cent) to the defendant being of no fixed address and other reasons 
were given on 16 (7 per cent) occasions. Consequently, the vast majority of reasons 
given for the refusal of unconditional bail relate to the three major exceptions to the 
right to bail with the risk of further offences being the most commonly used.
An average of 1.6 reasons were given hi each case where any reasons were given 
at all. In six cases no details were announced of the reasons, the magistrates simply 
saying that the same reasons applied as before. In other words, the previous court 
decision stood. In 71 cases one reason was given, in 56 cases two reasons, 15 cases 
three reasons and in 4 cases four reasons were given. In cases where only one 
reason was given by far the most commonly cited reason was risk of further offences 
(53 cases), followed by failure to appear (11 cases), and other reasons hi five cases. 
In two cases the only reason given for refusing unconditional bail was the 
seriousness of the offence which is not, in itself, an exception to the right to bail.
The most common combination of reasons when two or more reasons were given 
was failure to surrender and fear of further offences (27 cases) followed by risk of 
further offences and possible interference with witnesses. Seriousness of the offence 
was found in combination with failure to appear, risk of further offences and 
possible interference with witnesses which seems to suggest that the seriousness of
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the offence is an independent reason for refusing bail. As expected, the reason of no 
fixed address was linked to failure to appear in all of the cases where it was given.
Summary
The findings suggest that reasons are not being stated in court by magistrates, as 
required by law. Consequently, defendants are having their liberty taken away or at 
least restricted without the court articulating the reasons for the decision. If this is 
the case, even if the reasons are recorded on the bail sheet, the defence cannot 
assess the accuracy of the written reasons by comparing them to those given in open 
court. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the clerks can accurately record the 
reasons for the decision if they are not given openly to the court. In this situation 
it would be possible for the clerk to simply duplicate earlier reasons without 
realising that they had changed or simply writing down the reasons s/he thought 
were applicable.
The findings from this study suggest that the risk of further offences is by far the 
most commonly cited reason for refusing unconditional bail. There is also some 
evidence that seriousness of the offence is being used as a free standing reason for 
refusing bail rather than as a reason to apply one of the exceptions to bail.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE C.P.S. OBJECTIONS TO 
BAIL AND THE MAGISTRATES REASONS FOR
REFUSING BAIL
It has already been noted that the magistrates invariably agree with the C.P.S. 
remand request. However, just because the magistrates agree with the overall 
decision of the C.P.S. it does not follow that they agree with the C.P.S.'s reasoning 
behind that decision. It was possible to investigate whether or not the magistrates' 
reasoning corresponded to the reasoning of the C.P.S..
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In 115 cases data is available on both the C.P.S. objections to bail and the 
magistrates' reasons for rebutting the presumption in favour of unconditional bail. 
In fifty of these cases the magistrates' reasons for refusing bail do not correspond 
exactly to the objections put forward by the C.P.S.. This seems to suggest that in 
a substantial minority of cases magistrates, although agreeing with the C.P.S. 
remand request, do not agree with the reasoning behind the decision. Having said 
this, in only two out of the 50 cases did the magistrates' reasons not relate in any 
respect to the C.P.S. objections. Furthermore, the findings suggest that the 
magistrates rarely give a reason for refusing bail which has not been mentioned in 
C.P.S. objections. In only ten cases were any of the three main exceptions 
mentioned by the magistrates which had not been mentioned by the C.P.S. or any 
reason relating to it. These findings confirm the perceptions of the participants (see 
Chapter 6).
The most likely C.P.S. objection not to be included in magistrates' reasons was 
failure to appear (14 cases) with interference with justice not being translated into 
reasons in eight cases and further offences in five cases. The C.P.S. appeared to 
give the nature of the offence as a reason for objecting to bail in its own right and 
in relation to risk of further offending and failure to appear. However, in cases 
where the C.P.S. had given nature of the offence as a reason, even if it was in 
conjunction with further offending and no mention was made of failure to appear, 
the magistrates appeared to link it with failure to appear. In other words, in most 
cases where the nature of the offence was mentioned by the C.P.S., failure to appear 
was given as a reason to withhold bail by the magistrates. This suggests that even 
though the C.P.S. seem to link nature of the offence with both failure to appear and 
further offences, the magistrates still regard it as related primarily to failure to 
appear.
Summary
The findings provide limited evidence for the proposition that the magistrates make
325
the decision to refuse unconditional bail to a defendant on different grounds to those 
put forward by the C.P.S. while still agreeing with the remand request of the 
C.P.S.. At the very least the reasons given by the C.P.S. are used in different ways 
and to justify different grounds by the magistrates. However, it is impossible to 
assess the relationship between the stated reasoning of the magistrates and then- 
actual decision making processes. Nevertheless, it seems that, at least, in the 
application of grounds for the refusal of unconditional bail, the magistrates do make 
independent assessments albeit usually within the parameters of the C.P.S. remand 
request.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This chapter has provided further insight into the decision making process of remand 
decisions. The findings suggest that if the C.P.S. believe that a defendant can safely 
be granted bail the magistrates rarely question this decision and the C.P.S. rarely 
have to justify the decision and the defence do not provide any additional 
information. C.P.S. objections to bail are not routinely presented to the court nor 
is further verbal information habitually provided by the prosecution or the defence. 
The only situation where additional information and C.P.S. objections are nearly 
always verbally presented to the court is when the defence contests a C.P.S. 
application to refuse unconditional bail. This puts a great onus on the defence to 
apply for bail as this seems to be the only mechanism to ensure that full information 
is presented to the magistrates.
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NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Very little information provided only vague and superficial information and 
included such statements as "the defendant has been in prison before." The 
second group of some information included cases where slightly more 
information was supplied and it provided more than just a vague background. 
For example, "the defendant has just been released from prison after serving 
a term of 12 months for theft." The third group included all other situations 
when more information was given to the court than for classification two, in 
other words when information was not superficial or vague. This included the 
handing to the magistrates a list of the previous convictions of the defendant. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that to be included in group three that the 
information had in any way to be comprehensive.
2. The categories of information collected were: 
Offending related factors
Present offence, whether co defendants were involved, whether or not a 
defendant had previous convictions or had previously served a custodial 
sentence. Plea and the future sentence.
Bail History
Whether or not the defendant had been granted bail in past proceedings, had 
previously failed to appear, was on bail for other offences.
Community ties
Whether or not the defendant had an address or was in employment; had a 
partner; had any children and other family;
Other information concerning the defendant
Whether or not a relationship was in difficulty; the defendant had medical 
problems, level of education, financial problems, drug/alcohol problems, 
whether or not a surety was available.
Court factors
Delay, prison dispute
3. Offending related information includes the categories of present offence, 
previous convictions, previous custodial sentence, previous bail history, 
previous failure(s) to appear and information on other sentences. 
Communities ties included the categories of residence, employment, the 
partner and children of the defendant and other family members. Other
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information about the defendant included marital or relationship problems, 
medical history, education, financial circumstances and whether a surety was 
available. Not all the categories of information fitted into these groups and 
some overlapped and were, consequently, excluded.
4. For community ties, the defence supplied information in 293 instances 
compared to the C.P.S. who supplied 16. For other circumstances of the 
defendant, the defence also supplied information in 74 instances compared 
to 4 from the prosecution.
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